Post-War Identification

Everyday Muslim Counterdiscourse in Bosnia Herzegovina

Torsten Kolind

• Publisher: Aarhus University Press
• Year: 2008
• ISBN:
  9788771246728
• Topic: Storia
• Subtopic: Storia del XXI secolo

Stolac, the town of departure for this book and the site where the author conducted fieldwork, is located in the south-western corner of Bosnia Herzegovina. The war in Bosnia Herzegovina (1992-95) was initially an act of aggression and territorial conquest instigated by Serbian political leaders. However, as the war progressed, it increasingly came to consist of several minor wars, one of them fought in Western Bosnia Herzegovina between Croatian and Muslim forces. This was the one that affected the inhabitants of Stolac the most. Before the war, ethnic identity in Bosnia Herzegovina was only one identity among others, and ethnic differences were embedded in everyday practices. Today, ethnic difference is all there is. The Muslims of Stolac are fully aware that as Muslims, they constitute a totally separate group - and that ethnic identity is by far the most important form of identity in present-day Bosnia Herzegovina. In that regard the nationalist project has succeeded. Such a crystallisation and explication of identity fits in well with the structurally inspired anthropology of war and violence, which theorises that the function of violence is to create unambiguous identities. However, Post-War Identities shows that for the Muslims of Stolac, the creation of unambiguous ethnic identities is only half the story.

Part I
Framing the question

Prologue: Chronology of the war

Stolac, the town of departure for this book and the site where I conducted fieldwork, is located in the south-western corner of Bosnia Herzegovina. Before the war, according to the population census from 1991, the municipality of Stolac had 18,681 inhabitants (Muslims: 43 %; Croats: 33 %; Serbs: 21 %; others: 3 %), and the town itself had 5,530 inhabitants (Muslims:62 %; Serbs: 20 %; Croats: 12 %; others:6 %). A large proportion of the Croats lived in the minor villages in Stolac municipality. When I did fieldwork among the Muslims of Stolac no census figures were available, but judging from the number of schoolchildren attending the school in Stolac, the town had a majority of Croats, the rest being Muslims. Only a few Serb families had returned. According to the daily newspaper Dnevni Avaz (8 December 2001), between 1998 and 2001 about 3,700 Muslim refugees had returned to the municipality of Stolac, and 1,700 to the town itself. Most of the Muslim returnees were confined to a few neighbourhoods in the eastern and southern part of the town, which were largely destroyed during the war.

Before the war Stolac was a beautiful and historical town, as can be seen from pre-war pictures. The town contained many buildings from the Ottoman period, including mosques, houses, housing complexes and bridges. Post World War Two architecture was finely adjusted to the cultural traditions of the town. Stolac also had a lot of light industry, with several of the factories employing between 200 and 1,000 people. In addition, there were banks, a shopping centre, a museum, a cinema, many cafés, a new hotel, a big market, a hospital and a high school. Today a large proportion of these buildings have been destroyed, the industry has fallen apart, and the Croat population runs nearly all the public institutions.

The war in Herzegovina

Bosnia Herzegovina experienced a fierce war from 1992 to 1995, a war which divided the country ethnically. The Dayton peace agreement of December 1995 retained Bosnia Herzegovina’s international boundaries and created a joint multi-ethnic and democratic government. Also recognised was a second tier of government comprised of two entities roughly equal in size: the Bosniak/Croat Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina, and the Bosnian Serb-led Republika Srpska (RS) (see map). The Federation and RS governments were charged with overseeing internal functions.

The war in Bosnia Herzegovina was initially an act of aggression and territorial conquest instigated by Serbian political leaders. However, as the war progressed, it increasingly came to consist of several minor wars, one of them fought in Western Bosnia Herzegovina between Croatian and Muslim forces. This was the one that affected the inhabitants of Stolac the most. At the beginning of the war, Bosnian Croats and Muslims had joined forces, primarily because they faced the same enemy, the Serbs, who had already conquered large parts of Bosnia Herzegovina in the first month of the war. Croatia had already suffered from Serbian attacks, so in Croatia people felt sympathy for their neighbours. However, the alliance was a marriage of convenience, made up of rather different strategies.

