Communication Strategies in Turkey

Erdogan, the AKP and Political Messaging

Taner Dogan

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781838602253
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is known for his populist Islamist ideology, charismatic personality, and for ushering in new forms of communication strategies in Turkey. The key tools in Erdogan's political communication repertoire include religious, cultural and historic symbols and imagery. From engaging Israel to the Gezi Park protests, from the Arab uprisings to the July 2016 coup attempt, every key moment in Turkey's recent history has heralded a change in Erdogan's rhetoric.
Communication Strategies in Turkey examines the transformation of political messaging that has taken place within the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under Erdogan. Using quantitative and qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews with high profile AKP officials, observations at AKP rallies and headquarters, and analysis of Erdogan's speeches from 2002 to 2019, the book shows how his method of communication changed over time to prioritise a "New Turkey" to replace Atatürk and his legacy.

1

Introduction

Since 2010, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been in a kulturkampf. It is a challenge to transform the Kemalist laïcité¹ domestically, and the perception of Muslims globally – in other words, a struggle against Kemalism and Islamophobia. In fact, Erdoğan is trying to position himself as the patron of the Muslim world as he defends the rights of Palestinians by challenging Israel, welcomes millions of refugees and Muslim exiles since the Arab uprisings have started, supports rebuilding initiatives in Somalia, restores Ottoman era historic buildings in Balkans, builds new mosques and Imam Hatip schools² across the country, reconverts iconic Hagia Sophia and Chora Museum to a mosque and, above all, stands for religious freedom at home. Certainly, these expansions are enabled by the vast amount of political powers Erdoğan has acquired after taking possession of the judiciary, military and the police. By changing the constitution, he has made himself the strongest politician ever in the country. Yet, although these steps are strengthening Erdoğan’s reputation as a populist leader, the transformation from pluralism to Islamism is isolating Turkey every passing day , and Erdoğan’s communication is playing a critical role in this isolationist policies.

Erdoğan’s career started within a liberal frame when he and his reformist colleagues decided to form the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, hereafter the AKP) in 2001, following unsuccessful attempts to reform Necmettin Erbakan’s Milli Görüş movement.³ Erbakan’s ideological approach to politics was not approved by the younger generation of Milli Görüş. In fact, when Erbakan became the first elected Islamist prime minister in Turkey in 1996, he ruled for fewer than twelve months, because his party’s anti-Kemalist agenda resulted in a postmodern coup in 1997. The postmodern coup in Turkey had an immense impact on the religious conservatives in the country, as it involved the closure of Imam Hatip schools and headscarf bans for female university students. After this critical timeframe, the AKP came into being by emphasizing its focus on the words ‘justice’ and ‘development’ in their official name in response to Turkey’s economic and judicial woes in the early 2000s. They aimed to increase the diversity of their support base by focusing on Turkish people’s economic and political needs rather than on pursuing a religious ideology. The founding members of the AKP studied the political landscape carefully, presenting themselves as a party willing to embrace democracy, human rights, freedom of speech and the rule of law. The discourse and political agenda of the new party differed significantly from that of Milli Görüş, as it set its objectives around the pursuit of European Union (EU) membership, pluralism, neoliberal economics and pro-Western foreign policy. More importantly, it appealed to both Turkey and the international community as the new moderate face of Islam in the Middle East. They portrayed themselves as ‘conservative democrats’ in order to be at the centre of the political landscape straddling both the right and the left to create an image similar to that of the Christian democratic parties in Europe.

In the first election that the AKP contested, a mere fifteen months after its establishment, the party received 34 per cent of the votes, amounting to two-thirds of the seats in parliament which enabled them to form the government on their own. Erdoğan’s successful mayorship in Istanbul from 1994 to 1998, during which he delivered crucial services to the public – such as installing new water and natural gas lines, cleaning up the streets and the Golden Horn,⁴ undertaking paysage projects, improving transportation for Istanbulites – had already created an image of him as a young, charismatic and capable leader in the minds of the people. Therefore, his achievements as a member of Milli Görüş played a major role in the AKP’s success story.

The support for the conservative democrats grew from one election to another, as the party expanded freedom of expression and minority rights for Kurds and Alevis in particular, implemented a foreign policy based on the concept of ‘zero-problem’ and forged positive relationships with neighbours such as Syria, Armenia and Israel. The AKP appealed so effectively to the international community that Western capitals referred to it as a role model for other Islamist parties and movements in the Middle East and the North Africa (MENA) region For the first time in Turkey’s modern history, an Islamist party developed a positive communication with the West, which was ‘the other’ until that date.

The positive coverage of the AKP in the international media, which continued up until 2010, was a result of this narrative. However, a turning point came around this time, resulting from a heated exchange between President Erdoğan and the Israeli prime minister at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2009⁵ followed by the Mavi Marmara aid flotilla incident in 2010.⁶ This marked a shift in the image of the AKP from that of a role model to an Islamist party in the international arena. By standing up to Israel, Erdoğan repositioned himself as the guardian of the Muslim world.⁷ He came to be perceived on the Arab streets as a principled and charismatic leader, and his apparent repositioning relative to Israel gave rise to questions over whether Turkey is moving away from its Western political hemisphere. As the evidence collected for this research will demonstrate, after 2010 the agenda of the AKP started focusing on the Muslim world, fighting smoothly with the Kemalist elites on an ideological level. In addition, in terms of foreign policy, Erdoğan became less willing to follow Washington and Brussels’ lead by opening up Turkey’s horizons to Russia and China, moreover, introducing the Blue Homeland doctrine for maritime claims in the eastern Mediterranean. This repositioning became increasingly apparent in the rhetoric employed domestically by the AKP and Erdoğan himself after the Gezi Park protests in 2013, which were partially provoked by the enforcement of new conservative policies and a harking back to the country’s Ottoman heritage. This new rhetoric continued into Erdoğan’s speeches in the post-2010 period, and in policy changes following the coup attempt of July 2016. The role of Islam after this period started changing in the public sphere. From reconverting Hagia Sophia to a mosque, to naming new bridges and highways after Ottoman sultans and building Ottoman-Seljuki mélange mosques, schools and palaces, banning pride marches and queer-friendly events, and polarizing the society along cultural and religious lines, a new approach to politics emerged within the AKP – one which is related to what this book terms as Erdoğan’s ‘populist Islamist’ ideology. Yet Erdoğan’s aim with all these steps is to leave an imprint behind. Furthermore, he wants to have a pious generation that, later, will take over his legacy and ‘be leaders of the society’.⁸

