Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1943–1945

Red Steamroller

Robert Forczyk

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781473880924
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World War II
• Index: History

The author of Case White offers an extensive history of German and Soviet armored warfare toward the end of World War II. By 1943, after the catastrophic German defeat at Stalingrad, the Wehrmacht's panzer armies gradually lost the initiative on the Eastern Front. The tide of the war had turned. Their combined arms technique, which had swept Soviet forces before it during 1941 and 1942, had lost its edge. Thereafter the war on the Eastern Front was dominated by tank-led offensives and, as Robert Forczyk shows, the Red Army's mechanized forces gained the upper hand, delivering a sequence of powerful blows that shattered one German defensive line after another. His incisive study offers fresh insight into how the two most powerful mechanized armies of the Second World War developed their tank tactics and weaponry during this period of growing Soviet dominance. He uses German, Russian, and English sources to provide the first comprehensive overview and analysis of armored warfare from the German and Soviet perspectives. This major study of the greatest tank war in history is compelling reading.

Chapter 1

The Opposing Armoured
Forces in 1943

Efficiency Hypothesis

This work is the second part of a two-volume study of armoured operations on the Eastern Front in the Second World War. The first volume, Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1941–1942 Schwerpunkt (2014), covered the initial two years of the war during the period when the Germans usually had the initiative. This volume covers the second half of the war, as the Red Army gained the initiative after Stalingrad and kept it all the way to Berlin. These two volumes are not intended to be a comprehensive chronological account of every action involving armour in four years of conflict, which would require many more volumes. Rather, my intent is to attempt to identify the reasons for the eventual outcome in the dynamics of operational and tactical armoured operations. Oftentimes, I choose to focus on battles that lie outside the standard orthodoxy about the war, since there are too many pre-conceived notions about certain well-known battles, while other important actions are completely ignored. A case in point is the well-known Battle of Kursk in July 1943 and the virtually unknown German counter-offensive on the Mius River, which occurred just a few weeks later.

My working hypothesis for this study revolves around relative war-making efficiency. In the first volume, I outlined how German armoured operations in the first part of the war were generally successful because they had superior efficiency in terms of training and use of combined arms tactics. The Wehrmacht of 1940 was tailored to Germany’s limited resources, but the Wehrmacht of 1941–42 was not. In order to mount an operation on the scale of Barbarossa, the Third Reich had to confiscate thousands of captured vehicles from Western Europe as well as captured fuel stocks – but this was a one-time plus-up. Hitler’s Blitzkrieg Army was designed to win before internal weakness made it grind to a halt. Yet when Barbarossa failed, the Germans were not prepared for a protracted war – unlike the Soviet Union – and the inefficiencies in their system, such as low tank production, limited personnel replacements, inadequate theatre logistics and inter-service rivalries began to emerge as serious problems within six months of the start of the war. Thereafter, the German military effort on the Eastern Front – particularly their conduct of armoured warfare that was at the core of their operational-level doctrine – became less and less efficient as the war dragged on.

In contrast, the Red Army started at a very low level of efficiency due to the Stalinist purges and rapid pre-war expansion, but began to gain its footing by late 1942. However, thanks to the pre-war industrialization of the Five Year Plans, the Soviet Union and the Red Army were well prepared for protracted war. This volume begins in January 1943, as the relative efficiency of the German mechanized forces was beginning to decline and the Red Army’s tank armies were finally ready to begin spearheading large-scale offensives. While other works about the Eastern Front have suggested that this or that battle decided the outcome, be it Smolensk, Moscow, Stalingrad or Kursk, this study looks at the decline of German panzer forces and the rise of Soviet tank forces as a holistic process, not a solitary event. Furthermore, it was a process driven just as much by industrial decisions, as by battlefield ones.

German Armoured Units on the Eastern Front

At the start of 1943, the German Army (Heer) and Waffen-SS had five primary types of armoured units:

• Panzer-Divisionen, intended to spearhead mobile combined arms operations. These units comprised one Panzer-Regiment with 1–2 Panzer-Abteilungen (nominally 152 tanks), two motorized infantry regiments with four battalions (one mounted in SPW halftracks), a motorized artillery regiment with three battalions (24 10.5cm and 12 16cm howitzers), a reconnaissance battalion, a Panzerjäger Bataillon (with 14 Marder-type self-propelled tank destroyers), a motorized engineer battalion, plus signal and support troops.

