1.1 âItâs Complicatedâ
For the social sciences, matters of identity were complicated before the emergence of the Internet, but they were so in a more conceptual sense. Sameness versus difference of self through time, uniqueness versus similarity in relation to others, or agency versus structure as governing forces of the self are all traditional themes that polarized theoretical contributions surrounding the concept of identity. With a new layer added to our identities in recent years â online identity â come new complications that announce themselves exceptionally challenging not only for the social sciences but for humankind.
First, because of the speed of diffusion of this phenomenon. In a matter of years, hyper connectivity has become the norm for a large part of the world population. After the affluent West, we have seen China and other parts of Asia rise in online social media usage statistics. In the first quarter of 2020, Facebook â the largest social network in the world â had over 2.6 billion monthly active users, while domestic online social networks in China connected over 50% of its population (statista.com). The fact that half of the worldâs population is online, connected and interacting, means that vast amounts of personal data are constantly released online and can, at any time, be traced back to those that have produced it. Having an online identity has become unavoidable for anyone with an online presence and is part of the consequences of leading a connected life.
Secondly, because of the ethical implications raised by the possibility of having access to a real-time worldwide library of human profiles. While digitization made online surveillance implicit, the stakeholders involved in this process at any one time (commercial entities, state institutions, intelligence agencies, etc.), the extent to which surveillance happens at the individual level, or the specific objectives of surveillance (commercial, political, social, etc.) are largely invisible to regular users.
Thirdly, because of the technical vulnerabilities of identity data. Cyberattacks targeting personal data have increased in frequency and size. Once released online, identity information is no longer controllable by its originator and can, at any point, be subject to aggregation, appropriation or cybertheft, reaching unintended parties with unknown consequences.
Looking at these observations, we can begin to grasp the extent to which online identity has perturbed the problematic of identity. As technology is further embedded in the fabric of society, it continues to expand and ramify this problematic. From the perspective of the social sciences, the need to understand and conceptualize online identity as a phenomenon of our times is certain. The challenge, nevertheless, is to make sense of a phenomenon that is transforming at a high speed and to accept the proverbial possibility that any theory can itself change as it is formulated.
The concept of identity offers a logical anchor to the understanding of online identity: stripped of its technical armor, online identity is ultimately identity and, as such, it is useful to approach it as an element of the latter concept and not in theoretical isolation. We cannot talk knowledgeably about who we are online if we do not understand who we are in âreal life.â This integrative perspective is mindful of the permanent dialogue between identity and online identity, a process through which they recursively create and recreate each other. This first chapter thus starts from the premise that online identity is a new, inevitable layer of human selfhood, whose successful decoding relies on the conceptual framework of identity.
1.2 The Identity of Identity
The social sciences abound in writings on the subject of identity, leaving the curious to untangle a plethora of theories and concepts, formulated by psychology or sociology scholars, or reflecting a mosaic of interdisciplinary views. Looking at the sheer volume of work dedicated to this concept, one becomes discouraged in thinking that one might be able to assimilate the whole content of identity literature, let alone contribute with something new to what has already been said and written. It appears that the concept of identity has been over-discussed, over-analyzed, and over-exploited.
Yet, despite the large corpus of existing work, matters of identity are a relatively new preoccupation of humanity, judging from a historical perspective. As Baumeister (1987, p. 163) insightfully notes, âthe concern with problems of selfhood is essentially a modern phenomenon. The medieval lords and serfs did not struggle with self-definition the way modern persons do.â Unsurprisingly, then, identity is also a relatively new term in the social sciences. Although used in philosophy since John Lockeâs âEssay concerning Human Understandingâ published in 1690, the term had not been officially included in the technical vocabulary of the social sciences until as late as the mid-twentieth century. Looking into the semantic history of identity, historian Philip Gleason (1983, p. 910) contrasts two specialist reference works: the first edition of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (published in 1930) and the following International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (published in 1968). In the former, the term identity was nowhere to be found; identification was included, but in reference to âfingerprinting and other techniques of criminal investigation.â In the latter, a separate entry on âIdentity, Psychosocialâ is already developed into a âsubstantial article.â Somewhere between the temporal horizons of the two editions, identity became important as a concept.
