Distributive Justice and Taxation

Jørgen Pedersen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000334289
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Economics
• Subtopic: Economic History
• Index: Economics

Providing a thorough examination of distributive justice, Distributive Justice and Taxation presents and discusses different theories of what constitutes a just society, and how goods should be distributed in such a society.

The distribution of goods in society has direct and serious consequences on the lives of the people. There are therefore important questions to be asked regarding the justice of that distribution: Is it just that some people inherit large fortunes while others inherit nothing? Do rich people have additional access to political power because of their wealth? If so, is that just? And should the ambition for economic policies be to combat poverty, or to reduce inequality? This book explores these questions and a number of others through the analysis of related theories, spanning from strong egalitarian theories on the left to right-wing libertarianism. The chapters also explicitly examine the case of taxation – one of the most important and controversial measures of distribution of goods in society. Placing emphasis on the case of Norway and using data from both the UK and USA as a point of comparison, the work details and explores the key features of the tax system. It concludes by presenting and evaluating arguments for and against taxes such as income tax, wealth tax, and inheritance tax.

This book is essential reading for those interested in distributive justice, as well as students and scholars of philosophy, law, political science, and economics.

Part 1
Theories of justice

1 Justice as fairness
John Rawls

Introduction

John Rawls (1921–2002) is a liberal egalitarian thinker. He is liberal in his defence of a rule of law that secures individual rights and economic liberties. This puts him in the tradition of philosophers like John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill. At the same time, Rawls is egalitarian in his defence of a distribution of goods in which equality plays a central role. Marx criticized liberalism for ascribing a merely formal status to the political rights and liberties. Rawls takes this criticism seriously, and maintains that political rights must be secured substantially as well as formally. In practice, this means that inequalities must not grow too large to ensure everyone the same opportunity to exert political influence.

Rawls’ book A Theory of Justice (henceforth Theory) was published in 1971.¹ It presents and defends the theory of justice as fairness that Rawls kept refining for the rest of his life. In 1993, he published Political Liberalism, and in 1999 The Law of Peoples. The year 2001 saw the publication of Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. In this chapter, I will present Rawls’ position using his first and last book as my sources. However, when it comes to the distributive ideal, I will emphasize Rawls’ last book, which in my view defends a theory of just distribution that is clearer and more radical than the one he defended in Theory.

I shall start by introducing Rawls’ conception of society as a social cooperation, and his critique of utilitarianism. Next, I present and explain Rawls’ two principles of justice, and show how he uses these to criticize welfare state capitalism. Taken together, Rawls’ ideal of justice requires that the wealth of those who are best off in society is restricted, while those who are worst off must be ensured some wealth. I shall argue that tax on wealth and inheritance are important instruments to achieve justice according to Rawls’ ideal.

Society as social cooperation

Rawls’ goal in Theory is to formulate principles of justice for a society in which individuals are seen as free and equal, and where society is understood as a social cooperation to achieve common advantages. To Rawls, these two ideals are absolutely fundamental to modern democracies. Based on these ideas, he wanted to develop a theory of justice.

The way Rawls sees it, questions of justice arise from the conflicts of interests in a society with moderate scarcity of goods. In such a situation, people will realize that cooperation pays, because in that manner they can produce more than they would on their own. By dividing different tasks between them, so that some become specialists in producing one kind of good, and others specialists in producing another, the total amounts of goods in society increase. Cooperation thus yields a social product, and a theory of justice should, according to Rawls, tackle the question of how we distribute this social product.

Rawls sees society as an association of people where individuals have common interests, as in the example of division of labour. However, we may expect there to be disagreements between these individuals about how the collectively produced social product is to be distributed (Rawls 1999a:4). To avoid continuous conflict arising from such disagreement, it is in the interests of citizens to arrive at ways of regulating disagreements in the best possible way. Certain social institutions are therefore central to successful cooperation between the members of society: The Constitution, the justice system, the economy, and the family (Rawls 1999a:6). Rawls calls these institutions the basic structure of society.

