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The psychology of populism
The Tribal Challenge to Liberal Democracy
Joseph P. Forgas and William D. Crano
The first two decades of the 21st century were marked by a remarkable phenomenon: the largely unexpected rise of radical populist political ideologies in both well-established Western democracies and less-developed nations (Fournier, 2016). This book represents an integrated attempt to understand the psychological mechanisms underlying recent populist movements. Contributors include leading international researchers from the fields of social and cognitive psychology as well as political science, who seek to shed light on the psychological processes and dynamics of political populism.
Understanding the mental precursors of populist ideation is especially timely today, when populist movements increasingly represent a credible threat to what has been arguably the most successful civilization in human history, liberal democracy combined with market capitalism (Pinker, 2018; Shuster, 2016). Understanding populist movements requires a systematic exploration of how people think, feel, and mentally represent political reality. The idea that political systems are fundamentally constrained by human nature and are expressions of human psychology was first mooted two thousand years ago by Plato in his classic Republic. The same core idea was reaffirmed by John Stuart Millās famous dictum that āall phenomena of society are also phenomena of human natureā (Mill, 1947). Our book is predicated on the assumption that understanding political movements like populism above all requires a psychological explanation of the mental representations of its followers.
The Populist Challenge
Liberal democratic parties are currently under sustained attack by new populist formations, from both the left and the right. The specter of becoming ungovernable haunts several major democracies. In Germany, new populist parties decimated voter support for both the SPD and the CDU/CSU. In France, the traditional center parties have been replaced by Macronās new movement, closely followed by Le Penās populist party. In Italy, fragile governments alternate, and in Britain following Brexit, populism has become mainstream. Spain saw repeated inconclusive elections in recent years. And, of course, Trumpās 2016 victory turned the US political establishment upside down. Everywhere, the old certainties of traditionally centrist parties and the values of civility, tolerance, and open debate are challenged.
There are several reasons for these developments. In many liberal democracies, there is a growing sense of resentment against the āelitesā, a defining feature of populism. The rise of emotional, identity-based politics is replacing the old norms of rational, analytical, and pragmatic decision making. Consensus and compromise are supplanted by implacable animosity and tribal hatreds. On many issues, the established parties are no longer able to channel voter preferences, so the rise of various populist parties is inevitable.
Towards a Definition
Populism is a rather nebulous and hard-to-define term. Its current juxtaposition with democracy can be confusing, since both democracy and populism actually mean the same thing, rule by the people (demos in Greek, and populus in Latin). Then again, populist leaders are identified as demagogues, using the Greek vocabulary. Whereas democracy as an ideology is supported by over two thousand years of cultural evolution and refinement, populism remains a rough and superficial or āthinā ideology (Mudde, 2004), focusing on the perceived conflict between the romanticized concept of the people, who are good, virtuous, and kind, and an opposing elite seen as corrupt, immoral, and exploitative.
Democratic systems throughout history evolved increasingly precise and refined mechanisms to translate popular will into executive power. In contrast, populism mostly remains a simplistic and emotional tribal credo emphasizing the moral superiority of the people betrayed by those ruling over them (Rooduijn, 2015; KrekĆ³, this volume). Populist ideologies typically offer cognitive certainty and simplicity, a positive identity, moral superiority, and the promise of collective redemption (Kruglanski, 2004; see also Krueger & Gruening; Kruglanski et al.; van Prooijen, this volume). Rather than offering realistic and rational explanations, populist leaders like Trump, Putin, OrbĆ”n, or KaczyÅski describe their opponents as enemies of the people or evil. The kind of tribal animosity exploited by populists is also deeply rooted in human needs and values, especially the universal desire to identify with meaningful and positive valued groups or collectives (Tajfel & Forgas, 2000; Hogg & GĆøetsche-Astrup, this volume).
Anti-Individualism and Collectivism
Several chapters here argue that a key feature of populism is its fundamentally collectivist and anti-individualist character. This presents a major challenge to the individualistic and humanist philosophy of the Enlightenment that informs liberal democracies. Democracy assumes that the basic units of society are free and autonomous individuals who can determine their fate. In contrast, populism is a collectivist tribal ideology proposing a return to the romanticized pre-Enlightenment communal paradigm where the collective rather than independent individuals reign supreme. Populism assigns no inherent autonomy to the person, seen as a subordinate unit of the group they belong to (nation, race, religion, etc.).
