Intangible Flow Theory in Economics

Human Participation in Economic and Societal Production

Tiago Cardao-Pito

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781351580274
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Volkswirtschaftslehre
• Subtopic: Wirtschaftsgeschichte

The dominant economic explanations of the 20th century are not comprehensive enough to describe the complexity of economy and society and their reliance on the biosphere. Intangible Flow Theory in Economics: Human Participation in Economic and Societal Production outlines a new theory that challenges both economics and the relativism conveyed in social constructivism, poststructuralism and postmodernism. To mainstream economics and Marxism, monetary flows transform us humans into commodities. To this new theory, flows of economic elements as physical goods or money are consummated by intangible flows that cannot yet be precisely appraised at an actual or approximate value, for instance, workflows, service flows, information flows or communicational flows. The theory suggests a systematic alternative to refute the human commodity framework and interrelated conjectures (e.g. human capital, human resources, human assets). Furthermore, it exhibits that economic and societal production is fully integrated on the biosphere. Conversely, contemporary relativism argues for the end of theory development, suspension of evidence and entrenchment of knowledge validity among local systems (named as paradigms, epistemes, research programs, truth regimes or other terms). Thus, relativism tacitly supports dominant theories as the human commodity framework because it preventively sabotages the creation of new theoretical explanations. Disputing relativist theses, intangible flow theory demonstrates that innovative theoretical explanations remain possible. This book is of significant interest to students and scholars of political economy, economic sociology, organization, economics and social theory.

Part 1

Introduction

1 A new theory, economics and relativism

1.1 Social sciences, the human condition and a new theory

Why cannot the social sciences try characterizing or even improving the human condition? In other words, why cannot the social sciences attempt to answer questions on matters such as the manner in which our species has lived, where we come from, how we relate to one another, how we may organize our societies, how our species could be perpetuated, or how humankind integrates upon the biosphere? For millennia, human life has undeniably improved, though at a variated progress among different global regions and social groups. Through successive generations, for instance, humans live longer and have further access to water and varied food resources, better health care and sanitation, improved literacy, better means of housing and amenities, improved means of transportation and enhanced technology to address human challenges.¹

Still, our dynamic interactions and impacts upon the biosphere must be carefully addressed. Our planet’s atmosphere, hydrosphere and geosphere² can be considered part of the biosphere because they provide requirements for the existence of living beings. Despite technologies such as 24-hour mass media, the internet, cloud computing, robotics or artificial intelligence (which will feel banal or obsolete in a few years, but situate the moment when this book was written), we humans are still vitally integrated upon the precious biosphere from which essential resources for our survival and existence are obtained. In our monetary societies, however, exerting motivations for obtaining and accumulating more money, we observe members of our species depleting nonrenewable resources and doing effective damage to the biosphere through the most diverse forms of pollution and extinction. Mother Earth’s current biodiversity cannot resist every challenge our species poses to the planet. Although several species may yet resist for longer, our own species’ survival is not perpetually assured. Hardly could we resist an eventual destruction of our habitats.

Likewise, to address an ancient ambition for humankind, an important effort is under way to reach beyond into outer space. To date, we have only been capable of transporting a few humans to the nearby Moon. The capacity to inhabit other planets and spatial stations may, in extreme circumstances, reduce our species’ extinction risk if our planet’s conditions were to become untenable from either human or nonhuman phenomena. That is in a (hopefully very) distant future to come. Why cannot the social sciences participate in these human endeavors, as other scientists help find, for example, more efficient renewable-energy sources, food supplies, means of travel, storage or accommodation, new medicines or software? Even machine intelligence is, in some cases, allowed to address human problems, for instance, in water supply systems, transit networks, medical diagnosis and new medicines.

This work provides a defense for scientific methods based upon reason and logic to address the human condition as a subject of study. It is not a manifest to transform the social sciences into a demagogue voice of the people, which could replace the need for political and societal organization or decide human populations’ views for them. On the contrary, scientific discipline and rigor can control for populist, demagogue and irrational statements that so often have caused societal catastrophes and disasters. With tested mechanisms, social sciences might formulate and debate ideas, theories, hypotheses, methods, systems and so forth. Within these efforts, novel solutions can be discussed regarding our condition’s difficulties. Traditions and beliefs can be either reinforced or contested. Patently, the social sciences must not be expected to always find proper solutions for our many difficulties. Dramatic misgivings will continue to occur. Plenty of historical examples exhibit scientific failures and unsound scientific explanations. Yet, many technologies produced by non-social sciences, which have been quite beneficial to humankind, have also been used to militarily engage in highly destructive wars that have killed many human beings. Science can indeed be captured by political regimes and thus instrumentalized to produce supportive proto-evidence and citizen control mechanisms. Moreover, scientists themselves can create structures in their profession that enforce specific types of research and neglect, boycott or forbid others from expression. Status, roles, resources and accreditations might be allocated to specific scientific programs to the detriment of others. As a result, some dissident yet talented scientists may continue to face long degradation rituals of their reputation.³

