Iranian Romance in the Digital Age

From Arranged Marriage to White Marriage

Janet Afary, Jesilyn Faust, Janet Afary, Jesilyn Faust, Janet Afary, Jesilyn Faust

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9780755618286
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, there was a dramatic reversal of women's
rights, and the state revived many premodern social conventions through
modern means and institutions. Customs such as the enforced veiling of women,
easy divorce for men, child marriage, and polygamy were robustly reintroduced
and those who did not conform to societal strictures were severely punished. At
the same time, new social and economic programs benefited the urban and rural
poor, especially women, which had a direct impact on gender relations and the
institution of marriage. Edited by Janet Afary and Jesilyn Faust, this interdisciplinary
volume responds to the growing interest and need for literature on gender, marriage
and family relations in the Islamic context. The book examines how the institution
of marriage transformed in Iran, paying close attention to the country's culture
and politics. Part One examines changes in urban marriages to new forms of
cohabitation. In Part Two contributors, such as Soraya Tremayne, explore the way
technology and social media has impacted and altered the institution of family.
Part Three turns its eye to look at marital changes in the rural and tribal sectors
of society through the works of anthropologists including Erika Friedl and Mary
Hegland. Based on the work of both new and established scholars, the book
provides an up-to-date study of an important and intensely politicized subject.

Part One

Norms, Romance, and the Breakdown of Arranged Urban Marriage

1

The Emergence of Independent Women in Iran

A Generational Perspective

Masserat Amir-Ebrahimi

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the family is considered a fundamental social institution, and marriage is seen as an obligation for anyone who is physically and financially qualified. During the Iran–Iraq War (1980–8), married couples and extended families received many more privileges than single people from the government. Even after the war ended, married couples received preferential treatment in the job market, with regard to acquiring loans, rental accommodations, travel, among other things. Single people, especially single women, were last in line for all government privileges.

Despite these privileges, the structure of family appears to be fracturing. In the last decade, the rate of marriage has declined significantly, and divorce rates have increased in cities such as Tehran (one divorce for three marriages in 2018). In addition, the age of women at first marriage has risen considerably. In 2016,¹ nearly 37 percent of women living in Tehran between the ages of twenty and thirty-five had never been married. This delay in the age of marriage has been accompanied by a drop in fertility rates (from 6.4 percent in 1986 to 1.8 percent in 2014 and then a small increase to 2.0 percent in 2018 nationwide). These changes are accompanied by a general rise in the number of households composed of elderly, single people. They were also influenced by the rise of individualism among younger generations and a dramatic increase in the number of women who are heads of their household. In ten years from 2006 to 2016, the number of women who were heads of their households doubled, growing from 1.6 million (9.4 percent) in 2006 to 3.06 million in 2016 (12.7 percent). Of this group, around 1.36 million women (44.4 percent) were living alone. Besides single households, the number of young, unmarried people who were cohabiting with a roommate or a partner has been rising. This new phenomenon, which would have been unimaginable until a few years ago, is called “white marriage” or “married singles” by the media, as a way of giving it a certain religious legitimacy. As Azad-Armaki et al. have argued, this new type of household and cohabitation is mostly the result of globalization along with important economic, cultural, and social changes that have taken place in Iran.²

Living alone is a dramatically new phenomenon for Iranian women. Until recently, living alone was considered a sad “fate,” a life reserved to widows, the elderly, migrants, prostitutes, and—in general—destitute poor people. In Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s time, living alone was not common. In 1976, single households constituted 7.2 percent of all households in Tehran. Of this number, 49.7 percent was people who were less than thirty-five years old—most probably rural migrants who came to Tehran in search of better jobs. These individuals would eventually get married after their economic situation stabilized. About 22 percent of single households were elderly, which shows the prevalence of the extended family, and women represented only 31.2 percent of single households. Thus, living alone was mostly a masculine phenomenon and reserved for young people.

Forty years later, in 2016, the official rate of single households in Tehran has increased to 10.1 percent. This may not seem like a significant increase; however, the distribution is now very different. In 2016, youth under thirty-five constituted 19.7 percent of single households, whereas the elderly (more than sixty years old) composed 47.4 percent of single households. More surprisingly, living alone has become mostly feminized; indeed, 61.3 percent of all single households in Tehran were composed of women in 2016, so the rate had doubled since 1976. Among them, 62.2 percent were more than sixty years old. Such changes in the composition of single households in the last forty years show that the structure of the Iranian family has altered significantly.

These statistics point to two changes: (1) the transformation of the structure of the family from an extended family to a nuclear one based on growing individualism and (2) greater independence of women, who are living alone, sometimes by choice and sometimes because they have no other option.

