Rethinking Nationalism and Ethnicity

The Struggle for Meaning and Order in Europe

Hans-Rudolf Wicker

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000324198
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

While there has been a spate of books concerned with race and ethnicity in Europe more specifically, this timely volume offers a broader perspective and positions issues of identity, ethnicity, multiculturalism, xenophobia, regionalism and ethnonationalism within the wider contexts of trans- and supranationalism. With the weakening of welfare states and the homogenizing influences of globalization, nations within both Eastern and Western Europe are discovering that the battlefield of political action is being redefined, and as a result emotional alliances threaten to bypass the democratic systems of the past. Offering fresh insights that are both empirically and theoretically informed, this book illuminates the processes and consequences of these new developments. In particular, it reviews Marx's, Durkheim's and Simmel's theories on nationalism and national identity, and presents case studies of Belgium, Italy's Northern League, right-wing intellectual production in Russia, and much more.

1
The Future of Ethnonations in a United Europe¹

Josep R. Llobera

1. A Catalan version of this paper was published in the collective book El nacionalisme català a la fi del segle XX. Barcelona: Edicions de la Revista de Catalunya, 1993, pp. 17–30; the paper has been updated and revised, but not extensively rewritten. For a more detailed treatment of some of the topics dealt with in this paper see Llobera (1993) and (1994) and Goddard, Llobera and Shore (1994).

As the European Union inexorably moves towards higher levels of economic, political and cultural integration, states, ethnonations, transnational ethnic communities and regions ponder the advantages of such developments. The attitudes that each of these types of units display are obviously diverse and reflect their own different interests and agendas. In the overarching institutions of the European Union, ethnonations tend to see a ‘potentially more sympathetic and flexible framework in which to realize their objective of shared sovereignty than they do in the traditional state in which they find themselves at present. A ‘Europe of the regions’ -the ambiguity of the word ‘region’ notwithstanding - is one of the possible outcomes of the current process of unification, though the likelihood of such a development will depend upon the strength that ethnonations and regions can muster in their confrontation with the state and with the emerging European bureaucracy.

Social scientists have recently observed, although not really explained the apparent paradox that at present, while there is an impetus towards the building of large economic and political units, there is, at the same time, a strong assertion of small-scale regional, ethnic and national identities. This has been taken to signify the death-knell of the nation-state and the coming of a future configuration of Europe in which ethnonational and regional identities dominate the scene in the context of large scale, European-based institutions. Is this wishful thinking on the part of those who espouse such a thesis, or are there real trends in this direction?

Much has been made of the hegemony of the nation-state in modernity. There appears to be a consensus that the dominant, if not the sole form of political organization in the post 1789 era, and even before that, has been the nation-state. This thesis contains two very different assumptions. Firstly, it conveys the idea that, while in the medieval period a variety of state forms flourished (empires, city-states, theocracies, federations, etc.), modern times see the emergence, consolidation and final domination of a medium-sized, territorial, centralized, sovereign type of polity. Secondly, this new political unit is also characterized by national homogeneity - hence the expression ‘nation-state’, which means one state, one nation. Both assumptions are problematic, particularly the second one. While there is little doubt that there has been a tendency towards the consolidation of mediumsized, ‘modern’ types of states in Western Europe, the presence of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires until World War I, of the German Reich from 1933 to 1945, and of the Russian empire until recently, qualify the idea of the dominance of the nation-state in the modern period when referring to Europe as a whole. In addition, the persistence of small states in Western Europe challenges the assumption of the medium-sized, nation-state as the vessel of modernity.

A much more important critique of the concept of nation-state is that it is regularly used to describe states which are meant to be nationally, that is ethnically homogeneous, when in reality they are not. The idea of a world consisting of states, the boundaries of which coincide with the homelands of cultural groups, is a myth. In a well-known article, W. Connor (1972) remarked that only 9.1 per cent of the world’s existing states were ethnically homogeneous, and hence deserved the label ‘nation-states’. It would appear, then, that the uninational state is not a common occurrence, but rather a rarity. There are, of course, different degrees of heterogeneity: from the existence of a small national minority within a state to truly multinational states. The point to be emphasized here is the misnomer of the expression nation-state when we are ref erring to the realities, as opposed to the ideals, of modernity.

