Raised on the Third Day

Defending the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus

W. David Beck,Michael R. Licona

• Publisher: Lexham Press
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781683594338
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: Christian Theology

Did Jesus rise from the dead? Is resurrection even possible? There are numerous historical and philosophical challenges to belief in Jesus' resurrection. For many, these questions are insurmountable. Raised on the Third Day approaches these questions with critical and believing eyes. Edited by W. David Beck and Michael R. Licona, Raised on the Third Day collects essays from prominent contributors in the fields of philosophy, history, and apologetics. Contributors--including J. P. Moreland, William Lane Craig, Craig A. Evans, Beth M. Sheppard, and Sean McDowell--evaluate scriptural, historical, moral, and apologetic issues related to Christ's death and resurrection. Essays on the Shroud of Turin and near-death experiences round out the volume. Inspired by the foundational work of Gary Habermas--arguably the greatest contemporary Christian thinker on the resurrection--these essays build upon his work and move the discussion forward.Readers will better appreciate how Habermas has shaped scholarship on Christ's resurrection and further areas for exploration and discussion.

PART 1

On PHILOSOPHY, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, and PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY

1

ON HABERMAS’S MINIMAL FACTS ARGUMENT

Robert B. Stewart

I am not aware of anyone who has studied the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus longer and more deeply than Gary Habermas has. As of 2004, Habermas had completed an overview of more than 1,400 sources on the resurrection of Jesus published since 1975, and he had catalogued about 650 of these texts in English, German, and French.1 By the year 2012, that number had increased to around 3,400 sources.2 Has anyone ever read even half that many unique books and/or articles on the resurrection of Jesus? From time to time, Habermas has reported on his findings, although the sum total of his research is a moving target. To his credit, Habermas has been insistent on including atheist, agnostic, and liberal scholars in his catalog, along with mainline and evangelical scholars. He does this in order to ensure that nobody can say that he only surveyed his own scholarly group.

He has also pioneered a “minimal facts” method of arguing for the resurrection of Jesus. This essay will be an appreciative critique of that method. For more than thirty-five years, Habermas has argued that “surrounding the end of Jesus’ life, there is a significant body of data that scholars of almost every religious and philosophical persuasion recognize as being historical. The historicity of each ‘fact’ on the list is attested and supported by a variety of historical and other considerations.”3

Explaining the “Minimal Facts” Method

Habermas has two criteria for an occurrence to be designated a minimal fact:

1.Each event has to be established by more than adequate scholarly evidence, and usually by several critically ascertained, independent lines of argumentation.

2.Additionally, the vast majority of contemporary scholars in relevant fields have to acknowledge the historicity of the occurrence.

One must note the difference in nature between these two criteria: the first is established by evidence, the second by consensus of scholarly opinion. The first is much more firm; past events are not subject to change, although our knowledge of evidence related to them and our interpretation of that evidence may change. The second is indeed subject to change because all of us, from time to time, change our opinions on matters, whether for good or ill.

Habermas is well aware of the difference between his two criteria in terms of sources and natures. This awareness leads him to state:

Of the two criteria, I have always held that the first is by far the most crucial, especially since this initial requirement is the one that actually establishes the historicity of the event. Besides, the acclamation of scholarly opinion may be mistaken or it could change.4

All along, Habermas has produced two lists of facts, the first list being longer and more inclusive, the second shorter and more exclusive. He states it thus:

The longer list was usually termed the “Known Historical Facts” and typically consisted of a dozen historical occurrences that more generally met the above criteria, but concerning which I was somewhat more lenient on their application. This would apply especially to the high percentages of scholarly near-unanimous agreement that I would require for the shorter list. From this longer listing, I would extrapolate a briefer line-up of from four to six events, termed the Minimal Facts.5

Something that is sometimes overlooked concerning Habermas’s method is that a minimal fact is not simply the agreed-upon opinion of the vast majority of scholars. He does not fall prey to the fallacy of appealing to majority belief or consensus gentium. Both criteria are necessary; one without the other is insufficient to produce a minimal fact. Minimal facts are “established by more than adequate scholarly evidence” and “the vast majority of contemporary scholars in relevant fields [acknowledging] the historicity of the occurrence.” In other words, a bare consensus of scholarly opinion is just that—naked shared belief. Each criterion is a necessary condition, but neither taken by itself is a sufficient condition to establish a minimal fact. It is the shorter, more exclusive, “minimal facts” list—and the method that drives it—that interests me and is the focus of this essay.

What Are Habermas’s “Minimal Facts”?

In The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus, Habermas and Michael R. Licona argue for four minimal facts.6

•Fact #1: Jesus died by crucifixion.

