Britain and the United States in Greece

Anglo-American Relations and the Origins of the Cold War

Spero Simeon Z. Paravantes

• Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781350142022
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

For the first time, Britain and the United States in Greece provides an in-depth analysis of Anglo-American diplomacy in Greece from 1946 to 1950. After Word War II, as Europe floundered economically, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee looked to disengage Britain from some of its broad international obligations and increase American support for its new foreign agenda. One place he sought to do so was in Greece. Spero Simeon Z. Paravantes reveals how the relationship between Britain and the US developed in this formative period, arguing that Britain used the fast-escalating tensions of the Cold War to direct US policy in Greece and encourage the Americans to take a more active role – effectively taking Britain's place – in the region. In the process, Paravantes sheds new light on how the American experience in Greece contributed to the formulation of the Truman Doctrine and the containment of communism, the structure of Greek institutions, and ultimately, the birth of the Cold War. Drawing on a wide range of sources from Britain, the US, Greece and the Balkans, this book is essential reading for all scholars looking to gain fresh insight into the complex origins of the Cold War, 20th-century Anglo-American relations, and the history of modern Greece.

1

Historical Background: British Relations with Greece and the United States until June 1945

Like any regional power or superpower, the British have a long and well-documented history of intervening in the domestic affairs of foreign nations in pursuit of their national interest. Although the depth and breadth of that involvement has varied, the predisposition of the British to intervene in the affairs of other states has not. Their intervention has ranged from economic subversion and trade wars to coups (as in Iran in the 1970s) and the installation of rulers, as in Greece in the early nineteenth century with the installation of King Otto in 1821.

Relations between Great Britain and the United States also have a long and unique history and have been as diverse as the countries in which these nations have become involved. The last time that Great Britain and the United States came into direct military conflict was in 1812. One hundred and thirty years later, the Second World War forever altered not only the way(s) in which the United States and Britain related to each other but also, perhaps more significantly, the way in which they intervened in the affairs of foreign states. For the first time in history, two world powers switched positions of supremacy without coming into military conflict—but this shift was not without problems. It allowed the British to believe that they could regain their pre-war status and made the Americans more trusting of British intentions, information, and policies. These elements were extremely influential, not only to the British and American people but also to the people of Europe, who became pawns in the British and American “chess match” against the Soviet Union and its real or perceived intentions for world domination.

In terms of United States policy toward Greece, the end of the First World War saw the Americans, disillusioned with post-war European politics, withdraw into isolationism. By December 1940, after almost two years of war in Europe, the only commitment the US could make was to be the “arsenal of democracy” to provide the supplies needed by the British to fight the Germans.¹ It was not until the Japanese attacked the US on December 7, 1941 that isolationism was at least officially abandoned, and the United States embarked on an unprecedented and long-lasting period of direct intervention in European affairs.

Between 1922 and 1939, British policy toward Greece was not overly concerned with Greece’s strategic value because the possibility of war in the Mediterranean was not taken seriously. For their part, Greek politicians were content to maintain the current level of good relations with Britain because of British military power in the Mediterranean. However, the traditionally close Anglo-Greek economic links of the nineteenth and early twentieth century were beginning to wane, and by 1935, Greece enjoyed closer economic ties with Nazi Germany than with Britain because of favorable trading terms.

In the period between the Asia Minor catastrophe and the start of the Second World War, US interest in Greece also dwindled. It was not until after the end of the war that the dramatic reversal of Anglo-American positions and the perceived threat represented by the USSR and its satellites led to a change in the United States’ position.

The Special Operations Executive: The Impact of British Spies in Greece

In early 1941, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) performed many duties in Greece, since it acted as a liaison between the Foreign Office and the beginnings of what would become the Greek resistance groups, in addition to its duties of equipping and training saboteurs.² The SOE’s activities in Greece were kept secret because post-occupation planning may have implied that the defeat of Greece was inevitable and thereby undermined the will of the Greek military.³ The SOE was also tasked with coordinating action against the expected German occupation forces and relaying intelligence to the British government about the Germans and the Greek resistance should an occupation occur.⁴

When Hitler invaded the USSR in May 1941, he turned Stalin into Churchill’s most significant ally. Although the Nazi-Soviet peace had lasted for nearly three years, the USSR was under-equipped and unprepared to meet the German offensive. The rapid seizure of most of the Soviet Union’s European territory by the Germans reinforced Britain’s belief in the utter incompetence of the Soviet military, thereby reducing the importance placed by the British on the USSR as an ally.⁵ This reductive attitude was in turn furthered by Churchill’s outspoken anti-communism; however, his position did not sway the USA, which extended lend-lease to the USSR.⁶

Once the United States entered the war, it was initially able to agree with Great Britain only that the defeat of Germany and Japan should be the primary objective. Two main aspects of Britain’s efforts to influence US policy are truly remarkable. The first is their level of success, which was unexpectedly high, and the second is the degree to which the Americans would follow the British example after the Second World War was over.⁷

The fact that Churchill needed to establish an organization tasked not only with relaying information about but also shaping US policy indicates how far apart US and British policy were in the early years of the Second World War. On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor instantly drew the United States into the war. Despite gaining two allies (the USSR and the USA) within a period of six months, the British felt that they were in an unenviable position and still risked being the “odd man out” in the relations and planning conducted between the Big Three. The forces of isolationism, which had prevented the United States from joining the League of Nations in 1919, were still very strong and threatened to reassert themselves once the Second World War was over.⁸ To counter this, in the first few months after the United States entered the war, Roosevelt put forward his idea for the post-war era, which he called the “Four Policemen.” His plan was to create an organization similar to the League of Nations, but rather than relying on consensus amongst a hundred or more members, the United States, Great Britain, the USSR, and China (which together represented more than 1 billion people) would be the main decision-makers in the post-war world.⁹ It was the precursor to the United Nations Security Council and formed the basis for Roosevelt’s post-war strategy. Since Greece had fallen to Germany the previous year, and because the US was mainly focusing on the Pacific theatre, it was happy to allow the British to continue to deal with the Greek government and resistance.

