ONE
Female Respectability and Embodied National Sovereignty
THIS CHAPTER EXAMINES the relationship between womenâs activism, gender, and state building in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, from the moment of formal decolonization until the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. This was the period of what Malcolm Kerr (1971) called the Arab Cold Warâgeopolitical rivalries between pan-Arab republics, led by Egypt, and conservative monarchies, such as Jordan. Lebanon, where political elites were committed to foreign policy neutrality, found itself uncomfortably pulled in both directions, triggering a political crisis in 1958. Meanwhile, during this period, movements inspired by Gamal Abdel-Nasserâs vision of pan-Arabism, freedom from imperialism, and modernization, challenged state sovereignty in Jordan and Lebanon.
Feminist scholarship on decolonization has tended to present women as either active and empowered participants in the anticolonial struggle (Badran 1995; Fleischmann 1999; Hasso 2005a; Jayawardena 1986) or victims of patriarchal nationalist leaders who denied them full rights once liberation was achieved (for example, Enloe 1989; Moghadam 1994; Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989). This chapter aims to go beyond these seemingly contradictory conceptualizations of the relationship between decolonization and womenâs activism, arguing that anticolonial nationalism was simultaneously productive of womenâs activism while also contributing to the production of gendered inequalities in the postindependence state. Specifically, antiÂcolonial nationalism mobilized women but on the basis of an emerging norm of âfemale respectability,â which was constituted by as well as constitutive of national modernity and of national difference in resistance to the gendered and racialized ârule of colonial differenceâ (Chatterjee 1993: 10). Reformulated norms of female respectability were embedded within postcolonial state-building projects, enabling womenâs participation in national development on the condition that this would not challenge the gendered hierarchies underpinning the state.
Based on personal narratives, the chapter explores the ways in which different women embodied and/or resisted norms of female respectability in the early years of postindependence state building through their professional lives and respective activisms. Despite the apparent constraints of dominant notions of female respectability on womenâs agency, many women willingly embodied such norms to pursue professional ambitions and contribute to national development. In this way, they supported the naturalization of the dominant gender order, which, in turn, contributed to producing a ânatural stateâ (Weber 1998: 92) that underpinned regime authority in a context of threats to sovereignty from regional rivals and pan-Arab movements. Meanwhile, some women sought to resignify female respectability through expanding womenâs roles within the existing gender order, while others transgressed dominant gender norms by participating in political activism. Specifically, anti-imperialist, pan-Arab, and other radical ideological movements provided a terrain for women to resist existing gendered hierarchies and dominant gender norms in Jordan and Lebanon. Hence, womenâs independent activism was a particular target of repression and control for postindependence regimes.
THE GEOPOLITICAL ORIGINS OF WOMENâS ACTIVISM UNDER COLONIAL RULE
It is impossible to understand the significance, trajectory, and characteristics of womenâs activism in the Middle East without being attentive to the geopolitical context in which it emerged. While women (mainly of the peasant and working classes) have always participated in the economic, social, and cultural life of former Ottoman societies (Meriwether and Tucker 1999; Tucker 2008), the substantial public visibility of womenâspecifically those of the upper classesâwas a modern phenomenon, linked to socioeconomic and political changes arising with European economic penetration and, later, colonial rule. The Europeans justified their domination of non-European societies on the basis of their supposed cultural superiority, or what Partha Chatterjee has called the ârule of colonial differenceâ (Chatterjee 1993). European discourse constructed the âOrientâ as backward, irrational, and despotic, blaming Islam (Said 1978). Significantly, the situation of women, such as the existence of domestic seclusion (harem) and veiling, was held up as a marker of the regionâs backwardness (Ahmed 1992).
