Christianity and Violence in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Period

Perspectives from Europe and Japan

Fernanda Alfieri, Takashi Jinno, Fernanda Alfieri, Takashi Jinno

• Publisher: De Gruyter Oldenbourg
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9783110640182
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European Medieval History
• Index: History

The volume explores the relationship between religion and violence in Europe from the Middle Ages to the Early modern period, involving European and Japanese scholars. It investigates the ideological foundations of the relationship between violence and religion and their development in a varied corpus of sources (political and theological treatises, correspondence of missionaries, pamphlets, and images).

III. Theories and Practices

Reconquista and Muslim Vassals

Religion, Politics, and Violence on the Medieval Iberian Peninsula

Yuga Kuroda

1 The relationship between religion and violence on the medieval Iberian Peninsula

The close relationship between violence and Christianity peaked in the High Middle Ages (the eleventh to thirteenth centuries). Accompanied by internal economic growth and external expansion, a distinctive feudal society developed in which knightly status played a central role in justifying the use of violence in the name of Christianity. Such an overall trend during that era seems to have completely coincided with the situation of the Iberian Peninsula, which became a frontier zone among Western Europe, Maghrib, and al-Andalus regions from the beginning of the eighth century¹. As A. Bronisch rightly argued, from the beginning the so-called “Reconquista ideology” included a notion of sacred war, inspired by the Old Testament. From the end of the eleventh century, the Iberian Peninsula was influenced by the famous Gregorian Reform from the north and the Jihād movement brought in by the Almoravids from the south. As a result, it was broadly recognized as a battlefield of the Reconquista in what was considered not only a “just war” to recapture an unfairly stolen territory but also a “holy war” whose participants could enjoy the same spiritual benefits as the Crusaders².

But the situation was not so simple. If we look at the sequence of the territorial expansion of the Iberian Christian kingdoms, some surprising facts emerge. First of all, over nearly 800 years (711–1492), there were only very limited periods when they could successfully pursue the conquest: the first taifa period (1031–1090), the second taifa period (1143–1172), and the third taifa period (1224–1264), not including the early colonization (Repoblación) period (8th to tenth century) and the last Granada War (1482–1492)³. Second, the pursuit of conquest involving extreme violence, such as the enslavement or massacre of all the city’s inhabitants, was rarely carried out. Such cruel treatment for surrendered Muslims was normally limited to the accidental cases of small-fortress assault and, in most cases, could not be carried out in large-scale conquest. And thirdly, when the Christians attacked cities or strongholds in the war against al-Andalus, the conquests were, in many cases, realized after negotiation with the besieged Muslims. In fact, many of the important cities were conquered after the conditions for surrender were mutually agreed upon. For example, in the conquest of Córdoba in 1236 and Sevilla in 1248, the Muslim residents of those cities were ordered to evacuate but were allowed to take their property. And as is well known in such cases as Toledo, conquered in 1085 by Alfonso VI of Castile (reign: 1065–1109), and Zaragoza, conquered in 1118 by Alfonso I of Aragón (reign: 1104–1134), the treaties of surrender typically permitted Muslim inhabitants to stay within the cities, though they potentially faced discrimination⁴.

Thus, when the war against al-Andalus was waged, the massacre of “infidels” was avoided as much as possible. In spite of the strict social discrimination, surrendered Muslims and Jews continued to live side-by-side with Christians, and the Iberian Peninsula became a kind of melting pot where religious convivencia, albeit with limitations, was practiced until the end of the Middle Ages. And we must focus on the situation of warfare at that time in order to understand why such an apparently strange situation arose. What we should consider, as F. García Fitz states, is that constraints on exercising violence existed in the Middle Ages.