Politically, in the spring of 1942, the official British policy was to support King George II and the war effort, but through the actions of the SOE, in practice Britain was actually supporting groups that desired the collapse of the Greek government. SOE agents made contact with Venizelists, communists, and other Metaxas opponents as part of Churchill’s plan “to set Europe ablaze.” However, it seemed from the outset that British policy leading up to and during the Second World War was destined to keep Greece as divided as it had been in the 1920s. The SOE worked with republicans and communists because they were the most willing and able to operate underground. On the other hand, most of those loyal to the king and the Greek government were seen by the British as satisfied with the current political situation, and if they decided to resist the occupation at all, they did so too late and were therefore of little use to British intelligence.¹⁰

Though the occupying forces represented a common enemy, the forces that would rise up to oppose these occupiers had diverging political agendas. The British expected that these agendas would be set aside until the end of the war. British policies toward the war efforts of the Greek government in exile and the Greek resistance, despite appearing complementary on the surface, were in practice almost completely incompatible. They were effectively flawed from the outset, since those upon whom the British relied to support the first were also the least likely to accept or support the second. Not only did this create problems in Greece; it also created many problems between the main British agencies responsible for operations in Greece, the Foreign Office, and the SOE.

The SOE had been in Greece since 1941 training saboteurs, and the first SOE mission to support the Greek resistance in the mountains took place in October 1942. Nicholas Hammond, C. M. Woodhouse and Brigadier E. C. W. Meyers parachuted into Greece to destroy the Gorgopotamos railway bridge.¹¹ On March 8, 1943, British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden reiterated a policy of “full support for the Greek King and his government, even at the expense of some loss of active effort against the occupying powers.”¹² What Eden and the Foreign Office seemed not to be aware of was that with some 10,000–12,000 armed men, the Greek People’s Liberation Army (ELAS) was the only force large enough at the time to make any headway against the occupying forces.

Churchill ordered the SOE in a different direction. He stated that unless operational necessity dictated otherwise, aid to the Greek resistance “would favor the groups willing to support the king and his government.”¹³ However, this statement was not binding, and beyond stating that His Majesty’s government supported King George, the SOE was free to work with ELAS. The SOE continued to work with all groups that were opposed to the occupation and attempted to keep them from turning on each other. Had Churchill’s recommendation been followed, it is unlikely that aid would have been provided to any Greek resistance groups throughout the German occupation; but in practice the British supplied these groups with food, clothing, weapons, and gold. Despite the conditions of the war in Europe at this time, the amount of aid that ELAS and EDES received was impressive, especially considering the logistical problems that were involved in supplying it.¹⁴

The American attitude toward the Greek resistance was also greatly influenced by the British. At Britain’s insistence, the Americans helped repress news of the Greek military’s mutiny in the Middle East to avoid further damaging the prestige of the Greek government in exile.¹⁵ Furthermore, the British made it clear to the Americans that they desired the return of King George to power, and that while they would not use force to achieve this goal, they would attempt “to sell the King and the Tsouderos government” to the Greek people, at least in part by persuading them that the king intended to rule as a democratic constitutional monarch. The Americans agreed with the British and recognized the Greek government in exile and the king as the legitimate government of Greece.¹⁶ However, they stressed that the Greek people should be given the opportunity to express their views against the monarch and, in keeping with their own fears of foreign manipulation (which were well founded), insisted that the Greek king should not be “promoted” by a foreign power.¹⁷ The Americans feared that foreign intervention would re-stimulate longstanding political divisions in Greece and that Britain’s belief that only a monarchy would be suitable was supported “neither by the facts of recent Greek history nor by a reasonable analysis of the present temper of the Greek people.”¹⁸ The US view was that forcibly restoring an unpopular government would raise the possibility of armed conflict amongst organized groups that were prepared to oppose the return of the king and his government. Additionally, the Americans believed that if the Greek people were not supported by the United States in their right to choose their method of government, then they would likely turn to the Soviet Union for support.¹⁹ Therefore, although the United States followed British policy by recognizing and supporting the Greek government in exile and the king, it succeeded in its policy objectives by persuading the Greek king to declare that at the end of the war, he would “submit himself to the free expression of the will of the Greek people,” although the pledge was only for the composition of the government, not it...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle Page
• Title Page
• Dedication Page
• Contents 
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgments
• Note on the Text
• List of Acronyms
• Introduction
• 1 Historical Background: British Relations with Greece and the United States until June 1945
• 2 The Aftermath of Varkiza and Inter-Allied Confrontations
• 3 A New Era of American Intervention: The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the Beginning of the Cold War
• 4 “Paved with Good Intentions”: British Influence and American Intervention in Greece
• 5 The Tide Turns: The End of the Greek Civil War and the Supremacy of the United States
• 6 Détente and the Revelation of the New World Order
• Conclusion
• Epilogue
• Appendix: Chronology
• Bibliography
• Index
• Imprint