How exactly can ABM help theory testing? Within empirical sciences the standard way of theory testing is the empirical cycle:
1.Formulate a theory covering a certain field.
2.Derive expectations from that theory: if the theory holds, what will be the case in such-and-such circumstances?
3.Design and execute a study that observes what is actually occurring in the specified circumstances.
4.Compare the observations with the expectations. If they are congruent, the theory is corroborated; if they are incompatible, the theory is rejected.
5.Then:
a. If a theory is corroborated, we can always go back to step 2 in order to test the theory again in a different set of circumstances.
b. If a theory has been rejected, we have to go back to step 1 in the cycle, and formulate an adapted version of the theory, or indeed replace the original one with a completely new one. With the adapted or new theory we can go through the cycle again.
We like to stress that, in a strict sense, theory testing comprises the first four steps of the cycle. Step 5a is in fact testing the same theory all over again, which presumably is most fruitful by deriving expectations in step 2 for a different set of circumstances. Step 5b, however, may be seen as theory development, informed by the results of a test performed in steps 1â4.
Deriving expectations
Deriving expectations from a theory is not always easy, due to the complexity of the theory and the complexity of the âcircumstancesâ in which the results of that theory are expected to materialize.
ABM is useful when the complexity of theoretically founded expectations defies our analytical shrewdness. This is often the case when the theory is formulated on the level of actions of individual agents, while these actions are governed by the state of the world in its totality (i.e., the combination of the states of all other agents), which then is the aggregated result of all actions, aggregated over all agents. It is exactly this aggregation over sometimes many interacting agents that constitutes the complexity of the enterprise.
Let us present an example: imagine a criminal decision-making theory (within the routine activity paradigm) that claims: potential offenders aim to victimize only attractive targets and do so only when they will not be seen by passers-by (guardians).
Following the empirical cycle discussed above, let us try to derive expectations from that theory, in the special case of offenders aiming at home burglary. We try to establish what spatial distribution of burglaries we may expect according to the theory. First of all, we have to be more explicit on the content of the theory, in order to make progress (specification of formulated theory). In its present form, it is too gross to be able to derive what actions offenders take and how they exactly react to guardians. (Notice that such specification of a formulated theory is just as necessary when we try to test the theory by methods other than by ABM.) In our example, a possible specification of the theory may be as follows. Imagine a prospective burglar walking down a street, looking for an opportunity to burgle an attractive target; if the target he meets is not surpassing a minimum attraction threshold, he moves on to the next possible target, but as soon as he finds a target that surpasses a minimal threshold of attraction value, he looks around to check whether somebody might see him. If he perceives somebody in that street closer than a given distance, he decides not to burgle the given attractive house, as he is afraid of being seen by such a guardian. If, however, there is no guardian available within the given distance, he continues and burgles the selected target. We then need to be more explicit on the whereabouts of the guardians, e.g., like this: let people pass through the streets at a given pace, starting at arbitrary points, and at each crossroad taking an arbitrary direction.
Though the original theory was rather simple, the still rather straightforward specification makes the situation already pretty complicated; indeed, we think it is already prohibitively difficult to derive what spatial burglary pattern we may expect. That pattern will be dependent on the number of active burglars, how they move through space, their preference for attractive targets, the distribution of attraction values over space, the number of passers-by, their movement patterns, and most complexifying, on the dynamics of how burglars and guardians meet in the presence of attractive targets. We challenge the reader to bring forward an analytical solution to the question of what spatial pattern will be produced by the (specified) theory.
Many theories about human behavior meet the same difficulty, viz. that deriving exact expectations in given circumstances is very hard and often impossible. It is here that ABM simulation comes in handy. In fact, our specification above is already almost enough to construct an agent-based model, with offender agents and guardian agents, moving around on a street network of our choice, where the streets have houses (house agents) of various attraction levels. Indeed, such ABMs, in rather more complex situations, have been published (e.g., Birks & Davies, 2017; Bosse et al., 2010). Running such an ABM will indeed produce a spatial pattern, and given that the ABM has a number of non-deterministic processes on board, repeatedly running the model will provide us with a distribution of expected spatial patterns. Moreover, these results can be parameterized by some of the parameters of the specified theory, such as the minimal attraction level, the distance at which guardians are a threat, the number of offenders and guardians, the pace of guardians, the distribution of attraction values, and so on. All in all, using an ABM is a very powerful approach to deriving expectations from a theory, not analytically but constructively. As a side remark, building an ABM as an expression of a theory is also very helpful in the specification phase: how do we specify how the various agents react in various circumstances? Sometimes the theory is already explicit, but quite often we need to make a choice, which comes down to further specification of a theory. The necessity to be explicit on how agents behave, as a function of the state of other agents, helps in identifying where a theory needs specification.
Observation on what actually occurs in given circumstances
We have argued that ABM methodology can help in mastering the second step of the empirical cycle, producing expectations. Indeed, this is ABMâs strong point. But what about the third step, the observation phase, which is constituted by doing an empirical study and producing an empirical realization of the theory? Here we meet the weak point of ABM for theory testing. The observation stage should produce empirical results in the same circumstances that were present when the expectations were derived. But circumstances used in ABMs are generally of a highly abstract type, and reality, in which the empirical study can be situated, is not abstract, but real. For example, the study of Bosse et al. (2010), cited above, has an ABM in which burglar agents move over a chessboard, and guardians (police officer agents in this case) too. (This study was not a theory-testing study, but investigated, given routine activity theory, which police surveillance strategies were more or less effective in curbing crime.) We cannot observe âreal behaviorâ of âreal burglarsâ and âreal police offersâ on a chessboard. They, obviously, live and act in the real world. So, does the whole ABM approach to theory testing then run aground? We...