Today there are two types of single households: one is the traditional single household, which is based on quasi-obligation, because there is no other choice. These single people either have no family or are abandoned by them; they are old, migrants, or poor. On the other hand, the modern single household is based on individualism and independence. In these cases, living alone is a choice rather than a fate imposed on the person.

In his book on single people and singlehood, J. C. Bologne explains this new lifestyle as it emerged in the West. The rise of single households was linked to the emergence of the “modern woman” or “la femme moderne” in the twentieth century. It was related to the fact that divorce was no longer a stigma, as well as to the fact that a significant number of women had attended college, had jobs, and, therefore, could afford to live independently. The rise of single households was also related to harsh economic times. Dramatic shifts in social and, especially, technological factors in everyday life, from the introduction of refrigerators and microwaves to the arrival of television and the internet, all made this lifestyle possible.³ For many women who choose to live alone, acquiring some independence and freedom have been the most important reasons. However, living alone and staying single often remains a big challenge for most women, especially in traditional and more family-oriented societies. Tuula Gordon rightly points out that “constructing an independent life, reaching the status of ‘the individual’ and obtaining full social citizenship are still areas of struggle. . . . Single women are still marginalized in familyist societies and many of them experience multiple marginalizations.”⁴ In Iran, despite persistent negative views of singlehood, which make life harder for single women living alone, the new trend of globalizati on and greater exposure to modern lifestyles have facilitated this new type of household. In fact, with the massive entrance of women into higher education, the emergence of a larger job market (formal and informal), the construction of smaller rental apartments, the advent of satellite TV and social media into everyday life, as well as the emergence of new public spaces, living alone has become more bearable and plausible. In no small measure, women’s greater self-esteem and self-awareness have contributed to this trend.

However, traditional familial expectations lead many women to hide their way of life from their families or neighbors; they do not declare that they are living alone so as not to attract other people’s attention. In my research, I encountered young women, especially those who had migrated from the provinces to Tehran and left their families behind, who said they were occasionally sharing their apartment with a partner, a friend, or a family member but were actually living alone for most of the time. For a variety of cultural and economic reasons, they did not declare that they lived in a single household. Thus, the number of single households among youth may be much higher than what is declared officially. Although there is no indication as to who is living alone by choice and who is doing so out of necessity or social obligation, we can assume that this new type of single household is popular among those with economic advantages, especially in big cities and among middle-aged and middle- and upper-class women. In the 2016 census, 42.9 percent of female single households in Tehran were headed by women between the ages of fifty-five and seventy-four. These are women who at the advent of the revolution were aged between eighteen and thirty-seven years. Some of these women had acquired a certain degree of independence from their families during the shah’s time, because they worked and had a salary. Some had also been deeply involved in the early stages of the revolution, when hundreds of thousands of youth joined the movement. These women had a very different life experience compared to their mothers or even their daughters who grew up after the institution of the Islamic Republic, with its limitations and some mandatory segregated spaces.⁵ They are the only generation who lived their youth in the free public spaces of the prerevolutionary era but also experienced the enclosed and segregated spaces that were mandated after the revolution.⁶ This generation, which was born between 1942 and 1961 (roughly corresponding to the baby boomer generation), like their counterparts in Western countries, was a rebellious generation. Their children and grandchildren, those who were born around the time of the revolution (1976–91),⁷ were between the ages of twenty-five and forty when the last census was taken in 2016. Known as the Third Generation, this latter group has introduced major social changes to Iranian society. These two generations, the ones who were principal actors of the revolution (the First Generation) and the ones who have introduced important social changes after the revolution (the Third Generation), are my focus in this article.⁸ Women from the First Generation (never married, divorced, or widowed) account for a significant share of single households in Tehran (42.9 percent). Members of the Third Generation, however, often lack the economic opportunities and resources to rent or own an apartment on their own, especially with the high inflation in recent decades. Officially, women of the Third Generation compose only 12.9 percent of the women who are living alone in Tehran; as mentioned, however, they may be far more numerous. Both generations of women have tried to gain their independence within a society that has little respect for women who choose to live alone. To understand their trajectory, a glance at some important, historical, and social events and...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-Title
• Series
• Title
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Glossary
• Introduction
• Part One Norms, Romance, and the Breakdown of Arranged Urban Marriage
• Part Two Online Dating, Hymenoplasty, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies
• Part Three Reconstructing Hierarchies: Rural and Tribal Marriages
• Bibliography
• Notes on the Contributors
• Index
• Copyright