Defending Shame

Its Formative Power in Paul's Letters

Te-Li Lau

• Publisher: Baker Academic
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN:
  9781540960146
• eBook ISBN:
  9781493422302
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: Biblical Criticism & Interpretation

2020 Center for Biblical Studies Book Award (New Testament)

Our culture often views shame in a negative light. However, Paul's use of shame, when properly understood and applied, has much to teach the contemporary church. Filling a lacuna in Pauline scholarship, this book shows how Paul uses shame to admonish and to transform the minds of his readers into the mind of Christ. The author examines Paul's use of shame for moral formation within his Jewish and Greco-Roman context, compares and contrasts Paul's use of shame with other cultural voices, and offers a corrective understanding for today's church. Foreword by Luke Timothy Johnson.

Part 1
Framework

1
Definitional Background

The literature on shame is vast, and the study of shame has been approached from different disciplines: political science, education, philosophy, literature, ethics, history, neuroscience, psychology, psychoanalysis, cultural anthropology, social anthropology, sociology, law, and criminology. In this chapter, I present my understanding of the nature and character of shame. Shame can broadly denote the objective reality of disgrace or the subjective experience of pain that arises from falling short of some standard. Studies on honor and shame have adequately covered the former; I focus on the latter here. I examine how shame is an emotion and refine my understanding of shame by differentiating it from humiliation, embarrassment, and guilt. I then highlight certain conceptual confusions that surround the study of shame and define various terms so as to clear away this fog. I give some necessary precautions in a cross-cultural examination of shame. I then conclude with a succinct definition of shame.

Shame and Emotion

I take it to be uncontroversial that shame is an emotion. There is no definite consensus on how to define emotions, and this is not the place to give a detailed account of the nature of emotions. Nevertheless, some general observations that will orient us to the task ahead are in order.

Emotions are hard to define. On the one hand, William James defines emotions as the bodily feeling that arises from physiological changes that follow the perception of some exciting fact.1 They are the raw sensations of visceral disturbances due to the stimulation of the nervous system. On the other hand, Robert Solomon defines emotions as judgments about ourselves.2 Anger is the judgment that someone has wronged me; shame is the judgment that I am responsible for an inappropriate or offensive situation.

Such simplistic binaries fail to capture the complex nature of emotions. A much more promising definition of emotion is suggested by the philosopher Aaron Ben-Ze’ev. He writes, “An emotion is something that is generated by perceived changes; its focus of concern is personal and comparative; its major characteristics are instability, great intensity, partiality, and brief duration; and its basic components are cognition, evaluation, motivation, and feelings.”3 We can examine the basic components of emotion: cognition consists of information concerning the event or situation; evaluation appraises the personal significance of the event or situation; motivation addresses the action tendencies, desires, or readiness to act in these circumstances; and feelings are the consciousness of our bodily state.4

Ben Ze’ev’s definition that emotions are generated by perceived changes and that they are personal reminds us that the emotion cannot be abstracted from the conditions that elicit it, from the evaluation of those conditions, and from the feelings and desires that stir within us. An emotion cannot be relegated to one of its components; it is the whole story, the entire script, the unfolding experience of its basic components. Theorists disagree about which specific components should be included.5 Ben Ze’ev lists four, but “five appear in most theories in one form or another: (1) objects, causes, precipitating events, (2) appraisal, (3) physiological changes, (4) action tendencies/action/expression, and (5) regulation.”6

