Introduction
I begin by considering how erasure and self-negation are exacerbated by the claim of epistemicide in our context.1 This consideration highlights the maintenance of continued relegation vis-Ă -vis Black/Indigenous knowledge(s) owing to the claim of epistemicide.2 While my analysis acknowledges colonial imposition and subsequent epistemic slighting, I aim to defend the position that our context experienced systematic attempted epistemic erasure that was and continues to be unsuccessful. This is not to deny the historicity of coloniality, but rather to showcase that the claim of epistemicide only intensifies epistemic injustice. Simply put, I aim to make the case, through contesting epistemicide and linguicide, that this claim maintains the sociality of epistemic practices in Philosophy as discipline. My argument hinges on the Black Archive.3 In complicating the use of epistemicide, my aim is to showcase that language allows us access into knowledge that existed historically and remained irrespective of colonial imposition. Language undergirds, demonstrates and instantiates the Black Archive. The process of reclaiming knowledge that was displaced by colonial imposition is frustrated by claims such as epistemicide and linguicide, as these claims abrogate the starting point of re-membering and remembering. Abrogation of this sort has led to the contentious and salacious want for the âintellectualisation of African languagesâ for instance. This is to say that abrogation in this sense denies the existence and displaces the contributions of scholars and thinkers such as Nontsizi Mgqwetho, Benedict Wallet Vilakazi, Mazisi Kunene and SEK Mqhayi.
While South Africa grapples with a number of discontinuities owing to the âdisruptions [wrought by] colonialismâ (Abrahams 2003), and as Quayson (2002) states it, âwe have always been consigned to responding from the place where we ought not to have been standingâ, I however, maintain that the Black Archive allows us to contextually understand epistemic harms.4 While these harms might have been inflicted as early as the seventeenth century as detailed by Coetzee (1988) in White Writing: The Culture of Letters in South Africa, they do not amount to the claim of epistemicide in South Africa (consider Lebakeng et al. 2006; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015; Ramose 2004). Ramose (2014, 72), however, is cognisant of the shortfalls with this claim as he notes,
It was a systematic, systemic and sustained epistemicide which failed, despite its intensity and vigour, to kill completely and totally the indigenous cultures of Africa. This is the violent context within which Socrates was transported to Africa as the omniscient teacher endowed with the highest competence in the conduct of a deadly monologue (own emphasis added in italics).
My argument is that claims of epistemicide in South Africa are misplaced. I am therefore interested in the development of a concept that explains this problem without running into the challenges highlighted above of displacement and denial. This assertion is rooted in the wealth of knowledge that remains untapped by the Historically White Institutions (HWI).5 I suggest that by inviting6 this knowledge into the contemporary University, we begin to think critically about epistemic justice and restitution. Epistemic restitution is annulled owing to the lack of a shared ethical intuition; a point substantiated by the lack of engagement with the Black Archive.7 This slack engagement motivates claims of epistemicide and linguicide in the country. Furthermore, epistemic restitution is reduced to a non-starter by Black/Indigenous scholars who shore-up the notion of epistemicide. Resultantly, I invite my reader to consider the following questions. If indeed we have experienced epistemicide, how do we begin working towards epistemic restitution; a request that underpins the decolonial tradition? Moreover, is epistemic restitution subsequently meant to be a form of cultural invention? These questions undergird my critique.
My argument subsequently deals with the lack of a shared ethical intuition. I showcase that Frickerâs (2007) proposition (of a shared ethical intuition) does not do sufficient work in our context. I maintain that we not only lack a shared ethical intuition vis-Ă -vis the colour line/divide but more so, as a tradition; those invested in fighting against epistemic impositions that displace Blackness/Indigeneity. I suggest that there is a lack of a shared ethical intuition even amongst Black/Indigenous philosophers, therefore exacerbating erasure and self-negation, owing to minimal engagement with the Black Archive. The claim of epistemicide rests on not having fully engaged and exhausted the possibilities of the Black Archive. Mine then, lies in dispelling the myth of epistemicide and linguicide, and highlighting the role of the Black Archive in epistemic restitution.
There are two motivations to my argument. The first challenges the disciplinesâ failure to acknowledge knowledge of philosophical import that exists outside of Philosophy as discipline, resulting in the continued Eurocentric notions that define Philosophy. Dotson (2011) takes issue with this mode of exclusion maintaining that it inculcates ignorance and limits the kinds of questions that the philosopher can ask by privileging a western-centric and Eurocentric conception of knowledge. Secondly, I aim to showcase how an engagement with the Black Archive locates epistemic slighting in the historical machinations that define South African socio-political and socio-historical reality.
