SR-71

The Complete Illustrated History of the Blackbird, The World's Highest, Fastest Plane

Richard H. Graham

• Publisher: Zenith Press
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781610588126
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

At the height of the Cold War in 1964, President Johnson announced a new aircraft dedicated to strategic reconnaissance. The Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird spy plane flew more than three-and-a-half times the speed of sound, so fast that no other aircraft could catch it. Above 80, 000 feet, its pilots had to wear full-pressure flight suits similar to what was used aboard the space shuttle. Developed by the renowned Lockheed Skunk Works, the SR-71 was an awesome aircraft in every respect, and it took the world by storm. The SR-71 was in service with the U.S. Air Force from 1964 to 1998, when it was withdrawn from use, superseded by satellite technology. Twelve of the thirty-two aircraft were destroyed in accidents, but none were ever lost to enemy action. Throughout its thirty-four-year career, the SR-71 was the world's fastest and highest-flying operational manned aircraft. It set world records for altitude and speed: an absolute altitude record of 85, 069 feet on July 28, 1974, and an absolute speed record of 2, 193.2 miles per hour on the same day. On September 1, 1974, it set a speed and time record over a recognized course between New York and London (3, 508 miles) of 1, 435.587 miles per hour and an elapsed time of 1 hour, 54 minutes, 56.4 seconds. SR-71 covers every aspect of the SR-71's development, manufacture, modification, and active service from the insider's perspective of one its pilots and is lavishly illustrated with more than 200 photos.

CHAPTER 1

Beginning of the A-12

The SR-71 story actually begins with the development of the U-2. In the early 1950s the United States was becoming increasingly concerned about a possible surprise attack from the Soviet Union’s dreaded intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The United States had no means of verifying their capabilities, which prompted the Air Force to set up a study group, looking into an aerial reconnaissance program. In mid-1952 the study group recommended every known technique be used and new ones developed, to increase U.S. intelligence over the Soviet Union by high-altitude photographic reconnaissance and other means.

Lockheed’s Advance Development Project (ADP) boss at the time was Clarence “Kelly” Johnson. Hearing about this report, Kelly submitted a proposed aircraft known as the CL-282. After a short, but detailed, review, he received an official letter of rejection. Undaunted, Kelly decided to pursue funding for his high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft from other sources. He presented a refined U-2 aircraft design to a CIA study committee. On 24 November 1954, Kelly received the go-ahead to produce twenty aircraft at a total cost of $35 million. On 9 December the contract was signed between Lockheed and the CIA. The funding came from the CIA’s secret Contingency Reserve Fund. Within days, Lockheed’s ADP office had by default become a full-scale advanced design, engineering, and production facility. Kelly lived and died by his fourteen rules of management that suited his style perfectly and made the Skunk Works a true success in thinking outside the box (see appendices). The first test flight of the U-2 took place on 4 August 1955.

The CIA developed a cover story for the aircraft, stating that it had been developed as a high-altitude research tool for use by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). Flying the U-2 over and around the Soviet Union took place out of various locations overseas by the CIA. Between 1957 and 1959 around thirty Soviet Union overflights took place. During 1958, the Soviets began to gather momentum in their efforts to develop an effective U-2 countermeasure. The SA-2, surface-to-air missile (SAM), was being developed with a warhead that had a kill pattern with a diameter of around 400 feet and posed a potential threat for the U-2. Even though the probability of a kill was low, for the first time the U-2 was forced into taking the new SA-2 launch sites into consideration by giving them a wide berth of up to thirty miles.