In response to European encroachment, Ottoman officials initiated modernizing reforms, such as, the introduction of European models of administration and education, contributing to the emergence of a new social strata of Western-style educated bureaucrats and professionals, who began to debate the role of Islam in public life (Badran 1995: 10â11; Hourani 1983) and, related to this, the âwoman questionââthat is, a set of debates about womenâs âproperâ social roles as âmothers, managers of the domestic realm, as wives of men, and as citizens of the nationâ (Abu-Lughod 1998a: 8; see also Baron 2005: 17â39). It is perhaps lawyer Qasim Amin who is best known for advocating the reform of womenâs situation with the publication of Tahrir al-maâra (The emancipation of woman) in 1899 and Al-maâra al-jadida (The new woman) in 1900, in which he insisted on an end to female seclusion and face veiling, the elimination of abuses of divorce and polygamy, and the establishment of womenâs education, as necessary for social and national regeneration (Badran 1995: 18â19; Hourani 1983). In fact, women writers such as, Zaynab Fawwaz and Bahithat al-Badiya (Malak Hifni Nassif) and educationalist Nabawiya Musa had already pioneered calls for women to be educated and allowed to play a role beyond the household (Badran 1995: 61â69). Similarly, in Beirut, which from the late nineteenth century was an important center for the Arab cultural and intellectual renaissance (al-nahda), the âwoman questionâ was also taken up (Traboulsi 2007: 52â72). Nahda intellectuals, such as Butrus al-Bustani and Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq, argued for the necessity of womenâs liberation for the progress of society (Traboulsi 2003: 15, 2007: 67). Women also contributed to these debates through an emerging womenâs press (Booth 2001; Fleischmann 1999: 101; Thompson 2000: 120).1
Public debates over the âwoman questionâ alongside the growing anticolonial nationalist movements opened up new spaces for elite women, many of whom were the wives, daughters, or sisters of male nationalist leaders, to engage in public work. As philanthropists and educationalists, they created charitable associations and intellectual societies. In line with the broader aims of anticolonial nationalism, they sought to contribute to the struggle against national âbackwardnessâ and for social progress, particularly through the provision of services and education to poor women (al-Tal 2014: 31â34; Badran 1995: 48â60; Fleischmann 1999; Thompson 2000: 96). In this way, through their associational work, women activists contributed to the erasure of the âmarks of colonial differenceâ (Chatterjee 1993: 26) in welfare activities that sought âsocial upliftâ but also by their embodiment of the ânew woman.â Yet, simultaneously, elite womenâs activism also reinscribed the class hierarchies within the nationalist movement (Bier 2011: 29â34; Thompson 2000).
Womenâs associational activities were generally encouraged by nationalist elites; however, they were expected to contribute to the national struggle without forgoing notions of modesty, docility, and respectability that marked the âessenceâ of the nationâthat is, to be what Afsaneh Najmabadi has termed âmodern-yet-modestâ (1991: 49). Although such attitudes were contradictory, they were central to constructions of cultural difference from Europe, reflecting wider contradictions within anticolonial nationalismâwhich sought to be modern yet different from Europe (Chakrabarty 1997: 373). Notions of female modesty operated to exclude women from the sphere of formal politics. For example, in Egypt, a new constitution promulgated in 1923, following the awarding of nominal independence by the British, failed to grant women the right to vote, despite the important involvement of women in the 1919 uprising against the British (Badran 1995: 86â95). Meanwhile, in Lebanon, women activists were accused by conservatives and religious leaders of acting âcontrary to religionâ by calling for the right to vote (Thompson 2000: 143). However, rather than directly challenge norms of female respectability, women activists generally deferred to the gendered hierarchies of the nationalist movement, for example, by emphasizing the social and cultural aspects of womenâs mission, as well as through their choice of clothing (Badran 1995: 47â48, 58; Thompson 2000: 143). Likewise, in our interview, the late Marie Assaad, born in Cairo in 1932, in the then wealthy neighborhood of Faggala, insisted that womenâs activism during this period was not political: âWhen we think of active women like Huda Shaârawi [founder of the Egyptian Feminist Union] and all, they were not really political. They were all volunteering to do something. For other people, for women, for poor women, for service. That was the expression of our participation in society.