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The making and unmaking of the Congress heartland
On 10 July 1947, one R.S. Vidyarathi from Anand Math in Meerut shot off an angry letter to the Congress High Command, denouncing its decision to accept the partition of the country. As a Congress sympathizer since the early days of the freedom struggle, he could not come to terms with the decision of his party. In a letter to Acharya Kripalani, he wrote:
It is no doubt most regrettable that the Congress should have submitted to the decision of the partition of the country without any authority, [sic] to that effect from the people whom it claims to represent. But any way by accepting the decision to partition India in favour of the Muslim League, a communal organisation in the country, the Congress has committed suicide.1
Vidyarathiâs letter was one of many hundred letters sent to the Congress High Command which expressed horror at the fact that Congress had âsubmittedâ to the Muslim Leagueâs demand for Pakistan. Another letter from Hindu Relief Committee in the same district challenged the Congress government on its âanti-Hindu policyâ:
It is a fact that UP where Muslims are only 14% is a stronghold of the Muslim League. Only of late Hindus who had become cowards on account of being trampled upon for centuries, begun to scent the danger of his total annihilation and is now preparing to learn to defend himself if unjustly attacked. The vast majority of Hindus of this province are nationalists and Congressites and wish the Congress all success. The Congress has been kept alive only by their blood and it would be a sorrowful day if on account of biased communal politics like those of your government, [sic] we may have to decry as partial and unjust the very institution which is so dear to our heart. Your policy of unfairly appeasing the Muslims is misconceived.2
This correspondence reflects the prevailing sense, among many Congress workers of having been betrayed by their party. This mood, and the response it engendered, is best understood as a form of Hindu counter-mobilization. Borrowing from Steven Wilkinsonâs notion of Muslim counter-mobilization, I suggest that UP was gripped by the sense of a need, among many sections of the Hindu politicized community that they were in danger.3 Paradoxical though it may seem, given their overwhelming numerical dominance in the province, they felt under seize, brow-beaten into conceding the partition of Bharat Mata, threatened by the growing enemy across the border, and challenged by an âinternal enemyâ within. This enemy was the Muslim who stayed behind. He generated hatred and also fear. Hindus believed that not only were many working as agents for the enemy, but they were rendered powerful by their unity and fanatical zeal. A counter-mobilization was the need of the hour, in the face of the imagined Muslim threat.
Of course, the âHinduâ tilt of the Congress in the United Provinces and its consequences has been the subject of much debate in recent historiography. William Gould argues that in the 1930s Congress used religious symbols to win support, while continuing to pay lip service to its secular stance.4 Despite Nehruâs open displeasure, powerful provincial Congress leaders, such as Purushottam Das Tandon,5 were often seen on Arya Samaj platforms.6 Others as Prabhu Bapu shows, had forged links in the 1920s and 1930s with the Hindu Mahasabha, and the provincial Congress bosses could not stop the Mahasabhaâs cadres from infiltrating into the Congress, where they exerted a strong âHinduâ influence on the partyâs rank and file.7 Contrary to Bapuâs claim, this nexus between Congress and the Mahasabha was never broken: a powerful âHinduâ sentiment among ordinary Congressmen helps to explain why the party in UP so resolutely opposed the partition of India.
These policies and politics against the backdrop of universal adult franchise, unleashed a new round of factional struggles within the Congress, as different leaders jockeyed for power. In these struggles, certain groups which in the past had accepted the âCongress systemâ began to challenge it often from within the party.
In his study of factions in Uttar Pradesh, which laid the groundwork for understanding the electoral politics of the UP Congress, Paul Brass argues that the party relied on distributing benefits to build up its support base and that this inevitably led to arm-wrestling within the party and also between the party and government.8 Brass, however, does not give sufficient weight to the anti-Muslim and anti-partition sentiment, simmering after 1947, and its impact on the state Congress. Nor have the excellent works of Gould or Suhit Sen wholly filled this lacuna.9 Senâs otherwise excellent study argued that the party was subordinated to the ministerial wing after independence.10
Congress leaders from the Uttar Pradesh at the centre were of course provincial heavyweights in their own right. All had earned credentials as freedom fighters and served time in jail. From the United Provinces, Dr Sampurnanand, Chandra Bhanu Gupta, Charan Singh, G.B. Pant,11 Purushottam Das Tandon, Algu Rai Shastri, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai (a close confidante of Nehru) and Mohan Lal Saksena were among the big players on the national stage, whose standing after partition in both the province and nation changed, as did UPâs place within the national polity. Each had a powerful constituency in his home state, which the centre could ill afford to ignore.
The 3 June 1947 plan and Hindu âcounter-mobilizationâ
As soon as the High Command accepted the 3 June plan, the Congress party in the United Provinces faced a fierce wave of âHindu counter-mobilisationâ. The partyâs UP rank and file, right down to the lowest levels deeply opposed partition. The storm of protest which followed shook its organizational foundations and compromised party discipline. The threat was palpable as organizations such as the Hindu Mahasabha sought to woo Congressmen away from their party, under the emotive rallying cry of the âHindu nationâ in danger.
In the years just before and after independence, the popularity of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) increased, as did the hold of Muslim right-wing organizations over Muslims in the province. The All-India Congress Committee (AICC) and the Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee (UPCC) offices were inundated with protests from many different organizations. Many local Congressmen began to claim that Congress had jeopardized the future of Hindus by bowing down to the Muslim demand for Pakistan.12 Nehru viewed the activities of the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS with alarm, his correspondence with Patel, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee among others revealed that he saw their activities as a real threat to the unity of India. On 30 December 1947, in a secret letter to Patel, he accused the RSS of having a hand in the murder of Muslims in Jammu, alleging that the RSS was working against government efforts to solve Kashmir crisis. In another letter to the Maharaja of Kashmi...