The Bosnian Croats were divided between those living in central Bosnia, who considered themselves as much Bosnian as Croat, and the Croats living in areas dominated largely by Croats, mainly Western Herzegovina, who were eager to forge closer ties with Croatia proper, rather than with the other ethnic groups of Bosnia Herzegovina. The Herzegovinian Croats only constituted around a third of the total Croat population of Bosnia Herzegovina, but when the war started they were the most influential. This influence was primarily due to the existence of what some have called ‘the Herzegovinian lobby’ (Donia and Fine 1994: 249; Grandits 2007: 107-9), a hard-core nationalist group of mainly émigré Croats. The Herzegovinian lobby had contributed greatly to the Croatian President Tuđman’s presidential campaign in 1990 (Woodward 2000). Tuđman – himself strongly nationalistic, with his dream of annexing substantial parts of Bosnia Herzegovina¹ – rewarded his backers by supporting their desire to divide up Bosnia and make Herzegovina a part of Croatia. In July 1992, the Herzegovinian Croats, led by Mate Boban, leader of the HDZ-BiH (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica – Bosna i Hercegovina; the Croatian Democratic Union – Bosnia Herzegovina, a strongly nationalist Croat political party) convened a self-proclaimed Presidency of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna and declared a self-governing community (Donia and Fine 1994: 248-51; Glenny 1996: 192-9; Bennet 1995: 198-202).

The Herzegovinian Croats, despite the declaration of the self-governing community, lacked the strength to pursue the annexationist design and felt that in the long term an alliance with the Bosnian government was still the best way to realise their nationalist dreams. But it was clear from the start of the takeover of the HDZ-BiH by Mate Boban that the Muslim-Croat alliance was fragile: fighting broke out between Muslims and Croats at several places in Bosnia Herzegovina, and Croats started driving out Muslim inhabitants of villages under Croat control (Donia and Fine 1994: 250, Glenny 1996: 194, Cigar 1995: 125). For their part, the Muslims, who were desperately pursuing the goal of an autonomous unitary Bosnia Herzegovina, had no alternative but to form an alliance with the Bosnian Croats and uphold the best possible relation with Croatia. The Bosnian forces (of which the majority was Muslims) were illequipped and would have stood no chance if they were to face both the Serbs and the Croats. Furthermore, they depended on good relations with the HVO (Hrvatsko Vijeće Odbrane, the Croatian Defence Council, the army of the Bosnian Croats) in order to receive the illegal weapons supplies (illegal because of the international weapons embargo) coming through Croat-held territory, as well as food supplies to major Bosnian cities (Glenny 1996: 195, 228).

Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina, then, were officially war allies during 1992 and the beginning of 1993, and in Herzegovina Muslims fought in the ranks of the HVO against the Serbs. But in spring 1993, the latent Muslim-Croat conflict escalated into full-scale war. A prime reason was probably the international community’s Vance-Owen peace proposal, which, in addition to ratifying the carving up of Bosnia Herzegovina along ethnic lines, also allotted a proportionally large amount of territory to the Bosnian Croats. For the Bosnian Croats the Vance-Owen peace proposal was an incentive to consolidate their respective positions and assume full control of the area assigned to them under the plan, as well as to seize additional areas from the Bosnian government, including areas where Croatians were in a distinct minority (as in Stolac).

In many areas of Western Herzegovina the Bosnian Croats’ policy resulted in open fighting between Muslims and Croats. The Croats wanted to cleanse the territories ethnically and unite them with Croatia, while the Muslims wanted to keep the areas under the control of a multi-ethnic Bosnian state. Some of the fiercest fighting of the entire war broke out between Muslims and Croats in Mostar. And in areas south and south-west of Mostar (among them Stolac) the entire Muslim population, including former Muslim co-combatants, was disarmed and arrested, then placed in horrendous prison camps (logori) or expelled to territory held by the Bosnian army. At the same time the Croats and Muslims were still fighting together against the Serbs, in Sarajevo for instance.

