Theory of Knowledge

Keith Lehrer

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781135196080
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

In this important new text, Keith Lehrer introduces students to the major traditional and contemporary accounts of knowing. Beginning with the accepted definition of knowledge as justified true belief, Lehrer explores the truth, belief and justification conditions on the way to a thorough examination of foundation theories of knowledge, externalism and naturalized epistemologies, internalism and modern coherence theories as well as recent reliabilist and causal theories. Lehrer gives all views careful examination and concludes that external factors must be matched by appropriate internal ones to yield knowledge. Readers of Professor Lehrer's earlier book Knowledge will want to know that this text adopts the framework of that classic text. But Theory of Knowledge is a completely rewritten and updated version of that book that has been simplified throughout for student use.

1
The Analysis of Knowledge

ALL AGREE THAT KNOWLEDGE is valuable, but agreement about knowledge tends to end there. Philosophers disagree about what knowledge is, about how you get it, and even about whether there is any to be gotten. The question "What is knowledge?" will be the primary subject of this chapter and of this book. Why approach the theory of knowledge by asking this question? Epistemology, the theory of knowledge, and metaphysics, the theory of reality, have traditionally competed for the primary role in philosophical inquiry. Sometimes epistemology has won, and sometimes metapysics, depending on the methodological and substantiative presuppositions of the philosopher.

The epistemologist asks what we know, the metaphysician what is real. Some philosophers have begun with an account of the nature of reality and then appended a theory of knowledge to account for how we know that reality. Plato, for example, reached the metaphysical conclusion that abstract entities, or forms, such as triangularity or justice, are real and all else is mere appearance. He also held that the real is knowable, and he inquired into how we might know this reality.¹ Aristotle, on the contrary, held that individual substances, such as individual statues or animals, are real, and inquired as to how we might have knowledge, especially general knowledge, concerning these substances.² It is hardly surprising that Plato and Aristotle produced vastly different theories of knowledge when they conceived of the objects of knowledge in such different ways. Their common approach, starting with metaphysics, we might refer to as metaphysical epistemology. The problem with this approach is that the metaphysical epistemologist uncritically assumes we know the reality posited and only concerns himself with what such knowledge is like.

Other philosophers, most notably René Descartes, turned tables on the metaphysical approach by insisting that we must first decide what we can know about what is real and must remain skeptical about what is real until we have discovered what we can know. We might refer to this as skeptical epistemology. However, there is also a problem with this approach. When one once enters the den of skepticism, an exit may be difficult to find. Seeking to discover what he knew by following the method of doubting all that he could, Descartes imagined a powerful demon bent on deceiving us and thus found demonic doubt.³ It remains controversial whether such doubt admits of relief by reason. It seems natural to begin with skepticism with the hope of discovering what we know and what we do not, but if we first pretend to total ignorance, we shall find no way to remove it. Moreover, we shall lack even the meager compensation of knowing that we are ignorant, for that too is knowledge.

Are we then trapped between a method that uncritically assumes our knowledge of reality while assigning priority to metaphysics and one that rejects the assumption that we have knowledge and leads to skepticism? Our approach here will be neither skeptical nor metaphysical, We assign priority to neither metaphysics nor epistemology but attempt to provide a systematic and critical account of prior metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. We refer to this as critical epistemology. We begin with commonsense and scientific assumptions about what is real and what is known. These convictions constitute our data, perhaps even conflicting data if commonsense and science conflict. The object of philosophical inquiry, of which critical epistemology is a fundamental component, is to account for the data. The account, though, is critical. Sometimes we explain the data and sometimes we explain the data away. For the most part, it behooves a critical epistemologist to construct a theory of knowledge explaining how we know the things we think we do, but, in a few instances, a theory may explain why we think we know when we do not. In order to explain what we do know or why we do not, however, we do well to first ask what knowledge is. Indeed, we must do so in order to evaluate the claims of either the metaphysical dogmatist or the epistemological skeptic. It is to this inquiry that we now turn.

What Is Knowledge?

