ONE
Mimetic Convergence and Complementary Hierarchy
Without doubt, the historical [Brazilian] model of social cohesion, based in the assimilation of differences in service of acculturation and civilization, has lost credibility as a political utopia.
PAULA MONTERO, âMULTICULTURALISMO, IDENTIDADES DISCURSIVAS E ESPAĂO PĂBLICOâ
Unequal Encounters
I am sitting in a sweltering church in March 2005, regretting that instead of the shorts I, like most men, usually wear in Alcântara, I am stuck with the now-sweat-drenched formal pants that I put on in deference to the gravity of todayâs occasion. Before me in the seventeenth-century structure, a gilded and recently restored eighteenth-century altar rises up, its joyously pudgy rococo angels reaching heavenward and toward a golden crown. On the walls, engraved stones commemorate long-dead owners of enslaved people: merchants of salt, rice, sugar, and, especially, cotton. The 150 or so people with me in the pews are evenly divided between men and women; they are all Brazilian; almost all are black or brown, and, although they have dressed as finely as they can, most are visibly rural and poor. Some bureaucrats and urban NGO representatives are also present, mostly identifiable by their light skin, middle-class clothing, and the visible marks of urban comfort that I suppose I share.
Our eyes are set on a slide show projected onto a screen in front of the altar. It is controlled by a man who is also Brazilian, of East Asian origin, and dressed in the clothes of an urban professional. Like me and many others in the place, he fans himself with some of the pamphlets prepared by the Brazilian government ministries represented at this meetingâthe Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Agrarian Development, and the Special Secretariat of Policy for the Promotion of Racial Equality, among others. It is almost midday, and we have been in this stifling air for over three hours.
In the back of the hall are a few more light-skinned men, these in military dress. Unlike the other government representatives, these men from the air force have not prepared any pamphlets, and they will not speak publicly during these two days of hearings. When I try to talk to a lieutenant colonel later that day, he brushes me offâbut not before intimating that I, and the civilian officials present, are part of an international plot against Brazilâs space program.
The man presenting the slides is an engineer and official from the civilian-controlled Brazilian Space Agency. This civilian space agency works uneasily alongside an air force space program that is, nominally, under its direction.
To the weary crowd, and with surprising emotion, he explains the significance of a chart titled âExport guidelines: Comparison between export segments by aggregate value.â
The chart is divided into two columns: âIndustrial sectorâ and âAverage price per kilogram,â all figured in US dollars. Running from the cheapest to most expensive per kilogram item, the chart informs the crowd that the mineral sector and its product, iron ore, command a mere $0.01 per kilogram on international markets. The agricultural sector, the next lowest-valued item, comes in at $0.30. One might guess that this would be relevant to the people in the crowd. But the people present do not sell much from their farms other than the thick, crunchy farinha dâĂĄgua (manioc meal) that is a staple carbohydrate in this region where Brazilâs northeast meets the Amazon, the only significant cash crop here on the peninsula of Alcântara, and which, after living for more than a year in Alcântara, I have come to find as essential a complement to a plate of rice and fish as most locals do.1 They also sell, on regional markets, charcoal (a by-product of swidden horticulture) and other forest products. Women sell the laboriously and collectively produced babaçu oil, made from the nuts of the babaçu palms that are abundant here on the eastern perimeter of the Amazon, as well as gathered fruit such as juçara,2 muricĂ, and buritĂ. Men sell fish and shellfish from the nearby bay of SĂŁo Marcos and its brackish inlets, as well as wild forest game, the hunting of which is, in most cases, illegal.
But such sales are subordinate to Alcântaraâs subsistence economy, and its residents sell nothing on international markets, nor anything bearing any relationship to the figures on the screen. Machado, my friend and local social movement leader who sits on my left, harrumphs (perhaps partially at the US anthropologist fiddling with the controls of an expensive digital voice recorder on his right): âA quilombola like me, Iâve never even seen a dollar.â His statement attests to the absurdity of this presentation about big-money exports in a municipality in which, according to a study carried out a few years earlier, 95.87 percent of rural families earned less than US$100 per month (Forum/DLIS Alcântara 2003). Even though economic conditions had improved somewhat since the survey, with Bolsa FamĂlia, the Workersâ Partyâs conditional cash-transfer program, providing small monthly cash payments to families, most people in the church were still cash poor.
The engineer continues to make his case, dollar values ascending: steel and celluloid, US$0.30â$0.80 per kilogram; automotive materials, $10; the electronics sector, $100 per kilogram of audio or video equipment; the defense sector, a mere $200 per kilogram of rocket; aeronautics, $1,000 for one kilogram of commercial airplane; the defense sector again, tied with cellular-telephone makers, $2,000 per kilogram of missile and mobile phone; aeronautics again, $2,000â$8,000 for one kilogram of military airplane; and, finally, the priciest industrial sector on the chart.
âThis is why this project matters for Brazil and all of us,â the engineer pleads, clearly recognizing that few in the church are swayed.
The space sector: one kilo of satellite will set a buyer back $50,000.
