Section V
National Security Capacity Building
Determinants of Indiaâs Two Front Continental Strategy
Lt Gen PR Kumar, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)@
âThe continental school of strategy argues that control over land is the organising principle of nation-states and politics. Man, lives on the land, not in the sea [or air] and control of the land far supersedes in importance control over maritime areas or lines of communication. In historical perspective, conflict has taken place almost exclusively with control over territory as the stake in the contest.â
-Roger W. Barnett, âMaritime and Continental Strategies: An Important Question of Emphasisâ
Abstract
Emerging multi polar world, multi-domain security challenges both kinetic and non-kinetic, rise of authoritarianism, nationalism and bilateralism, threat of climate change, economic slowdown leading to trade wars and barriers, contest for strategic space and alliances is compelling all countries to carry out dynamic strategic balancing, leading to a turbulent international and regional security environment. Multi Domain Competition/Environment/War (MDO/E/W) has changed the security landscape globally and blurred the distinctions between peace and war, scope of confrontational activities and even levels of conflict (blurring distinction between tactical to strategic). Indiaâs Comprehensive National Power (CNP), the national security apparatus, economic positioning, military modernization structurally, hardware and software (including true integration and jointness in form of Theatre Commands) needs to be transformed to create requisite capacities and capabilities to compete, confront and if necessary fight a two-front war in a 24X7 Multi Domain Environment. At the outset it is imperative to understand that armed forces/militaries do not go to war, but nations go to war, and this fundamental principle must be addressed accordingly.
Introduction
The perennial debate: Closure of the debate on Continental Vs Maritime Vs Aerospace Power with the emergence of Multi Domain Operations/Environment/War (MDO/E/W). MDO envisions the Nation deploying and employing all facets of CNP including the military (not exclusively) and specially game changing technology âfrom diplomacy to economic leverages, fighters to destroyers, space shuttle to submarine, cyber to satellites, social media to psychological operations, Artificial Intelligence (AI), big data to networks, tanks to attack helicopters, munition factory worker to hacksâ working together intrinsically as âOneâ, to overwhelm the adversary with attacks from all domains: land, sea (including sub surface), air, space, cyberspace, psychological and networks centric operations. Dense urban, Information Influence Operations (IIO) including social media and electromagnetic environments are also critical spaces for military and non-military effects. It must be understood that no single domain can dictate/guarantee dominance of the World. On the multi-dimensional chessboard, the facts of geography, the ambitions of strategy and the realities of politics and technology all interact 1. Numerous strategic thinkers and defence analysts are forecasting that with multi domain capabilities possessed by the bigger powers it could mean the âend of geographyâ and even pure continental or maritime power. The proposition that âdomination of kinetic and non-kinetic domains, will eliminate the importance of geography and geopoliticsâ is clearly exaggerated. As David Lonsdale has warned, the âfifth dimensionâ, or the âionosphereâ, does not have its own environment and cannot apply unilateral force. Rather, cyber space and information acts as a medium for more efficient and faster physical expressions of strategic power 2. Improved technology may ameliorate, but will not end, the timeless challenge of mastering tactical topography and of âbattling the elements. It remains a truism that âphysical geography has a continuous, powerful, and profound effect on the nature and course of combatâ3. Realities of geography and geopolitics in conditioning strategy remain inescapable. Ultimately, the use of land power remains the most conclusive instrument of strategy and âwhether or not land constitutes the principal geographical medium on which combat is waged, strategic effect must ultimately have its way in a territorial contextâ. Only land forces provide presence, occupation, possession or control of physical space in modern joint conflict. However, continental power is also ânotâ an end in itself. The above argument is of significant importance when discussing the dynamics of India competing/fighting a two-front threat/war. Having staked the primacy of continental domain, one would like to categorically state that from a strategic and military point of view, for India to take its destined place as a regional power in the mid-term and a global power in the long term, India needs to be an economic, diplomatic, continental, maritime, air, space, cyber, military, economic, technological and information powerâ a Multi Domain Power. This paper will focus on the determinants of Indiaâs two front continental strategies.