So important, that it soon turned into a victim of its own success. With the detached eye of the historian, Gleason (1983, p. 931) reflects that identityâs âenormous popularization has had just the opposite effect: as identity became more and more a clichĂ©, its meaning grew progressively more diffuse, thereby encouraging increasingly loose and irresponsible usage.â âThe most widely used concept ⊠in the social sciences and humanitiesâ (Wrong 2000, p. 10) was afflicted by unappeasable theoretical controversy. Its very usefulness as a theoretical concept was ultimately questioned. Handler (1994) debated the westernized reification of identity, while Hall (1996) observed how the concept remained functional only because it was not replaced and thus was still vital to support an entire system of deriving concepts. Brubaker and Cooper (2000, p. 2) saw identity as âtoo ambiguous, too torn between âhardâ and âsoftâ meanings, essentialist connotations and constructivist qualifiers, to serve well the demands of social analysis.â
Identityâs disputed theoretical membership, concept definition difficulties, competing terms such as the self, lack of scientific consensus, and an apparent theoretical saturation have all potentially contributed to identityâs identity crisis: identity âtends to mean too much (when understood in a strong [essentialist] sense), too little (when understood in a weak [constructivist] sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity)â (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, p. 2). But even though the concept of identity was claimed to be âoperating âunder erasureâ in the interval between reversal and emergence,â it was still acknowledged as an idea âwithout which certain key questions cannot be thought at allâ (Hall 1996, p. 16). This is the point at which it becomes necessary to take a short theoretical detour. Without intending to be exhaustive, the following account includes key landmarks that have shaped the way identity is perceived today in the social sciences, laying out the conceptual framework necessary for understanding online identity.
1.2.1 Identity as Self-Realization
Erik H. Erikson, a psychoanalyst and a developmental psychologist brought up in the Freudian tradition, is generally credited with the popularization of identity as an analytical concept of the social sciences. His timing was perhaps key for the attention with which his theory of identity was received. His notion of identity crisis was providentially introduced in a historical period of extensive emigration that was forcing North America to become preoccupied with ideas of ethnicity and the search for identity (Gleason 1983). As Erikson (1950, p. 256) put it himself, âwe begin to conceptualize matters of identity at the very time in history when they become a problem.â Also, at a time when identityâs âpopular usage has become so varied and its conceptual context so expanded that the time may seem to have come for a better and final delimitation of what identity is and what it is notâ (Erikson 1968, p. 15).
So, what is identity according to Erikson? Imagine you are running an obstacle course. You are the only competitor, yet thereâs a watching crowd in the stands. You have no idea whatâs ahead, itâs the first time you are doing this. Each jump is a new challenge, different than the one before it, but with each successful passage, you become more confident and the crowd larger and more supportive. At the end of the course, you are an accomplished and recognized athlete. The obstacle course is your life and the analogy is helpful to bring clarity to Eriksonâs developmental theory, an eight-stage approach to the human life cycle. Each of the eight consecutive stages brings about a challenge for the individual (much like the obstacles mentioned) that triggers an identity crisis. The term crisis designates âa necessary turning point, a crucial moment, when development must move one way or another, marshaling resources of growth, recovery, and further differentiationâ (1968, p. 16). Once successfully resolved, it allows for the healthy passage to a superior stage of psychosocial developmental. In passing through these stages, individuals are seen as constantly negotiating their acceptance of and into society, a process that helps them understand and define who they are.
Identity is the result of assimilated and rejected childhood identifications, as well as a consequence of societyâs evaluation (back to the watching crowd) and ultimate acceptance of the individual as a self-standing adult (Erikson 1959). From this perspective, Eriksonâs identity is both about individuality and sociability. Thus, identityâs driving forces are both internal and external, turning identity into a concept with multiple connotations: âa conscious self of individual identity,â âan unconscious striving for a continuity of personal character,â âa criterion for the silent doings of ego synthesis,â âa maintenance of an inner solidarity with a groupâs ideals and identityâ (1959, p. 109). What is perhaps most interesting to note is that identity is always an awareness, a sense of self that involves a dual realization: âthe immediate perception of oneâs selfsameness and continuity in time; and the simultaneous perception of the fact that others recognize oneâs sameness and continuityâ (1959, p. 159). In other words, the sense of identity is achieved within the individual as bot...