Classic and well-articulated populist ideologies such as Marxism offer a clear illustration of such a thoroughly collectivist and deterministic system, where a personās status and even consciousness are externally determined by their economic circumstances and class membership (Koestler, 1952). Those who lack the required class consciousness are seen as suffering from a dysfunctional āfalse consciousnessā, or in Jost and Banajiās (1994) more recent neo-Marxist terminology, a system justification bias. Contemporary identitarian āsocial justiceā movements also emphasize a strict collectivist and anti-individualist ideology, where group membership is the primary source of a personās values and preferences. Individual deviations from the assigned norms of the identity groups are not recognized as valid. Examples abound: a black person who happens to be conservative (e.g. the economist Thomas Sowell) is not really āblackā, a gay person who deviates from LGBT ideology is not really gay (e.g. Douglas Murray), and a feminist who challenges current orthodoxy is not really a feminist (e.g. Germaine Greer; Murray, 2019).
Unlike sophisticated systems of democracy, populist ideology is often simple and indeed simple-minded, showing lack of subtlety and emphasizing moral absolutism, certainty, collectivism, leadership, and authoritarianism (Krueger & Gruening; Kruglanski et al., this volume). One of the core messages of this book is that populism has a tribal character and presents a collectivist challenge to the ideals of the Enlightenment, such as individualism, humanism, pluralism, and rationality (KrekĆ³, this volume).
Antecedents of Populism
Typically, in a democracy populist movements flourish when significant portions of the population feel that the political elite no longer properly represents their values and needs (Bar-Tal and Magal; Huddy & Del Ponte; Marcus, this volume). This often occurs when economic crises, social changes, racial or ethnic rivalries or pandemics destroy existing social conditions, and create frustration, uncertainty, anger, fear, and resentment. In fact, all of these conditions have occurred in the first two decades of the 21st century, so the current rise of populism is not all that surprising (Fukuyama, 2018; Spruyt, Keppens, & Van Droogenbroeck, 2016; Hogg & GĆøetsche-Astrup; Ditto & Rodriguez, this volume). A less tangible trigger of populist revolt is the perceived threat to a groupās cultural identity, when traditions, values, and way of life are undermined by cultural changes and immigration (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Murray, 2018; Zakaria, 2016; Golec de Zavala et al., this volume).
However, these challenges are not in themselves sufficient for populist movements to arise. What is also critical is a persuasive narrative that can turn dissatisfaction into a political force (Part IV; Cooper & Avery; Crano & Gaffney; Vallacher & Fennell, this volume). There is good evidence that support for populist politics is stronger among people with a well-articulated sense of perceived relative deprivation, grievance, and resentment (Fukuyama, 2018). Thus, the potential for populism is triggered by aversive economic, social, and cultural conditions, yet populism does not reliably arise in response to such social stressors. Historically, humans mostly lived in abominable conditions, yet populist revolts were rare (Harari, 2014; Mudde, 2004; Pinker, 2018). Over time, people can accept extremely adverse conditions without triggering revolt as long as they had enough time and latitude to adapt (Vallacher & Fennell, this volume).
Despite mostly abject conditions throughout history, humans were generally able to symbolically justify their existence as long as the conditions were stable, reliable, and offered a coherent explanation for oneās life (Harari, 2014; Ditto & Rodriguez, this volume). It is only when a previously stable context is disrupted by rapid changes undermining oneās sense of stability and certainty that people become receptive to populist narratives, exploiting the psychological states of uncertainty, frustration, fear, anger, envy, and resentment (Crano & Gaffney; Gelfand & Lorente; Kruglanski et al., this volume).
The main purpose of our book is to offer a social psychological analysis of the circumstances that promote populist political movements. One fruitful approach to understand how deprivation turns into populism is by analyzing the various human needs, goals, and values that have been challenged (see Part I). There are many taxonomies of such needs, goals, and values, and when they are frustrated a populist narrative may be adopted (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Fiske, 2010; Higgins, 2012; Maslow, 1943; Crano & Gaffney, this volume). The need for certainty, dignity, status, and identity are especially important, and the higher a personās need for certainty and closure, the higher is their support for populism (see Part II). From the perspective of the individual, populism offers a collectivist response and a solution to perceived deprivation.
Populism on the Left and on the Right
While for historical reasons populism is most often identified with right-wing, nationalistic, and nativist political ideologies, many of its psychological features are equally characteristic of left-wing radicalism (Cooper & Avery, this volume). The contemporary concern about the rise of political populism was largely elicited by events such as the election of Trump, Brexit, and the rise of right-wing populist parties with illiberal, nationalist, and fascist ideologies in countries like Germany, Austria, Russia, Turkey, Hungary, and Poland. However, these movements did not emerge in a vacuum, at least in Western democracies. Similarly close-minded, absolutist, and authoritarian left-wing populist movements have long been a feature of the political landscape in many Western countries. It just so happens that the appearance of right-wing populism is mor...