Climate Diplomacy and Emerging Economies

India as a Case Study

Dhanasree Jayaram

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000371956
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Biological Sciences
• Subtopic: Global Warming & Climate Change
• Index: Biological Sciences

This book analyses the role of the BASIC countries – Brazil, South Africa, India and China – in the international climate order.

Climate Diplomacy and Emerging Economies explores the collective and individual positions of these countries towards climate diplomacy, focusing in particular on the time period between the 2009 and 2019 climate summits in Copenhagen and Madrid. Dhanasree Jayaram examines the key drivers behind their climate-related policies (both domestic and international) and explores the contributory role of ideational and material factors (and the interaction between them) in shaping the climate diplomacy agenda at multilateral, bilateral and other levels. Digging deeper into the case study of India, Jayaram studies the shifts in its climate diplomacy by looking into the ways in which climate change is framed and analyses the variations in perceptions of the causes of climate change, the solutions to it, the motivations for setting climate action goals, and the methods to achieve the goals.

This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of climate change, environmental policy and politics and IR more broadly.

1 Introduction

Climate diplomacy is conceptualised and practised through multiple approaches. In International Relations, it is often conflated and interlinked with ideas of cooperation and multilateralism. When seen through the prism of foreign policy, climate diplomacy becomes integral to the process of identifying entry points for climate cooperation on various issues such as energy and land use among others. The interconnectedness between climate change and foreign policy can be expressed through climate diplomacy (adelphi, n.d.):

Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of the 21st century – the repercussions for our foreign policy agenda are substantial. A stronger role for foreign policy in international climate policy has been called for – namely through climate diplomacy.

Climate diplomacy can be considered a reflection of the persisting geopolitical scenario or it may also be seen as an instrument of geopolitics – a practice that influences the latter. Not only does climate diplomacy provide a framework for analysing geopolitics (such as North–South relations), but it is also an advocacy tool that is used by nation states and other actors (non-state and sub-state) to promote dialogue, stakeholder engagement, and so on. A good example of interplay between climate diplomacy and geopolitics is the way in which the emerging economies – namely, Brazil, South Africa, India, and China – asserted themselves both collectively and individually at the 2009 Copenhagen Summit to resist pressure from the industrialised countries to dilute differentiation between the developed and developing countries. It is therefore emphasised that they concretised their place in the global climate order as key agenda-setters and norm-creators.

Both ideational and material forces are known to guide climate diplomacy. While the ‘ideational’ is commonly related to constructivism, ‘materiality’ is linked to realism in International Relations. Some would argue that ideas and values matter more in the conceptualisation and practice of climate diplomacy, while others would argue that power politics and material forces are the sole drivers of a country’s climate diplomacy. Not only does this vary from context to context, but also the dichotomous relationship between the two itself is questionable. In fact, constructivism as an analytical and methodological approach gives space for the material and ideational to be “complexly interwoven and interdependent” (Pettenger 2007, p. 6). Moreover, ‘realist constructivism’ is an approach that finds mainstream constructivism compatible with classical realism (Barkin 2010). This inherent interplay between constructivism and realism is more evident in the case of the emerging economies for whom ideas and discursive power are of immense importance in projecting their positions on climate change, in conjunction with ‘power’, at the national and international levels.

The behavioural patterns of nation states in the international climate order are governed, to a great extent, by attitudes towards issues concerning global climate governance, which are in turn shaped by perceptions and ideas such as climate justice, national interest, vulnerability/danger, opportunity, historical responsibility, leadership, sustainable development, and so on. Hence, the gradual shifts in climate diplomacy positions of the emerging economies are clearly a reflection of a change in their perceptions of issues surrounding these ideas, coupled with the influence of material forces that emanate from an expansion of their ‘green’ capabilities and power positioning in the international system among other shifts. These ideas can be broadly categorised into moral/ethical, environmental/ecological, socio-economic and technology, cultural and political (including geopolitical). Climate diplomacy, in short, as an embodiment of power politics or a demonstration of international cooperation, is grounded on ideas that are critical for framing of climate change as well as issues that are linked to it.

