'Alexander': On Aristotle Metaphysics 12

Fred D. Miller, Jr., Fred D. Miller, Jr.

• Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781350179370
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ancient & Classical Philosophy

This volume presents a commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics Book 12 by pseudo-Alexander in a new translation accompanied by explanatory notes, introduction and indexes. Fred D. Miller, Jr. argues that the author of the commentary is in fact not Alexander of Aphrodisias, Aristotle's distant successor in early 3rd century CE Athens and his leading defender and interpreter, but Michael of Ephesus from Constantinople as late as the 12th century CE. Robert Browning had earlier made the case that Michael was enlisted by Princess Anna Comnena in a project to restore and complete the ancient Greek commentaries on Aristotle, including those of Alexander; he did so by incorporating available ancient commentaries into commentaries of his own. Metaphysics Book 12 posits a god as the supreme cause of motion in the cosmic system Aristotle had elaborated elsewhere as having the earth at the centre. The fixed stars are whirled around it on an outer sphere, the sun, moon and recognised planets on interior spheres, but with counteracting spheres to make the motions of each independent of the motions of others and of the fixed stars, thus yielding a total of 55 spheres. Motion is transmitted from a divine unmoved mover through divine moved movers which move the celestial spheres, and on to the perishable realms. Chapters 1 to 5 describe the principles and causes of the perishable substances nearer the centre of the universe, while Chapters 6 to 10 seek to prove the existence and attributes of the celestial substances beyond.

‘Alexander’

On Aristotle
Metaphysics 12

Translation

668,1Scholia on Book 12 of the Metaphysics of Aristotle¹

[Chapter 1]²

In the present book of the Metaphysics, to which it is customary for the Peripatetics to assign the title ‘Lambda’,³ Aristotle⁴ composes an account concerning the first (prôtos) and immovable (akinêtos) principle (arkhê),⁵ to which, indeed, this entire treatise (pragmateia) is devoted. But since the word 5‘principle’ is spoken in many ways (for matter (hulê), form (eidos), and privation (sterêsis)⁶ are each called a principle), he first articulates what they involve summarily and concisely, in order that we may have the account of them fresh in our minds and thus know easily how the principle about which we are enquiring (zêtein) differs from other principles. Alternatively, since he had enquired in the [book concerning] puzzles (aporia)⁷ in addition to other issues as to whether all things have the same principles or different things have 10different ones, but he has not yet hit upon a solution (lusis), he for this reason again takes up the account of causes (aitia) in order to prove (deiknunai) that in one way all things have the same principles but in another way they do not.

1069a18 The investigation is about substance; [for it is to substances that the principles and causes enquired about belong. For both, if the universe exists as a whole of some sort, substance is its first part; and, even if it exists through succession, substance is in this way also what is first, then quality, and then quantity. At the same time the latter are not even things that are (so to speak) without qualification, for example, qualities and movements – or else even the not-white and the not-straight [would be things that are without qualification]; at least we say that they are, for instance, ‘there is not white’. Further, none of the other things is separable. The early [thinkers] also bear witness in effect to this; for they were enquiring into the principles, elements, and causes of substance.]⁸

Since it has been proven that the science (epistêmê) set forth here is prior to all the other sciences, and the subject (hupokeimenon) of the first science is also 15first, and substance (ousia) is prior to all the other categories (katêgoria), substance will be the subject of wisdom (sophia);⁹ and since, in turn, among substances one is first and another second,¹⁰ that which is first of all will be the subject of wisdom. And after saying that the investigation (theôria)¹¹ is about substance, Aristotle concisely adds the reason for this, stating, ‘for it is to 20substances that the principles and causes enquired about belong’ (1069a18–19).¹² For by enquiring about the principles and causes of substance he enquires about substance itself, just as, also, one who enquires about the cause of the eclipse (ekleipsis) enquires about the eclipse itself. For the cause of the eclipse, as was stated in the second book of Posterior Analytics,¹³ is the definition (horos) of the eclipse, and this is the eclipse itself. Having proven, then, that the 25science set forth here is the first and that the first science is about the first things, he proves that substance is prior to the other categories; hence, if wisdom is first, and the first science is concerned with the first things, if it is 669,1 proven that substance is first, the present wisdom will be such as to investigate substance.

First, then, Aristotle distinguishes the ways in which it is possible to think of substance among the ten categories,¹⁴ saying, [on the one hand] ‘for both if the universe (to pan) exists as a whole (holon) of some sort,¹⁵ substance is its first part (meros)’ (1069a19–20), that is, substance will be the first part whether we understand all perceptible (aisthêtos) substance together with the accidents 5(sumbebêkos) as a sort of unity, or we think of the ten categories as broken up and separated (khôrizein) from each other and lying in succession, such that, say, quantity (poson) is first, then quality (poion), then substance, and then the rest.¹⁶ And in the latter case substance will be prior to the others, then quantity, then quality,¹⁷ and the rest similarly; for the latter alternative is indicated by 10‘even if¹⁸ [the universe exists] in succession’ (1069a19–20), that is, if we think of the categories as existing (einai) not as a unity (heis) but in succession and not existing within substance.