• Panzer-Grenadier-Divisionen, intended to supplement the Panzer-Divisionen with additional infantry. The Panzergrenadiers either had one Panzer-Abteilung or a Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung, but had a total of six infantry battalions.

• Independent schwere-Panzer-Abteilungen (Heavy Tank Battalions) assigned as corps-level units for breakthrough operations. The original ‘Organization D’ of August 1942 consisted of a battalion with two companies, each with nine Tigers and 10 Pz III tanks, but this was replaced with the ‘Organization E’ scheme in March 1943, which had three companies each with 14 Tigers.¹

• Sturmartillerie units to provide direct support to infantry units. Each battalion consisted of three batteries, with an authorized total of 22 StuG III and nine StuH 42.

• Self-propelled Panzerjäger units to provide general anti-tank support across a wide front. The earlier Panzerjäger-Abteilungen usually consisted of three companies equipped with 27 Marder-type tank destroyers, but the new schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilungen introduced in 1943 were authorized 45 Hornisse tank destroyers each.

On 1 January 1943, the Germans had a total of 21 Panzer-Divisionen and six Panzer-Grenadier-Divisionen committed to the Eastern Front, which altogether contained 41 Panzer-Abteilungen (battalions).* In addition, there were elements of two schwere-Panzer-Abteilungen, with a total of 40 Tiger tanks and 40 Pz III tanks, as well as a few odd company-size tank detachments. Altogether, on paper these battalions had an authorized strength of almost 3,200 tanks. However, after six months of intensive combat, the German Panzer-Divisionen were much reduced in both equipment and personnel strength. Ostensibly, according to numbers provided by Thomas J. Jentz, at the start of the New Year the Germans had 1,475 operational tanks on the Eastern Front, or about 46 per cent of their authorized strength, along with another 1,328 tanks awaiting repairs, which means that total write-offs (Totalausfalle in German terminology) amounted to just 12 per cent.²

Yet these numbers do not reflect the woeful state of Germany’s armoured forces on the Eastern Front and appear to be inflated. Only two Panzer-Divisionen, the newly-arrived 7.Panzer-Division and the veteran 9.Panzer-Division, had 100 or more operational tanks. Most of the remaining German Panzer-Divisionen at the front were ausgebrannt (burnt out) and had been reduced to just 30–40 operational tanks, meaning that they were closer to 25 per cent of their authorized armoured strength. Some particularly decimated units, such as the 3., 4., 8. and 13. Panzer-Divisionen, had barely a dozen operational tanks each. Furthermore, three Panzer-Divisionen (14., 16. and 24.) and three Panzer-Grenadier-Divisionen (3., 29., 60.) – comprising a total of 12 Panzer-Abteilungen – were encircled with the 6.Armee (AOK 6) at Stalingrad. While these trapped divisions still had 94 operational tanks and 31 assault guns, they were virtually out of fuel and on the verge of annihilation.³ Thus, the actual number of operational German tanks at the front was likely fewer than 800. Unlike the beginning of the War in the East in June 1941, by 1943 Germany no longer had a mechanized masse de manoeuvre.

At the start of 1943, the main German tanks in use were the Pz III Ausf L and Ausf M models, equipped with the long-barreled 5cm KwK 39 L/60 gun and the Pz IV Ausf G armed with the long-barreled 7.5cm KwK 40 L/43 gun. Under favourable circumstances, both of these medium tanks were capable of defeating their primary opponent – the Soviet T-34 medium tank – at typical battlefield ranges, although the Pz III’s modest level of armoured protection was a liability. Unlike the T-34’s advanced sloped armour, the German medium tanks could only increase their protection by adding bolt-on plates, which increased their weight. As it was, the Pz III and Pz IV were noticeably inferior to the T-34 in terms of mobility, since both used the Maybach HL 120 TRM petrol engine, capable of producing up to 300hp against the Soviet tank’s powerful V-2 diesel engine, which could produce up to 500hp. In addition, neither the Pz III’s torsion bar suspension, nor the Pz IV’s leaf spring suspension, could compare with the T-34’s Christie suspension over cross-country terrain. Furthermore, Germany’s best two medium tanks comprised only 42 per cent of their operational front-line strength – approximately 300 tanks. Nearly one-third of German armour still consisted of older Pz III and Pz IV models armed with short-barreled 5cm and 7.5cm guns, which were greatly-outclassed by the T-34, but these older tanks were kept on hand because newer models were still in very short supply. Another 20 per cent of German armoured strength consisted of obsolete Pz II light tanks and Pz 38t Czech-built light tanks, both of which were no longer useful on the front line. Thus, German armoured strength on the Eastern Front was really built around a remarkably small number of up-to-date medium tanks. While the Tiger heavy tank was on hand in very small numbers and the new Panther medium tank was just entering production in January, it would be many months before they could influence the armoured balance on the Eastern Front.