However, the latter remains unfulfilled after two decades of governance when considering the fact that generation Z (born between 1995 and 2010), who have not had the opportunity to witness the rule of any other party, shows less support for Erdoğan’s AKP. Similarly, compared to ten years ago, young people in Turkey describe themselves as less ‘religious’ and ‘pious’, embracing a modern lifestyle and respect for diversity.⁹ It is the same generation that consumes more social media than traditional mainstream media which is 85 per cent under Erdoğan control.¹⁰ The fear of losing generation Z leads Erdoğan to control digital communication by introducing new social media laws and confronting platforms such as Netflix to regulate the content regarding LGBTQ+ characters – further step of limiting freedom of speech.

In an attempt to understand the above-mentioned transformation that has taken place within the AKP and Turkey, this book will examine the AKP’s political communication strategies to unpick the development of and changes in its political message, discourse and language. The discussion divides the period of AKP rule into two eras: 2002 to 2009, which was characterized by a liberal political ideology and pluralism, and post-2010, which witnessed a shift towards a populist Islamist discourse, questioning the objectives of the democratization and liberalization process. In reference to the first period, the AKP is described as the first post-Islamist party in Turkey willing to embrace democracy and moderate Islam.¹¹ However, the changes in both discourse and policy after 2010 suggest that the new strategy of Erdoğan’s AKP is to change the dominant secularization policies of Atatürk and ‘rescue the Islamic world from Western colonization to once again achieve a dominant position in world politics’.¹² Thus, the development of the AKP’s political communication can be characterized by the transition from post-Islamism to populist Islamism.

The global rise of the ‘populist zeitgeist’, as Mudde¹³ describes, has put Erdoğan into the same category as that of populist leaders, such as Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi. This global development and AKP’s polarizing discourse – of differentiating between ‘us’ as the majority of religious conservatives who seek national independence, a strong economy and religious freedom, on the one hand, and ‘them’ who favour old Kemalist policies that make Turkey dependent on the West, on the other – have strengthened Erdoğan’s leadership. Yet when German historian Winkler speaks about Putinism in the context of Russia vis-à-vis the West, he underlines that it is not an intellectual challenge to the West as Leninism or Marxism once were.¹⁴ Because for him, homophobia, anti-feminism, anti-liberalism and anti-rationalism are crucial aspects that need to change course in Russia. The same applies to the communist regime in China according to the historian. In this regard, Erdoğan’s political approach, or ‘Erdoğanism’ in the context of Winkler, is not an intellectual contribution to Turkey’s political sphere. Erbakan’s suggestion of formulating an alternative economic model of ‘Just order’ (Adil Düzen), or his vision of creating the D-8¹⁵ (an EU-like political union among Muslim nations) and having a common currency – in other words, standing for an alternative political agenda – were what made his approach fundamentally different from Erdoğan’s when it comes to intellectual discussion about religious conservatism in Turkish politics. Despite Erbakan being more moderate when he came to power, as compared to the early 1970s when he started his political career, and leading a coalition government, he has not tarried to strengthen his base and gain credibility like his student Erdoğan. In fact Erdoğan’s conviction in challenging the West, its institutions and his anti-Israel discourse is a result of the confidence he gained after transforming the country economically from 2002 to 2010, winning one election after another, securing the presidency by appointing Abdullah Gül in 2007 as well as making changes to the judiciary and military with the support of the Gülenists.¹⁶ But in spite of the power he gained – especially after changing the constitution in his favour, abolishing the prime ministry and being the most powerful president of all times in Turkish history – his leadership was not able to forge unique models in politics, economics and education, which are the three fundamental areas vital for the future of any country. As a result, despite Erdoğan’s seemingly more power-emanating discourse after 2010, as will be examined in this research by concentrating on communication strategies and on the incorporation of more images and symbols based on his populist Islamist approach, he has not been able to present an alternative model that will back up what his discourse proposes.

This research contends that effective communication of a party’s message and charismatic leadership are fundamental to its political success. Of particular interest will be how changes in policy have been reinforced by Erdoğan’s charismatic leadership style. He has effectively used a variety of political communication strategies, including images and symbols, to create a collective identity among the AKP’s supporters, which has kept the social movement alive for a long period. However, starting with the Gezi Park process, this collectiveness among the AKP’s leading figur...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-title Page
• Dedication Page
• Title Page
• Contents
• Illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Short note on methods
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The concept of political communication
• 3 Modernization in the Ottoman era, Islamism in Turkey and AKP’s rise
• 4 The AKP’s code of identity
• 5 Communicating religion
• 6 Politics and p(owe)r: Evolvement of political messaging
• 7 Erdoğan’s communication: Populist Islamism
• 8 Post-Erdoğan Turkey
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index
• Copyright Page