The Making of Foreign Policy in Iraq

Political Factions and the Ruling Elite

Zana Gulmohamad

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781838604998
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

How is foreign policy made in Iraq? Based on dozens of interviews with senior officials and politicians, this book provides a clear analysis of the development of domestic Iraqi politics since 2003. Zana Gulmohamad explains how the federal government of Iraq and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have functioned and worked together since toppling Saddam to reveal in granular detail the complexity of their foreign policy making.
The book shows that the ruling elites and political factions in Baghdad and in the capital of the Kurdistan Region, Erbil, create foreign policies according to their agendas. The formulation and implementation of the two governments' foreign policies is to a great extent uncoordinated. Yet Zana Gulmohamad places this incoherent model of foreign policy making in the context of the country's fragmented political and social context and explains how Iraq's neighbouring countries - Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Syria before the civil war - have each influenced its internal affairs. The book is the first study dedicated to the contemporary dynamics of the Iraqi state - outside the usual focus on the "great powers" - and it explains exactly how Iraqi foreign policy is managed alongside the country's economic and security interests.

Chapter 1

Major domestic actors in foreign policy post Saddam

Iraq’s foreign policy making is shaped by the conflicting and overlapping interests of the elites and their political factions, which occupy the decision-making process and the Iraqi political scene. The competition, division and external ties of Iraqi political forces (Shia, Arab Sunnis and Kurds) and their attempt to influence policymaking have contributed to the incoherent and weak foreign policy. In this chapter, I will examine how the visions and approaches of the political factions and key figures directly and indirectly contribute to Iraq’s intricate and fragmented foreign policy making. The complexities are reflected in self-interest, political diversity between key figures and major factions, their exercise of external relations and their vying for influence over the federal government. According to former Iraqi deputy prime minister Dr Barham Salih: ‘The real foreign policy of Iraq was conducted through the bilateral arrangements of Shia political parties, Arab Sunni political parties, and Kurdish political parties with the Iranians, the Turks, the Arabs [Arab world]’ (author’s interview with Salih, 2014). Shia, Arab Sunni and those who are purportedly cross-sectarian political figures and forces have been involved in conducting foreign relations. There have been some tendencies between various ethnic sectarian factions and figures to cooperate, which plays into the hands of factions and elites. The factions and their leaders’ lack of detailed and committed foreign policy plans have left Iraq’s foreign policy at the mercy of their interests and regional calculations.

The visions, agenda and ties of the political factions and key prominent leaders extend beyond Iraq’s sovereign borders. Lukman Faily, Iraq’s former ambassador to the United States, pointed out the differences between key influential figures and political factions, including those inside and outside the government, which make it difficult for diplomats to present a clear picture externally (author’s interview with Faily, 2016). Labeed Abbawi, Iraq’s former undersecretary at the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs (I-MOFA), said ‘Iraq’s diplomatic ties with the outside world have become politicalized and political groups, especially Islamic parties, have an influence on how the country conducts foreign relations’ (Rudaw, 2017a). Post 2003, Islamic parties have more influence on Iraqi foreign policy than the non-religion-based parties. According to Hussein Sinjari (a Kurdish Yazidi), Iraqi ambassador to Romania and formerly to Portugal, ‘Iraq has a foreign policy but there is not coherence in Iraqi foreign policy … Therefore, foreign countries will not take us seriously or with respect … Iraq’s different religious and ethnic groups make it difficult for a coherent foreign policy’ (author’s interview with Sinjari, 2015).

Various political factions via their ethnic, religious, political, ideological and personal differences and their competition for resources and power have contributed to an incoherent foreign policy. Dhafer al-A’ni, member of Parliament in the Iraqi Council of Representatives (ICR) and in the Foreign Relations Committee (FRC), stated:

There are multiple or numerous levels of Iraqi foreign policy … Firstly it is based on ethnic or sectarian foreign policies; Shiite, Sunnis and Kurdish foreign policies … Secondly there are different foreign policies from decision makers’ level, such as the President, Prime Minister, and Minister of Foreign Affairs where each have their own perspective and they are not compatible … Thirdly, there are foreign policies that emanate from various political parties, which are different from each other; for example, the external relations of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan are different from those of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. (Author’s interview with al-A’ni, 2014)

These levels are interconnected, and there is room for cooperation between decision-makers to cut deals that reflect their personal and/or partisan interests. Therefore, policymaking is orientated by the agendas of the factions and elites as well as the increasing role of the influence of key figures such as Iraq’s highest religious reference al-Marjaia in Najaf.