â Marie herself was raised from an early age to take an interest in âthe fate of the poor.â During summer vacations from school, she would give literacy classes to underprivileged children living in her neighborhood. Marie was also a member of the Egyptian branch of the Young Womenâs Christian Association, which encouraged womenâs public participation through social work and youth activities. Yet, moments of political upheaval and crisis constituted opportunities for transgressing dominant norms of female respectability. During the 1919 uprising against the British, âgender rules were suspendedâ (Badran 1995: 74) and, for the first time, middle- and upper-class women participated in street demonstrations and other political actions, including organizing petitions, boycotts, and public debates (Badra 1995; see also Philipp 1978). In Lebanon, in the run-up to and during World War II, the participation of middle-class and upper-class Lebanese women in anti-French protests, which even included a collective unveiling by Muslim women, transgressed dominant gendered class norms, sometimes provoking hostile reactions (Thompson 2000: 184â96, 252â59).2 In Jordan, during the 1947â48 Palestine war, the Society of the Jordanian Womenâs Union (Jamiâiyat al-Ittihad al-Nisaâi al-Urdunni) trained women in first aid and nursing (not considered an appropriate activity for ârespectableâ women, since it would bring them into contact with men) to assist Jordanian soldiers and Palestinian refugees (al-Tal 2014: 157â58). Women created new organizations and initiatives, such as the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU), Egyptâs first independent feminist organization, founded in 1923, which not only provided welfare services to women and low-income groups, but also advocated for womenâs political rights, access to education, and changes to personal status laws (Badran 1995). However, these demands were framed in reference to gendered conceptions of citizenship, whereby reform of womenâs status was linked to their role as the mothers and nurturers of future citizens (Badran 1995: 128â33; Bier 2011: 33). While these moments of transgression did not dismantle the modesty-modernity boundary, they did enable a renegotiation thereof and a resignification of âfemale respectability.â
However, following World War II, a new generation of women activists went much further in challenging dominant gender norms. These women were more radical in their ideological orientations and more diverse in their class-basis compared to the previous generation of women activists (Khater and Nelson 1988). For example, women members of the Egyptian communist movement, such as Inji Aflatoun and Latifa al-Zayyat, broke social taboos by mingling with men through their participation in political party work (Botman 1988: 118). They were primarily focused on mobilizing support for the struggle against the British but were also concerned to improve the situation of Egyptian women, linking the struggle against imperialism to the struggle against class and gender inequalities (Botman 1988; Khater and Nelson 1988). Meanwhile, in 1948, Doria Shafik founded the Bint al-Nil organization, which led an occupation of parliament in 1951 to demand Egyptian womenâs full political rights (Khater & Nelson 1988). However, all forms of independent womenâs activism were banned in Egypt and Jordan in the years following formal decolonization.
As this section has demonstrated, the origins of womenâs activism can be traced to the major geopolitical transformations from the end of the nineteenth century onwardânamely European colonialism and growing indigenous resistance to it in the form of nationalist movements. Anticolonial nationalism sought to modernize society as proof of readiness for national independence and placed women at the heart of that project. While women from the working classes and peasantry had always contributed to economic, social, and cultural life, for the first time, women from the elite and emerging middle classes were able to enter public life through their participation in the nationalist movement. Norms of female respectability, however, prevented women from becoming involved in overtly political activities. As a result, women, with some exceptions, generally limited their activism to charitable and welfare activities, presenting these as a form of social activism in the service of the nation. The construction of the political/social distinction was constitutive of the norm of female respectability, which, in turn, was a marker of cultural difference from Europe. Therefore, despite insistence to the contrary, womenâs social activism was geopolitical, in that it was integral to the nationalist construction of the inner sphere of national sovereignty at the heart of the struggle that finally culminated in formal decolonization.