A year later the fighting between the Muslims and Croats was stopped by the signing of the Washington agreement by both parties on 1 March 1994. It was a federation agreement, and though not respected as such – the Croats did not dismantle their newly created republic of Herceg-Bosna, and joint command of the two armies remained a fiction – it was a step towards stopping the war in Bosnia Herzegovina. The Dayton agreement, which officially put an end to almost four years of total destruction and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia Herzegovina, was signed on 21 November 1995. The agreement was not a formal division of Bosnia Herzegovina (see however Mertus 2000), but in reality the country has been ethnically divided ever since. The Serb Republic is controlled and mainly inhabited by Serbs, and the Federation (between Muslims and Croats) is itself divided in Croat and Muslim areas and jurisdictions. As a case in point, today the country has in reality three different armies.

Today Bosnia Herzegovina faces huge problems. One of the hardest to solve has to do with the repatriation of displaced people. Between 100,000 and 200.000 people died during the war, and more than 2 million out of a total pre-war population of 4.3 million were internal or external refugees after the war.² So besides facing a completely ruined economy, a destroyed production apparatus, enormous unemployment, war traumas en masse, corruption and a general mood of despondency, the Bosnian people and Bosnian political system in cooperation with the Office of High Representatives (OHR) also have to solve the impossible puzzle of relocating people to their houses, houses which have in many cases been ruined or occupied. When the war was brought to an end, a pilot project facilitating inter-Federation returns in four towns was initiated. One of these was Stolac, where the Muslim and Serb populations were to be supported in returning. The return of the Muslim population to Stolac was met with resistance by the Croats, many of whom had fled to Stolac from central Bosnia during the war. These Croats feared for ‘their’ (the Muslims’) property as well as their newly won political power in town. And on the ideological level, the Croats worried about the decreasing prospects for realising the independent state of Herceg-Bosna. Of the four pilot projects, the Stolac project has been the most difficult one to realise,³ due to the immense obstruction from the Croats living in town. With this background in mind, I will now focus more closely on Stolac and offer some details.

The war in Stolac

The war started officially in April 1992, when Serbian forces occupied Stolac. But many people sadly recall an incident six months earlier, when a war memorial from World War Two commemorating fallen Partisans was blown up.⁴ The monument was located in front of the school. Today on the same spot the Croats have placed a bust of Ivan Musić, who was a leading Croat resister in the Herzegovinian revolt (1875-1878). The Serbian occupation of Stolac town did not meet any resistance. The Serbs set up their military camp outside town, but there was no fighting, and there was hardly any looting or killing as was the case in areas occupied by Serbs in eastern Bosnia during the same period. The occupation of Stolac had severe consequences though. Most of the Croatian population fled overnight, fearing the Serbian forces. The whole Serbian population of Stolac joined the Serbian army either compulsorily or voluntarily, and the Muslims secretly arranged a number of local defence units in order to protect their families if necessary. Some Stolac Croats have subsequently accused the Muslims of not having resisted the Serbian occupational force, but according to my informants resistance would have been suicidal, as the Muslims were too badly equipped to face what was the fourth largest army in Europe.⁵

Two months after the Serbian occupation, Croatian forces (the HVO and the HOS) conquered Stolac almost without a fight, and the Serbs withdrew to the mountains and hills east and southeast of Stolac.⁶ Many of the Muslims regarded the Croatian takeover as a relief. They hoped and thought things would improve, and many believed the Croats’ explicit statements about their desire for Muslim and Croatian coexistence, although on the other hand they also regarded the massive Croatian presence as a new occupation (vlast). Many Muslims from Stolac joined the forces of the Bosnian Croats (the HVO) because there were no units of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina (Armija BiH) in town: the closest was around Mostar, and service here would have meant separation from one’s family. Soon after the Serbian withdrawal, the Serbs started shelling Stolac, which caused several casualties, and fighting between HVO and the Serbs resumed.

