Special Forces Pilot

A Flying Memoir of the Falkland War

Richard Hutchings

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Aviation
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781781594162
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

A Royal Navy helicopter pilot's firsthand account of British Special Forces operations in the Falklands Islands and a failed raid on mainland Argentina.

In 1982, Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands initiated an undeclared war with the United Kingdom. During the ten-week conflict, Colonel Richard Hutchings served as a commando helicopter pilot with 846 Naval Air Squadron flying Sea King helicopters. Though the sensitive nature of his experiences prevented him from telling his story for decades, Hutchings now provides a firsthand chronicle of the Falklands War, offering fascinating insight into the conduct of operations there. Colonel Hutchings was charged with transporting Special Force units onto the enemy occupied islands, either to gather intelligence or conduct offensive operations, including the Special Air Service's successful Pebble Island raid and its ill-fated raid on mainland Argentina. That raid, known as Operation MIKADO, has been little discussed. But as Captain of the Sea King involved, Hutchings gives an authoritative account of what went wrong both in the air and on the ground. He details the circumstances of his crash-landing, encounters with the Chilean authorities and British diplomats in Santiago, as well as the debriefing in an MI6 safe house on return to the UK

Part 1

The Road to War

CHAPTER 1

Will We, Won’t We?

At 0430hrs on Friday, 2 April 1982, 150 men of the Argentine Special Forces landed by helicopter 3 miles south-west of the Falklands’ capital, Port Stanley. This was the beginning of the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands and was followed by the landing of over 1,000 more specialist troops and marines. Five hours later, the eighty-man garrison of Royal Marines had surrendered on the order of the Island’s Governor, Rex Hunt. The next day, the 22-man force of Royal Marines, which had landed from HMS Endurance onto South Georgia, some 800 miles south-east of Port Stanley, surrendered after a short but heroic battle. What became known as the Falklands War had started.

Meanwhile, in the UK on Wednesday, 31 March, intelligence and embassy reports confirmed that almost the entire Argentine fleet was at sea and that the invasion of the Falkland Islands was set for the early hours of 2 April. John Knott at once called the Prime Minister and a meeting was promptly arranged at her office in the House of Commons, also attended by Sir Henry Leach, the First Sea Lord. Henry Leach was given authority to make preparations. HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible would form the backbone of the maritime element of the Task Force. I was to learn a day later that Hermes would be my home for the next eight weeks. Later the following day, Mrs Thatcher ordered that troops be put on immediate alert for deployment to the South Atlantic. Within forty-eight hours, the Task Force was on four hours notice to sail.

The way that we, the British public, learned that our sovereign territory had been invaded did little to reassure us that the Government was in control of events.

By mid-morning on Friday, 2 April, Fleet Street was receiving news agency messages from Buenos Aires that Argentine forces had just landed at Port Stanley, which contradicted the MoD’s understanding of events 8,000 miles away. Media communications channels were to prove more reliable and timely than official government communications channels on several occasions during subsequent operations. The relative effectiveness of these communication channels was to impact on me and my family just a few weeks later.

It is standard practice for military units to be at a specific notice for deployment, the usual peacetime notice for military units being seven days. When the notice is to be shortened it should be a step-by-step process within the overall timescale, so the earliest that the Task Force should have been deployable, in theory, was some time after seven days had lapsed from 2 April, i.e. not before 9 April. However, the first ships of the Task Force deployed on Monday, 5 April. How was this possible? The answer is simple: the Armed Forces have a ‘can-do’ attitude. Even if Foreign Office officials were not interpreting the signals intelligently, there were plenty of military planners who were. My own unit, 846 Naval Air Squadron, was at the time well dispersed with a detachment supporting the weapon training of a unit of 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines in north-west England, and another detachment had only just returned to our base having taken part in a maritime counter-terrorism exercise in the North Sea. Fortuitously, all squadron personnel and helicopters were due to be concentrated at the Royal Naval Air Station, Yeovilton, on or by Friday, 2 April, in time for a well-earned period of leave over Easter.

846 Squadron was first commissioned on 1 April 1943. Disbanded in 1945, the Squadron reformed in 1962 and this was when the commando squadrons earned the illustrious nickname of ‘Junglies’ from Army units whilst in Borneo. Flying Whirlwind HAS7s from HMS Albion, they were used in action against the terrorist Guerrillas, and the ground units were constantly impressed by their highly skilled jungle navigation. After disbanding again, 846 Squadron reformed, this time with the Wessex V, in 1968, as a commando helicopter squadron based at RNAS Culdrose, before relocating to RNAS Yeovilton in May 1972. In February 1979, the Squadron joined HMS Bulwark, and from December that year began a modernization programme with the Sea King IV.