The current U-2S model carries state-of-the-art sensors able to collect intelligence in all weather and light conditions. The U-2 is employed during peacetime for intelligence planning and warning. Its wartime roles include battlefield surveillance, targeting, and battle damage assessment. Lockheed Martin

Throughout his career at the Lockheed Skunk Works, Clarence “Kelly” Johnson played a major role in the design of over forty aircraft, becoming one of the most talented and prolific aircraft design engineers in the history of aviation. Lockheed Martin

On 1 May 1960, CIA pilot Francis Gary Powers took off in a U-2 from a base near Peshawar, Pakistan. His reconnaissance targets were Sverdlovsk and Plesetsk, two major ICBM test sites in the Soviet Union. The Soviets were becoming more aggressive in their attempts to shoot down a U-2. During his photo run over Sverdlovsk, a salvo of numerous SA-2 missiles were fired at Powers’ aircraft, and he subsequently ended up bailing out and being captured. Powers was tried as an American spy and put in a Soviet prison. On 10 February 1962, Powers was traded for the Soviet spy Rudolf Abel.

Several years prior to the Powers incident, Kelly Johnson and others believed that the U-2 would remain invulnerable for no more than about two years after starting the overflights of Russia. In the fall of 1957 Kelly was asked to conduct an operations analysis to determine the probability of shooting down an aircraft and how it varied respectively with speed, altitude, and radar cross section (RCS). The analysis concluded that supersonic speed, coupled with the use of radar-attenuating materials and design characteristics, greatly reduced the chances of radar detection. Kelly and others were impressed with the study’s findings and agreed that further exploratory work should be done. Attention in the CIA now focused on building a vehicle that could fly at extremely high speeds and altitudes and would also incorporate the best available radar-attenuating capabilities.

Early on, radar cross section was determined by placing the aircraft on a pole in various attitudes and measuring its ability to be “seen” by precision radars. With the use of radar-absorbing ferrites and plastics on all the leading edges, the SR-71 has been described as “looking for a single-engine Piper Cub at 80,000 feet.” Lockheed Martin

Former CIA pilot Ken Collins in front of an A-12. The yellow container on the ground supplies cooling air to the pressure suit during ground operations. Inflight cooling air is supplied from the aircraft air conditioning system. Ken Collins

Kelly spent virtually every available minute working on the advanced aircraft program, which he jokingly referred to as the “U-3.” Between 1957 and 1959 Kelly and his team of engineers came up with several aircraft meeting the speed and altitude requirements for a reconnaissance platform. On 29 August 1959, Lockheed received official notification that it had won the competition with its A-12 design submission. On 4 September, Lockheed received $4.5 million by way of an advanced feasibility contract. The CIA’s top secret project received the classified name: Oxcart.

The sheer quality and quantity of imagery secured by the U-2 overflight program had become highly addictive to the U.S. intelligence community. However, the future of Oxcart was far from certain. The Powers shoot down proved to have a profound impact, as detailed in a top secret memo of 2 June 1960, written by General Andrew Goodpaster, military aide to President Eisenhower:

I spoke to the President early this week about the question of whether work should go forward on the successor to the U-2. After considering the matter, he said he was inclined to think it should go forward, on low priority, as a high performance reconnaissance plane for the Air Force in time of war. I suggested it might be useful for Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Gates and Mr. Stans to get together to consider the matter, and he agreed. He said he did not think the project should now be pushed at top priority. In fact, they might come to the conclusion that it would be best to get out of it if we could. Alternatively, they may feel that we have so much invested in it that we should capitalize on this through carrying it forward.

Funding allocated for Oxcart by the CIA also included developmental funding for the Pratt & Whitney J-58 engine. Pratt & Whitney had been involved with Oxcart from the very beginning. Their J-58 had been sponsored originally by the Navy as a conventional, but very advanced, turbojet engine providing extraordinary high thrust with the ability to operate routinely at high speeds up to Mach 3. The J-58 became increasingly difficult and expensive to develop for the A-12. Additionally, several of the aircraft for which the J-58 was originally intended had ceased to exist. As a result, the Navy lost interest and the J-58 was without a home or sponsor. On 30 January 1960 Lockheed received official word that funding for twelve A-12s had been approved. Pratt & Whitney also was informed they were cleared to move ahead with the construction of three “advanced, experimental engines for durability and reliability testing.” Work could begin in earnest.