Derived from the critique of Frickerâs (2007) theory, and as my second move, I will showcase how the Black Archive works towards epistemic restitution. I do not dismiss Frickerâs contribution, rather the aim is to showcase how the South African context is such that there is no shared ethical intuition. Fricker (2007, 86) suggests the cultivation of virtuous traits in hearers subsequently counteracting the risk of prejudice(s) distorting the perceptions of the hearer. Developing a virtue schema for testimonial justice, Fricker (2007, 86) suggests an examination of the âanti-prejudicial current that the virtuous hearerâs sensibility needs to contain in orderâ to steer clear of committing further testimonial injustices against the speaker. Fricker subsequently inquires of âthe critical awareness needed for a hearer to be able to correct for identity prejudice in a given credibility judgementâ (2007, 90). This is foregrounded by uMqhayiâs sentiments, when he notes that â[i]ntetho nemikhwa yesiXhosa iyatshona ngokutshona ngenxa yelizwi nokhanyo olukhoyo, oluze nezizwe zase Ntshona-langaâ8 (1914, v). uMqhayi demonstrates epistemic injustices derived from colonial imposition, and subsequently suggests that, â[y]indawo yomlisela nomthinjana wasemaXhoseni, ukuba akhangele ngokucokisekileyo ukuba iya kuthi, yakutshonela iphelele le ntetho nale mikhwa inesidima yakowawo, kutshonele nto ni na emveni kokoâ9 (1914, v). It is clear to note that as early as the 20th century uMqhayi had begun thinking about the ethics of power and knowing; a preoccupation inspired by the epistemic slighting of Black/Indigenous knowers due to colonial imposition. Furthermore, I contend that the credibility deficit instituted by colonial categories of thought continues to be perpetuated by scholars who claim epistemicide in our context. The sociality of epistemic injustice, so construed, surfaces an element of Frickerâs argument, i.e.
For a hearer to identify the impact of identity power in their credibility judgement, they must be alert to the impact not only of the speakerâs social identity but also of the impact of their own social identity on their credibility judgement (2007, 91).
Contesting epistemicide through language
To frame the historical encounters in the country as an attempted epistemic erasure that was unsuccessful is rooted in the knowledge that continues to define the realities of our context and the African continent. I begin with the proposition that language on the continent challenges the claim of epistemicide a point that will become clearer as I develop my argument through code-switching. Code-switching (or what is now commonly known as translanguaging), demonstrates the instantiation of epistemic restitution through the Black Archive in the academe. I code-switch with the aim of demonstrating how ânewâ questions have been considered historically albeit in different forms and in varied mediums. Lastly, code-switching in this treatise demonstrates an epistemic justice praxis.
To make the point of a systematically attempted epistemic erasure as opposed to epistemicide, more vividly I work through Ndlovu-Gatsheniâs (2015, 493) argument,
At another level, the decoloniality articulated here involves re-telling [sic] of history of humanity and knowledge from the vantage point of those epistemic sites that received the âdarker sideâ of modernity, including re-telling the story of knowledge generation as involving borrowings, appropriations, epistemicides, and denials of humanity of other people as part of the story of science.
Re-telling history from those epistemic sites that received the âdarker sideâ of modernity is interesting in how Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) seems, in this instance, to be flattening the topography that defines the variance of experiences among colonised peoples. To demonstrate, consider Kumaloâs (2018a) analysis of two houses, uKumalo noMagubane, conceptually framed as dialogically responding to one another. Kumalo contends that, âclaiming the innocence that is created by Inyosi10 as he reframes, remembers and re-members history, uMagubane is created as an innocent actor in his nation building project.â (2018a, 208â209). I ought to clarify two concepts here. Kumalo (2018a) makes reference to remembering and re-membering history. In these two instances Kumalo (2018a) highlights orality as a legitimate source of knowledge production seen in his argument as the use of clan names. Orality in the case of remembering is important as it relays and inflects historical narrative with the names of the men and womxn who were worthy of being remembered through izibongo. Remembering, through orality, inscribes an Indigenous identity as the names of oneâs forebears define(d) and are defined by the landscape, bestowing an âAdamic languageâ as detailed by Coetzee (1988) when he writes of a language that is born of the landscape and not imposed.
On the second matter of re-membering, Kumalo (2018a) takes seriously political negotiations in the project of telling histories. Simply put, the narratives constructed by Inyosi are subject to contestation(s), deletions and embellishments, as a conscious political move. My analysis of the Kumalo house as represented by uMzilikazi and detailed by Kumalo (2018a) surfaces this point poig...