Goebbels And Der Angriff

Russel Lemmons

• Publisher: The University Press of Kentucky
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9780813182858
• Topic: Histoire
• Subtopic: Biographies historiques

The Berlin newspaper Der Angriff ( The Attack ), founded by Joseph Goebbels in 1927, was a significant instrument for arousing support for Nazi ideas. Berlin was the center of the political life of the Weimar Republic, and Goebbels became an actor upon this frenetic stage in 1926, becoming Gauleiter of Berlin's Nazis. Focusing on the period from 1927 to 1933, a time the Nazis later called "the blood years, " Russel Lemmons examines how Der Angriff was used to promote support for Nazism. Some of the most important propaganda motifs of the Third Reich first appeared in the pages of Der Angriff. Horst Wessel, murdered by the German Communist Party in 1930, became the archetypal Nazi hero; much of his legend began on the pages of Der Angriff. Other Nazi propaganda themes—the "Unknown SA man" and the "myth of resurrection and return"—made their first appearances in this newspaper. How could the Germans, seemingly among the most cultured people in Europe, hand over their fate to the Nazis? As this book demonstrates, Der Angriff had much to do with the rise of National Socialism in Berlin and the cataclysmic results.

1

The Berlin NSDAP before Der Angriff, 1920-1927

Chaos characterized the early history of National Socialism in Berlin. Promoted by the atmosphere of the capital after the revolution of November 1918, the party emerged as one of numerous voelkisch (far right) groups determined to destroy the fledgling republic. Because of the fragmented nature of right-wing politics during this period, the origins of National Socialism in Berlin are extremely difficult to trace, but 1920 appears to be an appropriate point of departure. In that year, a chapter of the repugnant Jew-baiter Julius Streicher’s German Socialist Party or DSP (Deutschsozialistischen Partei) was founded in the capital city. The following year this group renamed itself National Socialists (Streicher Group).¹

November 1922 saw the establishment of the first Ortsgruppe Berlin der NSDAP (Local Branch of the Berlin NSDAP) at the Restaurant Reichskanzler in Kreuzberg. This group, however, was short-lived. The murder of Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau by right-wing extremists had led to passage of the Republikschutzgesetz (Law for the Defense of the Republic) under which Prussian Interior Minister Carl Severing had outlawed numerous political parties aimed at the violent overthrow of German democracy. Among those receiving a Verbot (prohibition) in Prussia was the NSDAP. Therefore, the newly formed Nazi organization called itself the Grossdeutschen Arbeiterpartei (Greater-German Workers’ Party) or GDAP. The title of the new group did not mask its political goals, and Severing banned the party on 10 January 1923. The National Socialist movement in Berlin would not reemerge until after the ill-fated Beer Hall Putsch and Adolf Hitler’s release from prison.²

Although a party organization was not permitted during the years 1923-1925, the evolution of the groups that would become the paramilitary wing of the NSDAP, the Sturmabteilungen (Storm Sections), or SA, continued. The period 1921-1923 witnessed the genesis of the so-called Voelkische Turnerschaften (People’s Gymnastic Groups). Mere fronts for right-wing hooliganism, these clubs were important forerunners of the SA and engaged in the burgeoning civil war in the streets of Berlin. For example, in April 1924, members of the Turnerschaft Hutten, on their way to a political rally in the Bluethnersaele on Luetzowplatz, brawled with members of the German Communist Party (KPD), both sides suffering numerous injuries. Even before the April clash with the KPD, the Turnerschaften were being absorbed by the newly founded Frontbann. This group, led in the north by the former SA chief, Ernst Roehm, would play an important role in the development of the Berlin SA. By March 1925, the Frontbann Berlin-Brandenburg had two thousand members.³

About this time, the Frontbann formed an alliance with the newly reestablished Ortsgruppe Berlin of the NSDAP. On 17 February 1925, ten days before Hitler officially reestablished the Nazi Party, Erich Thimm founded the new National Socialist group. The following month, Hitler upgraded the organization to the Gau Gross-Berlin der NSDAP (Greater-Berlin Region of the NSDAP), which included the entire province of Brandenburg. The Fuehrer also named Dr. Ernst Schlange the first Gauleiter (regional leader) of Berlin’s 350 Nazis.⁴