This basic structure must be organized in such a way that it does not violate the fundamental rights of individuals. “Each person”, Rawls writes, “possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override” (Rawls 1999a:3). We cannot allow ourselves to disregard this inviolability, even if doing so were to serve society as a whole. The goal of Theory is therefore to arrive at criteria that can be used to decide whether the basic structure of society is just. It is especially important to Rawls to arrive at a set of principles of justice that allow us to distribute the goods and duties that follow from social cooperation.

Critique of utilitarianism

With Theory, Rawls wanted to challenge utilitarianism that dominated Anglo-American political philosophy. Utilitarianism is a theory in moral and political philosophy, which in its political manifestation maintains that the actions of the most important political institutions should create the greatest amount of welfare for the greatest number of citizens. Rawls challenges utilitarianism, both on the question of what principle of justice should guide the distribution of goods and on the question of what should be distributed. Let us look at the first question first. The main problem with utilitarianism is that it allows for the maximization of the total amount of welfare in society, without regard to the fact that doing so may come at the expense of certain individuals or groups. Rawls thus sees utilitarianism as a theory that allows the welfare of some individuals to be sacrificed for the sake of the welfare of the rest.²

Rawls also thinks utilitarians are wrong about what it is that is to be distributed. What we should distribute is not welfare, but primary goods. It is by looking at these goods that one can compare individuals to discover whether they are well or badly off. Rawls presupposes that people normally prefer having more rather than fewer primary goods. Primary goods are (1) personal rights and freedoms, (2) the opportunity to achieve power and positions in their working life, (3) income and wealth, and (4) social bases of self-respect. Social bases for self-respect means that institutions must be so arranged as to allow people to feel secure that the position they have in society will be respected, and that pursuing one’s conception of the good is a worthwhile endeavour. Civil rights are central to securing the social bases of self-respect (Freeman 2007:153). Rawls thinks that these primary goods are goods one will value and desire regardless of what one may otherwise value in life (Rawls 1999a:54).

The principles of justice in a well-ordered society

Rawls is thus concerned with articulating principles of justice for a well-ordered society. Note that these principles are not primarily supposed to apply to individuals in their everyday life. Rather, they shall apply to the basic structure of society, controlling duties and rights as well as regulating the distribution of social and economic goods (Rawls 1999a:53). These principles shall regulate core issues of our economic and legal institutions. The tax system is one example of what belongs to the basic structure of society.

Rawls defends two principles of justice

1. Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: First, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle) (Rawls 2001:42–43).

In what follows, we will first try to understand each of these two principles and what significance they have for distribution. Towards the end, we will clarify what is the overall ideal of distributive justice in justice as fairness.

Rawls calls the first principle—(a)—the Liberty Principle. The Liberty Principle ascribes every individual equal rights to fundamental freedoms. It comprises right to life, freedom, and security for one’s own person, liberty of conscience as well as freedom of speech and assembly, property rights, and the right to vote. These are rights that are commonly secured and guaranteed in the constitution of liberal democracies. In addition to these liberties, the Liberty Principle also comprises rights that are more controversial, including that everyone must be ensured equal opportunity to hold public office and to influence elections. Rawls also maintains the importance of ensuring fair value of these political liberties. In other words, they cannot merely be guaranteed formally, but must be guaranteed substantially. Rawls’ distinction between formal and fair value of equal political liberties is inspired by Karl Marx. Marx claimed—for example, in On the Jewish Question—that liberal capitalist societies ascribed to citizens formal liberties that would necessarily be undermined by the inequalities produced by capitalism. Rawls took Marx’s criticism of merely formal liberties very seriously (Rawls 2001:148–150, 176–179).