•Fact #2: Jesus’ disciples believed that he rose and appeared to them.

•Fact #3: The church persecutor Paul was suddenly changed.

•Fact #4: The skeptic James, brother of Jesus, was suddenly changed.

Each of these four facts was affirmed by 90 percent or more of the scholars that Habermas had studied in his voluminous cataloguing of sources on the resurrection of Jesus.7

Interestingly enough, in 2010, with the publication of his The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach,8 Licona trimmed (with Habermas’s agreement) their earlier list of four facts to three, which he termed “historical bedrock.”9 Which criterion was discarded and why? The castaway was fact four, that James was suddenly changed. Did the percentage fall below the requisite threshold of at least 90 percent affirmation? No, but the sample size was deemed too small compared to the sample size of the other three minimal facts for this highly-agreed-upon fact to be retained. Apparently there is a required sample size as well as a required percentage, although neither Habermas nor Licona state exactly what that sample size needs to be.

The (minimal) elephant in the room is the absence of one other historical statement that both Habermas and Licona, along with the majority of scholars that Habermas cataloged, personally affirm: the empty tomb. Why do they exclude the empty tomb as a minimal fact? Because it does not rise to the level of at least 90-percent agreement among the scholars that Habermas has catalogued. A large majority of scholars, across the theological divide—skeptical, liberal, mainline, and conservative—conclude that the tomb was empty, but not 90 percent. In other words, it was left out because the percentage of scholars that affirmed it was not high enough. It had nothing to do with the evidential support or the epistemic justification for the proposition itself.

Nevertheless, in The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (2004), Habermas and Licona designate the empty tomb as a “Plus One” fact. They grant that less than 90 percent of scholars writing on the resurrection affirm the empty tomb as a fact, but they give the empty tomb significant attention because “there is strong evidence for it, and it is accepted as a fact of history by an impressive majority of scholars.” Habermas estimates that 75 percent of scholars affirm it.10

In Licona’s tome, he offers up four “second-order” facts: (1) the conversion of James, (2) the empty tomb, (3) Jesus’ predictions of his violent, imminent death as well as his resurrection afterwards, and (4) that the earliest apostles held that Jesus appeared in a bodily form.11 Habermas seems to agree with Licona on these points.12

I mention this to point out that even Habermas and Licona seem to want to include more than their method allows. I wonder if there is something driving this desire that warrants attention.

Analysis and Critique

There are thirteen points I want to make about this method: some positive, some negative.

1. Habermas’s minimal facts method is evidential. Although rational belief in God’s existence may not require evidence, belief in an event in history seems to require evidence. In other words, given that history is a public discipline, one arguing for a historical event needs to argue from evidence that anyone can access and critique, and by doing so reach a reasonable conclusion regarding the claim that has been made. Habermas appeals to the most certain and widely attested evidence, i.e., that evidence most likely to be publicly affirmed, and thus his argument for the resurrection is based on a very solid foundation.

2. The minimal facts approach is simpler than others. In other words, by limiting the data that one is considering, the method focuses one’s attention on a few truly important issues, thus keeping potential objections to a minimum. Minimal facts arguments are less vulnerable to criticism because there are fewer points to be challenged. This focus is good, although it may overlook otherwise significant issues. One generally reliable rule of thumb is this: address the central issues and the peripheral ones will fall into line. Additionally, historians, like scientists, need to keep the principle of parsimony (Ockham’s razor) in mind. All other things being equal (and they almost never are), the simpler solution is generally to be preferred. Although Ockham’s razor applies to solutions, not methods, perhaps something similar is true concerning methods to arrive at a solution. Even if such is not the case, the simplicity of the method must still be appreciated.

3. On the other hand, comprehensiveness is also a good thing. In historical investigation, one should take note of all the relevant data. All other things being equal, the explanatory theory, or hypothesis, that can make sense of the most data should be preferred. Focus is a good thing, but so is comprehensiveness. Simplicity has a mirror twin, and her name is sufficiency. To its credit, Habermas’s method fares well in terms of focus and simplicity, but it does not fare as well in terms of comprehensiveness.

4. Habermas’s minimal facts method “has the benefit of bypassing the often protracted preliminary discussions of which data are permissible.”13 This is one of its strengths. Frequently the first step to resolving disagreements is to find that on which all (or most) parties can agree, and then work from that starting point. This allows the apologist to fight as few battles as necessary to achieve his or her aim.

