Re-imagining Border Studies in South Asia

Dhananjay Tripathi

• Publisher: Routledge India
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000333343
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Geopolitics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book presents a radical rethinking of Border Studies. Framing the discipline beyond conventional topics of spatiality and territoriality, it presents a distinctly South Asian perspective – a post-colonial and post-partition region where most borders were drawn with political motives, ignoring the socio-cultural realities of the region and economic necessities of the people.

The authors argue that while securing borders is an essential function of the state, in this interconnected world, crossing borders and border cooperation is also necessary. The book examines contemporaneous and topical themes like disputes of identity and nationhood, the impact of social media on Border Studies, trans-border cooperation, water-sharing between countries, and resolution of border problems in the age of liberalisation and globalisation. It also suggests ways of enhancing cross-border economic cooperation and connectivity, and reviews security issues from a new perspective.

Well supplemented with case studies, the book will serve as an indispensable text for scholars and researchers of Border Studies, military and strategic studies, international relations, geopolitics, and South Asian studies. It will also be of great interest to think tanks and government agencies, especially those dealing with foreign relations.

Section II

Borders

Regional economy and connectivity

5
India’s quest for connectivity with Central and Southeast Asia

Dhananjay Tripathi and R. Madhav Krishnan

I: Introduction

As discussed in the introductory chapter, and subsequently reiterated, borders in South Asia are largely associated with a sense of security, strongly guarded to monitor the flow of goods and people. The story of borders is one of fascination in the Indian subcontinent, and much of it was imposed by the British. In short, borders in the Indian subcontinent, neutrally termed as South Asia, are the result of colonialism, imposed modernity, and post-colonial political contestations on territories. The Westphalian order gave birth to the modern system of nation-states that initially influenced Europe, and subsequently European colonial powers carried it to the rest of the world. Colonised spaces were organised on the basis of the Westphalian model giving relevance to territory over social systems. The colonisers who were bereft of socio-cultural history and bounding of these regions, started to draw lines for political-administrative purposes and strategic reasons. These colonised spaces with drawing of borders became easy to administer, to meet the political ends and to attain strategic goals. A good example of the political-administrative reason is the partition of Bengal in 1905. This partition, according to Lord Curzon (then British viceroy in India), was to divide Bengal for administrative imperatives, although the ulterior motive was to break the Hindu-Muslim unity in order to weaken the national freedom movement. The Durand Line, established in 1893, was to safeguard British strategic and colonial interests. Drafted as a result of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Mortimer Durand and Afghan Emir Abdur Rahman Khan, it was primarily to avert other imperial powers from entering the Indian subcontinent, giving pre-eminence to the British (Omrani 2009). These lines, though drawn by outsiders, were readily imbibed by the post-colonial South Asian states. Interestingly, South Asian states also acquired security concerns from the British and had shown strong determination to make their borders safe and secure.

This obsession with border security could be justified under the impression that post-colonial South Asia was committed to preserve the hard-earned sovereignty. Also, post-colonial South Asia witnessed partition and bloodshed that added further worries to border security. This ‘territorial anxiety’ makes states uncomfortable with the idea of open borders. The fortified borders in South Asia are considered a barrier to the movement of goods and people.

The ‘controlled border principle’ has internationally lost its appeal after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Globalisation in this regard stands opposed to the idea of borders. So, while the right of the state to militarily secure the borders is unquestioned, there is strong acceptability for easing the movement of goods and people. South Asia, despite its keen commitment to globalisation, fails to replicate the same enthusiasm for regionalism, and the borders in South Asia are mostly about fences, security, and violence. For India, the largest constituent of South Asia and one of the fastest-growing economies of the world, the story is not much different when it comes to regional connectivity. Indian economic success is largely derived from being connected to the world economy, albeit its regional and intraregional connectivity fail to match its aspirations to become a world power and an economic powerhouse. In this chapter, we will discuss Indian ambition to connect with energy-rich Central Asia and economically strong Southeast Asia and analyse how a number of issues continue to dampen its plans to reach these two regions.

II: India-Central Asia: reviving the traditional connection

Economic growth in India has given it a renewed sense of strength. Marching on the path of free market reforms, India has improved its economic status and added richness to its vault. While there are issues of acute disparity related to the neoliberal economic reforms in India and it is indeed a matter of concern, still, the economic buoyancy has added wealth to a section, creating a strong consumer base and a league of entrepreneurs who are willing to expand their horizons in search of profit. In addition to the number of consumers with an increased appetite for products and services, the first thing that comes under stress is India’s energy requirements. Secondly, the noteworthy economic ambition of India requires it to get connected to other parts of the world where it can reap an advantage. These two necessities make it imperative for India to step out of the traditional frame of border policy and to look for accessibility in newer regions. In this quest, Central Asia and Southeast Asia fit into the overall requirements of India. Central Asia is an energy-rich region, and Southeast Asia serves as a destination for the aspiring business class of India. Both of these require connectivity, a passage for easy and fast movement in a bid to make things cost effective. In this chapter we will delve into these dimensions from the perspective of Border Studies. The chapter extensively focuses on connectivity issues.

