Interdisciplinary Dialogues on Organizational Paradox

Investigating Social Structures and Human Expression

Rebecca Bednarek, Miguel Pina e Cunha, Jonathan Schad, Wendy K. Smith

• Publisher: Emerald Publishing Limited
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781801171885
• Topic: Sozialwissenschaften
• Subtopic: Soziologie

Interdisciplinary Dialogues on Organizational Paradox is a two-part volume exploring how paradox theory benefits from interdisciplinary theorizing and how we might go about undertaking such research.
The chapters draw from four disciplinary realms: beliefs, physicality, expression, and social structure. Unique commentaries from thought leaders expand and assess the focal pieces of each volume.
Part B: Investigating Social Structures and Human Expression continues the exploration of the why, how and where of interdisciplinary research within paradox theory by looking specifically at the realms of social structure - from logic and Luhmann, to historical analysis - and expression - from linguistics, to the maths and poetry of Spencer-Brown, to jazz. The chapters are complemented with reflective commentaries from Charles Hampden-Turner and Ann Langley. The collection ends with an examination of where the interdisciplinary foundations for organizational paradox theory arose via conversations with seminal paradox scholars.

B1. REALM OF SOCIAL STRUCTURES

LOGIC(S) AND PARADOX

Marco Berti

ABSTRACT

This chapter investigates the mutual relationship between logic and paradox, showing that paradox is indispensable to test logic, as well as logic is necessary to extend our understanding of paradox. Firstly, I consider the lesson that organizational theory can draw from formal logic’s investigation of semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. Subsequently, I survey the plural interpretations of the concept of “logic” in organizational theory (as logic of theory, logic of practice, and institutional logics). I argue that this plurality of meanings is not a source of confusion but offers an opportunity to illustrate different manifestations of, and ways to cope with, organizational paradoxes.

Keywords: Paradox; logic; institutional logics; practice theory; pragmatic paradox; organizational theory

“It is always easy to be logical. It is almost impossible to be logical to the bitter end.”

(Camus, 1955, p. 8)

INTRODUCTION

Paradoxes have been explained as fallacies in the construction of logical categories (Whitehead & Russell, 1962), but also accepted as an unavoidable consequence of logic (Priest, 1979). The philosophical discussion on paradox dates back to the fourth century BC, when Eubulides, a contemporary of Aristotle, offered the first formulation of several logical puzzles, including the famous liar paradox, that have since defied an agreed upon solution (Priest, 2017). The notion of paradox is now well established in organizational studies, where it is employed to account for the apparent absurdities that characterize most workplaces (Hennestad, 1990; Farson, 1996). These organizational paradoxes derive from the existence of persistent, interdependent contradictions that are intrinsic to organizing (Smith & Lewis, 2011).

This chapter examines the mutual relationship between logic and paradox, showing their interdependence: on the one hand, logic both generates and helps disentangling paradoxes; on the other hand, paradoxes both challenge and reinforce logic, by revealing its limitation. This philosophical investigation can prove useful to advance our understanding of organizational paradoxes, helping to investigate the sources of such interdependent contradictions, explaining why they are so widespread in organizations.

I start by considering how paradoxes are discussed in the context of formal logic, the system of reasoning which is at the basis of traditional scientific inquiry (Lewis, 2000), as this is the field of studies that has been investigating paradoxes for the longest time. In philosophy paradoxes are not considered mere puzzles; rather they have been used to test apparently solid chains of argumentations, strengthening the edifice of formal logic. Indeed, paradoxes have long been employed to reveal and challenge the taken-for-granted assumptions that found conventionally accepted knowledge (Luhmann, 1986). Even if the complexity of the social world far exceeds the rarefied realm of formal logic, organization studies can benefit from a reflection on the logicians’ treatments of paradoxes. In particular, I propose to leverage on the multiple meanings of “logic” that have emerged in the context of Management and Organization Studies: logic of theory versus logic of practice, and singular logic versus plural logics. These alternate definitions of logic can be used to reveal and map different conceptualizations (and manifestations) of organizational paradoxes, and to extend our understanding of their origin.

PARADOXES AND FORMAL LOGIC

The relationship between logic and paradox is long and multifaceted: it has been said that “logicians… abhor ambiguity but love paradox” (Barwise & Etchemendy, 1989, p. 3). On the one hand “the logical tradition tries to suppress the paradox” as it threatens to “destroy the telos of thinking” (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 38). On the other hand, paradoxes have been a resource for logical inquiry, forming a natural object of philosophical investigation from ancient Greece to contemporary application to system logics and computer science (Cantini & Bruni, 2017; Schad, Lewis, Raisch, & Smith, 2016).

To better understand the role of paradoxes in the context of logic it is useful to start with some definitions. Logic is “the analysis and appraisal of arguments” (Gensler, 2010, p. 1) and, more specifically

formal logic is primarily concerned with valid inferences – in other words, with inferences in which the logical forms of premises and conclusion force us to accept the latter once we have accepted the former. (Hoyningen-Huene, 2004, pp. 24–25)

In a logic perspective a paradox may be defined as “a contradiction that follows correct deduction from consistent premises” (Watzlawick, Jackson, & Bavelas, 1967, p. 188). Therefore, paradoxes seem to produce a fracture in the edifice of logic: how can a contradiction derive from correct inferences? Indeed, logicians seem to react in polarized ways in face of paradoxes.

