Empires

A Historical and Political Sociology

Krishan Kumar

• Publisher: Polity
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781509528387
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

Empires have been the commonest form of political organization for most of recorded history. How should we best understand them? What are their principles and how do they differ from other political forms, such as the nation-state? What sort of relations between rulers and ruled do they express? Do they, as many have held, follow a particular course of "rise, decline, and fall"? How and why do empires end, and with what consequences? Is the era of empire over? This book explores these questions through a fascinating analysis of the major empires of world history and the present. It pays attention not just to the modern overseas empires of the Europeans, but also to the ancient empires of the Middle East and Mediterranean, the Islamic empires of the Arabs, Mughals, and Ottomans, and the two-thousand-year Chinese Empire. As Kumar shows, understanding empires helps us understand better the politics of our own times.

1
Empires in Time and Space

The Problem of Definition: A Family of Meanings

“Definition,” the great sociologist Max Weber once said, “can be attempted, if at all, only at the conclusion of the study” (1978: I, 399; my emphasis). Weber, as a great admirer, would also have been sympathetic to Friedrich Nietzsche’s parallel observation that “only that which has no history can be defined” (1956: 212). Since all human ideas and practices have a history, that more or less rules out attempts at definition in the human (or social) sciences. In any case, both Weber and Nietzsche caution us against the efficacy – if not the impossibility – of defining phenomena in human society. Whether we are speaking of concepts or institutions, their protean character makes it extremely difficult to pin them down, like butterflies in neat glass cabinets.

Empires come in many shapes and sizes. They also evolve historically, both within themselves, as particular empires, and also collectively, as types of rule. That means that Weber’s and Nietzsche’s cautions apply to any and all attempts to define them. The danger is, at one level, an all-encompassing vacuity, a cover-all definition that is so general and abstract as to be virtually useless when considering particular cases; at another level, it leads to elaborate attempts to classify empires by type, or to distinguish them by historical periods or geographical regions, such that comparisons become awkward and difficult, if not impossible.

The approach in this book is not to attempt a precise definition of empire at the outset. That would lead to just the sort of straitjacket feared by Weber (for a famous example, look at the problems encountered by Durkheim in basing his Elementary Forms of the Religious Life on a strict definition of religion at the very beginning). If some sort of definition appears, then it will do so largely by emergence, as one goes through the material and discusses specific cases and issues. At the end of the book, perhaps, not just the reader but the author might have a better sense of the nature of the entity under consideration. At the very least, we might begin to see the “family resemblances,” Wittgenstein-style, between different uses and meanings of the term “empire” (cf. Cooper 2005: 26–7).

That, at any rate, is the hope. Of course, even if they don’t have precise definitions, words must have meanings (though, again, often a range), and so we must give some sort of meaning to the word “empire.” At its most basic, and consistent with its origin in Latin imperium, it means absolute or sovereign rule over a people or territory, without the right of appeal to any earthly outside power (though not necessarily excluding appeal to a divine or supramundane authority). This was the earliest use of the term, during the Roman Republic. As the Republic became an Empire, the term was extended to mean rule over a multiplicity of peoples and lands, as in the Imperium Romanum (hence the usual connotation of empire with large or extensive political entities) (Koebner 1961: 4–5, 11–16).

Both meanings continue up to and including the present, though certainly in many current uses it is the second feature – rule over many peoples and lands, or of a “core” over various “peripheries” – that has tended to predominate (e.g. Howe 2002: 14–15; Osterhammel 2014: 428; Streets-Salter and Getz 2016: 3–4). Together, they allow us to distinguish empires, however broadly or imprecisely, from other political entities such as nation-states, though in practice, as we shall see, there can be considerable overlaps between empires and nation-states. For instance, “core” and “periphery” can be found in many large nation-states – e.g. Britain, France and Spain – as well as empires (hence the concept of “internal colonialism” – see further below). More helpful is the distinction between “metropole” or “mother country” and “colonies,” though for obvious reasons that applies mostly to overseas empires and can be problematic with land empires, which often do not have anything that can clearly be designated colonies. Equally vexing is the attempt to distinguish between nation-states as having “citizens” and empires as having “subjects,” since, until as late as 1948, the inhabitants of the United Kingdom – not generally thought of as an empire – were subjects of the British crown, not citizens.

