PART ONE
ETHICS, CONSERVATION, AND ANIMAL PROTECTION
TRYING TO MAKE DIFFICULT DECISIONS EASIER
The essays in this part are concerned with various topics that fall under the general category of ethics, what are the ârightâ and âwrongâ things to do in a given situation. Of course, given the difficult decisions we have to make involving diverse animals living in different habitats in a wide variety of cultures, there has to be some flexibility. However, without a firm and consistent framework of general guiding principles that would obtain in the best of all possible worlds (which this isnât), itâs impossible to make the difficult decisions with which weâre faced daily. Modifying or overriding these principles in certain circumstances, for example, first do no harm, would require strong arguments for why this should be done. I often wish I didnât have to make some of the choices that need to be made, but they wonât go away if theyâre ignored. For better or worse we are the surrogate decision makers for other individual animals and for a wide variety of species and ecosystems, and given who we are, we can do just about anything we want. The essays in this section provide the foundation for much of what follows later in this collection.
John Vucetich and Michael Nelson set the stage for much-needed, wide-ranging discussions concerning ethical foundations of conservation. They note that life and nature manifest themselves in different ways, as individual creatures, populations, and ecosystems. Concerns for populations and ecosystems are the focus of conservation, and concerns for individual creatures are the focus of animal welfare ethics. Both are important, but each has a tendency to ignore the other. Their chapter is an attempt to develop an ethic that transcends both perspectives. Further discussion of these issues can be found in Aitken (2004), Bekoff (2006, 2010), and Fraser (2010).
Vucetich and Nelson go on to argue that the ethical foundation of conservation is a shambles and that we canât even provide good answers to the most important unanswered questions in conservationânamely, (1) What is population viability and ecosystem health? (2) How does conservation relate to and sometimes conflict with other legitimate values in life, such as social justice, human liberty, and concern for the welfare of individual nonhuman animals? How should we resolve such conflicts? (3) Do populations and ecosystems have direct moral considerations? These challenging questions have direct on-the-ground consequences for conservation, and the authors argue that we need ethical consensus, not individual decisions, on the matters at hand. These questions are also philosophical or ethical in nature, not purely scientific. Vucetich and Nelson also show the importance of empathy, not only for sentient animals but also with nonsentient beings and ecological collectives. They show how important education is, a theme echoed in many other essays in this collection. Conservation science and humane education need to generate a sense of wonder for nature rather than emphasize prediction and control and must emphasize the ways in which nature is morally relevant.
Paul Waldau also emphasizes the importance of education and empathy and notes that the animal protection and conservation movements are really social movements and that members of each will have to work together in the future if weâre to make meaningful progress. He writes, âConservation and animal protection both call upon fundamental human abilities to recognize realities of other living beings.â Waldau draws a powerful and hopeful conclusion: âConservation insights are also driven by our great need to connect to the meaning of life. The two movements discussed in this chapter can, when working together, offer a very special hopeânamely, that we now live in a time in which we can name war, genocide, habitat destruction, countless unnecessary murders of living beings, and global climate change as our heritage and our predicament, but also as problems we can choose to face squarely. In a world in which our political systems have slipped into an appalling lack of civility, and religious traditions struggle to gain the spiritual character to promote peace rather than division, the prospect of conservationâs protective, constructive, healing insights being linked to the animal movementâs power to instill and nurture individualsâ ethical character is a soothing one. This can happen if the active citizens in each of these movements will choose to work together. This is one choice we can make as a way to celebrate the world we want to live in and leave for our children.â Education and empathy can lead to large and significant positive changes in how we treat other animals and the habitats in which they reside. We are obliged to do this for future generations who will have to live with our decisions about who lives and who dies.
Clearly, we do what we do to other animals and ecosystems because we can, and we donât have to answer to individuals of other species who might be wondering what in the world are we doing. Eileen Crist argues that we humans have devastated the natural world because of our sense of entitlement to other species and animals in particular, and our sense that losses of animals and animal suffering do not really matter. She investigates the intellectual and historical roots of the belief in human superiority, or âhuman supremacyâ as she refers to it. Her analysis invites us to scrutinize our hierarchical speciesist assumptions about humans and animals and to recognize the destructive way of life those assumptions support. Our tragic planetary predicament calls for a radical transformation of our understanding of ourselves in relation to our animal kin. We need to pay more attention to Charles Darwinâs ideas about evolutionary continuity in which differences among species are recognized as differences in degree, not kind. Crist argues convincingly and powerfully âthe long-standing denial or disparagement of animal minds is causally implicated in the devastation of the biosphere. Through the portrayal of animals as inferior beings, and eventually even as mechanical entities, the objectification of the natural world and its transformation into a domain of resources was vastly facilitated.â Judith Benz-Schwarzburg and Andrew Knight (2011) correctly note that our relationships with other animals show clearly that while weâre cognitive relatives we act as if weâre moral strangers, alienated from whom other animals truly are.