Two major intellectual traditions on the usage of paradox have historically emerged. The “logical” tradition has attempted to suppress paradoxes treating them as breaches to the Aristotelian law of non-contradiction (contradictory propositions cannot be true at the same time). By contrast the “rhetorical tradition” has leveraged on paradoxes to test and reframe taken-for-granted assumptions (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 38). Embracing the etymology of the term, para (contrary to) and doxa (common belief), paradoxes have been used as epistemological tools to complexify our understanding of reality (Tsoukas, 2017). In line with the first perspective, some logician argue that paradoxes do not constitute “veridical sentences,” i.e., statement that can be either true or false (Hoyningen-Huene, 2004, p. 16): therefore they cannot be the object of logic analysis, similarly to other assertions that are neither true or false: norms, desires, commands, exclamations, or tautologies. Instead, those embracing the second position treat paradoxes as essential objects of philosophical reflection, raising questions about the nature of truth (Gensler, 2010). From this perspective “the significance of a paradox is never the paradox itself, but what it is a symptom of” (Barwise & Etchemendy, 1989, p. 4). Inspired by the idea that “in the evolution of real knowledge […] a contradiction […] marks the first step in progress towards victory” (Whitehead, 1925, p. 187), the discussion of paradoxes has allowed important advancement in formal logic.

Definitions are central to any form of scientific inquiry (Jensen, 1983), and the first hurdle to be overcome in the study of paradox is the correct usage of the term. In lay language any apparent contradictions is typically labeled “paradox,” and as a consequence different constructs are bundled together (Putnam, Fairhurst, & Banghart, 2016). Quine (1966) offers a more formal and precise classification, distinguishing real logical paradoxes both from “veridical paradoxes,” counterintuitive but correct statement (e.g., the number of birthdays of someone born on a leap day does not correspond to their age), and from “falsidical paradoxes,” apparent contradictions emerging from incorrect premises, as the Zeno’s paradox of motion, which fallaciously “proves” the impossibility of movement (Huggett, 2019).

Language plays a central role in creating paradoxes, and formal logic identifies an entire category of unsolvable contradictions, known as semantic paradoxes, which derive from terminological indeterminacy, i.e., the ambiguity or “fuzziness” of most words (Hyde & Raffman, 2018). Semantic paradoxes often stem from self-referential definitions, as in the case of the Liar’s paradox (e.g., “this statement is false,” or “I am lying”). Addressing these paradoxes, influential logicians such as Bertrand Russell and Alfred Tarski have proposed that, as a safeguard against logical incoherence, a language must not contain their truth predicate (that is, the affirmation that something is “true”). This implies that, to avoid circular references, a meta-language must be employed “to ascribe truth or falsity to a statement in a given language” (Gensler, 2010, p. 381). A meta-language is a higher-level language, “dealing with the structure of the first language and having itself a new structure” (Russell, 1951, p. 23). When considering the “I am lying” sentence in this new light, we realize that this apparently simple, three-word sentence actually combines two separate statements, one on the object-level, the other on the metalevel, and these two are saying opposite things, hence the confusion. If we want to preserve meaning factual statements and statements about statements should be kept separate (Watzlawick et al., 1967, p. 193).

Logicians and mathematicians have also identified paradoxes that cannot be ascribed to linguistic inconsistencies, but are intrinsic to logic. These are also labeled antonymies (Kant, 2009 [1781]), or set-theoretic paradoxes. The best known example is the so called Russel’s paradox, “the class of all classes which are not members of themselves” (Watzlawick et al., 1967, p. 190): such set is both a member of itself and not a member of itself, violating the principle of non-contradiction, one of the cornerstones of logic. The discussion on how to deal with paradoxes is still ongoing among contemporary logicians (Cantini & Bruni, 2017). This debate has led to the development of a whole branch of thought, defined paraconsistent logic. Also known as Dialetheism, this approach accepts that at least some contradictions can be “true” and valid (Priest, 1979; Priest, Berto, & Weber, 2018), a position that is also held by various Eastern philosophies (Schad, 2017).

These philosophical reflections on the causes of paradox can be put to use to reflect on the sources of organizational paradoxes, addressing a question that has been frequently neglected by organizational scholarship: why are organizations “rife with paradoxes” (Smith, Lewis, Jarzabkowski, & Langley, 2017, p. 1)? Or, in other words, what explains the “underlying tensions” (Smith & Lewis, 2011, p. 382) that organizing invariably generates?

FORMAL LOGIC AND ORGANIZATIONAL PARADOXES

In a seminal contribution to paradox theory, Poole and van de Ven noted that “paradoxes in management are not, strictly speaking, logical paradoxes” (1989, p. 564). Their argument is that in a social context oppositions are not so clear cut: instead of logical irreconcilability they are characterized by tensions, “stress, anxiety, discomfort, or tightness in making choices” (Putnam et al., 2016, p. 69). The fundamental difference is that, while in formal logic appearances, interpretations, communication biases are inconsistencies to be expunged, from a sociological perspectives they are building blocks of social reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1967 [1990]).

In organizational theory paradoxes are therefore seen as “contradictory yet interrelated elements… that seem logical in isolation but absurd and irrational when appearing simultaneously” (Lewis, 2000, p. 760, emphasis added). Building on the seminal contribution by Smith and Lewis (2011), various studies have helped articulating the dynamics through which underlying but latent tensions are made salient by conditions of plurality, change, resource scarcity...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction B
• B1. Realm of Social Structures
• B2. Realm of Expression
• Conclusion
• Index