Some have denied that we know what is true or what is false, and they have remained skeptics. Skepticism will have a hearing, but we shall pursue our study as critical epistemologists: We assume people have knowledge. But what sort of knowledge do they have, and what is knowledge anyway? There are many sorts of knowledge, but only one, the knowledge that something is true, will be our concern. Consider the following sentences:

I know the way to Lugano.
I know the expansion of pi to six decimal places.
I know how to play the guitar.
I know the city.
I know John.
I know about Alphonso and Elicia.
I know that the neutrino has a rest mass of 0.
I know that what you say is true.
I know the sentence 'Some mushrooms are poisonous' is true.

These are but a few samples of different uses of the word 'know' describing different sorts of knowledge.⁴ If we are interested in finding out what people have when they have knowledge, we must first sort out the different senses of the word 'know'. Then we may ask our question again, once it has been disambiguated.

In one sense, 'to know' means to have some special form of competence. Thus, to know the guitar or to know the multiplication tables up to ten is to be competent to play the guitar or to recall the products of any two numbers not exceeding ten. If a person is said to know how to do something, it is this competence sense of 'know' that is usually involved. If I say I know the way to Lugano I mean that I have attained the special kind of competence needed either to get to Lugano or to direct someone there. If I say that I know the expansion of pi expanded to six decimal places, I mean that I have the special competence required to recall or to recite the number pi expanded to six decimal places.⁵

Another sense of 'know' is that in which the word means to be acquainted with something or someone. When I say that I know John, I mean that I am acquainted with John. The sentence 'I know the city' is more difficult to disambiguate. It might mean simply that I am acquainted with the city and hence have the acquaintance sense of 'know', or it might mean that I have the special form of competence needed to find my way around the city, geographically and/or socially. I also might mean that I know it in both the competence and acquaintance sense of 'know'. This example illustrates the important fact that the senses of 'know' that we are distinguishing are not exclusive; thus, the term 'know' may be used in more than one of these senses in a single utterance.⁶

The third sense of 'know' is that in which 'to know' means to recognize something as information. If I know that the neutrino has a rest mass of 0, then I recognize something as information, namely, that the neutrino has a rest mass of 0. The last three sentences on the list all involve this information sense of the word 'know'. It is often affirmed that to know something in the other senses of 'know' entails knowledge in the information sense of 'know'. I must have some information about Lugano if I know the way to Lugano; about the expansion of pi if I know the expansion of pi to six decimal places; about the city if I know the city; about the guitar if I know how to play the guitar, and so forth. Thus, the information sense of the word 'know' is often implicated in the other senses of the word.

In our study, we shall be concerned with knowledge in the information sense. It is precisely this sense that is fundamental to human cognition and required both for theoretical speculation and practical sagacity. To do science, to engage in experimental inquiry and scientific ratiocination, one must be able to tell whether one has received correct information or not to obtain scientific knowledge of the world. Engaging in law or commerce requires the same sort of knowledge. This sort of knowledge goes beyond the mere possession of information. If you tell me something and I believe you, even though I have no idea whether you are a source of truth and correct information about the subject or a propagator of falsehood and deception, I may, if I am fortunate, acquire information when you happen to be informed and honest. This is not, however, knowledge in the sense that concerns us; it is merely the possession of information. Similarly, if I read some gauge or meter and believe the information I receive, though I have no idea whether the instrument is functioning properly, I may thus acquire information, but this is not knowledge. If you doubt this, consider a clock that is not running because it stopped at noon some months ago. As luck would have it, you happen to look at it just at noon and believe that it is noon as a result. You might, as a result, come to believe it is noon when indeed it is, but that is not knowledge. If the clock is in fact running properly, but, again, you have no idea that this is so, you will have received the information from a reliable source; but your ignorance of the reliability of the source prevents you from recognizing that the information is correct, from knowing that it is correct, even though you may believe it to be so. It is information that we recognize to be genuine that yields the characteristically human sort of knowledge that distinguishes us as adult cognizers from machines, other animals, and even our childhood selves.