For the first month of the party’s existence, it maintained close ties with the Frontbann, portions of which served as the paramilitary arm of the NSDAP. Since most of the Frontbann insisted upon maintaining its independence from the Nazis, pressure grew within the party to sever ties with the organization. The split between the Nazi movement and the Frontbann as well as the founding of the Berlin SA occurred on 22 March 1926. On this date, the leadership of the Berlin Frontbann met in the Wernicke bar on Potsdamerstrasse. Kurt Daluege led the faction, which included about one-fifth (450 men) of the Frontbann, that seceded and offered its allegiance to the Nazis, forming the core of the new SA. The remaining 80 percent gave its support to Erich Ludendorff’s Tannenbergbund, one of numerous other extreme nationalist groups in Weimar Germany. In June, the NSDAP announced that membership in the Frontbann was not a substitute for belonging to the SA.⁵

In spite of the creation of the SA and the upgrading of the local organization to Gau status, the movement did not prosper. Intra-party strife and political impotence infested the party organization. The bone of contention in these disagreements was one not of party program but of power. The Nazis divided into two factions, one supporting Gauleiter Schlange, the other behind SA leader Daluege. In August 1926, Berlin’s 120 district leaders met in the Haberlandt Hall to discuss the Gau leadership post. The Daluege faction had shrewdly waited until Schlange was on vacation to make its move. The opening of the meeting foreshadowed subsequent events. The introductory remarks made by the temporary Gauleiter, Erich Schmiedecke, were, as the official Situation Report recorded, “interrupted by noise and interruptions coming from the majority of those present.” Daluege then took action. Claiming that both Schlange and Schmiedecke were corrupt, he insisted that they be called before the party’s Court of Honor. The leader of the Berlin Court of Honor, a man identified only as Hageinan, argued that Schmiedecke should resign in light of the charges brought against him and that a committee should be established to run the Gau. The Berlin SS chief, Wolter, claiming authority from Hitler, removed Schmiedecke and made Knodn acting Gau Leader. In addition, the regional leaders voted to establish a committee to oversee the Gau. This is the first example of the rift between the SA and the party leadership that would come to characterize Gau Berlin in the 1930s. Given the anarchy within the party, it is small wonder that much of the Berlin party leadership enthusiastically greeted the appointment of Joseph Goebbels as Gauleiter in October 1926.⁶

Goebbels earned his reputation as an effective organizer in the Ruhr Valley. An excellent speaker, his “leftist” views enabled him to appeal to the working class of the heavily industrialized region. He worked his way up the party hierarchy as a protégé of Gregor Strasser, who, along with his brother Otto, ran a voelkisch publishing house, Kampfverlag, in Berlin. The Strassers were notorious within the movement for their somewhat unorthodox views—they took the word “socialism” in the party’s title seriously—and quarreled often with Hitler. Goebbels’s connection with the Strassers both helped and hindered his appointment as leader of the Berlin Nazis. Though it was clear that his anticapitalist views would aid in his mission to the largely working-class Berlin populace, Hitler was hesitant to appoint a potential dissident to such an important post.⁷

During the course of 1926, this impediment was removed. Goebbels’s conversion to blind support of Hitler, which would take years, began at this time. Even after breaking with the Strassers, he was often critical of his Fuehrer. Political enemies, hoping to discredit Goebbels as an opportunist, probably misrepresented his actions at the Bamberg leadership conference of February 1926. In Bamberg, he allegedly broke completely with the Strassers and became an unquestioning supporter of Hitler. Goebbels’s diaries paint a somewhat different picture. Here one sees hesitancy on his part. Although he clearly found Hitler’s personality compelling, Goebbels frequently disagreed with the Fuehrer’s program and was less willing to surrender his principles than his opponents claimed. Hence, it took several months for him to come around to support of Hitler.⁸

Goebbels’s visit to Munich in April 1926 was probably when Hitler finally won him over. The Fuehrer treated him well, going out of his way to impress his visitor. Hitler extended Goebbels every courtesy, dining with him on a number of occasions and loaning him his car. On 13 April, Goebbels recorded his impressions of a meeting with Hitler: “We are moving much closer.” He realized that his ideas and the Fuehrer’s were not very different. Hitler also wanted to socialize “combines, trusts, production of finished articles, transport, etc.” The ideological rift between them was becoming narrower. “I am reassured all around,” he continued. “Taken all round he is a man. With his sparkling mind he can become my leader. I bow to his greatness, his political genius!” They parted friends, Goebbels now Hitler’s consistent but by no means unquestioning ally.⁹

