A Shield Against the Bomb

Ballistic Missile Defence in a Nuclear Environment

A. Vinod Kumar

• Publisher: VIJ Books (India) Pty Ltd
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9789388161442
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

For every major military invention in human history, there has quite always been a countervailing technology. Nuclear weapons have, however, remained an exception. Ballistic missile defence (BMD) has, in recent years, emerged as a formidable means to defend against nuclear-armed delivery systems though yet to prove their total reliability. What does the advent of BMD mean for the nuclear revolution – will it make nuclear weapons obsolete or in turn lead to a new arms race among great powers? This book is a concise volume that examines these strategic dimensions of missile defences, mainly its impact on deterrence. It promises thematic variety by incorporating a technological survey that explains the evolution of BMD concepts and also includes a case study of Southern Asia that throws light on BMD dynamics in a volatile region. The volume balances new conceptual inquests with policy analysis that will make it useful literature on BMD for academics and policymakers.

CHAPTER - V

MISSILE DEFENCE IN THE SOUTHERN
ASIAN THEATRE

The composite region termed as Southern Asia has been a dynamic theatre of nuclear interplay with the unique presence of three nuclear-armed states—China, India and Pakistan.¹ Ever since the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964, nuclear weapons have invariably shaped the strategic contours of this region, which was further conditioned by the nuclear weapon pursuits of Pakistan and India. While China strove to calibrate its deterrent against its perceived rivals (initially the Americans, and later also the Soviets) during the four decades of its nuclear monopoly in the Southern Asian region, the India-Pakistan deterrence equation began to effectively take shape after both nations embarked on a series of nuclear tests in May 1998, and declared their intention to achieve credible minimum deterrence. The subsequent years were marked by an intense build-up of nuclear arsenals, with China pursuing a strategic modernisation effort even as India and Pakistan raced to fulfil the primary prerequisites of what they perceived as “credible” and “minimum” deterrence.

Meanwhile, the advent of the various components of the US missile defence system since the late 1990s also began to influence the strategic calculus of the region. Though India was supposedly the first among the three to begin work on missile defence technologies, China was also by then synchronising its responses to American missile defence initiatives that were beginning to impact the security environment in its neighbourhood. For over a decade after Washington’s announcement of its layered BMD plan,² Beijing publicly and vociferously opposed the very idea of missile defences, terming them as a cause for an arms race and the militarization of space. Remarkably though, China thereafter set forth on its own missile defence and anti-satellite (ASAT) programmes as part of its active defence strategy. On the other hand, India is believed to have launched its missile defence programme in the late 1990s (as a response to China-Pakistan missile cooperation) probably around the same time it was galloping towards overt nuclearisation. As the third player in this matrix, Pakistan spent its energies on developing an India-centric nuclear deterrent, along with the acquisition of high-end conventional capabilities, which it believed could deter India comprehensively. However, in the process, Pakistan seems to have spared few resources to devise a technological option as a response to the missile defence influx in its strategic periphery.

By most accounts, nuclear deterrence in Southern Asia (especially in the South Asian dyad) seems to have evolved to levels certainly beyond the rudimentary; but it is yet to reach a condition of adequacy that could be deemed as survivable and credible. Thus, should the introduction of missile defence in Southern Asia be seen as premature in this evolutionary curve? And if so, will it not complicate the evolving deterrence dynamics in this region rather than contribute to its consolidation or lead to deterrence stability? Instead, should it be construed that the nuclear states pursuing missile defence expect to enhance deterrence by adding greater defensive depth through these platforms? The current picture remains unclear as the nuclear powers in the region are yet to grapple with the full dimensions of this technology. Indeed, they are still confronted with the dynamic transformations in the security environment which challenge the consolidation of their nuclear deterrence process.

Some inferences can be highlighted about this condition. First, despite different levels of capabilities and characteristically divergent approaches to deterrence, all three states are talking about their prevalent posture of minimum deterrence and consequently seeking to match the capabilities of their nuclear rivals. However, none have seemingly reached a position where they can confidently declare the acquisition of assured destruction or massive retaliation capability, which remains at the core of their nuclear doctrines (the no-first-use postures of China and India, or Pakistan’s presumed intention to use nuclear weapons first). Second, even when theoretically convinced that their offensive (or survivable retaliatory) capabilities will determine the potency of their deterrent, the two states pursuing missile defence seems unclear in their public articulations about its operational space and doctrinal character in their strategic force planning. For that matter, it might seem early for them to define whether missile defence systems will provide them with an advantage of defensive depth (to protect against either a first strike or a retaliatory attack), or augment their deterrence postures against adversaries. In other words, even while working towards employing missile defences alongside their strategic forces, neither China nor India is articulate about whether they will be aiming at denial deterrence, or will use these defences to buttress retaliatory deterrence. As such, it would be easier to infer that the Southern Asian nuclear powers are confronted by a situation wherein the technology they have developed has preceded their strategic objectives and doctrinal requirements. This, however, may not be assumed to be a finite or uniform pattern if the Chinese and Indian strategic debates are assessed. While the world waits to understand the objectives of China’s missile defence programme after years of its opposition to this technology, the Indian security establishment is attempting to provide a definite meaning to this technological pursuit in its deterrence posture.

Deterrence in Southern Asia: The Space for Missile Defence

As states that were opposed to, or not initially poised towards missile defence, the current development progress attained by China and India opens questions about their evolving conceptions towards this technological platform, their intended objectives, and how their employment is likely to alter the strategic environment in the respective theatres. To start with, deterrence in Southern Asia is itself passing through a crucial evolutionary phase, embodied in the constant expansion of capabilities, doctrinal realignments, and divergent patterns of technological development and postural behaviour. Some postulations could be made to describe this.