García Fitz concludes that to achieve the Reconquista idea – that is, the “eradication” of al-Andalus – the peninsular kings, particularly the kings of Castile, deliberately pursued all steps from physical violence (e.g., large-scale engagement, siege, the destruction of cultivated land or supply bases) to indirect violence, like the diplomatic negotiations that could likewise produce confusion and discord in enemy ranks. However, it was impossible in practice to achieve this “eradication”. In the Middle Ages, human and material resources were always lacking. Thus, a unilateral slaughter could not be carried out, and the human loss of allies had to be avoided as much as possible. In a medieval society with an undeveloped logistical system, it was also impossible to carry out a long-term war. Therefore, they chose deliberately to avoid direct battle with their enemies whenever possible and preferred to incorporate the territory by causing them to surrender. On the Iberian Peninsula, which should have become the stage for holy war in the name of God, paradoxically a curious situation emerged in which the Christians not only desisted from employing unlimited violence but also allowed Muslims to be incorporated into their society⁵.

What I deal with in the following pages is some examples of the Muslim magnates that became vassals of the kings of Castile in the High Middle Ages. We could consider the Muslim vassals to be persons that symbolize the modus vivendi characteristic of the medieval Iberian Peninsula, where Christianity and violence were combined in a unique way. And this relationship with the Muslim vassals not only facilitated efforts at conquest but also could play a role in alleviating the violence necessarily associated with that conquest. However, we do not have any contract document on vassalage, so there is no other way but to restore the historical circumstances based on the many fragmentary testimonies from the narrative sources as well as the documentary archives.

2 Muslim vassals of the eleventh century

At the fall of the Caliphate of Córdoba in 1031, al-Andalus reached the first taifa period, in which al-Andalus split into regional powers that fought each other. At the same time, the northern Christian kingdoms aimed for political and military intervention in the rich south. Since the taifa rulers could not mobilize sufficient troops, they tried to survive this political situation by concluding a mercenary contract (the paria system, in which the taifa rulers paid the Christian monarchs for military protection against both Islamic and Christian rivals) with Christian kings or magnates⁶.

2.1 Vassalage of the taifa kings of Toledo and Sevilla

Around the 1050s, the Kingdom of Castile-León became the most powerful kingdom, and its king, Fernando I (reign: 1035–1065), began to consolidate the paria system with many taifa rulers. Such relationships could be interpreted as feudal ones. Historia Silense, a chronicle written in the early twelfth century, describes the establishment of the paria system between Castile-León and Toledo as follows. When Fernando I attacked the Toledan taifa in the spring and summer of 1062, al-Maʾmūn, the taifa ruler of Toledo (reign: 1043–1075), offered him a vast treasure to stop the invasion. Fernando I took this treasure and abandoned the assault against Toledo⁷. However, according to the thirteenth-century chronicle Chronicon Mundi, which repeated the passage from Historia Silense almost verbatim, Fernando I received not only the treasure but also “the promise of fidelity to the effect that al-Maʾmūn would be his vassal” (sacramenti sponsione, ut sibi esset subditus)⁸. Moreover, in the official medieval Castilian chronicle on the initiative of Alfonso X (reign: 1252–1284), the following major addition to this episode was made.

King Fernando was […] so wise that he was able to oblige al-Maʾmūn to pay his good and great parias every year and to become his vassal. And at the end of all this, while King Don Fernando gave him the peace and truces that he promised, al-Maʾmūn swore to him with strong oaths by his law, and returned from there as his vassal⁹.

Again, according to Historia Silense, in the following year, 1063, Fernando I invaded the taifa territory of Sevilla. As in the previous year’s Toledan example, Sevillan ruler al-Mu‘taḍid (reign: 1042–1069) brought a large gift and asked Fernando to withdraw. Receiving this gift in consultation with his vassals, he demanded from him the relic of Santa Justa, a third-century martyr who died in Sevilla¹⁰. But again, according to Chronion Mundi, Fernando I “condescended to m...

Table of contents

• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction
• I. Seminal ideas
• II. Changing Meanings
• III. Theories and Practices
• Contributors