The relevance and contours of climate diplomacy

While there are no strict definitions of climate diplomacy, the following definition sums up its nature and goals to some extent, as well as the actors that are typically involved in the process (Mabey, Gallagher and Born 2013, p. 14):

Climate diplomacy is the interface between national interest debates and international cooperation. It is the process through which nation states – and increasingly non-governmental and sub-state actors – determine and work to deliver their international objectives.

Climate diplomacy is often seen through the prism of the international climate regime, which is essentially encapsulated in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its various outcomes, including the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement. However, in recent times, climate diplomacy has become a centrepiece of various other forums (such as G-20 and regional organisations) as well as bilateral relations between countries. These forums and exchanges may run parallel to the climate change negotiations, and they may also reinforce the international climate regime through iterative or other types of processes. For instance, they may be involved in implementing climate action at various levels of governance in the international system. They may also help develop trust between various parties on the future of climate action, and the climate order itself.

Climate diplomacy has been analysed through different analytical frameworks in the existing literature. For instance, the approach of ‘multiple bilateralism’ is defined as “a strategy that entails the maintenance of several – cooperative or confrontational – bilateral diplomatic relationships in parallel as a subset of a multilateral negotiation setting in order to reach policy objectives at that multilateral level” (Belis et al. 2018, p. 86). According to this approach, a country, while engaging in bilateral relations with multiple countries, takes into consideration its individual bilateral relations with each of them. These relations could be cooperative or adversarial in nature. Belis et al. (2015) attribute the proactive momentum on climate action from the Copenhagen Summit to Paris Summit to growing multiple bilateralism among players such as the United States (US), China, and the European Union (EU) to some extent. This could be in the form of the joint announcement reached by the US and China in 2014 in the run-up to the 2015 Paris Summit (explained further in the subsequent chapters) or the growing China–EU understanding on climate issues through discussions on energy or emissions trading (Jayaram forthcoming).¹

Climate diplomacy also drives formation of alliances, coalitions, and groupings based on ideational and material forces, including specific vulnerabilities, capabilities, and interests. This is where the salience of the BASIC grouping – formed by the emerging economies of India, China, Brazil, and South Africa – becomes apparent. These countries have been steadfastly upholding the principles of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC), right to develop (of the developing countries), historical responsibility (of the developed countries) etc. (Hurrel and Sengupta 2012).

Climate diplomacy, as Elliott (2013) points out, “is not divorced from the competing political interests that underpin it”. These interests are conditioned/shaped by not just domestic factors but also geopolitical ones. As much as nation states defend their “historical and national positions”, they may also use climate diplomacy to achieve their geopolitical interests, as is further explored in this study too. For instance, the emerging economies are known to position themselves as responsible players or global leaders in the arena of international climate governance (Karlsson et al. 2011). What needs to be noted here is the autonomous and intermediary roles played by the ideational and material forces that feed into these positions. The ideational and material factors are not customarily or paradigmatically disengaged from one another or they may not share any form of hierarchical relationship by which one set of ideas predominate the others. This is explained further in the subsequent sections of the chapter. Therefore, as perceptions surrounding climate change and solutions evolve and shape countries’ climate diplomacy, it also facilitates material progress by uncovering and creating new opportunities in the economic, social, technological, financial, and strategic domains among others (Hsu et al. 2015; Renner 2015).

The interlinkages between power hierarchies within the international system and climate diplomacy cannot be ignored while dissecting the latter. From the emergence of G-2 (the US and China), signifying a certain geopolitical realignment (Bush 2011), to China and India projecting themselves as leaders of the newly emerged climate order in the aftermath of the US’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement under the Donald Trump Presidency can be regarded as a combination of ideas and material forces feeding into their climate diplomacy positions (Zhang et al. 2017). Climate diplomacy is also used as a tool for soft power projection. Nation states that possess certain capabilities can offer their resources (through grant, aid, capacity-building etc.) to smaller and resource-poor countries for strategic purposes by winning their goodwill and confidence (Karakır 2018).