The Muslims and Croats joined forces from June/July 1992 and for almost a year, though as mentioned above it was a marriage of convenience. There was sporadic fighting between Croat and Bosnian forces several places in Bosnia Herzegovina, though not in the Stolac area. Then in April 1993, the Croats started arresting leading Muslim intellectuals and local Muslim politicians in and around Stolac, as well as the few Muslims who held more responsible positions in the HVO. The arrests continued, and on the 1 July all adult Muslim men from Stolac were arrested, interrogated, beaten and driven to prison camps (logori). According to my sources the oldest person arrested was 90 years old, and the youngest 13. A few managed to escape through the mountains, and a few hid in the hills. According to my informants, the whole operation was carried out systematically by troops from the HVO and the HV (Hrvatska Vojska, the Croatian army).⁷ To the Stolac Muslims the mass arrest came as a surprise. Although they had had a feeling that something was going to happen, my informants had generally been ‘naïve’ enough to hope that ethnic cleansing was not going to happen to them. Nevertheless, the Muslim men were forced into prison camps known as Dretelj and Gabela after the villages of the same name outside Čapljina, not far from Stolac. The camps were former JNA (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija; the Yugoslav People’s Army) hangars and ammunition warehouses, totally unfit for human habitation. The Muslims were crammed together in these extremely hot and totally dark buildings. They were beaten, threatened, starved and offered extremely low rations of water. And they were forced to listen to and also sing Croatian nationalist songs.

Women and children continued to stay in Stolac for about one month after the men had been expelled. It was a month of fear and uncertainty. Croats looted and burned down old Muslim houses, and terrorised the Muslim civilians. And the women and children had no information about their husbands, fathers and brothers. Then on 3 and 4 August, the women and children (and the men who had hidden themselves) were picked up in their homes, escorted to the school or a local factory where they were robbed, and then transported to the borders of Croat-held territory, from where they were forced to walk to the Bosnian-held territory of Blagaj. In Blagaj people searched for places to stay, in private homes, or abandoned houses: many families lived together in a few square metres.

Throughout the following year (1993-94) the women, children and elderly lived under miserable conditions. Both Croatian and Serbian forces shelled them, there was hardly any food to be obtained, and many contracted infectious diseases. Some managed to smuggle money or some basic food supplies past the Croatian search in Stolac, but these resources only lasted a short time.

Following the expulsion of the Muslims, Croatian forces started looting Muslim property in Stolac and destroying all signs of the town’s Muslim heritage: the town’s four mosques were blown up and the remnants were removed. Old houses, the town market, the town café, which had been built in traditional Ottoman style in 1986, and an office complex from 1990 were burned. Libraries, private as well as public, were burned, collections of carpets and rugs and other old irreplaceable antiques were destroyed.⁸ The destruction of Stolac formed part of what can be seen as a general ‘urbicide’ (destruction of urbanity) in Bosnia Herzegovina (Coward 2002).

For the first three months after the internment, the prison camps were kept secret, but their existence was brought to public attention after the visit of the journalist Ed Vulliamy to the camps on September 1993 (Vulliamy 1995: 277-86) and the visit of the Red Cross the day before. After the visit of the Red Cross, around 500 of the prisoners in the poorest condition were released, but only on condition that they were to be transported to territory outside Bosnia Herzegovina – that is, mainly European countries and the US. The rest remained in the camps. In the following month more were released, but many remained imprisoned until March 1994, when the Washington deal was signed. They could then rejoin their families in Blagaj and other areas; for a period of one year, they had not had any information about one another.

The return

As mentioned above, Stolac participated in a UN-sponsored pilot project to facilitate the inter-federation return of displaced persons. But such returns were difficult to realise, and many local politicians obstructed them. And the situation was particularly grave in Stolac. One must remember that the expulsion of the Muslims from villages in Herzegovina had formed part of a general Croatian war aim of creating ethnically clean territories, whereas return projects such as the one in Stolac attempted to remix these territories. In the eyes of many nationalist-minded Herzegovinian Croats, towns like Stolac had been conquered in war – so they and their contents were to be seen as booty.

In 1996, groups of Muslims began visiting Stolac for the first time since the war. They drove from Mostar by bus escorted by SFOR (Stabilisation Force; a NATO-led multinational force overseeing the implementation of the Dayton agreement). On their arrival in Stolac they were often met by angry Croats throwing stones, eggs and bread at the buses. According to my informants, the throwing of bread was an attempt to insult the Muslims, whic...

Table of contents

• Forside
• Titelblad
• List of abbreviations
• Acknowledgements
• PART I: FRAMING THE QUESTION
• PART II: WHO ARE THEY, THE ONES WHO DID THIS TO US?
• PART III: WHO ARE WE, SINCE THIS WAS DONE TO US?
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Kolofon