Philosophy of Science

An Introduction to the Central Issues

Wang Wei

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781317542308
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

The book is a translation of the second edition of a much-used and research-based Chinese textbook. As a succinct and issue-based introduction to the Western philosophy of science, the book brings eight focal issues in the field to the fore and augments each topic by incorporating Chinese perspectives.

Followed by an overview of the historical framework and logical underpinnings of the philosophy of science, the book thoroughly discusses eight issues in the discipline: (1) the criteria of cognitive meaning, (2) induction and confirmation, (3) scientific explanation, (4) theories of scientific growth, (5) the demarcation between science and pseudoscience, (6) scientific realism and empiricism; (7) the philosophy of scientific experimentation, (8) science and value. Not confined to Western mainstream discourse in this field, the book also introduces voices of Chinese philosophers of note and adopts a stance that productively combines logical empiricism and Kuhnianism, both of which tend to be covered in less detail by many English language textbooks. In the final chapter the author offers a prognosis regarding the future of the discipline based on recent trends.
This book will be of value to students who study philosophy of science and hope to gain a better understanding of science and technology.

1

Introduction

Starting in the twentieth century, philosophy of science has become a rapidly developing branch of philosophy in the West. As a consequence, many leading universities have established specialized departments for philosophy of science (e.g., Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, etc.), international academic networks have formed around related subjects (e.g., the Philosophy of Science Association in America and the European Philosophy of Science Association in Europe), and specialist academic journals have appeared (e.g., Philosophy of Science, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, etc.).

Western philosophy of science has also spread extensively in the Chinese academic world, particularly since the 1980s, with China going so far as to establish a specialized committee for philosophy of science called the Chinese Philosophy of Science Association (CPSA), which is subordinated to the Chinese Society for Dialectics of Nature. Consequently, CPSA members have done extensive research in this field and have obtained significant results in the past three or four decades. In light of this growth in the field, both in the West and in China, this book is conceived as a comprehensive introduction to the main issues in Western philosophy of science.

What is philosophy of science?

If we want to know what philosophy of science is, we should start by first asking ourselves the following question: What is philosophy of science not? According to E. D. Klemke (1998), philosophy of science, first of all, is not history of science. History of science examines the development of science, as well as great contributions made by scientists. In spite of the close connection between philosophy of science and history of science, however, the former is not concerned with historical research.

Second, philosophy of science is neither cosmology nor natural philosophy, for these two are concerned with issues like the infinite divisibility of matter, the ultimate end of the universe, and so on. Certainly, philosophy of science entails knowledge about the natural world, but the class of issues described above remains more within the scope of scientific research.

Third, philosophy of science is neither sociology of science nor psychology of science, which are concerned with social phenomena related to science and scientists’ mental processes, respectively. For instance, the effects of the Strategy of Rejuvenating China through Science and Education or of Albert Einstein’s psychological processes during his debate with the Copenhagen School would be issues addressed within these particular disciplines. Although philosophy of science is certainly nurtured and informed by the research conducted in these fields, it does not primarily consist of such kinds of empirical research.

Finally, philosophy of science is not science itself. The aim of research in the natural sciences is the discovery (or invention) of laws of nature by means of mathematical formulation and experimentation. Philosophy of science, however, is not primarily concerned with those previously mentioned fields of research. Instead, it is mainly concerned with issues like the logical form of laws of nature, the necessity of the scientific method, and so on. The object of research of both – that is, philosophy of science and science itself – as well as their mutual relationship, can be represented as follows:

Figure 1.1Relationship between philosophy of science, science, and the real world

At this point, we might finally ask: What then is philosophy of science? Klemke has given us a helpful preliminary definition: “the aim of philosophy of science is the understanding of the significance, methodology, and logical structure of science by means of logical as well as methodological analysis of its purpose (object), methods, norms, concepts, laws and theory in general” (Klemke 1998, pp. 19–20). According to this definition, we can infer that philosophy of science takes science itself as its research object and an enhanced understanding of science as its aim.

