Intellectual Dependability

A Virtue Theory of the Epistemic and Educational Ideal

T. Ryan Byerly

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000372625
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophie
• Subtopic: Épistémologie en philosophie

Intellectual Dependability is the first research monograph devoted to addressing the question of what it is to be an intellectually dependable person—the sort of person on whom one's fellow inquirers can depend in their pursuit of epistemic goods. While neglected in recent scholarship, this question is an important one for both epistemology—how we should conceptualize the ideal inquirer—and education—how we can enable developing learners to grow toward this ideal.

The book defends a virtue theory according to which being an intellectually dependable person is distinctively a matter of possessing a suite of neglected virtues called "the virtues of intellectual dependability" that are themselves distinctively concerned with promoting epistemic goods in others' inquiries. After defending the existence and educational significance of these virtues as a group, the book turns toward the project of identifying and conceptualizing several specific instances of these virtues in detail. Virtues discussed include intellectual benevolence, intellectual transparency, communicative clarity, audience sensitivity, and epistemic guidance. In each case, an interdisciplinary treatment of the nature of the virtue and its relationship to other virtues, vices, and personality features is offered, drawing especially on relevant research in Philosophy and Psychology. The book concludes with a chapter devoted to identifying distinctive ways these virtues of intellectual dependability are manifested when it is inquiring communities, rather than individuals, that occupy the position of intellectual dependence.

By directing attention to the ideal of intellectual dependability, the book marks a novel turn of scholarly interest explicitly toward a neglected dimension of the ideal inquirer that will inform both epistemological theorizing and educational practice.

Part I

1 The Intellectually Dependable Person

Dependence, including dependence on other people, is a pervasive feature of the life of inquiry. When we are trying to find something out or improve our understanding or hone our investigative techniques, we are frequently at the mercy of a variety of factors not under our direct control, including the cooperation of our fellow human beings. In light of this pervasive dependence on others, it is of paramount importance for the life of inquiry that there are intellectually dependable people—roughly, people on whom others can depend in their inquiries. Without such people, the quality of our inquiries would often be put in jeopardy. It is the ideal of the intellectually dependable person that is the object of study in this book. The book’s basic question is: What is it to be an intellectually dependable person?

This first chapter is concerned with clarifying the concept of this ideal and with examining the relationship between intellectual virtues and this ideal. In Section 1, I explain that this ideal is that of a person on whom others can depend as a fellow member of the community of inquiry. The intellectually dependable person is the sort of person on whom we can depend in those myriad ways in which we distinctively depend upon fellow inquirers when conducting our inquiries. In Section 2, I contrast this ideal with the related but different ideal of the expert, and argue that unlike the ideal of the expert this ideal is centrally constituted by the possession of intellectual virtues. I contend, moreover, that if there is a subset of distinctively other-regarding intellectual virtues that I call the “virtues of intellectual dependability,” they in particular make an especially important contribution to this ideal. I conclude the chapter by briefly noting why these virtues of intellectual dependability, upon which the remainder of the book largely focuses, should be of interest to both social epistemologists and virtue epistemologists.

1 The Ideal of the Intellectually Dependable Person

Because the intellectually dependable person is one on whom others can depend in their inquiries, the subject of inquiry is a fitting place to begin the present discussion. Inquiry is typically conceived by philosophers as activity aimed at achieving epistemic goods. Most paradigmatically, perhaps, it is concerned with “finding something out” or with answering a question (Hookway 2003: 194). The inquirer engages in activity oriented toward determining whether or not something is the case. As part of this activity, she may gather evidence, deliberate upon it, and ultimately form a judgment. Such activity is by nature dynamic rather than static; thus, inquiry is stretched out in time. Yet individual instances of inquiry may be relatively swift or more protracted. Ray’s inquiry into whether he left the bathroom light on may come to a quick terminus; Susan’s inquiry into effective treatments for Alzheimer’s may occupy her entire professional career.

Understood in this way, it is tempting to think of legitimate inquiry as aiming at true belief. The inquirer, in seeking to find out whether something is the case, seeks to believe the truth on the matter in question. Ray seeks to believe the truth about whether the light is on; Susan seeks to believe the truth about which treatments for Alzheimer’s are effective. Yet no sooner have we stated this proposal than it becomes clear that true belief alone cannot be the only legitimate aim of inquiry. Or, more exactly, it cannot be that the exclusive aim of legitimate inquiry is to believe every (relevant) true proposition. For it is often the case that inquirers also wish to avoid error—they wish to avoid believing false propositions. Susan, for example, may well aim not only to believe of effective Alzheimer’s treatments that they are effective, but also to avoid believing of ineffective Alzheimer’s treatments that they are effective. Legitimate inquiries, then, can aim both at obtaining true beliefs and at avoiding false beliefs (cf. e.g., James 1897; Riggs 2003; Alston 2005).

