BRICS Media

Reshaping the Global Communication Order?

Daya Kishan Thussu, Kaarle Nordenstreng

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9780429888700
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

Bringing together distinguished scholars from BRICS nations and those with deep interest and knowledge of these emerging powers, this collection makes a significant intervention in the ongoing debates about comparative communication research and thus contributes to the further internationalization of media and communication studies.

The unprecedented expansion of online media in the world's major non-Western nations, exemplified by BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) is transforming global communication. Despite their differences and divergences on key policy issues, what unites these five nations, representing more than 20 per cent of the global GDP, is the scale and scope of change in their communication environment, triggered by a multilingual, mobile Internet. The resulting networked and digitized communication ecology has reoriented international media and communication flows. Evaluating the implications of globalization of BRICS media on the reshaping of international communication, the book frames this within the contexts of theory-building on media and communication systems, soft power discourses and communication practices, including in cyberspace. Adopting a critical approach in analysing BRICS communication strategies and their effectiveness, the book assesses the role of the BRICS nations in reframing a global communication order for a 'post-American world'.

This critical volume of essays is ideal for students, teachers and researchers in journalism, media, politics, sociology, international relations, area studies and cultural studies.

Part I

Challenging dominant discourses in a new world order

1

The BRICS paradox¹

Marko Juutinen and Jyrki Käkönen

Since its inception in 2009, the BRICS group of countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China – joined in 2011 by South Africa) has sought to represent itself as an institution of change and reform, and as a voice of the developing world (Thakur, 2014). One potential interpretation of BRICS is that it is a new initiative of transnational politics, reflecting global power transitions, the possible end of US dominance, as well as the final countdown of the liberal international order. Other institutions of such a new world order would be, for example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). This interpretation, however, is contested by scholars who argue that there is little if any evidence to support the view that BRICS is an institution of a different kind of globalization (Bond, 2016).

These different and conflicting interpretations of BRICS represent what we would like to call the BRICS paradox. The concept of paradox refers to a claim that is apparently based on sound reasoning from true premises, but which leads to logically unacceptable conclusions. In this chapter, we identify three paradoxes. First, that because BRICS members are so different, they cannot form a functioning alliance. Second, that because BRICS have demanded changes in international organizations, they constitute a challenge to the current international order. Third, because BRICS has formed new financial institutions, it is functioning as a model or promoter of alternative financial governance. The idea that BRICS represents change or the voice of the global South, at the same time as seeming to be well integrated into the international system as a loose grouping of neoliberal countries, pertains to this paradox.

By presenting and reviewing the three paradoxes, this chapter interprets current debates on BRICS, showing that it appears to be a little bit of everything. As a result, the contribution of this chapter to the ongoing BRICS debates is not a presentation of new data, but interpreting old data and previous debates in new manner. Moreover, using this work as a stepping stone, this chapter seeks to propose ways to better understand BRICS. This it does by proposing structural imperialism and non-Western perspectives as potential ways to understand BRICS without a paradox.

Thus, this chapter argues that perhaps the BRICS paradox is not as much about BRICS as it is about the conflict between different theoretical conceptualizations of BRICS. The classic mandala (‘circle’ in Sanskrit) from the Indian indigenous tradition of foreign policy analysis or tianxia (‘All under heaven’ in Mandarin) system from the Chinese, one may provide more suitable perspectives in which to understand and evaluate its role and nature. These two perspectives would at least fit the context of a post-hegemonic world order and what appears to be the return of the past (Juutinen, 2018; Käkönen, 2020).

Paradox of an unlikely alliance

The first ten years of BRICS’ existence have not made it easy to define what BRICS is about. It is hardly a political organization, although it is more than just a forum for talks. Certainly, it is not a security organization, although at the 2015 BRICS summit in Ufa in Russia, Russia tried to bring BRICS and SCO closer to each other. Neither is it an economic cooperation organization or a free trade area. In internal BRICS trade China is an important partner to everyone else but, otherwise, mutual trade within BRICS is still insignificant. BRICS’ 11th Summit was held in 2019 in Brasília, the capital city of Brazil. While the association has entered its second decade, it is still questionable whether it has come to stay, or whether its diversity will cause it to disintegrate. It is hardly ever mentioned in Western reports on the state of the world (see for instance, Global Trends, 2017; Global Trends to 2035, 2017).