The connection between India and Central Asia dates back to time immemorial, with both regions being part of the ancient Silk Route. The imprint of this connection is visible even to this day on art, culture, and culinary of both Central Asia and India. This flow of people, trade, and culture was stalled after India was colonised and specific borders were created. Afghanistan was established as a buffer state by the British as part of the ‘Great Game’ with Russia, thereby separating India from Central Asia. While the British left the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the borders they created remain unaltered in the region, as well as largely unquestioned and securitised. Moreover, United India was also divided into India and Pakistan, and unfortunately both remain indulged in a territorial dispute. Likewise, Pakistan and Afghanistan too have border controversies in relation to the Durand Line.

The modern nation-states system evolved in South Asia both during colonial and post-colonial periods, but unfortunately it restricted the movement of people and goods. Moreover, Central Asia was incorporated as a part of the Soviet Union, and also the political transition in China (coming from a communist regime) affected the Silk Route (Radhu 2017). These developments slowly erased the public memory of the Silk Route until China swung into action. China recently began making a daunting effort to revive the old Silk Route, renaming it the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). On a simple reading, the BRI is an attractive project, but with the advent of the nation-state system, the spaces have changed to territories, demarcated by borders and controlled by governments. In this regard, the BRI is contingent on participation of nation-states, whereas the old Silk Route was not strictly controlled by the states. The political tensions are evident when nation-states take their call on BRI (Macaes 2019). Therefore, Pakistan has too readily accepted the BRI, even at the cost of ignoring the environmental concerns. On the other hand, India is reluctant to be a participant in BRI over concerns of sovereignty.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), the geopolitics of Central Asia were altered and it is now represented by five Republics – Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. India rose to the occasion and established diplomatic relations with all five republics after their independence. It was expected that India would emerge as an immediate partner of Central Asia, but soon these beliefs dissipated. While India struggled, China and Russia successfully involved themselves in Central Asia, both in terms of economics and politics, making India a distant partner. As per estimations, Central Asia does $30 billion in trade with China and around $18 billion with Russia, whereas India marks $2 billion. As per the Ministry of Commerce, Government of India, though there is a significant increase from the previous figures of $1.8 million (2017), the trade deficit between the region and India has risen to $1.1 billion (2018) from around $850 million (2017). These figures are significant as they show that the Indian trade ratio with the Central Asian Republics is not reaching its potential despite several bilateral and multilateral agreements. Moreover, staggering projects and rigid tariff regimes and policies of the Republics have induced significant losses to India. It is also to be noted that the cumulative percentage of the share of trade of India with the Republics only amounts to 0.13% and has remained constant with no improvement since 2018 in regard to exports. With respect to imports, India’s share has fallen from 0.19% in 2018 to 0.18% in 2019 (until April 2017) (Ministry of Commerce and Industry 2019).

There are structural and institutional problems in enhancing India-Central Asia trade, and this goes with the fact that historical ties and cultural affiliations are not translating into robust commercial ties. While there are economic reasons, as discussed earlier, infrastructure deficits add to the overall concern. In the case of infrastructure, the biggest issue is how to physically reach Central Asia. With reservations to BRI, India has also opted not to reach Central Asia by utilising the pathway laid by China. Likewise, reaching Central Asia through Pakistan and Afghanistan would have made things easy, but the India-Pakistan conundrum related to the geopolitical conflict and mistrust fades any prospects of this preferred, easy, and traditional route (Kaushiki 2013). India, therefore, has initiated numerous projects to partner with other countries to get connected to Central Asia. India’s ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy is a bedrock and is consistently working on a number of projects. ‘The policy was publicly articulated in June 2012 and is based on a pro-active political, economic, strategic, and cultural policy with people-to-people engagement and some flagship projects’ (Bisaria 2013, 186). ‘Connect Central Asia’ is for all possible attempts to reach Central Asia and also to find alternatives to the traditional India-Pakistan-Afghanistan route.

‘In the prevailing situation the next best option is through Iran’ ( Joshi 2014, 87). Realising the relevance of Iran, India invested in Chabahar port of Iran to facilitate the trade of goods to Central Asia and Afghanistan. As per the agreement, India operates two berths in Chabahar port phase – I with capital investment of $85.21 million and annual revenue expenditure of around $22.95 million (PTI 2019).

The plan is for Indian shipments to be offloaded at Chabahar port, where cargo would be loaded onto trucks and trains to Zahedan and onward to Zaranj in Afghanistan. Goods can be transported then to any part of Afghanistan via the Ring Road, even beyond, to the CARs. Likewise, goods from Afghanistan and the CARs –...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of tables
• Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Foreword
• List of abbreviations
• Section I Theorising borders: the South Asian perspective
• Section II Borders: regional economy and connectivity
• Section III Borderlands
• Section IV Securitisation and borders
• Index