To return now to Western Europe, none of the medium-sized classical examples of nation-states (France, Great Britain, Spain) fit the bill; and the newcomers (Italy and Germany) hardly qualify because either the nation is wider than the state (Germany) or because the nation itself is an invention without roots and what has salience are the local identities (Italy). Of course, the word ‘nation’ is often used in a political sense as equivalent to citizenship in order to signify the democratic incorporation of the population of a country to the political tasks. But the word ‘state’ should suffice to indicate this reality, particularly in the twentieth century. It is true that there is some ambiguity in the word ‘state’, which can also mean, as is the case in the USA, a federal union; in this eventuality, the constituent units are referred to as ‘states’, and hence the use of the expression nation-state is used to refer to the whole. Nevertheless, these so-called states lack one essential characteristic – total sovereignty. It is inescapable that the term ‘nation’ should have a political and cultural dimension. Only ideally do countries converge towards the perfect congruence between the political (state) and the cultural (nation). As K. Aun has remarked, ‘the paradox is that both nation-building by the states and state-building by the nations have the same root – nationalism; and they have the same goal – the nation-state; but as processes they collide with each other’ (1980: 72). In fact, the objective of achieving true nation-statehood has proven a slippery, if not unattainable aspiration.

The process of clarification of the concept of nation-state has indicated an unavoidable ambiguity in the use of the term. It is naive to expect that the expression ‘nation-state’ will ever be used to reflect a univocal reality. The reluctance of social scientists to coin, and to agree to the use of new technical terms, with precise definitions, is notorious; they prefer to stick to everyday language, to redefine old terms and hence to contribute to the ceremony of confusion. But in addition to this, multiple meanings also result through the possibility that a term may be used by different groups to defend political models in the cultural area. In other words, terminological ambiguity may mask attempts to monopolize the symbolic capital of certain ideas which are considered extremely valuable in modernity. This is the case concerning the concept of nation. Many social scientists, particularly in the French tradition, are reluctant to label as ‘nations’ entities which are not politically independent; Durkheim, Mauss, Dumont, and more recently Schnapper (1994) all appear to agree on this point.

The insistence of multinational states such as the UK and Spain in calling themselves ‘nations’ should alert us to the appeal of the idea of nation. From the perspective of the submerged ethnonations, there is also an insistence upon asserting their nationhood by using the term ‘nation’ to refer to themselves. Furthermore, the process of cultural struggle is completed by each group labelling its opponent with a term considered unacceptable by the other – ethnonations do not like being called ‘regions’ and self-styled nation-states object to being referred to as states.

Certain rigid commentators believe that wherever state and nation do not coincide, there is bound to be a clash of loyalties; it is argued that one cannot serve two masters. Raymond Aron put it the following way: ‘Chacun de nous a une patrie et une religion, mais nul ne saurait avoir deux Patries’ (1969: 41). This is true in so far as both states and nations try to become nation-states which is precisely what happens in the era of nationalism. As expressed above, it is fair to say that, on the whole, the idea of a world in which nation-states would be the predominant political type is a mirage. The practice of nationalism in the past two centuries (both state nationalism and nationalism against the state) has shown how illusory the dream is, and how often it can turn into a nightmare. The first fact to be faced is that the reality any unit, no matter how many subdivisions a state might be subjected to, is likely to still be multinational and multiethnic. This is, of course, a generalization and, as such, it should be qualified. Even if we can agree that, at least in Europe, the nationality principle has radically changed the political map of the continent in the past two centuries, the end is never a set of homogeneous states. A number of reasons account for this.

1. The nationality principle is eminently ambiguous and open to instrumentalization by any group which has an axe to grind. All the key elements involved in the definition of a nation (language, culture, history) can easily be manipulated. Insofar as a national project can gather a degree of popular support, it has a de facto reality. In other words, there is no end to potential fissiparity, though in practice it may be restricted.
2. Once the notion of homogeneous states has been dispelled, the next myth to be challenged is the idea that there exist homogeneous territorial ethnonations. The uneven development of capitalism in the different European states has produced population movements which have undermined the traditional homogeneity of these areas.
3. Some parts of Europe, particularly the East are traditionally areas of great national and ethnic complexity.
4. Recent migratory processes have brought into Europe, particularly Western Europe, transnational ethnic communities from different parts of the world.

