A Short History of Carthage

Charles Rollin

• Publisher: Perennial Press
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781531263232
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Roman Ancient History
• Index: History

Carthage formed after the Model of Tyre, of which that City was a Colony. The Carthaginians were indebted to the Tyrians, not only for their origin, but for their manners, language, customs, laws, religion, and their great application to commerce, as will appear from every part of the sequel. They spoke the same language with the Tyrians, and these the same with the Canaanites and Israelites, that is, the Hebrew tongue, or at least a language which was entirely derived from it...

THE HISTORY OF CARTHAGE FROM THE FIRST PUNIC WAR TO ITS DESTRUCTION.

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THE PLAN WHICH I HAVE laid down does not allow me to enter into an exact detail of the wars between Rome and Carthage; since that pertains rather to the Roman history, which I do not intend to touch upon, except transiently and occasionally. I shall therefore relate such facts only as may give the reader a just idea of the republic whose history lies before me; by confining myself to those particulars which relate chiefly to the Carthaginians, and to their most important transactions in Sicily, Spain, and Africa: a subject in itself sufficiently extensive.

I have already observed, that from the first Punic war to the ruin of Carthage, a hundred and eighteen years elapsed. This whole time may be divided into five parts or intervals.

I. The first Punic war lasted twenty-four years.

II. The interval betwixt the first and second Punic war is also twenty-four years.

III. The second Punic war took up seventeen years.

IV. The interval between the second and third is forty-nine years.

V. The third Punic war, terminated by the destruction of Carthage, continued but four years and some months.

Total: 118 years.

The first Punic War.

The first Punic war arose from the following cause. Some Campanian soldiers, in the service of Agathocles, the Sicilian tyrant, having entered as friends into Messina, soon after murdered part of the townsmen, drove out the rest, married their wives, seized their effects, and remained sole masters of that important city. They then assumed the name of Mamertines. In imitation of them, and by their assistance, a Roman legion treated in the same cruel manner the city of Rhegium, lying directly opposite to Messina, on the other side of the strait. These two perfidious cities, supporting one another, rendered themselves at length formidable to their neighbors; and especially Messina, which became very powerful, and gave great umbrage and uneasiness both to the Syracusans and Carthaginians, who possessed one part of Sicily. As soon as the Romans had got rid of the enemies they had so long contended with, and particularly of Pyrrhus, they began to think of punishing the crime of their citizens, who had settled themselves at Rhegium, in so cruel and treacherous a manner, nearly ten years before. Accordingly, they took the city, and killed, in the attack, the greatest part of the inhabitants, who, instigated by despair, had fought to the last gasp: three hundred only were left, who were carried to Rome, whipped, and then publicly beheaded in the forum. The view which the Romans had in making this bloody execution, was, to prove to their allies their own sincerity and innocence. Rhegium was immediately restored to its lawful possessors. The Mamertines, who were considerably weakened, as well by the ruin of their confederate city, as by the losses which they had sustained from the Syracusans, who had lately placed Hiero at their head, thought it time to provide for their own safety. But divisions arising among them, one part surrendered the citadel to the Carthaginians, whilst the other called in the Romans to their assistance, and resolved to put them in possession of their city.

The affair was debated in the Roman senate, where, being considered in all its lights, it appeared to have some difficulties. On one hand, it was thought base, and altogether unworthy of the Roman virtue, for them to undertake openly the defense of traitors, whose perfidy was exactly the same with that of the Rhegians, whom the Romans had recently punished with so exemplary a severity. On the other hand, it was of the utmost consequence to stop the progress of the Carthaginians, who, not satisfied with their conquests in Africa and Spain, had also made themselves masters of almost all the islands of the Sardinian and Hetrurian seas; and would certainly get all Sicily into their hands, if they should be suffered to possess themselves of Messina. From thence into Italy, the passage was very short; and it was in some manner to invite an enemy to come over, to leave the entrance open. These reasons, though so strong, could not prevail with the senate to declare in favor of the Mamertines; and accordingly, motives of honor and justice prevailed in this instance over those of interest and policy.