Despite varying capabilities and inventories, all three nuclear states seek to pursue the common objective of attaining credible minimum deterrence even if the definition of credibility, and what amounts to be minimum may not be uniform.

Though each of the nuclear arsenals are galloping at an uninhibited pace, the assessments of individual nations of “what” and “how much” is needed to achieve credible minimum deterrence is not sufficiently articulated, and hence creates doubts, apprehensions, or misrepresentations about the credibility of these deterrents (the ambiguity could also be deliberate, to confuse the adversaries).

While Pakistan as the sole state with a declared preference for first-strike options is unsure about its realistic thresholds, both India and China are increasingly confronted with various push and pull factors on the need to revisit or readjust their No-First-Use (NFU) doctrines in order to address their dynamic strategic environments, as also to increase confidence in the doctrines.

Two relevant questions that will be considered in the subsequent analysis are: do India and China foresee the possibility of missile defences giving them greater defensive depth and/or adding to their deterrence capabilities? Will Pakistan be forced to change its deterrence postures with the introduction of missile defence in the region? A country-wise assessment of deterrence postures and drivers of missile defence could give a clearer picture.

China: Between Minimum and Limited Deterrence?

At the outset, it is worth mentioning the nuclear setting in which China practices its nuclear deterrence. China has probably the most challenging nuclear environment in which it has to consider the presence and influence of at least five nuclear-armed states— Russia, the USA, India, North Korea, and Pakistan—while undertaking its strategic planning. China has friendly relations with only two of these nuclear-armed neighbours, followed by a history of hostility with two others (India and Russia), and considers the nuclear competition with the USA (and American extended deterrence coverage in its neighbourhood) as the primary threat condition. China’s sustained force augmentation (strategic forces modernisation) and strategic support to North Korea and Pakistan create constant pressure on its competitive nuclear neighbours, with varied implications for each for them. This is the backdrop in which US missile defences have been introduced into China’s periphery: first through theatre missile defence (TMD) systems deployed with its East Asian allies; and second, the ineluctable pressure created on China’s nuclear deterrence with its longer-range missiles being susceptible to the US BMD mainstays, be it the GMDS in the American west coast or the EPAA systems covering the Eurasian frontlines. The Chinese riposte, with its own missile defence developmental posturing, though coming belatedly, has, however, complicated the nuclear deterrence calculus in the Asian region, which has two other actors (Russia and India) already surging forward in this new race.

Most of the available literature (not necessarily contemporaneous) on China’s nuclear deterrence is dominated by Western notions about Chinese postures and capabilities, with some of them dealing with questions like why China had based its deterrent on a small and vulnerable retaliatory force for a long period and without an operational doctrine.³ Highlighted in some texts is the prolonged reliance on a rather unsophisticated missile inventory, consisting of medium-range and interim-range missiles like the Dong Feng (DF)-2, -3 and -4, all liquid-fuelled, semi-mobile, and with low-penetration capability. The major shift in the attainment of strike capabilities was through DF-5 in the early 1980s, with over 12,000 km range to target the USA but with liquid-propellants and long preparation time. Despite improving on mobility and shifting to the solid propellant, even later systems like DF-21 and -31 were seen as no less vulnerable, with their huge support systems and dependence on pre-surveyed sites.

Besides factors like political chaos and tardy industrial culture being cited as the reasons for the slow progress in the early years, most observers attribute it to the attitude of first-generation leaders like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, who had termed nuclear weapons as “paper tigers” and symbolic.⁴ Although they later embraced the utility of nuclear weapons as a means to deter “nuclear aggression and coercion” and not for warfighting, they came around to the belief that a posture of (assured) retaliation using a small number of survivable weapons could create deterrence against nuclear-armed adversaries. In fact, this perception of existential deterrence guided China’s nuclear strategy for a long period, with a focus on creating a “certain power to strike back,” not by numerical matching or precision but through weapons which are survivable, and had lesser preparation time in the event of a surprise nuclear attack.⁵ However, this condition was to be transformed with the initiation of strategic modernisation traced to the 1990s, fuelled by remarkable economic growth and the impulses created by the post-Cold War environment. The process of strategic modernisation, though an ongoing process since its initiation, was initially aimed at: (a) augmenting the nuclear deterrent from “minimum” to “limited”, and beyond; (b) developing a new generation of survivable second-strike capabilities that enables assured destruction and first-strike uncertainty; and (c) the possibility of doctrinal and postural changes to refine deterrence, and also to deal with conventional or non-nuclear attacks from adversaries.

Minimum or limited: Most analyses on the modernisation process debate whether China has achieved the ability to project “minimum” deterrence, or whether it targets a capability of “limited” deterrence.⁶ The concept of minimum deterrence is defined as “threatening the lowest level of damage necessary to prevent an attack with fewest numbers of nuclear weapons.”⁷ Though the Chinese feel a small arsenal can provide minimum deterrence with the threat of unacceptable damage, it implies a qualitative threshold of “sufficiency” based on survivable retaliatory forces.⁸ By most accounts, China is assumed to be rapidly moving towards this threshold, but not sufficient enough to be credible in the context of a variety of threats and the wide force matrix of adversaries, and also with shortcomings in survivability, precision, numbers, and mobility (which the current modernisation process seemingly aims to address).

However, another s...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title page
• Copyright page
• Contents
• Preface
• Chapter - I The Context
• Chapter - II The Evolution and Future of Strategic Interception Technologies
• Chapter - III Missile Defence and Nuclear Deterrence
• Chapter - IV Offence-Defence Balance and Missile Defence
• Chapter - V Missile Defence in the Southern Asian Theatre
• Chapter - VI Conclusion
• Index