German Battlecruisers of World War One

Their Design, Construction and Operations

Gary Staff, Marsden Samuel

• Publisher: Seaforth Publishing
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781848323070
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World War I
• Index: History

The most comprehensive English-language study of the German Imperial Navy's WWI battlecruisers, fully illustrated with drawings, diagrams and photographs. In this in-depth study, naval historian and author of Battle on the Seven Seas Gary Staff presents a full analysis of Imperial Germany's battlecruisers. Known as Panzerkreuzer, the eight ships of this class were involved in several early North Sea skirmishes before their historic victory against the Royal Navy in the Battle of Jutland. Staff details the design and construction of these ships, and traces the full-service history of each one, recounting their actions, largely from first-hand German sources and official documents. Detailed line drawings and maps augment the text throughout, as do a wealth of contemporary photos that depict the vessels at sea as well as in dock, where many aspects of their design—as well as damage sustained in action—can be viewed in close up. A superb series of full-color computer graphics show full length profiles and top-down views of each ship in precise and clear detail. German Battle Cruisers of World War One presents a major contribution to German naval history in the English language. It is a must-have volume for Great War historians and enthusiasts, as well as battlecruiser modelers.

Chapter 1

THE LARGE CRUISER OF 1907

———‘F’———

VON DER TANN

Design

On 17 May 1906, two weeks before the first report from the London naval attaché about the British Invincible, the Kaiser launched a competition between the German shipyards for a ‘fast battleship’ type. This new type crystallised the Kaiser’s ideas regarding the new direction in warship construction, that these ships should form a division for special purposes, and also serve as reconnaissance cruisers. Therefore, compared to foreign contemporary battleships, they should have a speed advantage of 3kts and should mount at least four 28cm guns so they could fight in the line. The new battleships of the Ersatz Bayern/Nassau class should form the basis of the new type.

State Secretary von Tirpitz was against this competition because he feared the possible political and financial consequences of a new conceptual type, and the development of a new type would place great burdens on the already overworked staff in the imperial dockyards at Kiel, Wilhelmshaven and Danzig. Likewise, the General Navy Department, or (A), and the construction department, or (K), were fully employed in work for the battleships of the Ersatz Bayern class and preparations for the new cruiser of 1907. Nevertheless, the competition showed a remarkable farsightedness by the Kaiser and he was clearly ahead of his time in regard to type development.

A memorandum from the General Navy Department to the state secretary on 29/30 June 1906 on the ‘Großen Kreuzer 1907 and following years’ gave the opinion that the Imperial Navy was only forced to build such a type because of their numerical inferiority to the British in large cruisers, and it was anticipated that the British would also have a greater building capacity. With the attaché’s report that Invincible would mount eight 12in guns, and taking account of the Japanese Tsukuba, the General Navy Department considered that ‘we must build our Großen Kreuzer as fast battleships’. The General Navy Department foresaw that for years the large cruiser of the Imperial Navy had no possibility of ‘strategic reconnaissance and escort on a large scale’, or ‘independent cruiser warfare (and) merchant protection’, and this would conflict with the operational objectives of the ships. The principal purpose for the ships, for now, was purely participation in decisive battles as a fast wing. This task required the displacement of a contemporary battleship and an armament that must be effective against battleships, as a confrontation between the two types was inevitable; the General Navy Department was convinced about this. Therefore there was a fundamental disagreement between the General Navy Department and the state secretary in the question of operational employment. Admiral von Tirpitz saw the opponents of the large cruisers only as other cruisers. The General Navy Department had also shown remarkable insight, which was proved correct in every way. The final specific proposal from the General Navy Department for the cruiser project was for: ‘6-8x28cm SK¹ L/45 in double turrets or 2 double and 4 single turrets; 8x15cm SK L/45 in either casemate positions or 4 twin turrets; 20x8.8cm SK L/35 or 45; 4x8mm machine guns; 4 torpedo tubes; Armouring: (forward) conning tower 400 or at least 300mm, aft 200mm. In the remaining, approximately 10-20% weaker than the battleship (for Ersatz Bayern); construction coal provisions = 6% of the displacement; speed approximately 23 kts.’