The reasoning runs as follows: If everyone really is to be ensured equal opportunity to influence politics, one cannot allow too much inequality. With large inequality, there will always be a danger that the wealthiest use their economic power to achieve political power. Rawls is especially concerned that the very rich would unite on questions having to do with the advancement of their own interests and privileges (Rawls 1999a:198). However, even separately, the best off may achieve power by, for example, threatening to withdraw their investment in a local community if they are not given the conditions they desire. Alternatively, they could give large donations to political parties to ensure their own interests. Rawls thinks one can guard against the last kind of influence by introducing special arrangement such as public financing of political parties, limits on how much individuals can donate to candidates and parties as well as ensuring everyone equal access to the media. However, according to Rawls, such interventions are necessary but not sufficient to ensure the fair value of equal opportunity to affect politics. In addition to such special arrangements, one must prevent too great concentration of capital (Rawls 1999a:198).³

The second principle—(b)—is about socio-economic goods. The principle has two parts: The first part is frequently referred to as the principle of fair equality of opportunity, while the second part is referred to as the difference principle. The principle of fair equality of opportunity is similar to the general principle of equality of opportunity mentioned in the introduction. Even though this ideal is well known, the principle is “not altogether clear” (Rawls 2001:43), and most would agree that it should not be completely realized. For example, research indicates that parents who read to their children provide their children with several benefits. However, few think that it follows from this that the state should ban parents from reading to their children because of the inequalities thus created between those who are read to and those who are not.⁴

Rawls, however, has a particular interpretation of this principle. Here, we must make a distinction between formal equality of opportunity and Rawls’ more demanding notion of fair equality of opportunity. Formal equality of opportunity is a well-known principle implemented through legislation in many countries. It requires that, for example, a company advertising a position must choose the best qualified applicant for the job. One cannot give the job to someone on the basis of a wish to hire a woman or a man. Such a principle contributes to justice because it ensures that a person’s fate is determined by their qualifications, and not by their gender or family background. Many Norwegians like to believe that the principle of formal equality of opportunity is fully realized in Norway. However, the fact that people whose name sounds foreign are statistically far less likely than those whose names sound traditionally Norwegian to be called for job interviews or offered the lease on apartments for rent proves that Norwegians cannot take the realization of this formal ideal for granted. If a society really did have formal equality of opportunity, Peer’s opportunity to realize his ambitions would depend on his formal qualifications, and not on his Norwegian-sounding name.

Rawls’ notion of fair equality of opportunity is more demanding. It requires not only that positions are open to those best qualified, but also that people with comparable innate abilities and motivation have equal prospects of becoming best qualified (Rawls 1999a:63). When then minister of education in Norway, Thorbjørn Røe Isaksen, stated that “it is your skills and abilities that should decide, not what home you come from”, he could be seen to express support for this ideal (Isaksen quoted in Bøyum 2016:50). Fair equality of opportunity also entails that one must correct for disadvantages that are due to social background. In practice, this means that everyone must be ensured equal access to education; that one must establish a right to basic health care for all; and that the state limits the concentration of capital if such concentration impacts fair equality of opportunity (Rawls 2001:174). We know that in most societies, children born in the middle or upper classes have better opportunities to take a longer education and achieve prestigious positions compared to those born in the lower classes. This is the kind of inequality the principle of fair equality of opportunity is supposed to correct. It is therefore a radical principle, and would require significant state intervention to be realized.

One can argue for equality of opportunity in different ways. One way would be to claim that ensuring everyone equal opportunity is good for economic growth. If everyone is ensured equal opportunity to develop their skills and abilities, they will be able to contribute optimally to the social cooperation. Rawls’ argument for equality of opportunity is, however, not an efficiency argument. His argument is that fair equality of opportunity is necessary to ensure citizens’ rights as free and equal (Rawls 1999a:73).

Rawls’ ideal of fair equality of opportunity does not eliminate inequalities that are due to effort and talent. He thinks that people who ha...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• Preface
• Introduction: inequality, justice, and redistribution
• Part 1 Theories of justice
• Part 2 Controversies
• Index