In fact, philosophy of science, like any other practical activity of mankind, such as science or art, is embedded in a continuous process of change. In its earliest period, the main research method was logical analysis; at a later stage of development, however, it also began to incorporate historical methods, as well as sociological research. Other areas of research within the broader discipline of philosophy of science, including scientific experimentation and scientific modeling, have also experienced rapid development and change. In light of this, the author’s aim is not to offer a precise definition of philosophy of science; instead, the aim is to convey to the reader a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of its essence through the exposition of its main issues and research methods.

From the personages to the issues

In the early part of the 1930s, the Chinese scholar Tscha Hung (Qian Hong, 1902–1992) began his doctoral work at the University of Vienna and became one of the early members of the Vienna Circle. After his return to China, he took charge of the Institute of Foreign Philosophy at Peking University. Although his research was interrupted during the tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution, with the eventual introduction of the Reform and Opening-Up Policy, he was finally able to edit the two-volume work Logical Positivism (1982) and publish both The Philosophy of the Vienna Circle (1989) and On Logical Positivism (1999), along with other titles introducing the Vienna Circle and its philosophy to the Chinese people.

Moving into the 1980s, the Chinese philosophical community thus embarked on a more detailed and comprehensive re-elaboration of Western philosophy of science. Even in those early years of the 1980s, many excellent textbooks of philosophy of science appeared in China. A few notable examples include Tian-ji Jiang’s Modern Western Philosophy of Science (1984), A Commentary on Modern Western Philosophy of Science (1987) edited by Wei-guang Shu and Ren-zong Qiu, and Western Philosophy of Science (1987) compiled by Ji-song Xia and Fei-feng Shen.

From the 1990s onward, more titles appeared, such as The Frontiers and Developments of Philosophy of Science (1991) edited by Shun-ji Huang and Da-chun Liu, Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (1996) by Zheng-kun Yin and Ren-zong Qiu, General Theory of Philosophy of Science (1998) edited by Da-chun Liu, and Liu’s later monograph Introduction to the Philosophy of Science and Technology (2000). Also of note around the turn of the millennium were Towards the 21st Century Philosophy of Science (2000) edited by Gui-chun Guo and Course of Philosophy of Science and Technology (2000) by Wei-tong Sheng.

This body of work contributed greatly to the popularization of philosophy of science and to the promotion of other related fields of investigation. In most of these writings, the exposition revolves around the main personages of each period, arranged and treated chronologically. In other words, they introduce the main philosophers of science and their schools of thought during each of the following historical periods: logical atomism (with representative figures being Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein), logical positivism (Morris Schlick and Rudolf Carnap), logical empiricism (Hans Reichenbach and Carl Hempel), critical rationalism (Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos), historicism (Thomas Kuhn), postmodernism (Paul Feyerabend), and scientific realism (Dudley Shapere and Mario Bunge).

While such books have unquestionable value in conveying to readers the conclusions of these various philosophers and schools of thought, this approach also has its shortcomings. In the first place, it does not take into account those important philosophers of science who made great contributions but whose ideas never crystallized into a particular tradition or school of thought (e.g., Nelson Goodman, Alonzo Church, etc.). Second, this way of writing presents philosophy of science merely as an enumeration of points of view, as if its developments – unlike those in the natural sciences, for instance – have been arbitrary or void of any internal reasoning. Consequently, many people consider philosophical inquiry in this area as hardly more than the nonsensical rumination of scholars. Actually, in China there are many scholars who are overly enthusiastic about establishing their own philosophical schools and becoming famous, and this situation has become a serious obstacle for the development of philosophy of science as an academic discipline. Third, writing that focuses on great philosophers allows readers to keep track of the world’s more advanced philosophical trends, but it fails to help philosophical circles within China to innovate and develop their own research. After all, the reason why particular philosophers or schools of thought have triumphed over others is generally because they have succeeded in solving difficult issues or have introduced new and illuminating issues within philosophy of science. Therefore, from the perspective of disciplinary development, the issues of philosophy are prior to the philosophers themselves, not the other way around. In order to deeply understand the profound implications of these issues, particular attention must be drawn to the issues themselves, in addition to the study of those great philosophers.