It is interesting to note that the expression ‘nation of nations’ has made its recent appearance in the literature in order to account for such realities as Spain and the UK. This brings the issue of multiple identity and multiple loyalty into the fore. If it were possible to separate loyalty to the state (a political matter) from emotive attachment to the nation (a psycho-cultural phenomenon), the problem of congruence between state and nation would not be of much consequence. The problem arises because the state tries to become a nation, and thus has to elicit sentiments of belonging, that is love from its subjects; this is the modern precondition for loyalty. In order to succeed in this, it must attempt to homogenize a multiethnic reality. This is achieved by erasing, with a mixture of coercion and inducement, all cultures other than the dominant one. On the other hand, the nation, in an attempt to preserve its identity, has no other option but to try to become a sovereign, self-governing entity, that is an independent state. This is a rather ideal typical presentation of a much more complex historical reality. In fact, states and nations have to often compromise and accept solutions which are far from their intended objectives. Furthermore, it should already be understood that deviations from the ideal norm are overdetermined by a structural variable hitherto unmentioned – the regional or global interstate system.

It is precisely as a result of this fuzziness between state and nation that a concept such as that of ‘nation of nations’ could be coined. This expression seems to indicate a supemational reality, usually formed over a long period of time around a cluster of nations which share a state. The new entity would emerge in the context of a sort of pooling of cultures, each essentially preserving its identity, but giving rise to a higher level, national reality. Now, this model can only work if the state is the result of a pact of equals, and it is organized on a federal basis, respecting the national characteristics of the constituent parts. Historically, this is an extreme rarity, with only Switzerland perhaps approximating the model. In the historical context of Europe, even some states were initially the result of a union of crowns (usually engineered by monarchs in league with sections of the aristocracy), what happens in the long run is that they become centralized, unitarian type of states, with a dominant nationality which tries to impose, to various degrees, its own language, culture, sense of history, religion, etc. on the others. In as far as this process is successful, the expression ‘nation of nations’ may be appropriate but it implies that the second part of the equation refers mostly to the past. France, originally an ‘ethnic mosaic’, would perhaps best conform to this model, although one should not forget that the end-product is recent and it contains imperfections.

So what can be said about realities such as Spain and the UK? Can they be envisaged as nations? The two cases are not necessarily the same, although they offer interesting possibilities of comparison. The problem with the UK is that there is no single word to designate the members of the supposed nation – although Tom Narin (1988) has suggested, somewhat jokingly, the term Ukanian. British is, of course, the usual word, but it excludes the peoples of Northern Ireland. Leaving aside terminological problems, can we say that Northern Irish, Scots and Welsh feel the same towards the UK? It obvious that for the English the UK is England writ large or a England. British culture is essentially English culture, with some colourful concessions to the cultural peripheries. The English shamelessly to the UK as ‘England’ (a practice which is even widespread among foreigners). This should come as no surprise, if the Scots tried, after the Union of Parliaments, to popularize expression ‘Britain’ (and even ‘North Britain’ to refer to themselves). Scots, Welsh and Irish have lived under the spell of English culture, and have to a certain extent been ‘anglicized’. Pressures for the creation of a strong nation-state were stronger in Ireland (a kind of colonial outpost) and led to the creation of the incomplete Republic of in 1922. The Scots, who had essentially joined the Union of own will, preserved an array of separate institutions (legal and educational systems, Church, etc.); the Welsh were incorporated into English crown much earlier and by force, but were not ‘anglicized’ until well-entered modernity. There have been movements of national self-assertion in both Scotland and Wales since the late nineteenth century. While in the former, this self-assertion is based on a strong sense of history, in the latter, the linguistic and cultural elements predominate.