Some philosophers, choosing to place emphasis on the similarity between ourselves and these other beings, may insist that they have knowledge when they receive information.⁷ This is a verbal dispute in which we shall not engage, for it is profitless to do so. We shall remain content with the observation that our most cherished scientific achievements, the discovery of the double helix, for example, and our most worthy practical attainments, the development of a system of justice, for example, depend on a more significant kind of knowledge. This kind of knowledge rests on our capacity to distinguish truth from error.

Analysis

To indicate the information sense of the word 'know' as being the one in question is quite different from analysing the kind of knowledge we have picked out. What is an analysis of knowledge? An analysis is always relative to some objective. It does not make any sense simply to demand the analysis of goodness, knowledge, beauty, or truth, without some indication of what purpose such an analysis is supposed to achieve. To demand the analysis of knowledge without specifying further what you hope to accomplish with it is like demanding blueprints without saying what you hope to build. Before asking for such an analysis, we should explain what goals we hope to achieve with it.

First, let us consider the distinction between analysing the meaning of the term 'know' and analysing the kind of knowledge denoted. Many philosophers have been interested in the task of analysing the meaning of the word 'know',⁸ Indeed, many would argue that there is no need for philosophical analysis once we have a satisfactory analysis of the meaning of the term 'know'. This restrictive conception of philosophical analysis is sustained by a dilemma: either a theory of knowledge is a theory about the meaning of the word 'know' and semantically related epistemic terms, or it is a theory about how people come to know what they do. The latter is not part of philosophy at all, but rather that part of psychology called learning theory. It follows that if a theory of knowledge is part of philosophy, then it is a theory of knowledge about the meaning of the word 'know'. That is the argument, and it is one that would reduce the theory of knowledge to a theory of semantics.

It is not difficult to slip between the horns of the dilemma. A theory of knowledge need not be a theory about the meaning of epistemic words any more than it need be a theory about how people come to know what they do. Instead, it may be one explaining what conditions must be satisfied and how they may be satisfied in order for a person to know something. When we specify those conditions and explain how they are satisfied, then we shall have a theory of knowledge. An analogy should be helpful at this point. Suppose a person says that there are only two kinds of theories about physical mass. Either a theory of matter is a theory about the meaning of 'mass' and semantically related physical terms, or it is a theory about how something comes to have mass. This dichotomy would be rejected on the grounds that it leaves out the critical question of what mass is, or, to put it another way, it leaves out the question of what condition must be satisfied for something to have a given mass. A theoretician in physics might be concerned with precisely the question of what conditions are necessary and sufficient for an object to have mass, or more precisely, to have a mass of n. Similarly, a philosopher might be concerned with precisely the question of what conditions are necessary and sufficient for a person to have knowledge, or more precisely, to know that p.

Some philosophers have questioned whether it is possible to give necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, but the finest monuments of scientific achievement mark the refutation of claims of impossibility. Obviously, a necessary and sufficient condition for the application of the expression 'S knows that p' is precisely the condition of S knowing that p. This could be made less trivial with little difficulty. The objection to the idea that a philosopher can discover necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge may rest on the confused idea that a set of conditions necessary and sufficient for the application of a term constitutes a kind of recipe for applying terms which would enable us to decide quite mechanically whether the term applies in each instance. However, we may, without taking any position on the question of whether such a recipe can be found for applying the term 'know', state flatly that this is not the purpose of our theory of knowledge or the analysis of knowledge incorporated therein. Our interests lie elsewhere.

The Form and Objectives o...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Table Of Contents
• Theory of Knowledge
• Theory of Knowledge
• Preface
• 1 The Analysis of Knowledge
• 2 Truth and Acceptance
• 3 The Foundation Theory: Infallible Foundationalism
• 4 Fallible Foundations
• 5 The Explanatory Coherence Theory
• 6 Internal Coherence and Personal Justification
• 7 Coherence, Truth, and Undefeated Justification
• 8 Externalism and Epistemology Naturalized
• 9 Skepticism
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index