Nor is this all. Our legitimate aims as inquirers are plausibly quite diverse—conceivably as diverse as is the scope of epistemic goods itself. In addition to obtaining true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs, an inquirer may legitimately aim at attaining attitudes on the matter in question that are justified or rational from her own perspective. Such an aim may apply not only to the attitude of belief, but to the attitudes of disbelief and suspension of judgment. It may also apply to more fine-grained cognitive attitudes, such as degrees of belief, if these exist. The inquirer here aims for those attitudes she adopts—whatever they may be—to be justified or rational from her own perspective.¹

The aims of inquiry we have thus far identified all pertain to goods exhibited via the inquirer’s relationship to isolated propositions. The inquirer believes a true proposition or does not believe a false proposition, or takes an attitude toward a proposition that is rational. Yet, inquirers may also legitimately aim to be related in epistemically valuable ways to objects other than isolated propositions. A chief candidate for such an aim is that of understanding (Grimm 2012). For example, Susan may aim to believe the truth and avoid believing falsehoods about effective Alzheimer’s treatments as part of a broader project best described as aiming to understand Alzheimer’s disease. Her aim in this broader project is not focused on attaining a certain kind of attitude toward an isolated proposition about Alzheimer’s disease, but is plausibly instead concerned with attaining a complex relationship toward a system of propositions, or even toward a non-propositional object—the disease itself.

Inquirers may also aim for their inquiries to exhibit valuable dynamic features. They may aim to conduct their inquiries in a manner reflective of open-mindedness, or intellectual perseverance, or intellectual empathy, for example. Their aim here pertains less to the outcome of the inquiry—if indeed it has an outcome—than to the way in which it is conducted. In aiming for their inquiries to be conducted in these ways, inquirers aim for their inquiries to be conducted in accordance with what philosophers have come to call “intellectual virtues,” or “responsibilist intellectual virtues” more specifically. According to a common consensus I will follow in this book (cf. e.g., Montmarquet 1993; Zagzebski 1996; Baehr 2011; King 2014; Battaly 2015), these virtues are traits of character whereby their possessors are disposed to engage in a broad range of characteristic behaviors out of a motivation to attain epistemic goods for themselves or others, where these goods are conceived of as such and are pursued at least in part for their own sake. For example, the open-minded person is disposed to seek out and consider diverse perspectives on topics of inquiry out of a motivation to attain a better epistemic position on these topics for its own sake. Characteristic behaviors of the open-minded person involve seeking out and considering alternative perspectives; yet, to be fully intellectually virtuous, the open-minded person must engage in these behaviors ultimately out of a motivation to attain epistemic goods as such for their own sake. The intellectual virtues in this way have a “two-tiered psychological structure” (cf. Baehr 2011: 103–4): their possessor has a foundational motivation to attain epistemic goods, has reason to believe that engaging in certain patterns of action, feeling, and thought characteristic of an intellectual virtue are conducive to fulfilling this motivation, and is thereby motivated and disposed to engage in these distinctive patterns of action.

My claim here is that it is legitimate for inquirers to aim for their inquiries to be conducted in intellectually virtuous ways, so understood, and indeed for themselves to become intellectually virtuous people. Much recent attention has been paid to the question of whether there is an empirical case for thinking that few if any people possess intellectual virtues or even intellectual characters at all, their intellectual behavior instead being better explained by features of their situations rather than by intellectual character traits (see, e.g., Alfano and Fairweather 2017). For my purposes, it is an important assumption that people do have malleable intellectual characters and they can become more or less intellectually virtuous. Otherwise it would be illegitimate for anyone to aim to become intellectually virtuous. I will not however attempt to develop a novel defense of the existence of intellectual character or the appropriateness of pursuing intellectual virtue as an aim against this situationist challenge here, instead directing readers to the work of others (e.g., King 2014; Hill and Sandage 2016; Baehr 2017). It is worth noting that for my purposes, it is not a devastating problem if one of the central theses of “epistemic situationism” is true—namely, that possession of full-blown intellectual virtue is rare—as long as this rarity does not make it inappropriate to aim at growth toward these virtues. What is important for my purposes is only that it is appropriate to aim to conduct one’s inquiries in accordance with intellectual virtue, and indeed to aim for oneself to become (even if only every asymptotically) intellectually virtuous.

Finally, and relatedly, and as suggested by the original gloss on inquiry as aiming at “achieving epistemic goods,” inquirers may legitimately aim at epistemic achievements. Achievements are commonly understood to be valuable outcomes of activity attributable to individuals or groups of agents on account of their competencies (Sosa 2007). So understood, the relevant epistemic achievements will be valuable outcomes of inquiry attributable to the inquirer or to groups of which she is a part on account of competencies possessed by her or by the group more broadly. The competencies in view may include the responsibilist intellectual virtues, but they may include other features as well. For example, they may include the so-called “reliabilist intellectual virtues,” which tend to be conceived of as a broader category of reliable belief-forming faculties which include such features as good eyesight or keen memory (Battaly 2015).

According to one influential contemporary view, where the valuable outcome of an epistemic achievement so understood is that of true belief, this achievement will constitute the epistemic good of knowledge. On this view, what it is for an individual to know a claim is for her to hold a true belief in that claim where her arriving upon the truth in this matter is attributable to her competencies (e.g., Sosa 2007; Greco 2010). Or, on an extension of this view, it is for her to arrive upon the truth in a manner attributable to her own and others’ competencies (Green 2016). Yet, we needn’t affirm this view about the nature of knowledge to recognize the legitimacy of aiming at epistemic achievements so understood. Even if epistemic achievements do not constitute knowledge, it may still be legitimate to aim at them in our inquiries, given their value. Like the good of an intellectually virtuous inquiry, the good of epistemic achievement is a dynamic feature of inquiry.

