Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Between Ideology and Pragmatism

Przemyslaw Osiewicz

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000215380
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Regional Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

Providing a well-balanced and impartial perspective on the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, this book contributes to a better understanding of the current foreign policy of Iran, especially its internal and external determinants.

Combining theoretical and practical aspects, it provides readers with a short analysis of Iranian foreign policy. The first part is dedicated to the Pahlavi era between 1925–1979. The second consists of three chapters covering issues relating to ideological and institutional aspects of Iranian foreign policy after 1979. The last part incorporates eight case studies which best present both regional and global dimensions.

This comprehensive study contains a synthesis of views and opinions of commentators and scholars who often represent contradictory perspectives. Serving as a key reference and starting point for further studies, this book will be of interest to students and researchers studying Iranian foreign policy, international relations, and Middle Eastern studies.

PART I

Historical background

Iranian foreign policy under the Pahlavi dynasty

1
Reza Shah and his vision of Persian diplomacy

From the Qajars to the Pahlavis

Iranian foreign policy is rooted in a rich Persian history. The Persian Empire dominated both Central and South Asia for centuries. Its legacy is still noticeable not only in Iran, but also across the region, for instance, in such countries as Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan. The dynasties of Achaemenids, Parthians, Sasanians, Safavids, Afsharids, and Qajars encouraged respect in the region. The Qajar dynasty ruled Persia between 1794–1925 and preceded the last one – the Pahlavi dynasty. Yet before Reza Khan Pahlavi came to power and founded the new dynasty, Persia had undergone significant changes and had lost its regional influence.

The Qajars failed to provide their subjects with military security, administrative order, and finally with financial stability (Abrahamian, 1982: 37–49). Persia entered the twentieth century under the rule of Mozaffar ad-Din Shah Qajar. When he came to power in 1896, Mozaffar ad-Din was unprepared for the burdens of the Persian throne. Moreover, he had to face a serious financial crisis caused by the policies of his father, Naser ad-Din. However, his actions did not resolve the crisis and only worsened the situation. Patrick Clawson and Michael Rubin claim that:

the new shah strained the tight finances by making three trips to Europe at enormous expense. He was able to cover government expenses only by borrowing more and more money, especially from Russia and Britain, leading to increasingly more foreign influence over the government. This contributed to growing anxiety on the part of Iran’s nationalists and religious clergy.

(Clawson, Rubin, 2005: 42)

In order to manage the costs of the crisis the shah decided to sign monopolistic agreements with foreign companies. On that basis foreigners received concessions that provided them with almost complete control over various markets and industries. One of them was William Knox d’Arcy who later headed Anglo-Persian Oil Company – APOC.

Persia desperately needed to make changes, especially in relation to political reforms. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Persians attempted to modify their political system and make it more liberal. These initiatives resulted in the Constitutional Revolution between 1905–1911 (Rieffer-Flanagan, 2013: 17). Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar, who was the King of Persia from January 1907 until July 1909, opposed constitutional changes that had been introduced by his father, Mozaffar ad-Din Shah Qajar. Yet the biggest challenge Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar had to face was related to Persia’s foreign policy and its geopolitical position. The country was so weak that Russia and Britain took advantage of the situation and divided it on the basis of the 1907 agreement.

The last shah from the Qajar dynasty, Ahmad Shah Qajar, came to power in 1909 following the overthrow of his father. He ascended the throne at the age of 11 and his uncle, Ali Reza Khan Azod al-Molk, became a regent. Ahmad Shah was formally crowned on 16 July 1909. The young shah had to cope with an economic downturn as well as monopolistic practices of foreign companies like APOC. This British giant controlled almost the entire country and had rights to explore and develop Iranian oil resources for 50 years. This agreement increased the Iranian dependency on the United Kingdom and rendered Persia a protectorate, which resulted in popular opposition to these concessions. Iranian authorities received only 16% of net profits and this caused public discontent and anger. Political chaos, financial crisis, and economic exploitation provoked and antagonized the Iranian society. Bahman Nirumand claims that the Qajar kings weakened the Persian state bit by bit and made it more vulnerable to foreign interference. Great powers like the United Kingdom and Tsarist Russia soon began meddling in the internal affairs (Nirumand, 1969: 19–20).

By 1912 the Russian army took advantage of Iran’s military weakness, economic problems, and constitutional turmoil. Its commanders decided to occupy northern provinces of the country from western Azerbaijan to northeastern Khorasan. Abbas Amanat underlines the fact that “the following five years through terror and violence, the occupying Russian army kept a tenuous hold on the northern half of the country. Small wonder that Iranians welcomed the news of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution” (Amanat, 2017: 372). At the time the main motivation of the British was to secure colonial holdings in South Asia. Their troops occupied the southern part of Iran including three main cities, namely Bushehr, Shiraz, and Isfahan.

Reza Khan Pahlavi began his political career with the help of the British commanders. According to Gerard de Villiers, he:

instinctively knew he must choose Britain. Also, the British shared his fear of a Russian invasion, and therefore needed a strong government in control. The Qajars were incapable of providing it, hence the British must look elsewhere. (…) The choice was easy. Reza Khan was their man.

(de Villiers, 1976: 27–28)

The British intention was primarily to guarantee that Bolsheviks stop penetrating Persia. Its geopolitical location was still crucial from a British point of view, especially in the case of the British territories in India. For this reason, London preferred to support Reza Khan and counted on his gratitude as well as political acquiescence in the future.