Work on the A-12’s sensors also started. The primary camera manufacturer was Perkin-Elmer. Because of the extreme complexity of the design a decision was quickly made to fund Kodak’s proposed backup system in case Perkin-Elmer ran into difficulty. At the same time, Minneapolis-Honeywell Corporation was selected to provide both the inertial navigation and automatic flight control systems. The David Clark Corporation became the prime sources of pilot equipment and associated life support hardware.

In February 1960 the CIA posed to Lockheed that it would screen a minimum of sixty Air Force pilots in an attempt to assemble an initial group of twenty-four A-12 pilots. Those selected would resign from the Air Force and be hired into the CIA as civilians, a process called “sheep dipping,” similar to those who flew the CIA’s U-2 aircraft. They also decided to put each pilot through a physical comparable to that of the Project Mercury astronauts.

In 1960, the USAF office of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) requested Ken Collins to volunteer for testing for a classified space program. He didn’t know at the time, but he was volunteering for the highly classified A-12 Oxcart program. Ken tells how that came about:

The primary professional selection criterion of the Oxcart program was flying time in fighter type aircraft. The pilot needed more than a thousand operational flight hours in the aircraft and a total of two thousand flight hours. You had to be currently qualified and proficient. At that time I was an experienced instructor pilot in the RF-101, having had over fifty air-to-air refueling sorties and about ten transatlantic deployments, each with multiple air refuelings. That was the easy part for the Pentagon selection group. Either you had it or you didn’t. The requirements to be highly qualified as an officer and a pilot was basic . . . the absolute minimum. All of your flight, professional and medical records were meticulously scrutinized at all levels before your name was released for further evaluation.

The personal requirement was that you had to be married and preferably that you had children. They were adamant about this after some problems they experienced with the previous U-2 program. Their explanation was that the family unit is more socially established, dedicated and dependable. Our wives were also interviewed separately, and psychological evaluations were conducted. Expanded background investigations were run on each wife as well.

At this phase (April 1961) of the overall evaluation, we still did not know what we were being evaluated for. The following events and schedules were generally the same for all the pilots being considered. Each was individually and separately tasked for the respective events. Initially I didn’t know that there was another pilot (Captain Walter Ray) from Shaw Air Force Base (AFB) being evaluated. We started running into each other about a year later, when the field of pilots being considered was narrowed by process of elimination. From the beginning we were given the option of withdrawing from the selection process at any time without prejudice.

Our medical records were acceptable for the initial evaluation because we were all on flying status. However, Air Force physicals were not extensive enough for the final evaluation and we were about to find out what that really meant. I was scheduled for my “astronaut” physical at the Lovelace Clinic in Albuquerque, New Mexico. This is the same facility where the original astronauts received their medical evaluations, and was the medical facility for the original U-2 pilots. I discovered this later during a return visit to the clinic where I met Francis Gary Powers. The late Dr. William Lovelace, one of the pioneers of aviation medicine, founded the Lovelace Clinic.

I had a government contact (an Air Force flight surgeon) whom I met at the clinic. He established all of my schedules, appointments and observed all of the tests. He and I would have dinner together more as a part of the evaluation than just being social. The first medical phase lasted for five days. I arrived there on Sunday and departed the following Saturday. During those five days they checked out every bodily orifice, X-rayed every part of you from head to toe, flushed you out totally, took samples, and measured everything. I even carried a large brown bottle around for forty-eight hours to collect every drop of my urine. They conducted extensive EKGs and EEGs. I was hydrostatically weighted in a large water tank, ran the bicycle pulmonary functions, and passed another physical stress test. I was then flown to the Los Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico to be inserted into the “body counter,” which mapped the fat versus muscle tissue of my body. When correlated with the data from the hydrostatic weighting, theoretically, they could determine the total body capacity, regardless of size. After all that I was ready for the hospital!