Two other terms need to be noted. “Imperialism” is an etymologically logical extension of empire (imperium), but, surprisingly, it does not seem to have been used until the mid nineteenth century, when it was popularized to describe the rule of Napoleon III and his Second Empire in France. The British adopted the term, at first disparagingly, as a synonym for Bonapartism, and later more approvingly, to describe their own rule in the British Empire. But the term nearly always carried a whiff of disapproval, a feature that became even more pronounced under the scrutiny of anti-imperial liberals and socialists. The liberal J. A. Hobson’s Imperialism (1902) began the process, which, under Hobson’s influence, was carried further by Marxists such as Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, and Rudolf Hilferding, who analyzed – and denounced – imperialism as the desperate last measure of an embattled capitalism (Koebner and Schmidt 1964: chs. 4–8; Kiernan 1974: 1–68).

But, by the mid twentieth century, “imperialism” had largely been displaced by “colonialism,” reflecting the view more from the colonies, or ex-colonies – the anti-colonial “Third World” – than from the metropole.¹ While imperialism could be, and was, defended by some thinkers, colonialism was, almost by definition, in the post First-World War environment of Wilsonian “self-determination” and nationalism, described as an evil (Manela 2009). Increasingly, in the large literature on empire produced by left-wing writers, European and non-European, both imperialism and colonialism carried connotations of oppression and exploitation. It was mainly this that led “empire” to become a dirty word by the second half of the twentieth century: to speak up for empire, as for instance the British statesman Winston Churchill did in the 1950s, was to show oneself incorrigibly reactionary and outdated.

A late refinement of “colonialism” has been the concept of “internal colonialism.” This refers to the idea that many so-called nation-states have in fact been formed by an internal process of incorporation, whereby a core people or nation have conquered or swallowed up their neighbors. Examples would include Great Britain or the United Kingdom, in which the English conquered the Welsh and the Irish, and forced the Scots into a “parliamentary union,” to form a composite state of four nationalities: an internal “English empire” (Hechter 1999; Davies 2000). France too – present-day France of the “Hexagon” – has also been said to have been created by an imperial process, in which the French kings based on the Île-de-France gradually expanded their power to take in adjoining lands and principalities – Burgundy, Brittany, Provence, etc. – thereby creating a centralized and culturally homogenized France (Weber 1976: 485; Goldstone and Haldon 2010: 18).

The concept of internal colonialism has many attractions, not least in undermining many of the spurious claims made by and on behalf of nation-states (Kumar 2010). It has found favor with a wide range of scholars, who have applied it to such matters as apartheid in South Africa, the relation of the black minority to the white majority in the United States, and Stalin’s forced collectivization of the peasantry in the Soviet Union. Its very versatility and adaptability, covering so many different types of situations, has been seen as one of its weaknesses as a theoretical concept. The fact that it works mainly by an “artificial analogy” with conventional colonialism has also been seen as a serious methodological problem. Nevertheless, even its critics have acknowledged its usefulness in many spheres – in showing, for instance, the interaction of external and internal factors in the development of societies, as when perceptions and policies toward native peoples in the colonies are brought back home and govern the treatment of groups within the metropolitan society (Hind 1984: 553, 564).

One further usage should be mentioned. Some writers, following an influential article by two prominent imperial historians, John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson (1953), have wished to speak of “informal” as well as “formal” empire. Informal empire refers to a situation, such as obtained in the relation between Britain and parts of Latin America in the nineteenth century, where a state does not formally exercise sovereignty over another territory or people but displays a high degree of control, especially over its economic operations. While such situations undoubtedly existed and continue to do so (one source of the widespread talk of a twentieth-century “American Empire”), the notion of informal empire covers such a large number of cases and is so imprecise in its meaning – where does “control” begin and end? – that many have found it best to avoid it in their studies of empire. That sound advice will generally be followed in this book. However, in view of the importance of the case, and the fact that it has been the source of much interest and attention, we will, in the last chapter of this book, consider the question of how far America – the USA – can be thought of and studied as an empire.

