In 2009 the majority of Europeâs post-communist countries are members of the EU and may now consider themselves to be modern capitalist societies. Yet, the mood of optimism and appraisal of post-communist achievements prevalent in the 1990s has turned into caution and criticism during the post-accession years. The well-known analyst of post-communist transformation, Jacques Rupnik, has even characterized the post-accession backlash in the Central and Eastern European countries as a âreturn to post-communismâ in which âthe moral and political vacuum left by communism was fully exposedâ (Rupnik 2006). In the Baltic states, too, the years since EU and NATO accession have revealed that beneath the surface of extraordinarily high economic growth, society is tormented by unsolved political, economic and social problems. Despite having the fastest growing economies among the new EU members, the three countries still lag behind in the level and efficiency of social spending, and have the highest rates of âsocial diseasesâ, such as crime, drugs, HIV and suicides (Europe in figures 2008; Heidmets 2007b; Lauristin 2003).
The controversies surrounding Estoniaâs development can be well illustrated with reference to the divergent assessments of change held by the international community on the one hand, and by domestic media and public opinion on the other. Indeed, the political agenda of change, as well as its outcomes could be âreadâ completely differently from the perspectives of external observers vis-ĂĄ-vis internal, local participants (Lauristin & Heidmets 2002, pp. 23â4). For example, whereas from the external perspective, the issue of the Russian minority belongs to the area of human rights, the domestic political agenda has placed the accent on historical justice and the preservation of the majority language and culture (Ruutsoo 2002, pp. 41â52). External agencies and experts have highlighted the successful economic development and growing international competitiveness of Estonia, whose post-communist transformation has been assessed as one of the most successful amongst the 2004 accession states (Bertelsmann 2006, 2008; Nations in Transit 2008, available at: www.freedomhouse.hu/index.php?optionÂŒcom_content&taskÂŒview&idÂŒ196, accessed 13 December 2008).
The domestic view, however, has focused on the dark side of the changes shadowing this success story (Heidmets 2007a; Lauristin 2003). Evaluations of Estonian development by influential domestic experts sound rather critical:
When measured against Europe, Estonian society seems contradictory. On the one hand, we have fast economic growth, excellent employment levels, and a thriving digitalisation process; on the other hand we are characterized by poor health, xenophobia, incompetence in battling HIV, and overcrowded prisons. ...Our human development has taken us towards freedom, but not enough responsibility and common values. The result is a fragmented and individualistic Estonia that finds it difficult to fit conventional notions and way of life of Europe. (Heidmets 2007b, p. 115)
Has this imbalance emerged as a result of the external pressures exercised by strong monetary institutions headed by the IMF and EU? Or could it be better explained by stressing internal factors, such as the domination of right-wing parties on the political scene or the rapid shift from national development goals to individualistic values and consumerist orientations?
The Nature of External and Internal Factors in Social Change
The role of external and internal factors has been one of the key topics within analyses of Estoniaâs development (see Clemens 2001; Raik 2003; Smith 1999, pp. 176â82). When speaking of âexternal factorsâ, we mean those influences emanating from the presence of international, intersocietal and intercultural forces in a given society, whereas âinternal factorsâ refers to the mutual interrelations of values and social structure (social classes, ethnic groups, generations, gender groups, etc.) as they are institutionalized in a given society (Smelser 1992, p. 370). The model for the analysis of external and internal conditions of transition has been developed by Norgaard (2000), who highlighted several factors specific to Estonia: closeness to the Nordic countries, and specifically Finland (including access to alternative information channels in the Finnish language); the greater readiness of the Estonian managerial elite for the economic reforms; and lower involvement in the Soviet militaryâ-industrial complex (compared to Latvia) (Norgaard 2000, pp. 174â8). In several studies the analysis is focused on the factors behind Estoniaâs success during the early stages of transition (Buchen 2006; Feldmann 2007; Feldmann & Sally 2002; Norkus 2007; Panagiotou 2001). However, in the field of democratic consolidation, more critique than praise has been voiced: a common theme for all post-communist societies is the weakness of civil society (Howard 2003) and the specificity of the post-communist culture (Kennedy 2002; Sztompka 2004; Vogt 2005). Low trust and political instability is seen as characteristic of the reform process (Mishler & Rose 2001; Rose et al. 1998).
In the vast literature analyzing the changes in Central and Eastern Europe over the past two decades, the role of international agencies in promoting non-violent and successful re-integration of the so called ânew democraciesâ (including the Baltic countries) with Europe has merited particular attention (Löfgren & Herd 2000; Raik 1998, 2003; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeyer 2005; Vachudova 2005). The focus here is on the impact of the EU and international monetary institutions (IMF, World Bank, WTO) on the decisions and choices made by the governments of the post-communist countries, the influence of financial and knowledge flows from the West to the East, and the effects of regional and bilateral cooperation. Swedish economist Anders Aslund, summarizing the experience of âbuilding capitalismâ, has suggested that successful examples in the European post-communist countries are mostly related to extensive foreign input, whereas in those areas where the West has lacked sufficient willingness and/or resources for comprehensive involvement, the outcomes of transition have not been good enough. Witness, for instance, Aslundâs claim that âno international organization focused on democracy building or the building the rule of law, and little progress occurredâ (Aslund 2007, p. 313). On the other extreme are those authors who accuse external agencies of imposing liberal reforms and enhancing social inequalities. We, however, cannot accept this kind of black and white assessment of external input as a reason for the success or failure in certain areas of the transformation agenda. We rather agree with Smelser that the interaction between internal and external factors is one of the most interesting issues. The question is: âhow the distinction sometimes breaks down as the two kinds of forces fuse to generate or block the changeâ (Smelser 1992, p. 370).
The field of minority protection has provided good examples of the interplay between international and domestic agencies in framing the political agenda. Looking at the influence of the EU, the OSCE and the COE on policy concerning minority education in Estonia, Elena Jurado has discovered that the effects of certain modes of external influence differed in the early 1990s, compared to later periods (Jurado 2003, p. 420). At the present time, we can speak about a turn from an external to an internal focus in the Estonian policy of minority integration after the shock produced in society by the so called âBronze soldierâ crisis in April 2007 (see Petersoo & Tamm 2008).
Competition between parties is one of the most visible internal factors in the process of transformation (Grzymala-Busse 2007; Orenstein 2001; Vachudova 2005). As regards social agencies, the âwinnersâ and âlosersâ of transition (Rychard 1996) and the role played by the various interest groups, especially the inhibiting role of so-called rent seekers and âold nomenklaturaâ (Aslund 2002, 2007; Szelenyi 1999), have deserved some attention. The role of the initial leaders in setting the agenda of transition has been also stressed. For example, the composition of the first Estonian government after 1991, formed mostly by young radicals who lacked the burden of Soviet-era âcompetenceâ, has been mentioned as a factor facilitating the implementation of liberal reforms (Arias King 2003).
Authors who have critically analyzed political developments in the post-communist countries have pointed to the difficulty of establishing stable party systems, and fighting corruption and clientelism, as well as to the rise of populist conservativeâ-nationalist political forces (Arter 1996; Berglund et al. 2004; Rupnik 2006). Estonia has not escaped any of these problems, although it has been formally recognized as a full and stable democratic system since the late 1990s and, comparatively speaking, has been deemed successful in many areas of democratic reform, displaying: a low level of corruption, stabilization of the party-system, consistency and predictability of econo...