With the eruption of controversy in Berlin in the summer of 1926, a search for a new Gauleiter for the capital began. The party leadership considered Goebbels for the post. Probably because he recognized the inherent difficulties of going to Berlin, Goebbels was much more interested in a position in Munich as the party’s general secretary, but he received neither position at this time.¹⁰

At the 1926 party congress in Weimar, the first at which the Berlin NSDAP was represented, the Berlin leadership began to court Goebbels for the Gauleiter post. Hitler offered him the job in August; in response, Goebbels “sent a semi-refusal to Munich regarding Berlin,” because “I do not want to kneel in muck.” The Berlin party membership did not relent. He met with the regional leadership in September. Apparently, the last obstacle to his accepting the position was his salary. The Gau, which was on the verge of bankruptcy, simply could not afford to pay what Goebbels demanded. National headquarters removed this last barrier by agreeing to pay his salary. This final impediment removed, Goebbels accepted the position.¹¹

This appointment indicates several things about the attitudes of the national leadership of the NSDAP. First, the naming of one of the movement’s rising stars to the Gauleiter post of Berlin—even going so far as to pay his salary—evinces the seriousness of the Nazis’ intent to build a bridgehead in northern Germany, where they had had little success. The NSDAP received a scant 2 percent of Berlin’s votes in the most recent Reichstag election. Hitler and his cohorts hoped to improve upon these results. Also, the fact that Goebbels was known for his “leftist” sympathies, which would enable him to appeal to antibourgeois elements in Berlin, indicated the seriousness with which the Nazis intended to pursue the “urban plan,” under which they attempted to compete with the proletarian parties (Communists and Socialists) for the support of Germany’s workers. Hitler realized that if he were to gain power legally he would need support in northern Germany, and Goebbels would lead the Fuehrer’s struggle in the capital city. Berlin had gained a new importance in the movement’s plans. It is small wonder that the Berlin party, at least officially, welcomed the news of Goebbels’s appointment.¹²

The new Gauleiter assumed leadership of Berlin’s three thousand Nazis in November 1926. Among the first things he did was visit the district headquarters in the basement of a Hinterhaus on Potsdamerstrasse dubbed the Opiumhoehle (Opium Den). The situation there discouraged him. Permeated by tobacco smoke, the Opium Den was little more than a filthy hangout for unemployed members of the SA. It contained few of the amenities necessary for a serious political party, such as even rudimentary office equipment. Hence, in his first circular to the party membership, Goebbels made acquiring new offices his top priority. It would not be until January 1927 that the Gau moved its headquarters to Lutzowstrasse 44. In the meantime, the new Gau leader informed the party that loitering in the Potsdamerstrasse offices would not be tolerated; it interfered with serious work.¹³

As part of the incentive to get him to go to Berlin, the Fuehrer granted Goebbels powers that no other Gauleiter, with the exception of Hitler himself (Gauleiter of Munich), possessed. Not only could he appoint local leaders, a right traditionally held by the national organization, but Goebbels also controlled the Berlin SA. Instead of reporting to the national SA leadership, Daluege, as chief of the Berlin SA, was responsible directly to the Gau leader. Goebbels realized that, given the history of Gau Berlin, claiming these powers would prove problematic. He was, however, determined to do so. He began this process at a 9 November meeting in the Kriegervereinhaus in Spandau, a stronghold of the movement. As leader of the party in the Reich capital, Goebbels called for an end to all disagreements within the party—they had often led to physical confrontations in the past—and demanded the establishment of unity around his leadership. He insisted that those who rejected these conditions should resign their memberships. One-fifth of the approximately one thousand people present did so. While Goebbels alienated a significant portion of the party membership by his actions, those who remained within the Nazi fold agreed to support him, thereby solidifying his power.¹⁴

Goebbels also realized that the creation of a strong infrastructure was necessary for his and the party’s success and brought order to the previously disorganized Berlin party apparatus. Maintaining that “first the organization had to be strengthened from within, then we could take the struggle for Berlin to the streets,” he purged incompetent party leaders. Realizing that the rank and file needed to become more involved in party affairs, he insisted that small assemblies be held, at l...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• 1. The Berlin NSDAP before Der Angriff, 1920-1927
• 2. An Institutional History of Der Angriff, 1927-1933
• 3. The Party, the Fuehrer Myth, and the Presidential Election
• 4. The SA and Political Violence
• 5. Appeals to the Proletariat
• 6. The “System”
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index