Improved technology may ameliorate, but will not end, the timeless challenge of mastering tactical topography and of battling the elements. It remains a truism that âphysical geography has a continuous, powerful, and profound effect on the nature and course of combatâ.
China an emerged global power with attendant characteristics is moving to dominate Asia and subsequently the globe. Geographically contiguous India which has ideological and political differences and a boundary dispute (some would suggest deliberately unresolved) does not have the CNP to confront China. China with its strategic client state Pakistan, other acquiescent South Asian nations are trying to strangulate Indiaâsâ strategic space and thus, its genuine growth and rising aspirations given its geo-strategic location, size and population. The situation gets exacerbated with both China (to lesser extent) and Pakistan conducting proxy war. However, remote the probability, India must be ready to contest a two-front war against China and Pakistan in an unstable internal security environment. An additional half front mainly in the Valley (probability of friction in the North East hinterland is lesser, as most alienated groups are not secessionist) is also spoken about due to the insurgency situation which could worsen drawing in a fairly large number of troops to protect our logistics and communication lines.
Geographical Realities 4
India is the seventh largest country in terms of area in the world and shares approximately 15100 km of boundary with China, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. India has maritime boundaries with seven countries namely; Sri Lanka, Maldives, Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan, and has a coastline of approximately 7500 km, a sub-continent jutting like a colossus into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), dominating many of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) feeding Asia specially China and Japan. Indiaâs continental borders truly have a unique combination of mountains (low hills to super high altitude above 20000 ft), plains, desert and semi desert, riverine and jungle terrain with temperatures varying from -60 degrees to + 50 degrees centigrade. Indiaâs habitation profile varies from dense to uninhabited, demographic and people profile is totally diverse with different languages, cuisine and cultures. Indiaâs borders with Pakistan and China are disputed with 772.1 km of Line of Control (LC) and 126.2 km of Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) along the Siachen Glacier with Pakistan, and 3488 km Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China (total boundary of 3507 km). The LAC is unique in itself as its formal delineation and demarcation is neither done nor actual ground positions known to each side. Each side only has a perception of the other sideâs LAC making it very complex. There is no maritime boundary dispute between India and China, while there is a dispute in the Rann of Kutch (Sir Creek) with Pakistan. The above is relevant because if China decides to âbite the bulletâ and prosecute war against India, there exist a reasonable probability of using the land, space and maritime domains of our immediate neighbours to his advantage (conventional forces manoeuvre through Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan and maritime ports ex Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Maldives and Bangladesh, and also MDO in the hinterland.
International Security Truisms
It is pertinent to list out some prominent international security truisms before listing Indian security truisms. These are:
If China decides to âbite the bulletâ and prosecute war against India, there exist a reasonable probability of using the land, space and maritime domains of our immediate neighbours to his advantage.
International economic-political-security environment being turbulent and dynamic, multi polar assertions exemplifying statement of âno permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interestâ leading to all countries including global powers to carry out dynamic strategic balancing;
Scope of security, competition and conflict has enhanced in terms of geographical area, space, domains, time, potency, technology and blurred distinctions between tactical to strategic and even war and peace;
Nature and scope of deterrence has also revolutionized. With niche technologies and multi-domain operating environment the effects of deterrence are diminishing. But, more potent the multi domain capability the more effective the deterrence, and ironically if deterrence fails this same combat power will be deployed to win the confrontation/conflict;
Multi domain environment/competition/ 24X7 operations with gradually emerging potential of non-kinetic/ cognitive domains (cyber, information including potency of social media, psychological operations, domination of electro-magnetic spectrum, network centric operations).
Regional security zones remaining fairly isolated from interference, further providing impetus for nationalism, authoritarianism and militarization of nation states.
A civilizational superpower is immensely âsensitiveâ to the concept of âloss-of-faceâ.
Indian Security Truisms
Lack of a formal written and promulgated strategic doctrine/National Security Strategy ...