I tend to agree with B. Crick (1991) when he says that ‘British’ is political term and a legal concept best applied to the institutions of the UK state, to common citizenship and common political arrangements. It is not a cultural term, nor does it correspond to real sense of a nation. And nor should it: ‘… to be British demands kind of loyalty, but a pragmatic loyalty limited to those civil institutions we have in common’ (1991: 97). For the peripheral nations of UK, there was a sense at the height of the British Empire that being ‘British’ had ‘national’ overtones. However, this is hardly the case today, although there is still perhaps a mystical sense of British identity via the Royal Family. Furthermore, at present, the UK consists only of a disproportionately large dominant nation (England, with 46 million people) and three subordinated nations (Scotland, with million people; Wales, 2.7 million; and Northern Ireland, 1.5 million), but contains a number of transnational ethnic communities making for a polity which is culturally pluralistic in the extreme. A sense British identity in such a plural society can only be understood the sense expressed above by Crick. The nationalist demands the Scottish, Welsh and North Irish peoples are of a different quality and intensity, and may require differing specific solutions. In any case, whatever these solutions may be, they are more likely than not to further erode the idea of a British cultural nation. These developments, and the fear of being swallowed by Europe, are awakening the sleeping beast of English nationalism - a creature which at its worst exhibits xenophobic, chauvinistic and anti-European sentiments.

England is to the UK what Castile is to Spain. However, there is an initial terminological difference that should be noted. While in the British case there is only a cumbersome word to designate the supposed nation-state (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) and no word at all to refer to their ‘nationals’, the very opposite occurs in the case of Spain. Although the Spanish state is very much a Castilian invention and creation, the ruling elites and their ideological spokesmen have always insisted on using the term ‘Spain’ to refer to an indivisible, national reality. In Spanish nationalist discourses, from the post French Revolutionary period to today, if there is one constant it is that Spain is always described as a single and indivisible nation. None of the constituent parts of Spain are recognized with national status (although the 1978 Constitution accepts the existence of ‘nationalities’) in the sense of entities endowed with contractual powers, among which figures the right to self-determination.

For thirty-five years, the Francoist dictatorship engaged in the most active and aggressive policies of nation-building ever seen within the Spanish state. Its objective was to create a homogeneous national space of Spanishness; to that end, it was essential to erase the national identities of Catalonia and the Basque Country. If Franco failed to achieve his stated goal, it was not for lack of trying; he used all the means that a quasi-totalitarian dictatorship had at its reach - the educational system at all levels, military conscription, the media, political institutions, the fascist syndicates, the Catholic hierarchy, etc. - to project the idea of Spain as a chosen community, with a common past and a common destiny. He only underestimated one thing: the will of the people of Catalonia and the Basque Country to resist the policies of cultural extermination.

In the aftermath of Franco’s death, the demands for autonomy in Catalonia and the Basque Country could only go unheeded at the cost of alienating the two most dynamic areas of the Spanish state. A democratization of the country required as a sine qua non the devolution of power. The Constitution of 1978 was a compromise in that it created a moderately decentralized ‘state of the autonomies’, in which not only Catalonia and the Basque Country, but also all of the constituent parts of the state, were given autonomic powers (although the actual configuration and boundaries of the different autonomous communities were not without problems). This process of decentralization has generated strong regionalist sentiments in most of the autonomous communit...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: Theorizing Ethnicity and Nationalism
• 1 The Future of Ethnonations in a United Europe
• 2 Nationalism and the Theory of Society
• 3 Marx and Durkheim on Nationalism
• 4 The Quest for Identity: Modern Strangers and New/Old Ethnicities in Europe
• 5 Multiculturalism and Universalism in the United States and EU-Europe
• 6 Multiculturalism and Political Integration: The Need for a Differentiated Citizenship?
• 7 Multiculturalism and the Sphere Theories of Hannah Arendt and John Rex
• 8 Ethnic Revivals Within Nation-States? The Theories of E. Gellner and A. D. Smith Revisited
• 9 Affiliation, Exclusion and the National State: ‘Ethnic Discourses’ and Minorities in East Central Europe
• 10 Re-Imagining the Jew in Hungary: The Reconstruction of Ethnicity through Political Affiliation
• 11 Majority as a Minority: The Russian Ethno-Nationalism and its Ideology in the 1970s-1990s
• 12 The Nationalist Game: State Dominance and Ethnic Nationalism
• 13 Boundaries, Cohesion and Switching: On We-Groups in Ethnic National and Religious Forms
• 14 Italy’s Northern League: Between Ethnic Citizenship and a Federal State
• 15 The Dilemma of Separation Versus Union: The New Dynamic of Nationalist Politics in Belgium
• 16 Ethnicity and National Educational Systems in Westem Europe
• Notes on Contributors
• Index