Challenges to a Developmentalist Teleology
The point of the chart was not simply to inform the crowd that satellites are worth a lot more per kilogram than iron, sugar, orange juice, soybeans, or farinha dâĂĄgua. The least-schooled horticulturalist in the crowd no doubt knew this. Rather, the presentation was part of a public hearing in which a highly divided Brazilian federal government was unveiling its plan for the transformation and expansion of Brazilâs principal spaceportâone of many such plans that have come and gone since the 1980sâand making its best case that villagers should give up much of their land to facilitate spaceport expansion.
Several features of this meeting would have been unthinkable during the 1980s and 1990s, the first two decades of the Brazilian spaceportâs existence in Alcântara. The governmentâs new tactics mark changes in the structure of this conflict that shed light on the changing politics of inequality in Alcântara and Brazil.
At its announcement in 1980, the spaceport, or CLA (Centro de Lançamento de Alcântara, Alcântara Launch Center), was heralded by Brazilâs then Ministry of the Air Force as the most ambitious scientific project to be undertaken by a âdeveloping countryâ (Choairy 2000, 65; Meireles 1983). Broadly, when representatives of the waning military government (1964â1985) first touched ground in Alcântara to recruit young locals to expropriate backwoods villages, the politicsânot only of the baseâs construction but also sometimes of public oppositionâmost often appealed to goals of progress, development, and whole-cloth socioeconomic transformation and convergence (between Brazil and the First World and among Brazilâs regions and unequal citizens). The spaceportâs construction was sold locally and nationally as helping to raise Brazil into the ranks of the major world powers while simultaneously pulling local villagers out of deprivation and exclusion (deprivation here imagined sometimes in socioeconomic and other times in explicitly racialâand racistâterms). This whole-cloth transformation was imagined and institutionalized at multiple scales. Villagers were to be moved from scattered and winding settlements, where they practiced rotating horticulture on communal land, into rectilinear villages, where they would practice modern farming on individual plots, and where they would share in the progress brought by the base. Brazil was to have a space program with military applications, one that would help fulfill Brazilâs destiny as a world power.
After three decades in Alcântara punctuated by technological mishap and land conflict, proponents and opponents of the governmentâs plan to transform and expand the base spoke about the spaceport and its surround in markedly changed terms. Once an engine and index of Brazilâs push for technoeconomic convergence with the First World, by 2005 the base was more often cast as a generator of profit and, sometimes, sovereignty. And, while villagers were once incorporated into the project as archaic but modernizing remnants of a disappearing Brazil, they now were more often cast as modern subalterns, with an identity increasingly understood in ethnoracial terms.
Let us consider again the opening vignette and its slide show presentation: although the bureaucrats present represented federal government agencies, the chart had been prepared neither by the military nor by any other government agency but by AIAB (Associação das IndĂşstrias Aeroespaciais do Brasil, Association of Brazilian Aerospace Industries), an organization that represents private Brazilian aerospace companies. Moreover, what the bureaucrat was proposing to villagers was the planned construction by a civilian space agency of launching platforms to be used for profit by foreign governments and Brazilian and foreign corporationsânotably through Alcântara-Cyclone Space, a joint Brazilian-Ukrainian company then under formation to launch satellites from Alcântara.3
In contrast, when the base was built, the principal institutional actor was the Brazilian military, and the launching project was conceived as part of a push for nationalist development and a bid for entrance into the First World. Published in Rio de Janeiro in 1985, just as construction of the base was beginning, an essay by the well-known Brazilian astronomer Ronaldo RogĂŠrio de Freitas MourĂŁo, âWhy Brazil Must Intensify its Space Research,â captures this nationalist ambition succinctly: âIn the next 20 years, some space projects now under study will profoundly affect the economic, political, and social perspectives of the worldâs nations. These projects will increase enormously the current technological lacunae that exist between developing countries and those on the path to transform into the super-civilizations of the futureâ (MourĂŁo 1985).
Inequality is central to the push for the space program here. The world will divide into âdeveloping countriesâ and âsuper-civilizations.â For its proponents, the construction of this base was part of the drive to enlist Brazil among these super-civilizations, fulfilling a long-standing promise of Brazilian nationalism. But by 2005, this utopia of technomilitary convergence with the worldâs great powers was hard to find in pronouncements about the space program. Much more typical of the space program in 2005 was the profit-minded ambition represented by the slide show presentation in the church.
It is not that such developmentalist4 nationalism is completely absent from Brazilâs current space program. As I show, especially in chapters 3 and 7, the attempt to transform the space program into a civilian and commercial project with strong commercial and only mild developmentalist ambitionsâthat is, a space program that can properly be called neoliberalâhas generated a fierce backlash, particularly in the military. But even the strongest contemporary supporters of the space programâin particular, the civilian space programâframe their claims differently than did their predecessors. The most articulate and prolific defender of the Brazilian space programâcivilian and also militaryâJosĂŠ Monserrat Filho, for example, in a 2001 interview with the online science magazine ComCiĂŞncia, implored: âWe have already lost so much time and we need to act now with much greater determination and aggressiveness in order to sell the advantages of Alcântara as a truly competitive option on the world market. This can bring more resources and more experience for our whole space program, which will gain more of its own impetusâ (ComCiĂŞncia 2001).