In 1982, 846 Squadron was equipped with fourteen Sea King IVs, prior to which the Squadron had operated eighteen Wessex Vs, a well-tried and trusted workhorse. By contrast, the Sea King IV was unproven operationally. The Sea King IV, like all variants of the Sea King, was designed as a Naval Helicopter from the outset and had numerous features that made it well suited to embarked operations; these included powered folding rotor blades, a folding tail, a robust undercarriage, a telebrief system and construction from materials resistant to salt-water corrosion. The aircraft is a stable platform for Instrument Flying (IF) and in 1982 was fitted with a comprehensive suite of navigation aids including an Instrument Landing System (ILS), much the same as that found in civil airliners. The Sea King IV had clearance to fly in certain icing conditions. At the start of operations in 1982, the Sea King IV was not Night Vision Goggle (NVG) compatible. The Sea King also lacked the agility of the Wessex. On the plus side, the cabin was cavernous by comparison to the Wessex, with seats for up to twenty-seven troops, depending on equipment carried. The helicopter could carry heavy loads, underslung, over a very useful distance. With a full fuel load, the helicopter could remain airborne for six hours with up to ten troops embarked, depending on equipment to be carried. The Sea King IV was fitted with state-of-the-art communications, IFF and inertial navigation equipment. Overall, a vast improvement on the Wessex V, but like the Sea Harrier (SHAR), it was yet to be battle tested.

Since 1962, the Squadron had supported units of 3 Commando Brigade during land-based and amphibious operations and exercises. Procedures and drills for the Sea King had been developed and regularly practised with units of the Brigade, HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible. The Squadron was, therefore, confident that it would acquit itself well in any operation. The only Achilles heal was the lack of a self-defence system or weapon, other than a GPMG, which could be fixed in the entrance of the cabin door and operated by either the aircrewman or, if needs dictated, one of the embarked troops.

Along with 845 Squadron, full command of 846 Squadron was exercised through the Fleet Air Arm chain of command to the Commanding Officer of the Royal Naval Air Station, Yeovilton. Operational command and control of the commando helicopter squadrons was delegated for operations and exercises to either Commodore Amphibious Warfare (Comaw) or Commander 3 Commando Brigade, as appropriate. This meant that, in reality, the Squadron had a foot in three camps when not operationally deployed. Such matters as change of readiness was communicated through Royal Navy command channels.

There was considerable excitement in 846 Squadron throughout the day on 1 April. The Squadron consisted of approximately 180 personnel who were highly trained to work together as a whole, or in smaller units, in any environment under operational circumstances. The bulk of the Squadron personnel were aircraft maintainers of various specializations who worked tirelessly to ensure that the Sea Kings were fully operational and ready for any task. Years of experience with this aircraft type, in a wide variety of theatres, allowed 846 Squadron to operate with a flexible, ‘can-do’ approach, something that has always been at the core of the ‘Junglie’ squadron philosophy. The general mood was, therefore, one of excited expectation and high morale, both, however, being deflated on more than one occasion during the day as the indecision of our politicians became apparent. It was clear that the Government still sought to avert the invasion through diplomatic channels, rightly so of course, but this was not the sort of news that servicemen ‘champing at the bit’ wanted to hear. The political and diplomatic vacillations were certainly felt at Yeovilton.

Throughout the day, an ever-changing stream of instructions was received. After the deployment had been stood down, it was revived again, but this time with only a small group from the Brigade and limited helicopter support. This disappointment did not suppress the determination of squadron personnel to do their duty, and if there was a potential opportunity to ‘kick some Argentine butt’, all wanted to be a part of it. To this end, aircrew who were due to leave the Squadron in the near future, were asking the Commanding Officer (CO), Lieutenant Commander Simon Thornewill, whether it would be possible to have their postings to new units delayed so that they could remain with the Squadron should it deploy to the South Atlantic. The CO did not let them down and after a few phone calls through the chain of command, he was able to announce that should the Squadron deploy to the South Atlantic, all aircrew who were due to leave it during the coming weeks and months would be remaining with the Squadron. One pilot, who had recently left the Squadron and started a training course to convert to the Lynx, was Alan (Wiggy) Bennett. ‘Wiggy’ and I were close friends and had trained together to fly the Wessex and subsequently the Sea King. The CO negotiated his immediate release from the training course and he rejoined the Squadron that day. I could not have known at the time that in a few weeks our lives were to become inextricably linked, through a mutual dependence for survival.