Iraqi Shia factions and figures

The Islamic Da’wa Party

The Islamic Da’wa Party (Hizb al-Da’wa al-Islamiyya) was the major ruling political party involved in formulating Iraq’s foreign policy in the post-Saddam era until Iraq’s parliamentary election in May 2018 where Da’wa lost the prime minister’s post. The party’s leaders had a pre-eminent role in conducting Iraq’s foreign relations and drawing up its policy. From 2005 to 2018, figures in the Da’wa Party held the top executive position of prime minister: Ibrahim al-Jaafari (now leading his own party), Nouri al-Maliki and Haider al-Abadi (resigned from all positions in the party in May 2019). Following the 2005 election in Iraq, the Da’wa Party emerged as a compromising faction in order to maintain the fragile Shia unity (Hasan, 2018). From then until 2014, the party managed to manoeuvre other Shia factions at the elections and, to a degree, displayed secular and Iraqi nationalist tendencies, despite its Shia Islamic background.

Da’wa’s origins lie in a Shia Islamic political party created in 1957 in the holy city of Najaf. Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, inspired by the ideas of the Wilayat al-Ummah doctrine (the rule of community or people) (Latif, 2008), was the architect of the oldest currently active Iraqi Shia Islamist party in modern history.¹ Hasan Shubbar, one of the founding members of the party, credited the idea of founding the Da’wa Party to Talib al-Rifa’i, a prominent jurist who contributed through his network and activities to the party’s establishment. Mahdi al-Hakim, the son of Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, also shaped the party; he managed to separate the religious establishment in Najaf from the party to protect both entities (Alaaldin, 2017, 52 and 55).

The party that began as a clandestine network became known outside Iraq, and members were often exiled or executed as a result of Saddam’s persecution. Some of those who escaped were exposed to different ideas, cultures and education; some became less conservative than others. Da’wa’s ideological roots were a revolt against secular Arab nationalism and socialism in favour of the formation of an Islamic state in Iraq (Mamouri, 2018). The party was inspired and influenced by the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideologue Sayyid Qutb and according to Shubbar Da’wa followed in the footsteps of Hizbu al-Tahrir in Jordan and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Alaaldin, 2017, 51; Mamouri, 2018). The Da’wa Party has experienced major ideological, theological and political transformations and internal political differences – the party lacks cohesiveness to this day – that have resulted in the splintering of figures and groups, such as former foreign minister al-Jaafari in 2008. Dai (2008) argues that the Da’wa Party experienced three major shifts before 2003.² Eventually, this factionalism moulded the party’s flexible formula, which blends Iraqi nationalism with a Shia Islamic doctrine while attempting to formulate an independent policy. Islamic Shia theology matters in Da’wa politics; currently, the party and a large number of its members adhere to Sistani’s doctrine rather than the Iranian Khomeini’s. Post 2003, pragmatism has mattered in the parties’ political attitudes and within the government. Sadiq al-Rikabi, a prominent Da’wa member in the ICR, said

The centre of Shia Islam is in Najaf rather than Qom. As Iraqis, we believe we are the real and historical leaders of the Shia rather than the Iranians, but maybe the West accuses us of following Iran for political reasons. Iran welcomes these accusations so they can use the Shia of Iraq as another card on the table in their dealings with the West. (Qtd in Sirri et al., 2013)

Al-Rikabi’s views represent the pragmatic attitude of Da’wa senior officials. Although the party is indirectly influenced by Najaf’s Hawza, some key figures (such as al-Maliki) and members in the party have close ties with Iran. Salim Hussni, a senior leader and Da’wa Party historian, said ‘Iran deals with and has a close rapport with part of the Da’wa Party, known as al-Maliki’s group’ (Fayad, 2011). Hussni acknowledged the close relationship between Iran and the Da’wa Party but asserted some differences between them: the Iranians have had closer historical relationships with other parties, such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) (Fayad, 2011) and its splinter, Badr.

In 2013, the Da’wa Party’s electoral manifesto briefly pointed to foreign policy and focused on three main areas: first, promoting economy, trade and tourism as a policy of economic cooperation and regional interdependence and a tool of peace, by increasing Iraq’s oil production and GDP growth; second, promoting a moderate interpretation of religion and countering violence and sectarianism; and third, not repeating Saddam’s mistakes in foreign affairs, instead supporting international peace and security while protecting Iraq’s borders and sovereignty (Chatham House, 2013). The Da’wa Party portrays itself as defending Iraqi national interests. However, when the party’s leaders assumed office, its priorities were rearranged and focused on restoring foreign relations, security and the economy.

The Da’wa Party’s domestic and international opponents accuse it of aligning with Iran and failing to build ties with Gulf countries because of sectarian prejudice (Sirri et al., 2013). Although the party has been relatively sympathetic towards Iranian interests, it has been pragmatic in its approach to collaborating with the United States during its occupation (Van Veen et al., 2017, 48 and 49). In practice, the divisions between the Da’wa Party’s key members are reflected in their approaches to foreign policy, which are mirrored in their personal, ideological, geopolitical and international perspectives. Its two main wings, which surfaced in 2014, were those of al-Maliki and al-Abadi, which offered different approaches to Iraq’s foreign affairs. The latter was considered to be more open to Western engagement in Iraq. A third group within the Da’wa Party had the potential to emerge when neither al-Maliki nor al-Abadi succeeded in assuming office (Hasan, 2018). Al-Maliki has been the party leader three times: elected in 2007 (replacing former prime minister al-Jaafari) and re-elected in 2009, 2013 and 2019 as secretary general of the party. He gained considerable but not unanimous support from his party (Al-Mada Press, 2013a). Al-Maliki’s approach involved controlling the party to expand his personal leverage over the government. Regardless of his authoritarian tendencies and the party’s fragmentation, the party supported al-Maliki when he was prime minister and, to a certain extent, backed al-Abadi’s stance on foreign affairs – particularly on supporting the Shia masses regionally.