5. Minimal facts does not mean minimal information. The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus is 352 pages; The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach is 718 pages. The minimal facts method is thus one way to give maximal attention to the most widely accepted propositions concerning the death and resurrection of Jesus, and thus to draw out all the implications of these central historical facts. In this way, the objections to conclusions in favor of Jesus’ resurrection drawn from these minimal facts can be thoroughly assessed.

6. Habermas’s minimal facts method does not downplay the importance of biblical reliability. Instead, the method focuses one’s attention on a few nearly universally acknowledged facts without denying other less widely affirmed claims of Scripture. Nowhere, that I’m aware of, does Habermas ever indicate that the reliability of the New Testament should be doubted or denied, or that biblical reliability is unimportant. Still, it is true that the method does not depend upon biblical reliability. But this is a strength, not a weakness, in that his method can be used effectively with skeptics because it does not allow them to disregard facts supporting the conclusion that Jesus was raised from the dead simply by denying the inspiration and/or inerrancy of Scripture.

7. A clearly stated method that is consistently followed levels the playing field. We will never overcome our worldviews completely (although worldviews can be challenged, critiqued, and changed); but unless we state our methods, and then seek to justify them in public dialogue, we will never even limit their influence on us as to what we believe. Simply put, method matters. Habermas recognizes this, and he receives some support from an unlikely source in the person of John Dominic Crossan, who states it well:

Method, method, and once again, method. Method will not guarantee us the truth, because nothing can do that. But method, as self-conscious and self-critical as we can make it, is our only discipline. It cannot ever take us out of our present skins and bodies, minds and hearts, societies and cultures. But it is our one best hope for honesty. It is the due process of history.14

Though no method can ensure success in this endeavor, in my opinion this method has at least as good a chance as any other in this regard because it is a clearly stated method. (As an epistemic particularist, I feel obliged to point out that this is not epistemic methodism.)

8. One concern is that this method, with its insistence upon 90-percent or higher consensus, may be too clever by half. By requiring at least 90-percent agreement, it may force historians to ignore facts that are potentially even more helpful in discovering the truth than those that Habermas accepts as minimal facts. This is so because sometimes a proposition fails to achieve 90-percent affirmation, not because skeptics deny it, but because conservative scholars hold to positions regarding those propositions that even more strongly support the Christian case.

A personal story may help illustrate my concern. Several years ago, Habermas and I were speaking at the same conference. I presented an argument for the historicity of Jesus contra mythicism, one I now term an “argument from critical scholarship.” I accepted for the sake of argument the standard form-critical date for Mark’s Gospel of AD...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction (Michael R. Licona and W. David Beck)
• Note from Gary Habermas
• Part 1: On Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, and Philosophical Theology
• Chapter 1: On Habermas’s Minimal Facts Argument (Robert B. Stewart)
• Chapter 2: The Soul and Near-Death Experiences: A Case for Substance Dualism (J. P. Moreland)
• Chapter 3: The Image on the Shroud: A Best Explanations Approach (Mark W. Foreman)
• Chapter 4: The Uniqueness of Christianity in a World of Religions (Craig J. Hazen)
• Chapter 5: John Rawls’s Political Liberalism and the Problem of Taking Rites Seriously: From Abortion to Same-Sex Wedding Cakes (Francis J. Beckwith)
• Chapter 6: On the Organic Connection between Jesus’ Atoning Death and Resurrection (William Lane Craig)
• Chapter 7: The Moral Argument and the Minimal Facts (David Baggett)
• Chapter 8: The Logical Structure of Moral Arguments (W. David Beck)
• Part 2: On History, Philosophy of History, the Resurrection, and the New Testament
• Chapter 9: The Testimony of Josephus and the Burial of Jesus (Craig A. Evans)
• Chapter 10: Near-Death Experiences and Christian Theology (Dale C. Allison, Jr.)
• Chapter 11: The Deaths of the Apostles and Belief in Jesus’ Resurrection (Sean Mcdowell)
• Chapter 12: The History and Current State of Modern Shroud Research (Barrie M. Schwortz)
• Chapter 13: Racing toward the Tomb: Purity and Sacrifice in the Fourth Gospel (Beth M. Sheppard)
• Chapter 14: A Note on Women as Witnesses and the Empty Tomb Resurrection Accounts (Darrell L. Bock)
• Chapter 15: Historical Epistemology and Divine Action (Benjamin C. F. Shaw)
• Chapter 16: The Primacy of Paul in Discussions on Jesus’ Resurrection (Michael R. Licona)
• Chapter 17: What Aspiring (and Veteran) Apologists May Learn from Gary Habermas (Alex McFarland)
• Chapter 18: What Everyone Should Learn from Gary Habermas (Frank Turek)
• List of Contributors