The Last Sunset

Singh

• Publisher: Roli Books
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9788174369116
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Indian & South Asian History
• Index: History

A comprehensive history of the Lahore Durbar, the glorious reign of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and his exemplary organizational skills that led to forming of the formidable Sikh army and the fiercely fought Anglo Sikh wars. The Last Sunset: The Rise and Fall of the Lahore Durbar recreates history of the Sikh empire and its unforgettable ruler, Maharaja Ranjit Singh of the Shukarchakia dynasty. An outstanding military commander, he created the Sikh Khalsa Army organized and armed in Western style, acknowledged as the best in undivided India in the nineteenth century. Ranjit Singh's death in 1839 and the subsequent decline of the Lahore Durbar, gave British the opportunity to stake their claim in the region till now fiercely guarded by Maharaja Ranjit Singh's army. Captain Amarinder Singh chronicles in detail the two Anglo-Sikh wars of 1845 and 1848. The battles, high in casualties on both the sides led to the fall of Khalsa and the state was finally annexed with Maharaja Duleep Singh, the youngest son of Maharaja Ranjit Singh put under the protection of the Crown and deported to England.

The First §ikh War 1845-46

I. THE SIKHS

After Ranjit Singh’s death, the highly disciplined anny that had helped him build and secure his kingdom began to crumble. lfhroughout history, Sikhs have always responded to good leadership, a characteristic that was missing in Kharak Singh. His reign lasted only four brief months, a period during which the new maharaja, despite his previous active command in the army, spent his days in an opium-induced stupor.His son NaunihalSingh deposed him and together with his prime minister, Raja Dhyan Singh, spent much of his time with the army, continuing his grandfather’s policy of troop reviews and regular training exercises. Although keen and considered to be the closest in temperament to the late Ranjit Singh, Naunihal Singh, at eighteen, lacked experience and did not receive the complete respect and support of the army as had his grandfather. He was the last to exercise control over it.

It was during Maharani Chand Kaur’s reign that the real breakdown in command began. She occupied the throne for only two months-from November 1840 to January 1841 - and can hardly be blamed for this situation, yet historians attribute the independence of the army from the durbar to have started during her reign. The army began to act in all matters of state, overthrowing her and bringing Sher Singh to the throne. The one important aspect during Sher Singh’s reign which deserves a mention and which would later have a bearing in the battle of Gujrat during the Second Sikh War, was the visit of Ranjit Singh’s old enemy, the former king of Afghanistan, Dost Mohammad. He arrived in Lahore in February 1843 and signed a treaty of friendship with Sher Singh.

Being indebted to the army for his position, Sher Singh pandered to it in every way. He raised its strength, increased its pay and allowances, and submitted to it on all other matters. In 1842, for instance, Sher Singh increased the pay from 8 rupees to 12 to buy peace during the mutiny. During Maharani Jinda’s rule, she raised it to 14. In 1845, Peshora Singh, Ranjit Singh’s son, promised the army a pay increase to 15 rupees for an infantryman and 40 rupees to a cavalry trooper. In addition, a further 100 rupees and a gold bracelet would be given to every soldier who helped him seize the throne. Appeasing the army had now become routine.

It was during this period that the panchayat system took root in the army. This system had evolved in the villages, being a council of five elders who decided on matters that needed attention for the collective benefit of the whole. This was a concept that the troops both understood and trusted, and was therefore adopted by them. While this ‘democratization’ worked as a system of village administration, it caused havoc in the army. What should have been a disciplined force under a strong and effective leadership was now one that was controlled by voting. The council would decide what was right or wrong, or what should or should not be done in the battalion. Each company elected two members to the panchayat, putting an end to the disciplined force that Ranjit Singh had so painstakingly created. Commanding officers would henceforth exercise command on parade and, for whatever they were worth, lead their units in battle, but for administrative matters they had to abide by the decision of the panchayat. Lord Gough describes the panchayats as ‘guiding the united action of the soldiery, were able to dictate to their officers, and later on found themselves able to appear to be representing the Khalsa in arms, and to dictate to the durbar, or court itself’.

Sher Singh should have been the last person to accept such a system. He had been a general, had led successful campaigns during the days of Ranjit Singh, and knew the importance of being able to command. However, Ranjit Singh was aware that Sher Singh and his brother, Tara Singh, were not his sons. It was only towards the end of Ranjit Singh’s life that Sher Singh was permitted to be seated in the maharaja’s presence – Tara Singh was never given this honour. Perhaps because of this background, he turned a blind eye to the functioning of the army and let matters drift. The army realized its strength and now knew, as did the durbar, that if anyone wanted to rule the state it had to gain its approval. Consequently, the army declared itself the representative of Sikh aspirations and called itself the Sarbat Khalsa – the supreme body of the Sikhs, whose decision was binding on all.