At the present time, a majority of the textbooks about philosophy of science circulating internationally are centered on the major issues of the field. Accordingly, this book also attempts to describe the main issues of philosophy of science in an issue-centered way. Although China has brought forth few books that focus on the issues, most authors continue to be too driven by the Chinese research program of Marxism, with little concern for international integration. With that said, some monographs have appeared in China focusing on certain issues within philosophy of science, such as Xiao-ping Chen’s Inductive Logic and Inductive Paradox (1994), Jian Chen’s Demarcation in Science (1997), and Gui-chun Guo’s Course of Scientific Realism (2001). However, these books, by limiting their focus to specific issues, offer no comprehensive exposition of the central issues in philosophy of science. On account of this, the current volume is intended to show the range of content dealt with in philosophy of science and the beauty of the analytic method through an issue-centered exposition.

Certainly, this kind of exposition may leave beginners feeling lost in their study of the various issues, causing them to lose sight of the overall historical trajectory of philosophy of science. For this reason, this book also includes a chapter entitled “Historical introduction,” which outlines philosophy of science according to its historical development. Utilizing the notion of a “hermeneutical circle,” the author hopes this additional chapter on history will help to familiarize readers with the main figures and schools in philosophy of science, so that after having delved into the study of concrete issues, they might acquire a better understanding of the field of philosophy of science as a whole.

The central issues of philosophy of science

What are the central issues of philosophy of science? In the third edition of his book Introductory Readings in the Philosophy of Science (1998), which is one of the most widely used textbooks in philosophy of science worldwide, Klemke presents 17 main issues in philosophy of science. These 17 issues and their pertaining questions are as follows:

(1)Formal science. In which sense is formal science (mainly mathematics and logic) a science? How can we have knowledge about the truth of logical and mathematical propositions? What is the relation between formal science and experimental sciences such as physics and biology?

(2)Scientific description. What is a sufficient scientific description? What is the logical structure of concept formation in scientific description?

(3)Scientific explanation. What is scientific explanation? How many models of scientific explanation are there? What is the relation between scientific explanation and science itself?

(4)Prediction. Why can science make successful predictions? What is the relation between scientific prediction and explanation?

(5)Causality and scientific laws. What is the nature of the relation between causality and scientific laws? Are there non-causal scientific laws?

(6)Theory, models, and the scientific system. What is a scientific theory? What is the relation between scientific theory and scientific law? What is a scientific model? What is the role of models in science?

(7)Determinism. What are the implications of determinism in science? Is determinism true?

(8)Philosophical problems of physics. Has the theory of relativity introduced a subjective component into science? Has quantum mechanics overthrown determinism?

(9)Philosophical problems of biology and psychology. Are these two disciplines really different? Can they finally be reduced to physics?

(10)Social sciences. Are the social sciences real scientific disciplines? What is the difference between natural and social sciences?

(11)History. Is history a science? Does the scope of history include general laws?

(12)Reductionism and the unity of science. Is it possible to reduce all sciences to some fundamental science (e.g., physics) so that “the unity of science” can be achieved?

(13)The extension of science. Sometimes scientists make metaphysical assertions, like those regarding the eventual heat death of the universe, but can science make these kinds of assertions?

(14)Science and value. Is science value neutral? What is the relation between science and value?

(15)Science and religion. Can the conclusions of science affect religious beliefs?

(16)Science and culture....

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Information
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface to the English version
• Preface to the Chinese second edition
• Preface to the Chinese first edition
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Historical introduction
• 3 Introduction to logic
• 4 Criteria of cognitive significance
• 5 Induction and confirmation
• 6 Scientific explanation models and their problems
• 7 Theories about the growth of scientific knowledge
• 8 Demarcation between science and pseudoscience
• 9 Scientific realism
• 10 Philosophy of scientific experimentation
• 11 Science and values
• 12 New developments in philosophy of science
• Bibliography
• Name index
• Subject index