Despite this, in February 1921 Reza Khan carried out the coup d’etat and became the commander of the Cossack Brigade. This elite military unit was formed after the Caucasian regiments in 1879. Until 1920 it was commanded by Russians and therefore was often seen as a tool of Russian political influence in Iran. In the opinion of Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan:

Reza Shah’s coup fundamentally set back the progress of the Constitutional Revolution of 1905, which had sought a more accountable and representative government. While allowing elections for the Majles, the Persian parliament, he also manipulated these parliamentary elections from 1925 to 1940 in order to ensure that he had malleable lawmakers with whom to work.

(Rieffer-Flanagan, 2013: 19–20)

As a result of the 1921 coup, Sayyed Zia was appointed the prime minister by the shah. One of Zia’s main foreign policy goals was to declare the treaty with the British of 1919 null and void. Although the Cossack units in Persia had lost the support of Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, this formation still played a very important role in the political and social life of Iran. Zia made a large mistake by underestimating Colonel Reza Khan of Mazandaran. In Zia’s opinion, Reza Khan lacked both the prestige and military education. History showed, however, how wrong he was. Said Amir Arjomand noticed that:

late in May 1921, after less than a hundred days in office, Sayyed Zia was ousted by Reza Khan, to whom he had initially denied the war ministry but who had nevertheless emerged as his chief rival. Once appointed minister of war, over the prime minister’s head, on 25 April 1921, Reza Khan’s ascent was apparent to all and met with little effective opposition.

(Arjomand, 1988: 60)

The fourth Majles convened in 1921. Reza Khan managed to ally with conservatives and got their support. Two years later he appointed himself prime minister and the shah went on what was to prove an extended holiday in Europe (Axworthy, 2008: 223). Soon after that Reza Khan went on a pilgrimage to Najaf where he took the name Pahlavi. His intention with this name was to please nationalists since the name refers to the Middle Persian language from pre-Islamic times.

In the opinion of Homa Katouzian:

it took only two years and a few months, from June 1921 to November 1923, for Reza Khan to become prime minister in addition to minister of war and chief of the army. What happened in between was typical of the politics of chaos.

(Katouzian, 2004: 19)

The shah went to undergo a lengthy cure and did not intend to come back to Iran. That was the moment when Reza Khan considered proclaiming a republic. The opposition to his plan was, however, very strong. Fascinated with Mustafa Kemal’s Turkification of Turkey, Reza Khan Pahlavi intended to carry out a policy of Persianization. Yet, support in Iran differed from Turkey (where the majority of society accepted reforms and the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923). The situation in Persia was much more complex and complicated. When Sultan Ahmad Shah was deposed in 1925, Reza Khan was a natural successor. He was already strong enough to control the army as well as key departments. Robert Graham emphasizes the fact that Reza Khan’s purpose “was relatively simple: the regeneration of Persia and an end to foreign interference. He changed the name of the country from Persia to Iran in 1934 – Iran being by origin the same word as Aryan” (Graham, 1979: 55). The name Iran was the historical name of the country which had been used by its indigenous people.

Once Reza Khan became the shah of Iran in 1925, the new Pahlavi dynasty replaced the Qajars. Said Amir Arjomand specifies the main reasons for the Qajar dynasty’s failure. In his opinion:

clientelism, intrigue, and insecurity of office also go along a long way toward explaining the inability of Qajar government to pursue consistent policy and the tremendous influence of the British and Russian missions among the notables, many of whom sought to put themselves under the protection of Britain and Russia.

(Arjomand, 1988: 26)

Ramin Jahanbegloo adds that Reza Shah managed to combine nationalism with state centralization. He often referred to Iran’s classical past in the form of ideological and political manifestations of Iranian nationalism. Such actions were to support the formation of a modern nation-state through loyalty to traditional monarchy (Jahanbegloo, 2013: 13). At the very beginning of Reza Shah’s reign this strategy appeared to be very efficient and persuasive. Iranians looked forward to social stability and political independence. For that reason, they were ready to accept the new authoritarian ruler who at least was more convincing and firmer when comparted to the Qajars.

Reza Shah and his foreign policy in the 1920s and 1930s

The main element of Reza Shah’s foreign policy strategy was to play the Soviet Union against the United Kingdom. The shah attempted to keep both these enemies at bay. Yet history proved that such attempts were neither realistic nor rational. Both powers had essential interests in Iran. Additionally, the Russians and British still treated this Middle Eastern state as their sphere of influence. The Soviet Union was concerned with the British oil concession in the south, but Iran was not willing to offer the Russians a similar deal in the north. For this reason, the Soviet authorities welcomed Reza Shah’s decision of 1932, according to which Iran cancelled the agreement with the British. As a consequence, the United Kingdom applied to the League of Nations in order to block the Iranian decision (Ansari, 2014: 69).

According to James A. Bill, the United States carefully and successfully avoided any confrontation with Ru...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-Title
• Series
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Abbreviations
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• PART I Historical backgroundIranian foreign policy under the Pahlavi dynasty
• PART II The Islamic Republic of IranThe framework of foreign policy after 1979
• PART III Iranian foreign policy in practiceSelected case studies
• Conclusion
• Index