Dale Peterson and Ben Minteer consider the very complicated bushmeat crisis from different perspectives while echoing some of Vucetich and Nelsonâs and Waldausâs themes about how concern for individuals comes into conflict with concern for larger entities such as species and ecosystems. Bushmeat, meat from a wide variety of wild terrestrial animals including chimpanzees, gorillas, and bonobos, is harvested unsustainably and is a common source of protein throughout West and Central Africa, where there is an impending food shortage (recent data show that humans also eat almost ninety species of marine mammals; Robards and Reeves 2011). But there is much more here in that cultural differences among of those working on this crisis and the poverty and economic needs of those who benefit from the bushmeat industry means that local interests must be factored into any reasonable or practical solution. There are many stakeholders with different views on the issues at hand. There arenât any quick and simple solutions.
Dale Petersonâs essay âTalking about Bushmeat,â introduces one of the most urgent and least understood conservation issues, the industrialized killing and selling of wild animals for meat in Central Africa. He begins with a riveting account of what itâs like to walk through a bushmeat market. Noting the horrors he also tells how one of his friends rescued a small duiker who had been bound and left to rot in a small cage. The enormous commerce in bushmeat currently removes as much as five million metric tons of wild animal biomass per year from the Congo Basin ecosystem, which is a completely unsustainable take. The bushmeat commerce immediately threatens the well-being and indeed the very existence of the three African great apes (gorillas, chimpanzees, and bonobos), whose numbers are small to begin with, and who are profoundly vulnerable to hunting largely because of their low reproduction rates. We must not ignore this assault on nature, but what can we do about it? As Peterson suggests, we can begin a âcultural conversationâ about the problem and nature of bushmeat. He would promote arguments for controlling the bushmeat commerce based on human self-interest (such as protection from some serious public health threats) and human other-interest. The other-interest argument for protecting some species such as the great apes would identify a moral hierarchy based on either an evolutionary closeness to humans or a reasoned calculation of the animalâs psychological presence, or both.
Bushmeat appeals to many people in an historical way. Peterson writes, âThe big city markets in Central and West Africa have plenty of the boring domestic meats, if you happen to prefer that. But if you want meat that will recall when your family lived out in the village, meat with real flavor from an interesting wild animal, meat taken by skilled hunters from the forest and often cured by a flavorful process of smoking, meat with a real story behind itâbushmeat, in other wordsâyou will have to pay a premium, as you would for any other luxury item.â Peterson also is sensitive to westerners arrogantly barging into other countries and telling local people what to do. Responding to an accusation posed as a question, âHow dare you, a rich westerner, talk of limiting development, which represents the rightful economic advance of impoverished peoples in the Third World?â Peterson agrees that westerners who want to influence conservation elsewhere in the world should be prepared to pay. He also notes that most ordinary Africans do not benefit from the bushmeat trade. Cross-cultural discussions and give and take among the various stakeholders is sorely needed if weâre ever to make headway on this challenging crisis.
Also focusing on the bushmeat crisis and discussing various ethical positions, Ben Minteer begins by noting that even if there are disagreements among those people interested in animal protection and those interested in conservation issues such as the bushmeat crisis, they would all agree that the brutal slaughter of dolphins in Taiji, Japan, the wanton killing of mountain gorillas in the war-torn Virunga National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the slaughter of tigers in the wildlife trade is morally wrong. This âcompatibilistâ understanding of environmental and animal ethics is much needed in the real world of animal abuse, and itâs encouraging that people with different views are talking with one another more and more.