The fragmentation in the Da’wa Party is reflected in its foreign relations. This can be seen in a group within the party shifting its support from al-Maliki to al-Abadi in 2014. A few days before Prime Minister al-Maliki’s resignation, a number of Da’wa Party members visited Iran to persuade Iranian decision-makers not to support al-Maliki (Geranmayeh, 2014). However, Iran continued supporting al-Maliki in other positions and also his allies’ Shia militias.

The United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) was formed in 2005 with assistance from Iran and was the most powerful Shia political coalition, consisting of Da’wa and nineteen other Shia Islamic parties. In its 2004 programme manifesto, it promised to adopt an independent foreign policy, continue to be part of the Arab League and the organization of the Islamic Conference and focus on internal security and welfare – without referring to any particular details (Cole, 2004a). The UIA has brought the Da’wa Party to power since 2005. In the 2010 Iraqi elections, Da’wa led in formulating the State of Law Coalition (SLC), which included a section regarding foreign policy in its programme. It praised al-Maliki’s first government’s achievements in foreign relations, stating:

We were able to make great achievements in Iraq’s foreign relations with world states. This was mirrored in the opening of 86 diplomatic missions from Arab and foreign states in Iraq. Eighty-five Iraqi representations in the form of consulates and embassies exist in 35 states around the world. We are seeking to increase these numbers to develop our international relations. (Al-Jaredah, 2010)

The SLC’s electoral manifesto emphasizes that: foreign policy has to be under the authority of the central government; Iraq should have bilateral security agreements and cooperation with its neighbours to control the borders and fight terrorism; and Iraq’s previous problems that were created by Saddam’s regime need to be solved and strategic relationships formed with states such as Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Iran (Al-Jaredah, 2010). Al-Maliki’s second term witnessed very limited progress in Iraq’s relationships with its neighbours (excluding Iran), and tensions re-emerged. For example, the marginalization of Iraqi Arab Sunnis and the persecution of their elites reflected on Iraq’s foreign relations with its neighbours and the wider region.

Led by the Da’wa Party, the SLC’s campaign for the 2014 elections again had similar foreign policy objectives to the parties within the SLC; but differences within the Da’wa Party surfaced over al-Maliki’s approach in governance. These were especially prominent when al-Maliki was sidelined for the post of prime minister in 2014 and al-Abadi took office. Al-Maliki’s wing and Prime Minister al-Abadi’s opposing elements in the party, as well as in the SLC, tried to influence foreign policy. In October 2015, a number of members of the SLC formally requested that Prime Minister al-Abadi invite Russian military intervention (via airstrikes) in Iraq against Daesh. Al-Maliki promoted this, while al-Abadi ignored it. This demonstrates the different approaches within the Da’wa Party to foreign policy.

Since the Iraqi parliamentary election of 2018, the party became further divided as the two Da’wa leaders al-Maliki and al-Abadi campaigned on different political electoral platforms, the SLC and Itilaf al-Nasr (Victory), respectively. On 31 May 2019, al-Abadi resigned from the Da’wa Party and cemented his Nasr coalition – a significant move that heralded pro-Iran leaders’ domination of Da’wa, namely, al-Maliki.

The Da’wa Party has reached out abroad to build relationships with the Iraqi diaspora and represent their vision through clusters of its members and supporters (Segell, 2005, 226). However, beyond their media engagements and religious, cultural and sociopolitical gatherings and activities, there have not been extensive endeavours to expand or support the party’s cause abroad. In short, the new era of the party began post 2003, when it transformed from opposition party to one of the leading ruling parties in Iraq. Therefore, it has been relatively realistic in its foreign policy approach. The Da’wa Party has a close relationship with Iran and a pragmatic one with the United States in order to reap the benefits of such an association. The party’s leaders, such as ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-Title Page
• Title Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Introduction: A brief history
• Chapter 1 Major domestic actors in foreign policy post Saddam
• Chapter 2 The federal government’s core executive bodies in foreign policy making
• Chapter 3 The Kurdistan Regional Government’s foreign relations and foreign policy
• Chapter 4 The federal government’s key foreign policy priorities
• Chapter 5 Regional interferences and influences on Iraq’s foreign policy post Saddam
• Conclusion: The closing of the saga of Iraq’s foreign policies
• Notes
• References
• Index
• Copyright Page