But since what he means is still in a way rather unclear, let it be made clearer with an example (hupodeigma). Socrates is indeed a substance, but he is also white as well as philosophical and musical. Therefore, of the whole (holotês) 15that is composed of the substance of Socrates and the white and philosophical and musical, the musical is a part; similarly, Socrates is also a part of the compound whole (sunolon) that is made up of the white and musical and philosophical and Socrates. And just as in the case of these things, so it is also with the entire perceptible substance and the nine [other] categories. For in the case of these things, too, the substance will be a part of the whole made up of perceptible substance and quantity and quality and the remaining categories; and similarly quantity will also be a part of what is generated from (apogennêma) 20substance and quantity and the other categories.

Having said, then, that whether we envisage (phantazesthai) it as becoming a unity and a single nature (phusis) distinct from these ten categories, or as coming to be through succession, in both ways substance is prior to the others, Aristotle offers an additional proof, saying, ‘at the same time these are not even things that are (to on) so to speak without qualification (haplôs)’ (1069a21–2).¹⁹ 25He means by ‘these’ [the items in] categories apart from substance. And since Aristotle also wanted to make clear what the things are that are apart from substance, he added, ‘for example, qualities [and] movements’²⁰ (1069a22). And what he means is in effect this: for how in general could those other categories be considered prior to substance, those very ones that are not things that are in their own right (kath’ hauto) but are said to be and partake (metekhein) of being (ontotês) because they are affections (pathê) of substance? If, then, they are 30things that are on account of substance and it gives being (to einai) to them, it is evident (phaneros) that substance is prior to all of them.²¹

And ‘or else even the not-white and the not-straight’ (1069a22–3) is equivalent to saying: but even the not-white and the not-straight are called beings on account of the white and the straight. For we say that what is not white is and what is not straight is. Since, then, the white, though not a being in its own right, possesses its being from substance, and the not-white, 35being a privation of the white, both is and is spoken of on account of the state (hexis) – that is, being white – this is a clear-cut indication that substance is prior to the other categories.²² For it is due to substance that the states (for example, of whiteness and heat) are, and are called, beings, and it is due to the states that the instances of not-whiteness [and] not-heat are, and are also called, beings.

670,1‘Further’, Aristotle says, ‘none of the other things is separable (khôristos)’ (1069a24) from substance, but they possess being in it and need it for their being. Therefore, that from which other things are not separate (khôris), while it is separate from them, is prior to those other things.²³ And that substance is prior to the other things is also established (sunhistanai) from the testimony of the early [thinkers]. For they also, he says, were enquiring into the principles of 5substance and of nothing else, on the grounds that it is prior to the other [categories]; for nobody enquires into the principles of posterior beings while neglecting the principles of things that are prior and exist in the chief sense (kuriôs) (cf. 1069a25–6).

1069a26 Now, the present-day [thinkers] posit the universal<s>²⁴ instead as substances. [For the genera are universals, which they say are principles and substances instead because they enquire logically. The early [thinkers], on the other hand, posited individuals, for example, fire and earth, as substances, but not the common body.

1069a30 Now, there are three substances: one is perceptible (upon which all are agreed), of which it is also necessary to grasp the elements, [enquiring whether they are] one or many, and of this [i.e. the perceptible] the one is perishable and the other everlasting; and another is immovable.²⁵ And some say that the latter is separate (some of these divide it into two, some posit the Forms and mathematical objects as a single nature, and some posit the mathematical objects alone of these). The former sorts, then, belong to natural science, for they involve movement; but the latter sort belongs to another science, if there is no principle common to them.]

After proving that substance is prior to the other [categories] and, in addition 10to this, that wisdom, as prior to all the other [sciences], enquires into the principles and causes of substances, Aristotle subsequently (akolouthôs) discusses who considered which beings to be substances. He says, ‘The present-day [thinkers]’²⁶ say that ‘the universals (ta katholou) instead are substances’ (1069a26–7), and he adds what the universals are: ‘for the genera’ (genê), he says, ‘are universals’, which they declare to be principles and substances, because they ‘enquire logically’ (logikôs) or emptily (1069a27–8).²⁷ For since they had 15neglected the things (pragma), that is, beings in the chief sense, they carried out their enquiry (zêtêsis) about not-beings (to mê ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-Title Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Contents
• Preface
• Conventions
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Textual Emendations
• Translation
• Notes
• Appendix I: Freudenthal’s Comparison of the Two Alexanders
• Appendix II: Comparison of Ps.-Alexander’s Readings with the Aristotle Manuscripts
• Bibliography
• English–Greek Index
• Greek–English Index
• Index of Passages from Other Works
• Subject Index
• Copyright