But the people were not so scrupulous; for, in an assembly held on this subject, it was resolved that the Mamertines should be assisted. The consul Appius Claudius immediately set forward with his army, and boldly crossed the strait, after he had, by an ingenious stratagem, eluded the vigilance of the Carthaginian general. The Carthaginians, partly by art and partly by force, were driven out of the citadel; and the city was surrendered immediately to the consul. The Carthaginians hanged their general, for having given up the citadel in so cowardly a manner, and prepared to besiege the town with all their forces. Hiero joined them with his own. But the consul, having defeated them separately, raised the siege, and laid waste at pleasure the neighboring country, the enemy not daring to face him. This was the first expedition which the Romans made out of Italy.

It is doubted whether the motives which prompted the Romans to undertake this expedition, were very upright, and exactly conformable to the rules of strict justice. Be this as it may, their passage into Sicily, and the succor they gave to the inhabitants of Messina, may be said to have been the first step by which they ascended to that height of glory and grandeur which they afterwards attained.

Hiero, having reconciled himself to the Romans, and entered into an alliance with them, the Carthaginians bent all their thoughts on Sicily, and sent numerous armies thither. Agrigentum was their place of arms; which, being attacked by the Romans, was won by them, after they had besieged it seven months, and gained one battle.

Notwithstanding the advantage of this victory, and the conquest of so important a city, the Romans were sensible, that whilst the Carthaginians should continue masters at sea, the maritime places in the island would always side with them, and put it out of their power ever to drive them out of Sicily. Besides, they saw with reluctance Africa enjoy a profound tranquillity, at a time that Italy was infested by the frequent incursions of its enemies. They now first formed the design of having a fleet, and of disputing the empire of the sea with the Carthaginians. The undertaking was bold, and in outward appearance rash; but it evinces the courage and magnanimity of the Romans. They were not at that time possessed of a single vessel which they could call their own; and the ships which had transported their forces into Sicily had been borrowed of their neighbors. They were unexperienced in sea affairs, had no carpenters acquainted with the building of ships, and did not know even the shape of the Quinqueremes, or galleys with five benches of oars, in which the chief strength of fleets at that time consisted. But happily, the year before, one had been taken upon the coasts of Italy, which served them as a model. They therefore applied themselves with incredible industry and ardor to the building of ships in the same form; and in the meantime they got together a set of rowers, who were taught an exercise and discipline utterly unknown to them before, in the following manner. Benches were made, on the shore, in the same order and fashion with those of galleys. The rowers were seated on these benches, and taught, as if they had been furnished with oars, to throw themselves backwards with their arms drawn to their breasts; and then to throw their bodies and arms forward in one regular motion, the instant their commanding officer gave the signal. In two months, one hundred galleys of five benches of oars, and twenty of three benches, were built; and after sometime had been spent in exercising the rowers on shipboard, the fleet put to sea, and went in quest of the enemy. The consul Duillius had the command of it.

The Romans coming up with the Carthaginians near the coast of Myle, they prepared for an engagement. As the Roman galleys, by their being clumsily and hastily built, were neither very nimble nor easy to work; this inconvenience was supplied by a machine invented for this occasion, and afterwards known by the name of the Corvus, (Crow, or Crane,) by the help of which they grappled the enemy’s ships, boarded them, and immediately came to close engagement. The signal for fighting was given. The Carthaginian fleet consisted of a hundred and thirty sail, under the command of Hannibal. He himself was on board a galley of seven benches of oars, which had once belonged to Pyrrhus. The Carthaginians, thoroughly despising enemies who were utterly unacquainted with sea affairs, imagined that their very appearance would put them to flight, and therefore came forward boldly, with little expectation of fighting; but firmly imagining they should reap the spoils, which they had already devoured with their eyes. They were nevertheless a little surprised at the sight of the above-mentioned engines, raised on the prow of everyone of the enemy’s ships, and which were entirely new to them. But their astonishment increased, when they saw these engines drop down at once; and being thrown forcibly into their vessels, grapple them in spite of all resistance. This changed the form of the engagement, and obliged the Carthaginians to come to close engagement with their enemies, as though they had fought them on land. They were unable to sustain the attack of the Romans: a horrible slaughter ensued, and the Carthaginians lost fourscore vessels, among which was the admiral’s galley, he himself escaping with difficulty in a small boat.

So considerable and unexpected a victory raised the courage of the Romans, and seemed to redouble their vigor for the continuance of the war. Extraordinary honors were bestowed on the consul Duillius, who was the first Roman that had a naval triumph decreed him. A rostral pillar was erected in his honor, with a noble inscription; which pillar is yet standing in Rome.