Concerning the bushmeat crisis, Minteer notes, âThe intersection of animal rights/welfare and conservation ethics is particularly intriguing in the case of what has become known as the âbushmeat crisis,â a subject of increasing concern in both the nature conservation and development communities. . . . The bushmeat problem raises an intricate complex of ecological, economic, cultural, and most fundamentally, ethical challenges regarding the survival of species and the welfare of animals, as well as the health and livelihood of some of the poorest and most vulnerable peoples on the planet.â And, stressing ethical pragmatism, also needed in the real work of animal abuse, Minteer concludes, âthe bushmeat problem appears to be a case in which both animal rights/welfare and a strong nature-centered ethic of conservation would be supported by a strict ban on bushmeat harvest and trade, the establishment of more tightly managed (for biodiversity preservation) protected areas in bushmeat regions, and increased enforcement and interdiction efforts. . . . The upshot is that a feasible, effective, and ethically inclusive policy response to the bushmeat dilemma will require balancing a complex of values and interests, as well as accommodating diverse stakeholders in workable, multilevel partnerships that can reduce human impact on wildlife species and tropical forest systems while improving the food security and livelihood prospects of poor rural people.â
The five essays in this section raise many different issues concerning who we are and what we do to other animals and to ecosystems. They highlight, once again, the central role humans play in deciding who lives and who dies. While the problems at hand seem daunting and insoluble, decisions have to be made. The status quo is unacceptable. The real challenge is to come to terms with which, if any, compromises and trade-offs are permissible, and which are not. Flexibility and pluralism are needed in discussions among the human stakeholders. One thing is clear, Western standards will not be easily pushed on to other cultures. Nor should they be, a theme that is taken up in part 5.
References
Aitken, Gill. 2004. A New Approach to Conservation: The Importance of the Individual through Wildlife Rehabilitation. Hants, UK: Ashgate.
Bekoff, Marc. 2006. Animal Emotions and Beastly Virtues: Reflections on Redecorating Nature. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
. 2010. The Animal Manifesto: Six Reasons for Expanding Our Compassion Footprint. Novato, CA: New World Library.
Benz-Schwarzburg, Judith, and Andrew Knight. 2011. âCognitive Relatives Yet Moral Strangers?â Journal of Applied Ethics 1: 9â36.
Fraser, David, ed. 2004. âConservation and Animal Welfare.â Animal Welfare 19 (2): 121â95.
Robards, Martin, and Randall Reeves. 2011. âThe Global Extent and Character of Marine Mammal Consumption by Humans: 1970â2009.â Biological Conservation 144: 2770â86. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0006320711002977.
1
The Infirm Ethical Foundations of Conservation
John A. Vucetich and Michael P. Nelson
Introduction
That conservation has an ethical foundation is widely appreciated. Less appreciated is the shambled condition of that ethical foundation. This condition is revealed by our inability to answer questions like, What is population viability and ecosystem health? and, Is conservation motivated only to meet the so-called needs of humans, or also by respect for nonhuman populations and ecosystems? Some argue that this ethical uncertainty does not impede the effectiveness of conservation. We provide examples that suggest otherwise. We also explain how the source of ethical uncertainty is our mistaken tendency to think that the morality of our behavior should be judged more on the consequences of our actions and less on the motivations that underlie our actions.
Conservationâs aim is often thought or said to be to maintain and restore population viability and ecosystem health. Achieving conservation is difficult, but the framework for conservationâs goals seems in place: Use the best available science and the precautionary principle as input for a decision-making process that will suggest which actions will most likely lead to the most desirable outcomes; use politico-legal force to turn desired actions into law or policy; and include some environmental education (e.g., media and formal curricula) to build social support. That education almost always reduces to describing how humans affect natural systems, as if that will shock or shame us into supporting conservation.
This framework rests, unfortunately, on an infirm foundation that casts doubt on whether we really understand the aim of conservation. The answers to three questions illuminate the inadequacies of the foundation of conservation:
1. What is population viability and ecosystem health?
2. How does conservation relate to and sometimes conflict with other legitimate values in life, such as social justice, human liberty, and concern for the welfare of individuals, nonhuman animals? How should we resolve such conflicts?
3. Do populations and ecosystems deserve direct moral consideration?
These are the most important unanswered questions in conservation. Not having answers that are well defended and widely agreed upon has practical, on-the-ground consequences for conservation. Moreover, none of these questions are purely science questions. They are all philosophical or ethical in nature. This is disturbing because the ethics and philosophy of conservation may well be the most undertreated aspects of conservation. The very nature of conservation is, therefore, up for grabs because its ethical foundation is up for grabs. All the while, few people seem concerned. The need is not for each individual to answer the question in his or her own way; what is needed is the development of ethical consensus, which arises from ethical discourse (Nelson and Vucetich 2011).
An...