The World Crisis: 1911–1914

Winston S. Churchill

• Publisher: RosettaBooks
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9780795331299
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: British History
• Index: History

The causes of the Great War are examined in this first volume of the series that is "essential reading, as fresh and compelling as ever" (Jon Meacham, bestselling author of Franklin and Winston ). An absorbing history of the outbreak of World War I from a true insider's point of view, the first volume of Winston S.Churchill's five-volume The World Crisis is unsurpassed as both a historical and personal account of the earth-shaking events leading up to WWI. Beginning in 1911, when Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty, this report is based on thousands of his personal letters and memos. Churchill's epic series opens with a chilling description of the Agadir Crisis, and provides an in-depth account of naval clashes in the Dardanelles, one of Churchill's major military failures. It takes readers from the fierce bloodshed of the Gallipoli campaign to the tide-turning battles of Jutland and Verdun—as well as the United States' entry into the combat theatre. Written in powerful prose by a great leader who would also go on to receive a Nobel Prize in Literature, The World Crisis, 1911–1914 provides a perspective you won't find anywhere else: a dynamic insider's account of events that would shape the outcome of modern history. "Whether as a statesman or an author, Churchill was a giant; and The World Crisis towers over most other books about the Great War." —David Fromkin, author of A Peace to End All Peace

APPENDIX A

MEMORANDUM BY THE FIRST LORD ON NAVAL STAFF TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

(A.)—Military Education and War Staff Training.

1. It is necessary to draw a distinction between the measures required to secure a general diffusion of military knowledge among naval officers and the definite processes by which Staff Officers are to be trained. The first may be called ‘Military Education,’ and the second ‘War Staff Training.’ They require to be treated separately, and not mixed together as in the report of the Committee. Both must again be distinguished from all questions of administration, of material, and of non-military education and training. The application of fighting power can thus be separated from its development. We are not now concerned with the forging of the weapon, but only with its use.

Military Education.

2. As early as possible in his service the mind of the young officer must be turned to the broad principles of war by sea and land. His interest must be awakened. He must be put in touch with the right books, and must be made to feel the importance of the military aspect of his profession. The existing curriculum at Dartmouth and on the cruiser is already too full; and until the officer has reached the rank of Lieutenant I see no immediate opportunity of adding to his instruction. But thereafter his ‘Military Education’ should be provided for in two ways. First: Every Lieutenant should go through a military course of (say) two months during the first four years of his service. The course to be prepared by the Training Division of the War Staff; aim, thoroughness in a simple and strictly limited sphere. The course to conclude by a standard examination to test only what the pupil remembers of his instruction. It would be preferable to hold the courses at Greenwich continuously. Thus a good scheme of instruction adapted to the class of officers and the limits of time will develop and uniformity will be established; and young officers will be accustomed to associate Greenwich with the study of war.

All specialist officers, submarine and air service officers included, must go through this course.

In exceptional circumstances, where exigencies of service do not allow, extension to within the first six years may be granted.

The course will be obligatory on officers now under two years’ service as Lieutenant. There should be four courses a year; the first to begin October, 1914. It should be voluntary for officers now over two years’ service as Lieutenant.

(Let me have calculations about numbers which can be handled during the first five courses; and make proposals for giving effect to the above scheme in detail.)

No grading as Assistant War Staff Officers will result from this course, and no certificate will be given or letters printed after an officer’s name. It is a pure matter of routine, and a necessary qualification of all future naval officers. The college authorities will, however, keep a register of officers, and report upon their general aptitudes for staff work and tactical subjects. This will be of use later in considering claims to compete for entry into the War College.

Secondly, as soon as practicable (if possible, next time) an examination should be held for entry into the War College for the War Staff Course. This examination should be competitive. It will be open to all Commanders and Lieutenant-Commanders, or Lieutenants who will be Lieutenant-Commanders before the course is completed, whose names are submitted by the Flag Officers under whom they are serving and who are approved as candidates by the Admiralty. A proportion of vacancies will be assigned to each rank. The results will be published. The object of this examination will be to test ability for staff work. In the first instance the tests will have to be of a simple character, but gradually, as the military education of the naval officer develops, they can be stiffened and extended. The examination will be conducted by the War College according to principles prescribed by the War Training Division. Intending candidates will be notified three months in advance of the subjects in which they should prepare themselves.

When an officer is successful in the competition, but owing to foreign service or other exigency cannot at once attend the War Course, he may be allowed to take a vacancy next time.

Captains of Ships and War Staff Officers afloat will aid officers to prepare themselves for this examination.

War Staff Training.

3. The successful candidates will enter the War College at Greenwich as residents for War Staff training. This course must for the present be limited to one year, but later it should be extended to eighteen months. As an examination will be held every six months, there will at the beginning be two batches under instruction, rising later to three. This will give the necessary numbers at the College. The period of this course, provided the officer gives satisfaction, should, in my opinion, count as sea service.