In a 2014 interview I had with Monserrat Filho, he made a similar point, emphasizing the importance to the space program of international collaboration (with China, Israel, the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, all countries that have at times shown interest) and of the baseâs commercial potential.
Although Monserrat Filho, like the bureaucrat at that dayâs meeting in Alcântara, is a tireless advocate of Brazilâs extraterrestrial aspirations, his vision of earthly technopolitical advance for Brazil has important differences from those of his predecessors. Despite some dissenting voices, well-placed proponents of the twenty-first-century space program speak as often of market shareâor, in the case of AIABâs chart, the price per kilo of satellitesâas they do of an autonomous launch program. And they seldom speak of a space program that might spur a nationalist convergence with the worldâs great powers.
Contradictions of Convergence
At the widest scale, one of the key arguments of this book is that this utopia of redress for inequality, the idea that the poor would somehow follow along the same teleological trajectory as the rich, becoming more and more like the richâthe idea that a decline in inequality must entail a decline in differenceâhas lost the dominance that it held during much of the twentieth century. It no longer shapes the way people think about the redress of inequality in Alcântara with the hegemony that it did during the spaceportâs early years. This utopia of redress for inequality was dominant during the Cold War, as one response to the competing promises for the amelioration of global inequalities promoted by capitalist and communist powers of the First and Second World (Coronil 1997, 385; J. Ferguson 2006, 176â93). The utopia of convergence enjoyed a brief resurgence in international and Brazilian accounts of Brazil during the economic boom of Brazilâs first decade of the twenty-first century (e.g., Cohen 2011) and with the much-debated rise of a so-called new middle class comprising as many as 40 million Brazilians (Klein, Mitchell, and Junge 2018; Neri 2012; Pochmann 2014).5 But the utopia of convergence vanished from international and Brazilian accounts during the period of political conflict and economic decline that began in 2013 (Pinheiro-Machado and Dent 2016; Mitchell, Blanchette, and Silva, n.d.). I call this utopia of redress, in which poor nations and poor individuals are imagined to follow the rich in some teleological pantomime, mimetic convergence.6
Mimetic convergence was a developmental âgrid for interpreting and explaining the worldâs inequalitiesâ that was globally dominant in the decades after World War II, as James Ferguson has shown (2006, 177). Focusing on the collapse of postwar developmentalist ideology in contemporary Africa, Ferguson has observed a transformation much starker than that in Brazil, despite some important similarities. Ferguson describes a developmentalist temporalization of inequality that has, since the Cold War, come undone. In a clear description of mimetic convergence, Ferguson writes, âThe effect of this powerful narrative was to transform a spatialized global hierarchy into a temporalized (putative) historical sequence. Poor countries (and by implication, the poor people who lived in them) were not simply at the bottom, they were at the beginning . . . historyâthe passage of developmental timeâwould in the nature of things raise the poor countries up to the level of the rich onesâ (178; see also J. Ferguson 1999).
Contemporary Brazil is not facing the same degree of socioeconomic hardship as much of contemporary Africa. But the changes in Alcântaraâs conflicts that I document in this book mark changes in the way in which socioeconomic and sociotechnical inequalities tend to be understood and acted upon in Brazil, too. The developmentalist utopia from which the space program was born conceived of inequalities along a temporal line, in which the telos of development (in varieties of both the political Left and Right) held out the promise of a confluence of the developed and underdeveloped somewhere in the future. In the Brazil of neoliberal capitalism that emerged after the Cold War, and of multiculturalism and redistribution that emerged under PT (Workersâ Party) governments between 2003 and 2016, that utopia of teleological convergence is no longer dominant.
This is not to say that Brazilâs space program is no longer the site of many nationalist ambitions or that Brazilian policy makers no longer think about and plan for the nationâs ascension into the ranks of international powers. Such ambitions and projects run through many plans for the space program and the nation, as we will see in the pages that follow. Moreover, many of the years that I have been researching in Brazil have been marked by ambitious projects of south-south cooperation and of national development plans (Burges 2014; Boito and Berringer 2014; Cesarino 2012). But the difference between AIABâs chart and Cold Warâera attempts to enter MourĂŁoâs âpath to transform into the super-civilizations of the futureâ shows us how the unitary teleological grid on offer during the Cold War has receded, leaving the purpose and meaning of national development open to new forms of contestation.
In its focus on the value of space technologies in international markets, the presentation to the villagers was drastically misaimed at people who mostly earned their livelihoods through subsistence activities. But, less obviously, it hinted at shifts in the imaginaries of inequality, progress, and time institutionalized in Brazilâs space program. As shorthand, we might say that earlier visions of the space program institutionalized an imaginary of international inequalities framed in temporal terms: Brazil was behind but would strive to catch up to the worldâs powers, which were ahead, in the future. In the space programâs early twenty-first-century iteration, on the other hand, the institutionally dominant imaginary of international inequality is one we might gloss as spatial: Brazilâs space program here may never help the nation âcatch up,â but the equatorial base in Alcântara has a value, identity, and a niche that can be protectedâand be highly beneficial to the nationâor at least to some in the nation. There are close symmetries between this transforma...