From that date forward I was subjected to many different kinds of personal and professional evaluations. There was the soundproof black box where you had to remain for twelve hours in total darkness. Having various dinners and lunches with a whole variety of “professional” people. They were medical and intelligence people, ranging from senior managers to the basic company employee. All were there to get an opinion, except for the lesser guy. He was there to keep me out of trouble. After the sorting was near completion, I learned that eight would be selected for the initial program. This sounded reasonable since that was the average size group for the astronaut program, or so we thought!

I finally received my orders assigning me to the Headquarters, USAF, Washington, D.C., with a reporting date of 28 October 1962. I went back to Shaw AFB to start the moving process with my wife. While getting ready for the move, I was summoned to Washington, D.C., for a final meeting, at which time I still had the option of withdrawing from the program. For the first time, I was told it was not the astronaut program, but a project to fly and test an exotic new airplane for the CIA. There were no pictures or any other details.

I arrived in Washington, D.C., with my wife, Jane, and our four children. The next day I was taken to headquarters to sign on the dotted line. We headed west the following day. Jane had been interviewed and evaluated separately during the entire process. She was not told what I would be doing and was told not to talk about it to anyone. She could say that I decided to resign from the Air Force and go to work for Hughes Aircraft. For anyone who thinks we received a great salary, we all made about $4,000 more per year than our Air Force pay; however, the job was well worth it.

The first time I saw the A-12 was in December 1962 after I arrived at Area 51 [at Groom Lake in Nevada]. Colonel Doug Nelson, project manager, took me to a hangar and let me walk in by myself. What an amazing sight! The sun’s rays entered the upper hangar windows, illuminating only the nose and spikes. As my eyes adjusted to the restricted light, I began to take in its sleek length, the massive twin rudders and its total blackness. A vision I will never forget.

Getting the family settled and feeling secure was important to the program. They knew the project pilots would generally be out of touch from Monday through Friday and some weekends. If there was a serious problem, my wife was given a telephone number to call any time and request that I call back. The return call could be immediate, or in one or two days, depending on my schedule and location. My wife knew that I was on a very special operational flying assignment, but not my location, what I was flying, my sponsor, or my associates, other than the project pilots. Once I had the family in place, I was ready to dedicate myself to the project.

When the final screening was completed the A-12 pilots included Ken Collins, Mele Vojvodich, Jack Layton, Dennis Sullivan, Francis Murray, Jack Weeks, William Skliar, Walter Ray, Alonzo Walter, David Young, and Russ Scott. Only the first six listed were destined to fly the A-12 on operational missions.

CHAPTER 2

A-12 Construction and Testing

In the summer of 1960, as the jigs began to go together inside the Burbank building where the aircraft were to be built, the difficulties entailed in the A-12’s ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Contents
• Foreword
• Introduction
• Chapter 1: Beginning of the A-12
• Chapter 2: A-12 Construction and Testing
• Chapter 3: YF-12 Interceptor
• Chapter 4: D-21 Drone Project
• Chapter 5: Enter the SR-71
• Chapter 6: Home for the SR-71 Blackbird: Beale AFB, California
• Chapter 7: Selection Process
• Chapter 8: Training Program
• Chapter 9: Physiological Support Division and the Pressure Suit
• Chapter 10: Command and Control
• Chapter 11: Preparing to Fly the Mission
• Chapter 12: Flying the Mission
• Chapter 13: Refueling
• Chapter 14: Acceleration and Climb to Mach 3+ and 71,000 Feet
• Chapter 15: Cruising at Mach 3+
• Chapter 16: Inlet Unstarts and Restarts
• Chapter 17: Entering the Sensitive Area
• Chapter 18: Descent and “Hot” Tanker Air Rendezvous
• Chapter 19: The Recovery
• Chapter 20: Post-Flight Activity
• Chapter 21: The Final Years
• Chapter 22: Rising from the Ashes
• Appendices: List of Acronyms, 1997 Letter from Senators Levin and Byrd to Secretary of Defense, Kelly Johnson’s Fourteen Rules of Management, Bibliography
• Index
• Acknowledgments
• Dedication
• Copyright Page