On completing the course, the officers who have qualified may be placed upon the War Staff List, with the approval of the Admiralty, as at present, and will then be available for staff employment.

(B.)—Development of the Admiralty War Staff.

1. Two years have passed since this body was instituted, and both the progress made in the Admiralty and the acceptance of the idea by the Fleet justify a further advance.

Three main questions have arisen:—

(1) The creation of a Trade Division.

(2) The preparation of Manuals and direction of training generally.

(3) The detachment of the Mobilization Department from the War Staff.

I have come to the conclusion that the first essential is the creation of a War Training Division, under a Director, and equal in importance to the Operations and Intelligence Divisions. This division will be charged with the theoretical direction and co-ordination of all tactical and strategical exercises and instruction whether in the Fleets or at the Colleges. It will, of course, have nothing to do with the education which fits a cadet to become a naval officer, or with the training of Specialists of any kind, or with the training which fits a boy to become an able seaman. All this is in the Administrative sphere and belongs to the Second Sea Lord. The War Training Division is concerned only with what the naval officer learns about war, what tactical use the gunnery and torpedo experts make of their weapons, and what exercises are prescribed for the Fleets and Squadrons.

2. Nothing in the work of this division will relieve Flag Officers from their present duties and responsibilities in the training of their commands. But henceforward they will work on regularly explored and considered lines, and within limits which are the result of collective thought and experience; and henceforward continuity and uniformity will be preserved by a central direction and co-ordination, which gathers up and authorizes the established conclusions, without restricting reasonable initiative. It is no answer to the advocates of such a Division, to say that war training is given by the Commanders-in-chief at sea, and that war training is in the department of the First Sea Lord. The Commanders-in-chief change repeatedly, and with them their personal instruction changes, very often without leaving a trace behind. The First Sea Lord cannot possibly prepare manuals of tactical and strategic instruction. This work can only be done by a regular department permanently at work.

3. I propose, therefore, in principle to constitute without delay a War Training Division of the Admiralty War Staff. This division will be organized under a Director (D.T.D., short for D.N.T.D.) in three sections, denominated respectively x, y, and z.

The following will be the main distribution of duties:—

(x) Manuals and Exercises.

Preparation and revision of all Training Books and Manuals (other than technical or administrative) including Signal Books in their tactical aspect.

Preparation of manœuvre schemes.

Report and criticism of manœuvres.

Record and criticism of tactical and strategic exercises.

Advice upon the initiation of experiments (other than technical or administrative), upon the organization of units, upon War Establishments, and upon the tactical aspects of New Construction.

Distribution of War Staff publications.

(y) War Colleges: Examinations and Courses.

Supervision of War Colleges and all war educational arrangements.

Examinations and courses in tactical and strategic subjects.

Libraries.

(z) Historical.

The staff of this new division will be formed in part by reductions from the Mobilization and Operations Divisions (some of which latter’s work is taken over); and in part by an addition to the Estimates for which Treasury sanction will be required. As a set-off against this there is the economy of reducing an Admiral by bringing the War College to Greenwich.

Nine or ten officers (some of whom can be retired officers) should suffice with the necessary clerks and writers.

Let me have proposals on these lines with estimates.

4. The Operations Division will have been to some extent relieved by the formation of the War Training Division. It must, however, be augmented by the addition of a new section (the Manning Department) dealing with War Mobilization, which will be explained later; and, secondly, by the new Trade Defence Section. This latter is clearly only a part of the Operations sphere. It is grouped with Operations because the defence of trade is essentially an offensive operation against the enemy’s armed ships.

The Operations Division will, therefore, be organized in four sections—(a), (b), (c), and (d)—as follows:—

(a) War Plans.

Distribution of the Fleet.

Schemes of attack of all kinds.

Joint naval and military action.

C.I.D. work.

War Room.

(b) Coast Defence.

Plans for the employment of

Patrol Flotillas.

Air Craft at the Naval Air Stations.

Coastal submarines.

Organization of Signal and Wireless Stations.

Examination Service.

Distribution of Intelligence along the coast.

Joint naval and military action in coast defence.

Home Ports Defence Committee.

Overseas Defence Committee.

(c) Trade Defence.

All arr...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Foreword
• Preface
• I. The Vials of Wrath
• II. Milestones to Armageddon
• III. The Crisis of Agadir
• IV. Admirals All
• V. The German Navy Law
• VI. The Romance of Design
• VII. The North Sea Front
• VIII. Ireland and the European Balance
• IX. The Crisis
• X. The Mobilization of the Navy
• XI. War: The Passage of the Army
• XII. The Battle in France
• XIII. On the Oceans
• XIV. In the Narrow Seas
• XV. Antwerp
• XVI. The Channel Ports
• XVII. The Grand Fleet and the Submarine Alarm
• XVIII. Coronel and the Falklands
• XIX. With Fisher at the Admiralty
• XX. The Bombardment of Scarborough and Hartlepool
• XXI. Turkey and the Balkans
• Appendix