In addition to the Panzer-Divisionen, Germany had 22 Sturmgeschütz-Abteilungen (assault gun battalions) and 7 Panzerjäger-Abteilungen (tank destroyer battalions) deployed in the Soviet Union. These battalions theoretically comprised another 900 armoured tank-killing weapons, but seven of these battalions were trapped at Stalingrad and the remainder were reduced to 30–50 per cent operational numbers, or roughly 250 assault guns and tank destroyers. Furthermore, while these weapons added to the defensive anti-tank capabilities of German infantry formations, they were not well-suited to the kind of fast-moving manoeuvre warfare favoured by German mechanized doctrine since 1940.

The onslaught of two powerful Soviet counter-offensives – Operations Mars at Rzhev and Operation Uranus at Stalingrad – had caused the Germans to concentrate their armoured strength on the Eastern Front in just two commands: with the 9.Armee defending the Rzhev salient (five Panzer-Divisionen, one Panzergrenadier-Division and three Sturmgeschutz-Abteilungen) and Heeresgruppe Don (six Panzer-Divisionen, two Panzergrenadier-Divisionen and two Sturmgeschutz-Abteilungen). Generaloberst Walter Model’s 9.Armee had just succeeded in repulsing a massive Soviet attempt to sever the Rzhev salient with Operation Mars in November–December 1942, but this effort had necessitated massing virtually all of Heeresgruppe Mitte’s armour in this one sector. Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein’s Heeresgruppe Don was still seized in crisis as the New Year began, attempting to stop the Soviets from advancing to Rostov and cutting off the retreat route of Heeresgruppe A from the Caucasus. Von Manstein enjoyed absolute priority for replacements and would retain this advantage throughout 1943. The rest of the German front was largely denuded of armoured reserves, particularly in the north around Leningrad and in the centre around Orel. Although the Germans still had four nominal ‘Panzer Armies’ on the Eastern Front, these had been reduced to little more than empty husks, with none possessing more than 100 operational tanks.

Between July and December 1942, the German armoured units on the Eastern Front had lost 1,256 tanks as Totalausfalle*, while receiving 1,365 replacement tanks – so German tank strength had actually increased slightly during the 1942 campaign. Indeed, when the Soviets began their winter counter-offensives in November 1942, the Germans had 40 per cent more operational tanks than they had possessed at the start of Case Blau in July. However, the Panzer units on the Eastern Front only received 67 per cent of the tanks built in the period July– December 1942 and this percentage actually dropped to just 60 per cent in the final three months of the year due to the crisis in North Africa.⁴ The remaining 33–40 percent of German tank production was not going to the Eastern Front, but to other fronts or retained for training new units. Thus, the Panzer-Divisionen on the Eastern Front received just enough replacements to maintain their authorized strength, with no real theatre reserves of replacements. A normal rule of thumb is that a mechanized army should try to maintain a 10 per cent over-strength of key weapons, like tanks, in a category called ‘Operational Readiness Floats’, which are in-theatre spares to replace losses. Without a reserve of spares, natural attrition meant that German Panzer-Divisionen at the front could not be kept at authorized strength levels. Nevertheless, if German theatre logistics had been adequate, this approach might have sufficed.

The OKH Panzer Reserve was located at Sagan in Silesia. After acceptance from the manufacturers in Germany, new panzers typically arrived by rail at Sagan, where they were either forwarded on to front-line units in Russia or kept temporarily in holding depots at Vienna. The OKH decided the priority of where new tanks would be sent, but the logic employed was arcane; for example, sending Tigers to the Leningrad Front where terrain was clearly unfavourable for the use of heavy tanks. Normally, replacement tanks were sent in small groups, usually 10–20, to specific Panzer-Divisionen. This method of injection kept combat units going and spread the resources around, but prevented them from ever getting back up to full strength.

Furthermore, the weakness of German theatre-level supply greatly undermined German armoured strength on the Eastern Front, which was built on a logistical house of cards. The advances of 1941–42 had brought the German Panzer-Divisionen very far from their logistical support bases in Eastern Europe and the homeland, which greatly complicated field and depot-level repairs on vehicles. In the Caucasus for example, Heeresgruppe A was dependent upon a single-track rail line to supply Panzerarmee 1 (PzAOK 1), which was grossly inadequate for receiving regular supplies of fuel and spare parts. At Rzhev, the main rail line from Vyazma was never converted to standard gauge, so the 9.Armee was forced to fight off Zhukov’s Operation Mars offensive while receiving no more than two supply trains per day.