WOMENâS ACTIVISM AND POSTINDEPENDENCE STATE BUILDING
The period from formal decolonization until 1967 was a time of regional upheaval and geopolitical contestations. The 1947 UN partition of Palestine triggered the first Arab-Israeli war, resulting in the defeat of the Arab forces and the Nakba, or âcatastropheâ for the Palestinians. The loss of Palestine led to the political radicalization of a new generation of Palestinians as well as citizens of Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan. New ideological parties emerged across the region espousing pan-Arab unity, anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism, and social justice, challenging the geopolitical order established by the European powers and their local allies. In Egypt, a group of army officers, calling themselves the Free Officers, launched a coup in July 1952, forcing King Faruq to abdicate, dissolving the government, and paving the way for a full withdrawal of British forces. The new regime, headed by the charismatic Gamal Abdel-Nasser, set about building a new domestic order based on a coalition of popular forces and supplanting the class of wealthy business owners and landlords. Meanwhile, the regime sought to overturn Western influence in the region more broadly and became a leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Following the 1956 Tripartite Aggression by Britain, France, and Israel, Gamal Abdel-Nasser became a hero both at home and abroad, inspiring radical movements across the region, which resulted in the toppling of pro-Western regimes in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, and Libya, and, if it were not for Western intervention, might have also overturned the Hashemite monarchy of Jordan. Pan-Arabism became a strong norm governing regional Arab politics (Barnett 1998). Even the pro-Western monarchies (Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Jordan) were obliged to at least be seen to act in accordance with pan-Arabism or risk their citizens rising up against them. This section examines the ways in which norms of female respectability, produced through the anticolonial struggle, were deployed in postindependence state-building projects and anti-imperialist movements, and the ways in which women embodied, resisted, and renegotiated these norms through their activism and professional lives.
Gender and Geopolitical Order in Egypt
Under Nasserâs leadership, Egypt would experience one of the most ambitious national modernization programs of all the Arab countries, including land redistribution, state-led industrialization, rural development, and expansion of free education and health care, which were accompanied by social benefits, including a minimum wage, reduced working hours, access to cheap credit and subsidized goods and services (Yapp 1996: 215â19; Vatikiotis 1991: 393â402). Urban middle and lower-middle classes experienced significant social mobility, as did peasants and workers in the formal sector, whose living standards improved until economic stagnation set in after 1965 (Waterbury 1983: 207â23). These measures not only boosted the popularity of the new regime but also helped to dismantle the power and wealth of the former elites.
An important component of the regimeâs state-building project was the implementation of a program of âstate feminismâ (Hatem 1992; Bier 2011). Important measures in this respect included the 1956 constitution, which granted women the right to vote and stand for office; the amendment of labor laws between 1958 and 1959 to provide maternity leave and workplace crèches for working mothers; a 1964 law guaranteeing jobs in the state sector for all university graduates irrespective of gender, and implementation of a state family planning program (Bier 2011; Hatem 1992: 232).3 Other measures that greatly benefited women and girls included the introduction of free education. Between 1960 and 1976, female primary and secondary education enrolment increased threefold and female university enrolment increased by six times (see Hatem 1988: 413). Commitment to state feminism was part of the raft of social policies that built popular support for the regime, while serving as a means of mobilizing womenâs productive and reproductive capabilities in the service of the stateâs modernization policies (Hatem 1992). As Laura Bier argues, Nasserist state feminism represented a continuation of earlier nationalist projects to remake women but also transformed the âwoman questionâ in a way that was âconsistent with the dictates of a secular nation-state project and the notions of secular modernity that underpinned themâ (Bier 2011: 16). State feminism signaled the progressive character of the regime, thereby contributing to the regimeâs legitimacy, particularly vis-Ă -vis its main political rival, the Muslim Brotherhood. Nasser ridiculed the Muslim Brotherhoodâs attitudes toward womenâs rights, characterizing them as reactionary and a threat to the gains of the Egyptian revolution (ERTU 1965).
Writer, literary critic, and political activist Farida El-Nakkash was one of many young women to benefit from the new regimeâs policies, graduating in English Literature from Cairo University in 1962, the same year in which the government announced that all university graduates would be guaranteed state employment. Farida worked for the state-owned Middle East News Agency as a journalist. She recalled: âWhen women began to get university education on a broader scale, they began to enter into all sorts of professions very actively. From time to time religious groups would say that a womanâs natural place is in her home and that raising the children was her most important job, but the society in general was accepting of women entering the workforce.â This shift in gender norms was also reflected in popular culture. Egyptian films in the 1960s promoted the idea of women working, such as the 1966 film Mirati mudir âam (My wife, the gener...