The Value of Empathy

Maria Baghramian, Meline Papazian, Rowland Stout

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000317855
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

The Value of Empathy explores various approaches to understanding empathy and investigates its moral and practical role.

The central role of empathy in understanding others, and the need for it in our social and inter-personal encounters, is widely acknowledged by philosophers, social scientists and psychologists alike. Discussions of empathy abound, not only in more specialised academic publications, but also in traditional and social media. Yet neither a clear understanding, nor a uniform definition of this relatively new term is available. Indeed, one difficulty in discussing empathy, in philosophy and beyond, is the profusion of definitions; the difficulty is compounded by a lack of clarity in the distinction between empathy and cognate concepts such as sympathy and compassion.

This book has two aims: Chapters 1–5 seek to address the dual concerns of the lack of clarity and profusion of interpretations by suggesting new ways of approaching the topic. The second aim of the book is to connect the more abstract discussions of empathy with its normative functions. Chapters 6–8 engage with the theoretical concerns relevant to the ethics of empathy and raise interesting points about its significance in ethical thought and action. The final four chapters focus on the practical normative significance of empathy by examining the connections between empathy, vulnerability and care in circumstances of ill health.

The chapters in this book were originally published in the International Journal of Philosophical Studies.

The Relational Value of Empathy

Monika Betzler

ABSTRACT
Philosophers and scholars from other disciplines have long discussed the role of empathy in our moral lives. The distinct relational value of empathy, however, has been largely overlooked. This article aims to specify empathy’s distinct relational value: Empathy is both intrinsically and extrinsically valuable in virtue of the pleasant experiences we share with others, the harmony and meaning that empathy provides, the recognition, self-esteem, and self-trust it enhances, as well as trust in others, attachment, and affection it fosters. Once we better understand in what ways empathy is a uniquely relational phenomenon, we can unveil its relevance to morality, which avoids the strictures of both partiality and impartiality. On the one hand, it is the relational value of empathy that grounds defeasible reasons to empathize insofar as empathy is morally called for by a particular relationship (or if we have defeasible reasons to establish a relationship by empathy). On the other hand, it is precisely empathy’s relational value that allows us to show that it can be kept within bounds. To realize empathy’s relational value, we are not constantly required to empathize. Instead, once we properly appreciate empathy’s distinct relational value, we can show that this leaves us room to respond to impartialist concerns.

1. Introduction

Philosophers and scholars of other disciplines have long discussed the role of empathy in our moral lives. Upon first inspection, one may think that those who are able to empathize with others care more about their well-being, are more attentive to their needs, and have more respect for their autonomy. As a result, they seem more likely either to do more for others than they otherwise would (Sober and Wilson 1998, 236f.), or to behave morally by being empathic (Slote 2007). One may therefore conclude that there exists either a causal or a conceptual link between empathy and morality.

After careful consideration, however, the link between empathy and morality turns out to be more complicated. There are many cases in which empathy does not lead to moral motivation. Taking delight in the joy of another person, for example, is not simply an instance that calls for additional other-regarding action; one might be motivated by the aim of ensuring that another person’s joy lasts as long as possible, although it is not clear that this can be regarded as a genuine moral motivation.¹ Hence, there are counterexamples to the claim that empathy leads to moral action.

One might also take issue with the alleged conceptual link. As has been repeatedly pointed out in the literature, empathy involves partiality, which implies favoritism (Snow 2000; Prinz 2011; Bloom 2016). By contrast, it is a widespread assumption that the moral point of view is impartial and does not differentiate between specific others. These concerns substantiate the view that empathy and morality are two different and potentially conflicting concepts. Empathy is neither necessary nor sufficient to bring about moral behavior. It can even lead to immoral actions through the neglect of others. We can empathize too little or too much, and we can empathize with immoral people with whom we should not empathize. There are other problems that cast doubt on the alleged link between empathy and morality, but these preliminary remarks should suffice to make us question this link.