The lack of standardization in spare parts was a particular disadvantage for German armour, compared to the standardization witnessed in the Soviet and Anglo-American tank fleets. When units lacked adequate spare parts to restore damaged vehicles they were wont to resort to cannibalization (also known as ‘controlled substitution’: taking parts from one or more damaged tanks to repair at least one tank) to keep tanks running, but cannibalization resulted in tanks being stripped for parts. Normally, tanks in heavy use should receive some kind of depot-level service every three to six months to restore their systems, particularly the suspension and engine-train. Field-level maintenance can keep tanks running for weeks or months, but minor problems will gradually escalate into major problems that cannot be readily fixed in the field – like a ruptured fuel cell. Certain types of combat damage could also be repaired in the field and some tanks were ‘knocked out’ multiple times, but usually depot-level maintenance was required to restore a tank to full fighting trim. Sending a damaged tank back to Germany for depot-level maintenance meant that it might be gone for many weeks and in the meantime, the unit was down another tank. Consequently, German under-strength Panzer units tended to keep large numbers of non-operational tanks up-front with them, hoping that through cannibalization and various field expedients they could keep a reasonable number of tanks operational. For example, if a tank had the electrical motor for its turret traverse burned out and there were no spare motors available, the tank could still use manual traverse – even though this put the crew at much greater risk in a tank engagement. The result was that tanks kept at the front, operating in ‘degraded mode’, were rather fragile. When winter arrived, the ‘degraded’ tanks tended to be the first to fall out.

The German logistic infrastructure supporting their panzers tended to fail whenever units were forced to retreat any great distance, when snow/ice/mud turned the Russian roads into glue, or when Soviet partisans succeeded in interfering with the lines of communication. This weakness was particularly apparent when the Soviets broke through Heeresgruppe B’s front along the Don in late 1942. German supply bases were overrun and often had to be abandoned due to lack of transport. This lack of operational mobility – insufficient trains, long-haul trucks and air transport planes – proved to be the Achilles’ heel that nearly brought German armoured strength to its knees in the winter of 1942–43. Essentially, German theatre logistics on the Eastern Front had no leeway and even minor disruptions could halt or delay the timely delivery of critical spare parts, ammunition and fuel to forward areas.

Guderian to the Rescue?

On 28 February 1943, Hitler appointed Generaloberst Heinz Guderian as Inspekteur der Panzertruppen. Guderian had been unemployed in the Führer-Reserve since Hitler had relieved him of command in December 1941, but now Hitler needed Guderian’s organizational talents to restore the depleted Panzer units on the Eastern Front. Guderian demanded a broad authority over all armoured units, included those belonging to the Waffen-SS and the Luftwaffe. However, Guderian lost the bureaucratic battle with the Sturmartillerie branch, which blocked his efforts to gain control over their assault guns, and the Panzerjäger branch also managed to retain considerable autonomy. Guderian wasted no time in drawing up a lengthy memorandum for Hitler on how to rejuvenate the Panzer-Divisionen, which was presented to the Führer on 9 March 1943.

In its main points, Guderian’s memorandum stated:

The task for 1943 is to provide a certain number of Panzer-Divisionen with complete combat efficiency capable of making limited objective attacks. A Panzer-Division only possesses complete combat efficiency when the number of its tanks is in correction proportion to its other weapons and vehicles. German Panzer-Divisionen were designed to contain 4 Panzer-Abteilungen with a total of roughly 400 tanks per division....at the moment, we unfortunately have no Panzer-Divisionen which can be said to possess complete combat efficiency. Our success in battle this year, and even more so next year, depen...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Plates
• List of Maps
• Glossary
• Preface
• Chapter 1: The Opposing Armoured Forces in 1943
• Chapter 2: Armoured Operations in 1943
• Chapter 3: Armoured Operations in 1944
• Conclusions
• Appendix I: Rank Table
• Appendix II: Armour Order of Battle, 1 July 1943
• Appendix III: Tanks on the Eastern Front, 1943–44
• Appendix IV: Tank Production, 1943
• Appendix V: Armour Order of Battle, 21 June 1944
• Appendix VI: Tank Production, 1944
• Notes
• Bibliography