Throughout all of the excitement, order and counter-order of the day, the Squadron’s Senior Pilot, Lieutenant Commander Bill Pollock, second-in-command, was trying to maintain some semblance of order and discipline – not an easy task with aircrew at the best of times, but now there was the added challenge of aircrew hell bent on ‘kicking Argentine butt’! The CO and Senior Pilot had been quick to appreciate the possibility of the Squadron deploying to war and to this end, preparations had already been put in train over the previous couple of weeks. The servicing of the helicopters had been brought up to date and equipment packed. However, when squadron personnel returned home at the end of the day, most were convinced that nothing would come of it. That said, wives and girlfriends were left in no doubt that evening that the Squadron might be going to war in just a few days.

In Portsmouth, the ageing carrier HMS Hermes was about to begin a refit, was empty of stores and food, and covered in scaffolding. The somewhat newer, but smaller HMS Invincible had just returned from arctic warfare exercises in Norwegian waters, with her embarked Air Group, 801 Naval Air Squadron, with six Sea Harriers, later to increase to an Air Group of twelve. Work to prepare these ships started in earnest, with sailors and ‘dockyard maties’ working together around the clock, including working under floodlights at night, to ensure that no valuable minute was lost. Work on Hermes now had to assume a somewhat different priority if this venerable ship were to be ready to put to sea by high tide on the following Monday morning, just five days later.

The Defence Review of 1981 envisaged that the Navy, and consequently the Royal Dockyards, would play a small role in any future conflicts. It therefore called for a drastic reduction in the number of workers in the dockyard, the first rounds of redundancy notices being issued on 2 April 1982. Against this backdrop of redundancies, Britain went to war and once again the dockyard mobilized. The order received on 2 April was: ‘Ships must sail by Monday morning!’ The condition of HMS Hermes was of particular interest to many back at Yeovilton because 846 Squadron was the ship’s designated commando helicopter squadron. 800 Squadron, with its Sea Harriers, also based at Yeovilton, would also be embarking as the ship’s Air Group. In addition to the two Yeovilton-based squadrons, there would be a squadron of ASW helicopters embarked from RNAS Culdrose. It was clear from the outset that it was going to be a tight squeeze for aircraft, maintenance, briefing facilities and beds.

The morning of Friday, 2 April was to be a very early start for Simon Thornewill who was awoken by a telephone call at 0400hrs from the Captain of Yeovilton; the message was brief: ‘You are to mobilize your squadron for sea immediately’ – that was it, short and to the point! The message was relayed to a few key personnel within the Squadron through the well-tested recall system and all personnel were in the squadron lines by 0830hrs. The preparations of the past few days were now to pay dividends.

The squadron buildings were alive and buzzing with activity by the time I arrived at 0800hrs. The Squadron’s Air Engineering Officer (AEO), Lieutenant Commander Richard Harden, and his team, were already well ahead of the game in getting the helicopters ready for embarkation. The buzz around the Squadron was that we were going to embark in Hermes either on Saturday or Sunday and head south towards the Falkland Islands on Monday, 5 April. The morning brief at 0830 that day was like no other. The CO told us as much as he knew at that time. There was clearly an issue over the state of the flight deck of Hermes – just the previous day it had been covered in scaffolding. There was also the issue of timings – there was a Harrier Air Group to embark, together with Sea Kings from our squadron, plus Sea Kings from another squadron, all of which had to be de-conflicted. The Harriers were to embark in several groups: eight on the Saturday, three the following day and the last aircraft after departure from Portsmouth. Another challenge was embarkation whilst the ship was alongside in the dockyard. Ordinarily, this was not permitted for safety and noise abatement reasons, but the nation was about to go to war.

‘Bugger noise abatement,’ said the CO, rather loudly. As the day progressed, final preparations and last-minute administrative matters were addressed.

‘Have you all made your wills?’ asked the Senior Pilot, with a wry smile on his face. It was apparent that some had not, but the Royal Navy has a form for just such an eventuality – but then the Royal Navy seems to have a form for just about every eventuality.

In terms of operational preparedness the Squadron was in good shape. We had supported amphibious training in Norway during February, so collectively and individually we were up to speed with ship-borne operations, troop drills and deck landings by day and night. The way in which I had personally joined the training and exercise in Norway was not altogether unusual: a four-stage transit flown over four days covering 1,500 miles. Embarkation in Hermes, in Norwegian waters, followed five days later. Long-distance transits were therefore commonplace for the Squadron, given its broad role. Experience of long-distance navigation was to prove invaluable during subsequent operations in the South Atlantic, where 200- or 300-mile transits over the sea at night were to become the norm for some of us. At the end of the day, embarkation in Hermes was confirmed for the following day.