This skepticism, however, has inspired proponents of an empathy-based morality to introduce more sophisticated proposals to the debate. They are meant to convince us that empathy is, in some qualified sense, necessary and sufficient for, or, at the very least, ‘essential’ to, morality. Broadly, we can identify three sets of approaches that have been put forward in support of the case for empathy’s qualified role in morality.

According to one set of proposals, although the unrestricted practice of empathy may not be morally significant, it can be restricted in the way it is exercised so as to pass moral muster. At least two strategies have been devised to regulate the practice of empathy in this manner.² One is to limit what a person should empathize with: the process of empathy can only be said to have been properly practiced when it has been based on a person’s concern for another’s basic well-being (Simmons 2014, 101ff.; Masto 2015, 90). Another strategy is to broaden the perspective of the person who is empathizing³: empathy should be felt and expressed in the way of an impartial and benevolent spectator. According to both strategies, it is this qualified practice of empathy – carried out on a target that meets particular conditions or executed under idealized conditions – that is regarded as both necessary and sufficient to bring about moral behavior.

However, to limit the object of one’s empathy to the basic well-being of others does not lend support to the argument that empathy is essential to morality; it is simply an ad hoc strategy. It also remains doubtful whether an ideally regulated and thus ‘impartial’ empathy is a psychologically realistic option that can be of normative import to non-idealized agents. After all, it asks us to refocus our attention on what things look like from the perspective of each of those affected by an action and to detach ourselves from our own personal ideals and goals. It is unclear, however, whether we can develop and sustain empathy if we are to empathize with possibly conflicting perspectives – and do so independently of our own perspective. This strategy seems to rob empathy of its essentially perspectival nature. After all, we empathize from our particular perspective with particular others. And even if such impartial empathy were possible, it is questionable whether it provides non-ideal agents like us with normative reasons to act on behalf of others (Ramirez 2017, 515ff).

A second set of proposals may be more promising. It contains suggestions for employing empathy in moral decision-making and states that empathy should be recognized for what it is – namely as partial or biased – but that, in principle at least, can be balanced against moral principles, such as impartiality, justice, and self-respect (Carse 2005, 176). The problem with this view is that it is unclear how and on what basis an agent should navigate between her empathy and her moral principles. As a result, both sets of proposals – either regulating the practice of empathy, or balancing its unregulated practice against moral principles – largely fail to explain why we should and how we can accord empathy, however cautiously, its proper place in the moral domain.⁴

More recently, a third set of proposals has been mooted that promises to explain more fully why empathy should feature in our moral decision-making: empathy is considered to have a particular epistemic significance.⁵ Experiencing how another person feels is believed to be irreducibly valuable as it provides us with a shortcut to gaining unique insights and helps us to understand why another person feels the way she does. Thus, it is the information about other people’s emotions provided by empathy that can be taken to be a basis for defeasible moral reasons, which can then be balanced against other moral reasons. The problem with this proposal is not so much that it is wrong, but that it is incomplete. Understanding why another person feels the way she does is an important input for moral deliberation. But as I will set out below, there is a yet deeper explanation as to why that is the case. The explanation is provided by empathy’s distinct relational value, which I hope to pin down and illuminate in this article, and that has, so far, been largely overlooked in the literature.

To date, only a few philosophers have touched on the relational significance of empathy (Halpern 2001, 111ff.; Carse 2005; Herrmann 2013; Song 2015). Here I take up their suggestions and demonstrate, in more detail, that empathy has a distinct relational value that helps us to establish, maintain and deepen relationships with others. What makes empathy unique is not so much that we gain access to a certain kind of knowledge or understanding by engaging in it, but rather that we enter into and maintain a distinct kind of relationship with another person. Once we better understand this relational value, it will be easier for us to establish the basis for restricting empathy, both internally and externally, and to informatively explain its particular role in the moral domain. I will thus argue the case for a novel normative connection between empathy and morality. To the extent that empathy has relational value, it generates morally relevant, yet defeasible, reasons. They are morally relevant to the extent that they help fulfill empathy’s relational, and thus (in part, at least) other-regarding, value. They are defeasible insofar as empathy’s relational value can be balanced against other values.⁶