What we have learned from the first BRICS decade is that the five members have their own reasons to cooperate and that, as a group, BRICS is able to act in international fora. Many scholars argue that these reasons are not enough for a strong and viable political alliance and might drive the countries apart. For example, Katzenstein (1996) has argued that a strong alliance necessitates common culture, geographical proximity and a similar type of institution: BRICS can boast none of these.

For Russia, BRICS is an important element to balance the encroachment of the transatlantic world on its Western borders. It has brought Russia closer to China. In Russian world politics, BRICS is understood as an alliance by the major non-Western powers against Western hegemony. Therefore, in the Russian imagination the goal of BRICS is to reorganize if not revolutionize the current international order (Novikov and Skriba, 2019: 587, 591).

For China, BRICS is a valuable tool to increase its own political weight to match its economic strength. This is not the only reason why BRICS matters for China. In the classical Chinese imagination, BRICS can be seen as one of the means to return China to the centre of world politics. At the same time, in Chinese foreign policy, BRICS is hardly the top priority in transforming the international order. It is one element among others, like China-financed AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank). According to some scholars, China’s main instrument in transforming the world is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Xi, 2017). Others argue that for China’s foreign policy, BRICS is a mechanism to unite all major non-Western powers (Lukin and Xuesong, 2019: 622).

Russia and China are the strongest military powers in BRICS: of these two, only Russia is capable of confronting the United States. According to the traditional Chinese worldview, China’s own development is dependent on a stable and peaceful international order. Brazil and South Africa have an interest in BRICS for regional reasons. For both, cooperation with Russia, China and India can support their role as a potential regional leader. At the same time, membership in BRICS gives them a chance to participate in the construction of possible Asia-centric world order.

India is in a more complicated situation: it simply cannot stay outside and leave the gate open for a Chinese hegemony in Asia and maybe even in the future global order. For India, membership in BRICS allows it to keep an eye on China. For BRICS, India’s membership makes it hard to become an anti-Western coalition. This is because of India’s current close economic, political and cultural relations with the US, its participation in Quad (the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which links it with Japan, Australia and the US) and strong commitment to the liberal international order (e.g., Pant, 2016; Juutinen, 2018).

Moreover, while BRICS political economies differ, for example, from the US economy and none are great fans of the Washington Consensus, this does not validate the hypothesis of systemic change or an alternative economic model (e.g., Muhr, 2016; Juutinen, 2019). Indeed, internally the BRICS are very different in terms of their economic structures. Russia is heavily dependent on its oil and gas exports and has a poorly diversified economy. India has a booming services sector but about half of its population survive on small-scale agriculture. There are as many poor Indians as there are Europeans all together, but there are also as many rich Indians as Germans. China, on the other hand, is the most important trading partner of all the major powers of the world and, while many are dependent on China, China is dependent only on a few. Interestingly, China’s economic ties are much closer to the European Union and US than to India, for example, or other BRICS countries. Indeed, China’s economic and military clout in South Asia intensifies the tension between the two (Pant, 2016).

In the context of integration theories, it is the diversity of BRICS members that makes the group a weak political actor. The diverse interests of its members make it complicated, if not impossible, for BRICS to define a coherent agenda and policy for changing the international order. However, BRICS has survived its childhood and is entering its teenage years. It has been argued that events in Eurasia have always defined world history (Frankopan, 2015; Cunliffe, 2017), and BRICS brings together huge parts of Eurasia. However, Islamic Central Asia, as well as the Islamic world in general, is outside the association. This may be changing, as China’s BRI brings Central Asia into close contact with BRICS. Russia’s interest in connecting BRICS and the Eurasian Economic Union (the 2015 treaty which links Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia) has the same function.

BRICS diversity and the diverse interests of its members are not necessarily symptoms of weakness. The Xiamen summit in 2017 demonstrated how working together was important for BRICS members. Just a few days before the Xiamen summit, the potential conflict between India and China in Doklam on the border with Bhutan threatened the opening of the summit. To ensure the summit could go ahead, India and China found a solution, at least temporarily (Woody, 2018). BRICS and SCO are two of the few institutions where India and China are inclined to work together.

In forcing two of its members to settle their bilateral problems, the Xiamen summit demonstrated that BRICS still had a role. The interest shown by other countries in BRICS tells the same story. The Xiamen summit was organized in the form of BRICS+. China invited Egypt, Guinea, Tajikistan, Thailand and Mexico to participate in the summit. In addition to Egypt and Mexico, Argentina, Indonesia, Iran, Turkey and Nigeria are on the potential new members’ list. The next step could be to invite some of them as permanent observers.