I have been going on now for several paragraphs identifying a variety of legitimate aims of inquiry. It is natural to wonder about the relationships between these aims. Are some more fundamental than others? For example, are some best understood as subsidiary or instrumental to others? Is there a single aim that is the only legitimate non-instrumental aim of inquiry, such that any other legitimate aims are only legitimate insofar as they are legitimate as instrumental to achieving this non-instrumental aim? I will not here undertake a lengthy and detailed defense of an answer to these questions.² The reason for this is that doing so is not necessary for my purposes in this chapter of explaining the ideal of intellectual dependability and defending the relevance of intellectual virtues for this ideal. What is essential for my purposes is only that the aims listed are indeed legitimate aims of inquiry, regardless of their relative levels of fundamentality. For example, it is immaterial for my purposes whether the good of holding justified attitudes is only legitimate as an aim of inquiry that is instrumental to the aims of holding true beliefs and avoiding erroneous ones, or whether it is legitimate as a non-instrumental aim of inquiry. What matters is just that the aims identified are widespread and legitimate aims of inquiry, which is rarely disputed. I will, however, return to the question of the relationships between these aims in Chapter 4, as in my view part of the virtue of intellectual benevolence is a sensitivity toward these relationships.

In the same way that I am pragmatically suspending judgment here about the relationships between the legitimate aims of inquiry listed previously, I am also pragmatically suspending judgment about the exhaustiveness of this list. I make no claim that the legitimate aims of inquiry I have listed are the only legitimate aims. What is essential for my purposes, again, is only that the aims are among the legitimate aims of inquiry.

My claims thus far can be summarized as follows. Inquiry requires dynamic activity aimed at achieving epistemic goods. These goods may include obtaining true belief, avoiding false belief, obtaining justified attitudes, acquiring understanding, conducting inquiries in accordance with responsibilist intellectual virtues, and obtaining epistemic achievements, and these goods may be sought legitimately either as instrumental or non-instrumental aims of inquiry. What is important for us to see next is a point about our widespread dependence in pursuing these aims. In pursuing inquiries with these varied aims, we are often if not always highly dependent upon factors which are in large measure beyond our control.

For example, epistemologists have recently given much attention to the way in which any inquiry whatsoever is impossible without the inquirer’s pervasive reliance upon or trust in their own basic cognitive faculties (see, e.g., Zagzebski 2012, ch.2). The faculties in view may include faculties of perception, memory, intuition, and inference. According to some authors, we cannot acquire non-circular justification for the epistemic value of relying upon these faculties, as any attempt to acquire such justification would of necessity employ the faculties. If we are to get anywhere in our inquiries, we have to use the faculties we’ve got; but in doing so we are dependent upon what we’ve got, and the quality of what we’ve got is in significant measure beyond our control (cf. Zagzebski 2012, ch.2). It’s not that we can’t do anything to improve the quality of our basic cognitive faculties, or to improve our use of them. We might even enlarge our faculties in a way by acquiring belief-forming mechanisms which pair together our native equipment with external enhancements, such as calculators or eyeglasses. But what is important for our purposes here is to notice that even in attempting to improve our cognitive faculties or our use of them in such ways, we must rely on these faculties. Dependence on our basic cognitive faculties for purposes of inquiry is inescapable.

We are also heavily reliant upon the cooperation of the environments in which we conduct our inquiries. The literature on the Gettier problem (e.g., Hazlett 2015) is littered with examples of cases in which the cooperation or lack thereof of an inquirer’s environment makes a significant difference for the outcome of her inquiry. For example, a factor as mundane as the lighting conditions in which we employ our basic faculties of vision to view objects establishes limits in which we can employ these faculties to achieve epistemic goods. Often it is not up to us whether the environments in which we conduct our inquiries are hospitable to their success.

Yet not all of our dependence is upon ourselves or upon impersonal others. A great deal of our dependence in inquiry is upon other people. And it is this dependence, or a certain dimension of this dependence, that is my primary focus in this chapter.

There are different ways in which we can depend on other people in our inquiries. Not all of these ways are distinctively interpersonal. For example, in some domains such as Epidemiology it is other people who are among the chief objects of inquiry. We often depend upon others in our inquiries in these domains in a way analogous to our dependence on our environmental features more generally. We need their cooperation if our inquiries are to be successful. Yet in these cases we are not depending upon other people in a way we only depend on other persons. Our mode of relating to them in this case is as objects of inquiry, and objects of inquiry can include impersonal objects.

On the other hand, we do often depend on other people in our inquiries in ways we only depend on other persons. When we do so, we depend on others as fellow inquirers. We depend on them as others who, like us, engage in activity with the aim of achieving epistemic goods. The availability of other such inquirers is potentially an extensive resource for enhancing the quality of our own inquiries. ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• Part I
• Part II
• Index