The article is structured as follows: After providing an account of empathy, I will specify what I mean by ‘relational value’. I will follow this by demonstrating that empathy is both intrinsically and extrinsically valuable because of various evaluative dimensions, such as the pleasant experiences we share with others, the harmony and meaning that empathy provides, the recognition, self-esteem, and self-trust it enhances, as well as the trust in others, attachment, and affection it fosters. To conclude, I will examine the relevance of empathy’s relational value to morality, which avoids the strictures of both partiality and impartiality.

2. Conceptualizing empathy

While the moral relevance of empathy is a well-established object of enquiry, an independent debate exists on the nature or concept of empathy. The term ‘empathy’, however, is not only used to cover a variety of different phenomena; it is also employed differently in different disciplines.⁷ A conceptual analysis therefore seems hard to come by and requires a paper in its own right.

Despite the blurriness that surrounds the analysis of the concept, many philosophers have come to subscribe to what I call the Standard Account of empathy. Accordingly, empathy is a ‘process or activity, where to empathize with a person, A, is to vicariously experience A’s internal experience’ (Song 2015, 438; Coplan 2011, 5). Somewhat more precisely, the Standard Account takes the following conditions to be at least characteristic or prototypical of an instance of empathy: for a person P (the subject) to empathize with person Q (the target), (i) P is aware of and apprehends Q’s internal experience E (awareness condition); and (ii) P experiences E*, with E* being sufficiently similar to E, because Q is undergoing E (re-enactment condition).⁸

Hence, the conceptual analysis that is widely shared among philosophers – various quarrels notwithstanding⁹ – has thus far been primarily concerned with empathy as an individualist, unidirectional, and static phenomenon. A key feature of this analysis is that empathy is instantiated in an individual’s mental state that is directed at another person’s mental state. This is not surprising given that this analysis played an important role in an earlier debate on what it takes to read other minds (Carruthers and Smith 1996; Stueber 2010). What is striking, however, is that the debate about the connection between empathy and morality has tacitly maintained that conceptualization. While it is valuable for the purpose of understanding other minds, I question whether it is fully apt to capture what is at issue when we think about the role empathy might play in our moral and thus normative practices. After all, we make moral demands with regard to other’s empathy. We blame others for not being empathic enough, we criticize others for not allowing us to empathize with them, and we think that some people over-empathize or misuse their empathy. What underlies this moral practice is that empathy is thought to have some proper function, and that it is therefore thought to be good for something. Whenever we blame others with regard to their empathy or lack thereof, we take it that what empathy is good for has not been realized.

But only once we understand what empathy is good for are we able to assess its potential connection with morality. If empathy can be good for something, certain conditions must hold that go beyond what it means for one pe...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Citation Information
• Introduction: The Value of Empathy
• 1 The Relational Value of Empathy
• 2 Relational Empathy
• 3 Language, Behaviour, and Empathy. G.H. Mead’s and W.V.O. Quine’s Naturalized Theories of Meaning
• 4 No Empathy for Empathy: An Existential Reading of Husserl’s Forgotten Question
• 5 Finding Empathy: How Neuroscientific Measures, Evidence and Conceptualizations Interact
• 6 The Contribution of Empathy to Ethics
• 7 The Empathetic Soldier
• 8 Sentimentalist Practical Reason and Self-Sacrifice
• 9 Pathophobia, Vices, and Illness
• 10 Beyond Empathy: Vulnerability, Relationality and Dementia
• 11 Empathy, Respect, and Vulnerability
• 12 Empathy, Vulnerability and Anxiety
• Index