In terms of China-India cooperation, another important achievement in Xiamen was the adoption of a mutual stance against terrorism. For the first time, the summit condemned Pakistan-supported terrorist organisations active in Kashmir (BRICS, 2017: Article 48). Here China took a stand against its all-weather friend Pakistan. China did this most likely to construct a peaceful context for advancing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (part of BRI), which India sees with a great degree of suspicion, as it passes through the disputed area of Pakistan-administered Kashmir and ends up in the port of Gwadar, suitable not only for cargo but also for military purposes (Pant, 2016: 368, 369). Since then, India’s rapprochement with the US and China’s deepening ties with Pakistan may have disrupted this Sino-Indian understanding about terrorism, because neither one of the two summits after Xiamen mentioned Pakistan-supported or any other terrorist organization (BRICS, 2018; 2019).

The paradox of BRICS Challenge Theory

BRICS Challenge Theory divides into two main lines of hypothesis: that BRICS poses, first, a challenge to the hierarchy between states in the current system, and, second, that it seeks to challenge the whole liberal international order. Challenging the hierarchy between states is relevant in a state-centric analysis of foreign policies, and particularly for the US and its allies (e.g. Tammen et al., 2000). From an institutionalist perspective, on the other hand, the question of state order is irrelevant, as long as global relations are mostly about rules and norms, and as long as decision making takes place in international organizations between many instead of by one (e.g. Ikenberry, 2001; Acharya, 2016). From an institutionalist perspective, it is relevant to study BRICS in relation to current institutions or norms, rules and international organizations.

Despite diverse national interests, BRICS members have common interests, rendering support for the idea that BRICS is indeed a functioning institution of global politics and a viable alliance between rising powers. BRICS countries share the view that the Western powers and values have an immoderate influence in global governance. This makes BRICS an institution that at least challenges the Western hegemony. Rejecting Western universalism, a common goal for all BRICS members is a multipolar world order, reflecting the diversity of interests. The Xiamen and Johannesburg BRICS summit declarations are clearly in support of the institutions of global governance. It is in BRICS’ interests to strengthen the role of the UN, the Security Council, the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as the G20 in global governance but with a more decisive role for India, Brazil and South Africa in the UN context. BRICS gives support for further globalization, the realization of the Paris Agreement on climate change and is strongly against protectionism (BRICS, 2017; 2018). However, current members China and Russia are not ready to see any other BRICS country as permanent UNSC members (BRICS, 2017; 2018).

Despite such disagreements among BRICS members, it has been able not only to survive the first ten years but also to create new functioning financial institutions. In 2014, BRICS launched the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) in response to the US failure to yield its dominance in the global financial institutions. NDB – also referred to as the ‘BRICS bank’ – is an institution led by developing countries. In practice it endorses the developing world’s independence from the still Western-led Bretton Woods system. With the New Development Bank, BRICS has established, in addition to the World Bank and the IMF, its own model for the rest of the developing world, though the aim is not to replace those Western-led institutions. However, it is still open to question how much the NDB represents a new kind of system of global...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Information
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Contributors
• Foreword
• Introduction
• Part I Challenging dominant discourses in a new world order
• 1 The BRICS paradox1
• 2 Shifting paradigms in communication research
• 3 Moving beyond Western models in the study of BRICS media systems
• Part II Media and communication structures and systems
• 4 The Brazilian media system in a turbulent environment
• 5 A post-analogue hybrid media system: The Russian case
• 6 Media systems and structures in India
• 7 Beyond convergence: Rethinking China’s media system in a global context
• 8 South Africa: Beyond democratic deficit in public service broadcasting
• Part III BRICS and global strategic communication
• 9 Brazil and corporatist soft power
• 10 Russian soft power from USSR to Putin’s Russia
• 11 India: Culture as soft power
• 12 China’s cultural power reconnects with the world
• 13 Contending soft powers: South African media on the African continent
• Part IV BRICS and changing communication practices
• 14 BRICS journalism as a new territory for localizing journalism studies
• 15 Neoliberal capitalism and BRICS on screen
• 16 BRICS de-Americanizing the Internet?
• INDEX