During the two following years, the Romans grew still stronger at sea, by their success in several engagements. But these were considered by them only as essays preparatory to the great design they meditated of carrying the war into Africa, and of combating the Carthaginians in their own country. There was nothing the latter dreaded more; and to divert so dangerous a blow, they resolved to fight the enemy, whatever might be the consequence.

The Romans had elected M. Atilius Regulus, and L. Manlius, consuls for this year. Their fleet consisted of three hundred and thirty vessels, on board of which were one hundred and forty thousand men, each vessel having three hundred rowers, and a hundred and twenty soldiers. That of the Carthaginians, commanded by Hanno and Hamilcar, had twenty vessels more than the Romans, and a greater number of men in proportion. The two fleets came in sight of each other near Ecnomus in Sicily. No man could behold two such formidable navies, or be a spectator of the extraordinary preparations they made for fighting, without being under some concern, on seeing the danger which menaced two of the most powerful states in the world. As the courage on both sides was equal, and no great disparity in the forces, the fight was obstinate, and the victory long doubtful; but at last the Carthaginians were overcome. More than sixty of their ships were taken by the enemy, and thirty sunk. The Romans lost twenty-four, not one of which fell into the enemy’s hands.

The fruit of this victory, as the Romans had designed it, was their sailing to Africa, after having refitted their ships, and provided them with all necessaries for carrying on a long war in a foreign country. They landed happily in Africa, and began the war by taking a town called Clypea, which had a commodious haven. From thence, after having sent an express to Rome, to give advice of their landing, and to receive orders from the senate, they overran the open country, in which they made terrible havoc; bringing away whole flocks of cattle, and twenty thousand prisoners.

The express returned in the meantime with the orders of the senate, who decreed, that Regulus should continue to command the armies in Africa, with the title of Proconsul; and that his colleague should return with a great part of the fleet and the forces; leaving Regulus only forty vessels, fifteen thousand foot, and five hundred horse. Their leaving the latter with so few ships and troops, was a visible renunciation of the advantages which might have been expected from this descent upon Africa.

The people at Rome depended greatly on the courage and abilities of Regulus; and the joy was universal, when it was known that he was continued in the command in Africa; he alone was afflicted on that account. When news was brought him of it, he wrote to Rome, and desired, in the strongest terms, that he might be appointed a successor. His chief reason was, that the death of the farmer who rented his grounds, having given one of his hirelings an opportunity of carrying off all the implements of tillage, his presence was necessary for taking care of his little spot of ground, (but seven acres,) which was all his family subsisted upon. But the senate undertook to have his lands cultivated at the public expense; to maintain his wife and children; and to indemnify him for the loss he had sustained by the robbery of his hireling. Thrice happy age! in which poverty was thus had in honor, and was united with the most rare and uncommon merit, and the highest employments of the state! Regulus thus freed from his domestic cares, bent his whole thoughts on discharging the duty of a general.

After taking several castles, he laid siege to Adis one of the strongest fortresses of the country. The Carthaginians, exasperated at seeing their enemies thus laying waste their lands at pleasure, at last took the field, and marched against them, to force them to raise the siege. With this view, they posted themselves on a hill, which overlooked the Roman camp, and was convenient for annoying the enemy; but, at the same time, by its situation, rendered one part of their army useless. For the strength of the Carthaginians lay chiefly in their horses and elephants, which are of no service but in plains. Regulus did not give them an opportunity of descending from the hill; but, in order to take advantage of this essential mistake of the Carthaginian generals, fell upon them in this post; and after meeting with a feeble resistance, put the enemy to flight, plundered their camp, and laid waste the adjacent country. Then, having taken Tunis, an important city, and which brought him near Carthage, he made his army encamp there.

The enemy were in the utmost alarm. All things had succeeded ill with them, their forces had been defeated by sea and land, and upwards of two hundred towns had surrendered to the conqueror. Besides, the Numidians made greater havoc in their territories than even the Romans. They expected every moment to see their capital besieged. And their affliction was increased by the concourse of peasants with their wives and children, who flocked from all parts to Carthage for safety: which gave them melancholy apprehensions of a famine in case of a siege. Regulus, afraid of having the glory of his victories torn from him by a successor, made some proposal of an accommodation to the vanquished enemy; but the conditions appeared so hard, that they could not listen to them. As he did not doubt his being soon master of Carthage, he would not abate anything in his demands; but, by an infatuation which is almost inseparable from great and unexpected success, he treated them with haughtiness; and pretended, that everything he suffered them to possess, ought to be esteemed a favor; adding this farther insult, “That they ought either to overcome like brave men, or learn to submit to the victor.” So harsh and disdainful a treatment only fired their resentment; and they resolved rather to die sword in hand, than to do anything which might derogate from the dignity of Carthage.