On Friday, 2 April, the only personnel issue still to be resolved was the status of our foreign-exchange pilots. We had assumed from the outset that our Australian pilot, Ron Lawrence, and American pilot, Dale Johnson, would not be permitted to deploy, and confirmation was received later that day. The Task Force was to be a strictly British affair, which came as a major disappointment to Ron in particular, who without doubt was gutted.

‘We have the same Head of State, for Christ’s sake,’ said Ron, but no one was listening. Ron was to remain at Yeovilton as the officer commanding the rear party, whereas Dale returned to the USA for the duration of hostilities.

In addition to resolving the issue of the non-British pilots, we learnt that there was also to be a potential addition to the Squadron’s complement of pilots. On the Friday, the CO was contacted by Lieutenant Commander Mike Spencer and Lieutenant Peter Rainey with news that was to have a pivotal impact on the Squadron’s subsequent operations. Mike was a test pilot working at the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough, and Peter was a test pilot working at the Aircraft and Armaments Experimental Establishment at Boscombe Down, who was to die tragically in a drowning accident in 2003. They made the CO aware of a significant development in the evolution of NVG. Earlier versions of NVG had significant limitations for flying operations because they covered part of the face, thereby restricting a pilot’s ability to switch between flying with or without the aid of goggles. The new NVG were of a binocular design which facilitated quick and easy changes between flight, with or without them. It was clear that the new goggles had potential during night-flying operations in the South Atlantic, but from the Squadron’s perspective they were an unknown quantity and needed to be evaluated. To this end, on the Sunday evening, the Squadron’s Qualified Helicopter Instructor (QHI), Lieutenant Nigel North, together with the Helicopter Warfare Instructor (HWI), Lieutenant Bob Horton, our RAF exchange pilot, Flight Lieutenant Bob Gundy and Lieutenant Pete Rainey were to be driven to Farnborough to carry out a flying evaluation of the NVG in the establishment’s Puma. It would therefore be another two days before we would know whether or not the goggles would be an addition to the Squadron inventory.

As the working day moved towards its close, the thoughts of most turned increasingly towards our loved ones and as soon as deployment was confirmed there was a mad scramble to find a phone somewhere so that calls could be made home to alert wives, girlfriends and families. Tonight was to be the last night that we would see our loved ones for an unknown period of time – as it turned out, it was to be the very last time for two of the aircrew.

That night at home we said our long farewells, for it was clear that the following morning there would only be enough time for the briefest of loving exchanges. At the time I had two young sons, Justin aged seven, and James aged four. Both were too young to understand fully what was about to happen, but grasped the essential fact that I was going to be away from home for quite a long time and that they, therefore, had to look after Mummy in my absence. Quite what families go through when their men, and increasingly these days also women, are away fighting for Queen and country can only really be appreciated by those to whom it has happened. During our absence in the South Atlantic, families were kept up to date as best as possible, within the constraints of operational security, through MoD information channels. However, on many occasions these channels proved to be considerably slower than the media – I shall return to this issue in a later chapter. Suffice it to say at this stage that servicemen and servicewomen, when deployed on operations, are always anxious to know that their loved ones back home are receiving accurate and timely information; regrettably on many occasions during the Falklands War this did not happen. Our fighting men and women are more effective if they do not have the unwelcome distraction of worrying about what is happening back home.

That night I packed my kit ready for embarkation. What to pack though? The military equipment was obvious, but what about personal items? I packed only two books, Jonathan Livingston Seagull, by Richard Bach, essential reading for all aviators, and The Prophet by Kahlil Gibran. I was somewhat amused to learn later, after embarkation in HMS Hermes, that one of the Harrier Pilots, Dave Morgan, had also bought with him a copy of Jonathan Livingston Seagull. Dave’s career had been rather unusual, to say the least, in that he had transferred between the RN and RAF, and was later in his career to transfer back to the RN, but more of him later.

Saturday morning, 3 April, was an early start for everyone in the Squadron. With few exceptions, squadron personnel were driven to Yeovilton by wives or girlfriends and dropped off. It was with a heavy heart that I said farewell to Lorraine and the boys, and started to focus on the task ahead. It may seem to many that embarking a squadron of helicopters in a ship is an easy enough thing to do: just take off, fly to the ship and land – what could be simpler? To an extent that is exactly what happens, however, the helicopters need engineering and handling support the instant that they land on board, therefore embarkation has to be a staged evolution. A small party of maintainers, under the command of the Chief Artificer, Pat Garrett, had been dispatched to the ship the previous day to ensure that all was ready for the eventual arrival of the hel...

Table of contents

• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Epigraph
• Table of Contents
• Table of Figures
• Foreword
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Part 1 - The Road to War
• Part 2 - Operations in the TEZ
• Part 3 - The Mainland Option
• Epilogue
• Glossary
• Index