The second part of Louis Althusser's much quoted 1970 essay âIdeology and Ideological State Apparatusesâ tackles the matter of the formation of the subject in ideology, what he terms interpellation, by way of a âtheoretical sceneâ or âlittle theoretical theatre.â2
I shall then suggest that ideology âactsâ or âfunctionsâ in such a way that it ârecruitsâ subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or âtransformsâ the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: âHey, you there!â
Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed individual will turn round. By this mere 180-degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject. Why? Because he has recognized that the hail was âreallyâ addressed to him, and that âit was really him who was hailedâ (and not someone else). Experience shows that the practical telecommunication of hailings is such that they hardly ever miss their man: verbal call or whistle, the one hailed always recognizes that it is really him who is being hailed. And yet it is a strange phenomenon, and one which cannot be explained solely by âguilt feelings,â despite the large numbers who âhave something on their consciences.â3
The voice of authority uttering âhey, you there,â presumably heard and listened to above all and despite other sounds and voices on the street, is also a voice whose sound prompts one to turn. This turning around is precisely the gesture that for Althusser confirms tautologically how the individual is interpellated as subject in ideology.4
But if not âexplained solely by âguilt feelings',â why would one feel compelled to turn? Or, to put it differently, isn't this turning around but activated by sound, a sound that is attended to and that had already bound the hailer with the one hailed, before and besides the words uttered and heard? Like Orpheus, Althusser's individual-as-subject is the one who cannot help but look at the source of the sound â who or what is hailing or whistling.5 To look back then is to trace the trajectory of the sound back to its source and cause; it is to map a voice onto a body, and to ascribe that body with an intention. Note the blocking of the scene: the sound arrives from behind, an elsewhere external to the field of vision, and it has always already happened. The gesture of recognizing oneself as the one addressed is instantiated in a particular spatio-temporal dimension: behind and in the immediate past, in a space inhabited just a moment before. The willingness to recognize oneself in that call is performed as an act of translation of that spatio-temporal configuration of externality (behind/past) into co-presence (in front/present). Hence the ââtransformationâ of the individuals into subjectsâ happens precisely in that spatial and temporal gap between the hailing and the turning back, and it happens as an act of matching of the sound of the voice with its source, or to put it otherwise, as an act that synchronizes listening with looking, the listened to with the looked at.
The passage quoted above is followed by an afterthought of sorts, where the prose returns once again to the scene in an effort to clarify:
Naturally for the convenience and clarity of my little theoretical theatre I have had to present things in the form of a sequence, with a before and an after, and thus in the form of a temporal succession. There are individuals walking along. Somewhere (usually behind them) the hail rings out: âHey, you there!â One individual (nine times out of ten it is the right one) turns round, believing/suspecting/knowing that it is for him, i.e., recognizing that âit really is heâ who is meant by the hailing. But in reality these things happen without any succession. The existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing.6
Preoccupied that his vignette aptly demonstrates the âalways-already-happenedâ of interpellation, the author has to disavow the transformation staged by his primal scene. That is, by invoking simultaneity, this paragraph downplays that movement in time which made his theoretical scene a theatrical representation of the everyday eventness of interpellation. The last two sentences in particular, after that âbut in reality,â ensure that the scene just described again, functions still as illustration of a theory founded on the very impossibility of a before and after. Like Medusa's gaze, here the process of abstraction stops the âlittle theoretical theatreâ dead, to safeguard the ârealityâ of theory. Before and after are folded into each other, into a still âone and the same thing,â while the space of the encounter (the square, the street) suddenly turns into a sort of green screen, abysmally nothing/nowhere yet always already something.
In an influential essay from 1993 entitled âBeyond Interpellation,â Mladen Dolar, with the intent of salvaging what was still crucially âuncomfortableâ in Althusser's work, observes that both the theory of Ideological State Apparatuses and the formula of interpellation are organized by the idea of âthe clean cut.â7 Interpellation implies a break8 and so does the theory of ideology:
If we take Althusser's argument as a whole, it appears that there is also a clean cut between the two parts of Althusser's theory of ideology. Roughly speaking, there is a break between his insistence on the materiality of state apparatuses on the one hand, and interpellation on the other â between exteriority and the constitution of interiority. How exactly would materiality entail subjectivation? Why would interpellation require materiality? ⌠One could say that materiality and subjectivity rule each other out: if I am (already) a subject, I am necessarily blinded in regard to materiality. The external conditions of ideology cannot be comprehended from within ideology; the institution of interiority necessarily brings about a denial, or better, a disavowal of its external origin. ⌠Thus one must face an either/or alternative: either materiality or subjectivity; either the exterior or the interior.9
In response to the impasse of such either/or, Dolar performs a virtuosistic re-reading of Althusser with Jacques Lacan.10 He connects the end product of interpellation, the illusorily autonomous subject, with what psychoanalysis takes as point of departure, that is, precisely what the constitution of the subject leaves out. The remainder of subjectivation is in fact that residual, unprocessed trace of the external within interiority: âthe point where the innermost touches the outermost, where materiality is the most intimate.â11
But, again, what if we pay attention to sound. Dolar's response to the Althusserian impasse is reported here also because it is somewhat predisposed to listening. Its emphasis on the space of intimate materiality, where the external and internal touch offers a felicitous âopening to the register of the sonorous,â to put it in a recent beautiful formulation.12 It can be contended in fact that such a space of intimate materiality was already there, constituted by sound. Listening to the hailing is also always already contingent to the space and time of the encounter, as a resonance and co-vibration of self and other, of interior and exterior.
Synchronization then is not just a technological trick, masking the fundamental heterogeneity of the visual and the aural.13 More than that, it is taken here as the articulation of implications, whereby the very constitution of audio-vision as a simultaneity of discreet streams is what hails ideological subjects. The following scenes dwell on this turning back as a way in which the aural and the visual are articulated: like a trope for that âandâ of the book's title, synchronization affords the opportunity to attend to the aesthetics and politics of subjects, implicated within that very conjunction and simultaneity.