Risk Assessment and Management in the Context of the Seveso II Directive

Michalis D Christou, Georgios A Papadakis, Christian Kirchsteiger

• Publisher: Elsevier Science
• Year: 1998
• ISBN:
  9780080540610
• Topic: Technology & Engineering
• Subtopic: Chemical & Biochemical Engineering
• Index: Technology & Engineering

The assessment and management of risk to society from the operation of chemical process plants and other industrial activities in which dangerous substances are produced, used, handled or stored will remain a topic of great importance in the next decade. In order to evaluate this specific risk on a qualitative and/or quantitative basis, the concepts of risk analyses are linked together in this book.

The "performance based" and "goal oriented" regulatory requirements of the European Council's new "Seveso II Directive" for the identification of large scale industrial hazards, prevention of sudden and uncontrolled releases of dangerous substances from industrial plants and mitigation of serious consequences of industrial accidents to people and the environment are examined. The fact that risk assessment and management are key elements to such forms of regulation is also demonstrated.

While the "Seveso II Directive" defines "what" has to be achieved on the control of major hazards involving dangerous substances within the European Union, the methods of risk assessment and management give guidance on "how" to achieve it. The text provides a practical guide for decision-makers in regulatory bodies and companies with a non-technical background. Scientists and engineers who are not yet familiar with the concepts of risk assessment and who want a survey of some fundamentals of, and principal results from, risk assessment studies and approaches primarily for applications in the context defined by the "Seveso Directives" will also find this book invaluable.

II. Risk Assessment

II.1

Lessons Learned from Past Accidents

Andrew G. Rushton

This section aims - in the form of a selection of “milestone” major industrial accidents - to restate some of the lessons that can be learned from past major industrial accidents, to emphasise that the opportunity to learn many of these lessons recurs and to link some of these lessons to the provisions of the ‘Seveso II Directive’ [1]. Some of the lessons that can be learned from four major industrial accidents (at Flixborough, Seveso, Bhopal, and on the Piper Alpha platform) are presented. Despite the variety of the accident locations, the intended activities and the immediate causes of the accidents, the strong overlap between the lessons that can be learned is clear.

The ability to prevent major accidents relies not only on good technical abilities but also on the combination of several general principles. These include inherently safer design, defence in depth, safety management and planning for control and mitigation. These principles are applicable to all sectors of the process industry. Whilst, of course, there will continue to be new lessons to be learned, it can be expected that the next major industrial accident in Europe will present some of the same lessons that we have already had the opportunity to learn. The avoidance of major accidents requires the widespread application of the general lessons learned from past accidents, as well as the widespread communication of the more specific lessons applicable to particular activities. The ‘Seveso Directive’ aims to achieve both of these objectives. The relationships between some of the lessons that can be learned from past accidents and the provisions of the Directive are presented.

1. Objective and Introduction

A short reminder of the salient features of four major accidents will be presented, along with a selection of the lessons that can be learned. A detailed analysis of the accidents and a comprehensive account of the lessons that can be learned is not the objective here. References to more complete descriptions of the accidents are cited below. The “lessons learned” that are presented draw largely on the description of each incident given in reference [2].

The major accidents which will be considered are those which occurred at Flixborough [3], Seveso [4,5] and Bhopal [6–8] and on the Piper Alpha platform [9,10]. These four accidents have been highly influential in the formulation of public opinion and policy, in Europe and throughout the world. There is no intention to suggest that the lessons to be learned from other accidents are less significant, but these four are sufficient to the purpose of this discussion. It should also be emphasised that many lessons can be learned from accidents with few or no tragic consequences, but tragedy undoubtedly spurs the mobilisation of resources aimed at defining the lessons to be learned and creates a willingness to learn in the community.

There are substantial differences between the accident locations, the intended activities carried out on each site and the technicalities of the immediate causes of the accidents. Nevertheless, it will clearly be seen that there is significant overlap between the lessons that can be learned from each and all of these disasters.

There are a number of principles which are generally applicable to the avoidance of major accidents and some of these are briefly outlined. Some of the lessons from the four disasters will be restated in summary and in relation to the provisions of the ‘Seveso Directive’. As discussed in Section I.2, the aim of the Directive is to ensure the creation and maintenance of the essential components of major accident prevention throughout the process industries. This is to be achieved by identifying the sources of possible major accidents, by requiring a demonstration that the essential components are in place to prevent and to mitigate the consequences of major accidents and by establishing a database of lessons learned, from accidents and nea...

Table of contents

• Cover image
• Title page
• Table of Contents
• Industrial Safety Series
• Front Matter
• Copyright page
• Dedication
• Abstract
• Foreword
• Summary and Structure
• Acknowledgement
• The Authors
• Disclaimer
• I. Introduction & Legal Framework
• II. Risk Assessment
• III. Risk Management
• IV. Implementation of the Seveso Directive
• V. Appendices