Climate diplomacy is, without a second thought, influenced by domestic interests. With climate change being mainstreamed into various policy areas (such as energy, urbanisation, food, and water), the range of actors has increased to include transnational and private/civil society organisations as well. Apart from the head of the state whose special interest in climate change could prove to be consequential, other actors, including governmental agencies, ministries, non-governmental organisations, businesses, and media, also play a role in framing climate change–related issues domestically and internationally. With the Paris Agreement opening up the multilateral process and the realm of international climate policy in general much more for the participation and contribution of sub-state and non-state actors, these actors’ stakes and responsibilities have become more important to discuss. Non-state actors, for instance, are engaged not only in “activist efforts” aimed at gaining attention but also in “climate governance” in the form of “transnational networks, epistemic communities, public–private partnerships (PPPs), and multi‐stakeholder partnerships” (Kuyper, Linnér and Schroe 2017). In effect, the international climate order or regime is not a monolith; it is rather an archetype of multilevel, networked governance, involving multiple actors with varied interests, ideas, and capacities (Jayaram forthcoming).

Relevance of the emerging economies in the international climate order

Although the emerging economies’ climate diplomacy positions became the centre of attention at the Copenhagen Summit, their contribution to shaping the global debates on climate change has been highly influential since the beginning of talks on tackling climate change, even before the UNFCCC was established in 1992. Developing countries such as India were influential in defining and driving debates on environmental issues at the international level, right from the first global conference on the human environment (UNCHE), held in 1972 in Stockholm. At this summit, then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi delivered a speech that helped shape the dialogue on global environmental issues, including climate change in the subsequent decades. In her speech (Gandhi 1972), by linking environment to poverty and drawing a clear line between the developed and developing countries, the tone was set for future negotiations on most environmental issues, including climate change. This rhetoric dominated the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) summit, held in 1992 in Rio. Importantly, the politics of climate change has primarily been based on disagreements over the ideas that are closely interlinked with issues related to emissions reduction targets, finance, transfer of technology, MRV (measuring, reporting, and verification), and so on. These ideas form the basis of mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and REDD/REDD-plus (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) among others, which have been opposed and espoused by the emerging economies at various points in time.

The Copenhagen Summit served as a watershed moment in which the BASIC grouping, despite not being a cohesive alliance, emerged in a geopolitical and geoeconomic vacuum, left by the relative decline of the industrialised countries that were reeling under the turmoil created by the 2007–2008 financial crisis. It is necessary first to define what constitutes an emerging economy in the context of this study. The emerging economies have a lower-than-average per capita income, and are largely in transition.² They are categorised on the basis of their reforms agenda and rapid growth rates. Moving away from traditional economies, they are on the path to becoming developed economies. However, there is no simple definition of an emerging economy. When the 2007–2008 financial crisis erupted, the emerging economies, especially China and India, were affected only marginally. While China arrived on the world stage as a global economic powerhouse (Barth, Caprio Jr. and Phumiwasana 2009), India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 6–8 percent during this period.³

The emerging economies, therefore, hinged their climate diplomacy positions on their geopolitical and geoeconomic ‘emergence’, or ‘re-emergence’ in the case of India and China as these two countries were the largest economies in the world, once upon a time, before colonisation. These countries began to acknowledge their increasing capabilities and, commensurately, growing stature/power in the international political arena and the ‘international system’ in general, and one of the results of this development was and continues to be the willingness to take on greater responsibility as far as issues of global governance, such as climate change, are concerned. In addition, the emerging economies began to come under increasing pressure to adopt greater commitments to reduce emissions, in recognition of their escalating emissions. At the same ti...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Acknowledgements
• Foreword
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Emerging economies in the international climate order
• 3 Country-wise analysis of BASIC’s climate diplomacy positions
• 4 The evolution of India’s climate diplomacy (2009–2013)
• 5 The evolution of India’s climate diplomacy (2014–2019)
• 6 Conclusions
• Index