Of the above five components, those that are most culturally sensitive and dependent would be the precipitating event, the action tendencies, and the regulation of that emotion. But what is essential and constitutive of the emotional experience is the appraisal or evaluative component.7 The evaluative element makes the emotional experience what it is, differentiating it (e.g., anger) from other states (e.g., jealousy or pride). Moreover, the evaluative element is also causally responsible for the emotion and gives the reason for a person to be in that particular state. To be afraid is to evaluate or appraise a situation, object, or event to be dangerous with a significant degree of probability; to be overcome by grief is to realize that someone to whom I am deeply attached and who is irreplaceable has been permanently taken from me. Emotion words are not just labels for bodily sensations. An experience of fear, grief, or anger relates to the external world, and emotions are ways of perceiving and responding to changes in that world. To experience an emotion thus is to construe a personally significant event or situation in a particular way. In essence, emotions or emotion lexemes are the interpretive schemes of various script-like or narrative forms that give meaning and shape to the human experience of some self-relevant condition.8

When we apply the five components of an emotional experience to shame, we discover the following. The precipitating event can vary widely. It includes being seen doing bad things, being associated with people of ill repute, being rejected in an electoral venue, or failing an academic exam. It is important to note that shame is not produced by any specific event, for the same event can happen to two different people with two different emotional responses. As discussed above, what is central is the individual’s interpretation and appraisal of that event. In shame, the constitutive element is negative self-evaluation, the awareness of being seen to fall short of some perceived standard or ideal. The presence of an other may be the catalyst, but the evaluation constitutive of shame still depends on the self. As Douglas Cairns remarks, “In every case shame is a matter of the self’s judging the self in terms of some ideal that is one’s own.”9 The discomforting and perplexing experience of shame may have physiological, behavioral, and evaluative elements, but what distinguishes shame from other emotions is the evaluative component. The physiological changes may include an increased heart rate or the sensation of feeling hot. The action tendency may be to avert one’s gaze and hang one’s head. The regulation of the shame emotion may be denial, laughing about one’s transgressions, or embracing the criticism and seeking to do better the next time.

Shame, Humiliation, and Embarrassment

In the above section, I noted that the fundamental and constitutive element of shame is the negative self-evaluation brought about by the awareness of being seen to fall short of some standard, ideal, or goal. This can be sharpened by comparing shame with two closely related emotions, embarrassment and humiliation.

Andrew Morrison argues that embarrassment, shame, and humiliation are almost interchangeable and that they differ primarily in intensity.10 Humiliation is the most intense and embarrassment the least intense version of interpersonal shame. Embarrassment, shame, and humiliation can be accompanied by the same physiological symptoms (blushing, feeling hot, perspiration, trembling, or increased heart rate) and behavioral signs (pursed lips, squirming, a desire to hide or be alone, averting one’s gaze, bowing or lowering of the head). But I think what differentiates them definitively is the appropriate evaluative criteria, even if it is the case that the relevant evaluative criteria for humiliation make it the most intense and for embarrassment the least intense of the three emotions.11

Humiliation is elicited when the self perceives that an other displays an attitude of disgust and contempt for the self. Both shame and humiliation see the self as falling short of some ideal or standard. Central to humiliation, however, is not this self-reflection but the unjust experience of being put into that state by a contemptuous other. It does not consider the self as blameworthy. Rather, it focuses on the external attribution of this negative evaluation so that there are tendencies toward revenge.12 Shame may be brought on by an external other, but it focuses more on the internal attribution of the negative evaluation, involving primarily the self reflecting on the self.

In contrast to humiliation, shame and embarrassment are not prompted by a contemptuous assessment of the self, and one can feel shame or embarrassment before an other who displays a significantly less negative attitude. Both shame and embarrassment are related to exposure. Some assert that shame involves a violation of a moral norm and embarrassment a social norm or etiquette. It is, however, misleading to limit shame to a breach of a moral norm. For one can experience shame as a result of one’s dyslexia or stutter, but we would never assert that one is morally culpable for one’s dyslexia. A more fruitful criterion for distinguishing shame and embarrassment is the evaluation whether, in the moment of exposure, a significant character flaw has been r...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Foreword
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Part 1: Framework
• Part 2: Exegesis
• Part 3: Cultural Engagement
• Bibliography
• Name Index
• Scripture Index
• Ancient Writings Index
• Back Cover