In general, while the use of particular terms and concepts is unavoidable, we must always be aware of the range of meanings they convey, the sometimes conflicting elements they display, and above all the historical and cultural contexts in which they are employed. As an especially important example, consider that imperium is a Western term, in a Western language (Latin). It has given rise to most of the modern European equivalents (English “empire,” French empire, Italian impero, Spanish imperio; Germans use Reich for the political form, but also have, more figuratively, imperium and also imperialismus, imperialism). In other words, when we use “empire” or any other European equivalent, we must be aware that we are dealing with a term that has a Western history and that applies in the first place to Western experience. That makes problematic its application to non-Western forms, ancient and modern, even when we wish – as we often do – to speak of the “Chinese Empire,” the “Mughal Empire,” the “Safavid Empire.” Even more difficulties arise with the ancient “Egyptian Empire,” the “Inca Empire,” or the “Aztec Empire” – not to mention the “Commanche Empire.” In most of these cases, there are no words in their languages that translate as “empire,” as understood in the West. What, we might wonder, do they have in common? Why call them all “empires?” Why not simply use indigenous terms and explore their local and particular meanings?

This need not make us despair of finding any similarities or common meanings (“family resemblances”). For one thing, Western political vocabulary has been spreading across the world, with everintensifying force, since the 1789 French Revolution. The movement was given added impetus by the worldwide spread of the European empires, especially from the nineteenth century onward. So, voluntarily or involuntarily, European social and political terms and thought – the state, the nation, empire, Marxism – had become the property of the entire world by the twentieth century. Moreover, even before that, what we can agree to call empires – e.g. Rome and China – interacted with each other in various ways. Merchants and missionaries criss-crossed the world, carrying ideas as well as goods and people. Certain figures, such as Alexander the Great, became emblems of empire throughout Eurasia. Whatever the different terms used for what we call empires, therefore, they might carry a similar resonance, stress certain common ideas and values. That makes comparison possible.

In the chapters that follow, we shall be tracing that movement of vocabulary and those interactions – by no means all one-way – that allow us to speak of empire in a generic way, always with an eye on specific differences. But first we must make a map of empire. We must lay out our examples, show the range of empires across space and time. We will only be able to deal with a handful of them, though they will be among the most significant. But it will be helpful, at the start, to get a sense of the totality of the imperial story.

Empires Ancient, Classical and Modern: Two Watersheds in the History of Empires

John Darwin, in his masterly account of “global empires,” After Tamerlane, has said that “empire (where different ethnic communities fall under a common ruler) has been the default mode of political organization throughout most of history. Imperial power has usually been the rule of the road” (2008: 23; see also Howe 2002: 1; Goldstone and Haldon 2010: 19). Darwin is perfectly aware that there have been other political forms: tribes, chiefdoms, city-states, nation-states, leagues, and federations. But he is right to stress the ubiquity and longevity of empires – the fact that so much of recorded human history has been imperial history.² The earliest human civilizations, starting around 4000 BCE, soon took imperial form: Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, China. They were later, in the first millennium CE, joined by empires in what the Europeans came to call the “New World” across the Atlantic: the Toltec, the Aztec, and the Inca empires. The Mediterranean region threw up the Alexandrian and Roman empires. The Near and Middle East saw Hittite, Arab, and Persian empires. There were the steppe empires of Chinggis Khan and Tamerlane. Coming fairly late on the scene, from the sixteenth century CE onwards, there were the overseas empires of the Atlantic European powers, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, France, Britain. At about the same time, the Russians, Habsburgs, and Ottomans constructed great land empires stretching deep into Eurasia.³

Some empires, like the Egyptian and Chinese, lasted for thousands of years; others, like the European ones, lasted for hundreds of years. But, whether for shorter or longer periods, empires left an indelible mark on the world. The empire of Alexander the Great lasted no more than his short reign of 13 years (336–323 BCE), but it transformed Eurasia and left a lasting legacy.

With this profusion of empires, in space and time, for any analysis it becomes necessary to establish some sort of intellectual order. In this case, distinctions of space are less important than distinctions of time. At any one time, empires across the world – certainly the Eurasian world – were mostly aware of one another, and in many cases in active interaction with each other (the principal exception is the empires of the pre-Columbian New World). They can be compared as occupying similar tracts of space–time. The Chinese and Roman empires in the first century CE share many characteristics, as do the Mughal and Habsburg empires of the early-modern period, or the Japanese and French empires of the twentieth century.

What is more important is change over time. The later empires learned from earlier ones, striving to avoid their fates even as they strove to imitate them in key respects. At the same time, they benefitted – ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Empires in Time and Space
• 2 Traditions of Empire, East and West
• 3 Rulers and Ruled
• 4 Empires, Nations, and Nation-States
• 5 Decline and Fall
• 6 Empire after Empire
• Select Bibliography
• References
• Index
• End User License Agreement