In July 1906 a member of the information bureau, or (N), of the RMA, Korvettenkapitän Vollerthun, wrote an article in that month’s issue of the magazine Marine-Rundschau titled ‘The Panzerkreuzer as a Fleet Type’. This article was seen as a kind of response by the RMA to the Kaiser’s prize competition. In the article Vollerthun firstly presented a brief description of the historical development of the armoured cruiser type, before saying of the newest cruiser-building: ‘The modern English armoured cruiser is a cruiser of high combat value, but it does not possess the values required to resist a contemporary battleship in combat in a decisive battle.’ He went on to say that the cruiser type had not made the jump necessary to indicate transition to a common type, which had been discussed in trade papers and in parliaments. Paradoxically, he said it was an illusion to believe one could combine strength and speed in a common type, a deception that would be to the detriment of the type construction. ‘The impossibility to do so therefore requires a clear distinction between the duties of the battleship and the armoured cruiser, and limiting what one expects of the latter tactically. Never should the armoured cruiser be considered as a legitimate link in the line, and therefore should never be allowed to want to fight with the line.’ In conclusion, Vollerthun stated that the cruiser type was incapable of developing its combat power, and the battleship of increasing its speed, to a point where a common type could emerge. If we accept that the article was written on a semi-official basis, then we are forced to the conclusion that either the information bureau was firmly in the Tirpitz camp, or else the bureau was practising disinformation, aimed at convincing the British they were going down the correct path in their cruiser and battlecruiser development. The views expressed in the article were at odds with opinion in the General Navy Department and their views on the ‘fast battleship’ concept; however, Korvettenkapitän Vollerthun would soon join their number.

During the summer of 1906, as the reports about Invincible were received from the London naval attaché, Admiral von Tirpitz was coming to the realisation that something had to be done. On 18 July, from his holiday home at St Blasien, he wrote to his deputy in Berlin, von Trotha, that: ‘It has recently come to my knowledge that the English have increased the type size and calibre, which will make it necessary for us to proceed with a further type increase in the budget of 1907.’ He also instructed departments (A) and (K) to prepare designs for the battleship and large cruiser as soon as possible. The battleship was to have twelve 30.5cm guns, whilst the cruiser should have eight 30.5cm pieces. The cruiser, when compared to cruiser E/Blücher, represented a huge increase in combat capabilities. The choice of 30.5cm guns for the battleship was obvious, whilst the cruiser maintained parity with the reported armament of Invincible, and for that matter Tsukuba. With this proposal von Tirpitz was making a compromise between financial considerations, public opinion and military requirements. Nevertheless, the cruiser project was soon abandoned, on financial grounds, whilst the battleship project came to fruition a year later.

Shortly after, on 4 September, the state secretary sent a request to (A), (K) and the weapons department, or (W), of the RMA, stating the following:

I request the accelerated working through of this project for a Großen Kreuzer to the following criteria:

a. Heavy artillery 8–28cm (4 in double – 4 in single [turrets])

b. Medium artillery 8 to 10–15cm.

c. Light artillery as in the Großen Kreuzer E.

d. The displacement should not exceed that of the battleship Ersatz Bayern.²

e. The price should be below that of Ersatz Bayern.

f. Speed is approximately as that of Großen Kreuzer E.

g. Compared to Großen Kreuzer E the armour should be strengthened with all means.

h. If possible turbines.

I expect the presentation of the result with project sketches by mid September.

With this Tirpitz had committed to the conceptual proposal of (A) and its inevitable consequences, such as greater cost and defensive qualities, as the new cruiser would have to resist 12in gunfire. Without doubt the large cruiser was moving towards the battleship type in displacement, cost and offensive and defensive capabilities.

The protocol of the next meeting, on 15 September 1906, reveals some interesting information, as well as the presentation by (K) of their newest design studies. In his introduction State Secretary von Tirpitz noted that until recently he had been against trying to catch up with the English (that is, the British) in the budget year of 1906 because of financial reasons, but that this was no longer the case. He said that if the size of Invincible had been known, then Germany should have had the same. The decision to follow the English must now be taken. Then the chief of the construction department, Vizeadmiral von Eickstedt, spoke out in favour of maintaining the Blücher type for the new build of 1907, listing the following reasons:

1. The results of the explosive trials were pending, and if they called for a redesign and enlargement then two increases would quickly follow one another. This would cause further delay.

2. The turbine question was unresolved.

Admiral von Tirpitz stressed that political considerations must be taken into account, and these spoke for an immediate increase in displacement. He added that there was currently much goodwill towards naval requirements. In view of this Kontreadmiral von Heeringen was for an immediate displacement increase.

A gun calibre of 28cm was recommended, as this was suitable for fighting against the enemy battle line. However, von Tirpitz saw the opponents of the large cruisers as other cruisers and therefore thought the calibre question was debatable. Then he continued that one of the grounds for a displacement increase was a calibre increase, and on this basis he granted the 28cm gun.

After some further discussion about the underwater protection the state secretary announced he had decided for an increase in the large cruiser type. With that the construction department presented their design studies 1, 2, 3, 4 and 4b. Studies 3, 4 and 4b were rejected because of the positioning of thei...