Reduced to this fatal extremity, they received, in the happiest juncture, a reinforcement of auxiliary troops out of Greece, with Xanthippus the Lacedæmonian at their head, who had been educated in the discipline of Sparta, and learnt the art of war in that renowned and excellent school. When he had heard the circumstances of the last battle, which were told him at his request; had clearly discerned the occasion of its being lost; and perfectly informed himself in what the strength of Carthage consisted; he declared publicly, and repeated it often, in the hearing of the rest of the officers, that the misfortunes of the Carthaginians were owing entirely to the incapacity of their generals. These discourses came at last to the ear of the public council; the members of it were struck with them, and they requested him to attend them. He enforced his opinion with such strong and convincing reasons, that the oversights committed by the generals were visible to everyone; and he proved as clearly, that, by a conduct opposite to the former, they would not only secure their dominions, but drive the enemy out of them. This speech revived the courage and hopes of the Carthaginians; and Xanthippus was entreated, and, in some measure, forced, to accept the command of the army. When the Carthaginians saw, in his exercising of their forces near the city, the manner in which he drew them up in order of battle, made them advance or retreat on the first signal, file off with order and expedition; in a word, perform all the evolutions and movements of the military art; they were struck with astonishment, and owned, that the ablest generals which Carthage had hitherto produced, knew nothing in comparison of Xanthippus.

The officers, soldiers, and everyone, were lost in admiration; and, what is very uncommon, jealousy gave no alloy to it; the fear of the present danger, and the love of their country, stifling, without doubt, all other sentiments. The gloomy consternation, which had before seized the whole army, was succeeded by joy and alacrity. The soldiers were urgent to be led against the enemy, in the firm assurance (as they said) of being victorious under their new leader, and of obliterating the disgrace of former defeats. Xanthippus did not suffer their ardor to cool; and the sight of the enemy only inflamed it. When he had approached within little more than twelve hundred paces of them, he thought proper to call a council of war, in order to show respect to the Carthaginian generals, by consulting them. All unanimously deferred to his opinion; upon which it was resolved to give the enemy battle the following day.

The Carthaginian army was composed of twelve thousand foot, four thousand horse, and about a hundred elephants. That of the Romans, as near as may be guessed from what goes before, (for Polybius does not mention their numbers here,) consisted of fifteen thousand foot and three hundred horse.

It must be a noble sight to see two armies like these before us, not overcharged with numbers, but composed of brave soldiers, and commanded by very able generals, engaged in battle. In those tumultuous fights, where two or three hundred thousand are engaged on both sides, confusion is inevitable; and it is difficult, amidst a thousand events, where chance generally seems to have a greater share than counsel, to discover the true merit of commanders, and the real causes of victory. But in such engagements as this before us, nothing escapes the curiosity of the reader; for he clearly sees the disposition of the two armies; imagines he almost hears the orders given out by the generals; follows all the movements of the army; can point out the faults committed on both sides; and is thereby qualified to determine, with certainty, the causes to which the victory or defeat is owing. The success of this battle, however inconsiderable it may appear from the small number of the combatants, was nevertheless to decide the fate of Carthage.

The disposition of both armies was as follows. Xanthippus drew up all his elephants in front. Behind these, at some distance, he placed the Carthaginian infantry in one body or phalanx. The foreign troops in the Carthaginian service were posted, one part of them on the right, between the phalanx and the horse; and the other, composed of light-armed soldiers, in platoons, at the head of the two wings of the cavalry.

On the side of the Romans, as they apprehended the elephants most, Regulus, to provide against them, posted his light-armed soldiers, on a line, in the front of the legions. In the rear of these, he placed the cohorts one behind another, and the horse on the wings. In thus straitening the front of his main battle, to give it more depth, he indeed took a just precaution, says Polybius,...

Table of contents

• Character, Manners, Religion, And Government Of The Carthaginians
• The History of the Carthaginians
• The History of Carthage from the first Punic War to its destruction.