However, the resilience of scientific testing enables persistence that leads towards new theories and explanations, which may improve previous ones. Furthermore, social structures of science can be amended, as current ones need not be maintained in place forever. Why should they be? We must not equate science with its own worst abuses.⁴ Researchers, organizers and regulators can come up with enhanced governance and control mechanisms for scientific activity and its scrutiny, in the same manner we humans have been able to address many difficult problems of our condition. Rankings and prizes to research departments and publications will carry weight until scientists accept to be guided by them. Yet, a social scientist who was currently to admit that he/she is trying to improve the human condition would face the perils of becoming an object of severe disparagement. It could only be made worse if he/she were to admit considering other living humans as his/her brothers and sisters, despite all the DNA evidence that connect us as a species.

The new theory presented in this book addresses two major argumentative blocks against having the social sciences attempt to improve or at least characterize, the human condition. One of these blocks is the discipline of economics, or perhaps mainstream economics,⁵ which nevertheless has exported many concepts and methodological frameworks to other social sciences. The other block entails relativist views for the social sciences (or the possibility of science in general), which are often identified under different names such as social constructivism, poststructuralism or postmodernism (or post-postmodernism, post-poststructuralism and so forth).⁶ A great array of positions, ideas and highly heterogeneous groups of authors can and often are described under these terminologies, some of whom may not be relativists, and others are not concerned with scientific affairs. To develop our argument, we will be focused on positions and authors who are undeniably relativist (or anti-realist), even if they could themselves swear to be otherwise. We will of course explain why they are relativist. Importantly, economics and relativist perspectives are not opposite stances, but allied argumentative sets.⁷ Not least, they both sabotage knowledge production purposed to advance life and the existence we humans may have.

The discipline of economics glorifies money as some sort of mystical commodity. Moreover, it treats humans and our contributions to economic and societal production as commodities (often also with the form of assets or capital or resources) to be traded by monetary flows. Human-related flows not reflected on monetary flows are to be discarded or neglected, even if they could greatly contribute to improve the human condition. Relativism in the social sciences has different versions gathering around the outline that we cannot even be certain of facts, for even facts would be socially constructed. To adapt Kukla’s (2000, p. 4) typology,⁸ relativism can be as follows: (i) metaphysical (transcendental) for doubting that there exists a real world (of, say, objects, properties and relations⁹) outside our social and bio-mental¹⁰ constructions; (ii) epistemological (or scientific) for advocating that science cannot have empirical instruments to describe a real world besides our human constructions; and (iii) semantic for suggesting that human languages cannot describe a real world besides our human constructions. Semantic relativism may also entail claims over how institutions and social arrangements enable discourses into being.

An adopter of epistemological and/or semantic relativist arrangements may not entirely be a metaphysical relativist. For instance, someone who doubts that we have adequate scientific methods or language vehicles to capture reality may still accept that reality exist beyond our human constructions.¹¹ Nonetheless, all these three forms lead to relativist results, thereby providing arguments to contest that a definition of the human could be possible, let alone a characterization of our frail human condition. Any account of reality in science would be social constructed, for either (i) reality would not exist outside our individual and social selves or (ii) it would be constructed by scientific methods and/or language molds.¹²

As a result, the framework for the human, or human societies in economics would not need to be strongly contested. Not because those usages would not be constructed by economic methods and human languages, but because any alternative would be a mere metanarrative or grand narrative¹³ to be also deconstructed. Therefore, relativism implicitly allies to mainstream economics’ human commodity framework, for at least it (i) does not persuasively work to produce an alternative theory (and indeed several of its proponents adopt concepts formulated in economics) and (ii) preventively sabotages efforts to produce alternative theories.

Intangible flow theory¹⁴ is one such effort. It suggests a new description for human participation in economic and societal production. However, the new theory seeks also to address these two blocks that work against scientifically characterizing the human condition. As for economics, intangible flow theory presents an alternative to replace the human commodity framework where we humans are prevented from being treated as commodities (or assets, capital or resources). Furthermore, it contests the characterization of money as a metaphysical/mystical commodity, which leads to the neglect...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• About the author
• Part 1 Introduction
• Part 2 Intangible flow theory
• Part 3 Origins of the human commodity framework in mainstream economics and Marxism
• Index