As one publication of the period puts it:

Unsurprisingly under such circumstances, with the Khalsa unwittingly following the example of the Praetorian Guard during one of Imperial Rome’s more decadent episodes, government control of the army steadily weakened. Men took leave whenever they liked, discipline deteriorated, and training all but ceased. Heera Singh was briefly able to reintroduce regular parades in 1844, but in early 1845 it was recorded that, ‘exercise and drill were out of use’, and a number of parade grounds were subsequently ploughed up and sown with crops. Many officers were murdered during mutinies in support of one or another political faction and the rest were subjected to methodical harassment and intimidation. ⁷²

The army mutinied soon after Sher Singh’s accession in 1841. One of its demands was the removal of its foreign officers – a demand also supported by the sardars who had, even in the days of Ranjit Singh, felt threatened by them. A few of these foreign officers were killed during the mutiny and most left the army during his reign or later during the prime ministership of Heera Singh. Only four remained on the eve of the First Sikh War; however, none of those who had built the army – Allard, Ventura, Avitabile, Court – were amongst them.

Sher Singh was indifferent towards the events taking place around him. He isolated himself from reality and left the affairs of state to his prime minister. He became slovenly, enjoying his pleasures of dance, music, sports, and hunting, and has been described by some historians as completely debauched. Had Raja Dhyan Singh not exercised some control over events, the government would have collapsed. The army now dictated its strength and its pay – even to the extent of telling the durbar who its leaders should be. The Jagirdari Fauj fared better, as they continued to respond to their traditional leadership. On their own, these leaders increased the strength of their levies. This was done by the chiefs and sardars, more for their own security than necessity, as a consequence of the anarchy that was then prevailing in the army.

Ranjit Singh had left his regular army with a strength of 31 battalions of infantry and 10 regiments of cavalry. The army voted and raised its strength to 45 battalions of infantry under Sher Singh and to 62 battalions by 1845, under Maharani Jinda Kaur. Two additional cavalry regiments were raised during this period, one being added by the time of the First Sikh War, raising the strength to 13. The unit personnel were increased to their authorized strength. For instance, the strength of the Rajman Gobind, which stood at 98 in 1839, was now 528.

With self-enhanced salary and allowances, the government’s treasury was under extreme strain. For example, the two regiments of the Fauj-e-Khas – the Dragoons and the Grenadiers – whose strength in 1839 was 732 and 770 men, respectively, and cost 17,627 and 18,408 rupees to maintain, now cost the exchequer 21,945 and 22,313 rupees for a slightly reduced strength of 730 and 750 men, which was an increase of around 21.5 per cent in salaries alone. The artillery, which stood at 21 batteries of field guns, around 200 guns and 100 Kila Jat guns, rose to 232 field guns. During Sher Singh’s period, and by the time of Jowahar Singh’s premiership in the reign of Maharaja Duleep Singh, the Kila Jat strength had increased to 381 guns, nearly double the strength that existed at the time of Ranjit Singh. The smaller field guns were produced in three foundries that had been set up by Ranjit Singh at Lahore, Amritsar and Kotli Loharan, under the direction of General Court and Lehna Singh Majithia. The powder was manufactured in Lahore under the direction of Fakir Nur-ud-din and Dr Honigberger. All of the large siege guns were from the earlier Mughal period.

Because of the panchayat system, discipline and training suffered in the regular army. Even at the level of the durbar, bribes and money, rather than merit, became the order of the day. Fauja Singh Bajwa, in his Military System of the Sikhs, says,

Though the number of such cases can be easily multiplied, a few examples will do for our purpose. Lal Singh Murariwala was promoted by Jawahar Singh straight away from the rank of Commandant to that of General. Another man, Jiwan Singh, ‘the head of fools’, was promoted to the rank of ‘Sardar’. Megh Raj, who was known as ‘Mangloo’ and who had no qualifications other than being the brother of the attractive and sought-after slave girl Mangla who had since ingratiated herself with both the Regent and Raja Lal Singh, was appointed a General. Promotions were sold openly or secretly, sometimes even disproportionate to the vacancies. At the time of Heera Singh, Lal Singh was given the title of ‘Raja’ for a payment of 50,000 rupees. Sher Singh promoted people for money on the very day of enlistment, and Colonel Man Singh was notorious for the sale of promotions in his regiment.

Despite this gloomy situation, the morale of the average soldier remained high. The panchayats had enforced a rigorous discipline of their own and the troops themselves looked forward to a fight with the British. In his book Sikh Wars: British Army in the Punjab, 1845-49 (henceforth referred to as Sikh Wars), Hugh C.B. Cook writes,

The morale of the Khalsa, which had little use for the Durbar in Lahore, was extremely high and the vast majority were strongly Anglophobe. Now at last was the opportunity to prove once and for all the greatness of the nation Ranjit Singh had built up, to establish it as the most powerful state in India, an...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Insidecover
• The Last Sunset
• Other Lotus Titles
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Annexures
• Acknowledgements
• Declaration
• Introduction
• Prologue
• The Lion of Lahore
• The Evolution of the Army
• The Decline of the Lahore Durbar 1839-45
• The First Sikh War 1845-46
• Multan 1848-49
• The Second Sikh War 1848-49
• Epilogue
• Annexures
• Notes
• Select Bibliography
• Index
• Inside Backcover
• Backcover