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What Shall We Do with the Children?
This is a book about education. It is not the first book ever written about education, and it will definitely not be the last. One may well wonder, therefore, whether there is still anything to add to the ever-increasing stream of publications, and, more importantly, whether there is still anything new to say about education. The ambitions I have with this book are, however, relatively modest. I am not presenting revolutionary new insights about education, nor am I providing a new agenda for education policy, or a new model or approach for educational practice. I actually tend to think that one of the main problems in contemporary education is that there are too many models and approaches on offer, and that so many of them come with the promise that they will be able to âfixâ education once and for all. Research from a wide range of disciplines continues to make a significant contribution to the proliferation of such âsolutions.â But the global education measurement industry (Biesta 2015a) may well have become the strongest voice in the discussion about what education is and what it is supposed to be for.
In light of this, it is rather disappointing to see that so many policy makers and politicians are unable to put findings from PISA and similar systems in a meaningful perspective. Their knee-jerk responses â either taking pride in being at âthe top,â or acknowledging that there are âserious problemsâ that need âurgent attentionâ â do little in challenging the âeducational orderâ (DâAgnese 2017) which the global educational measurement industry seem to have managed to establish (see also Derwin 2016). And while policy makers and politicians may have room for manoeuvre, albeit within the complex dynamics of politics and policy making, this is far less so at the level of schools, colleges, and universities. Here teachers and administrators are often simply subjected to ongoing policy directives that provide little opportunity for their own judgement and agency ( see Priestley, Biesta & Robinson 2015). This is particularly problematic when their jobs are being made dependent upon producing an ongoing increase in student test-scores or securing constant student progress along predefined trajectories (see, e.g., Baker et al. 2010; Ravitch 2011).
One rather curious aspect of many of these developments is that they all stem from good intentions, particularly the promise to make education better. In my rather long career in education I have actually never met anyone who was deliberately trying to make education worse. Everyone seems to be committed to educational improvement, although ideas about what counts as improvement and what meaningful ways of achieving it are, vary widely (see also Biesta 2016a). And there are, of course, also elitist agendas that focus on improvement for the few, but not for the many. All this, plus the sheer size of the educational âenterpriseâ around the world, helps to explain why the field seems to be moving in so many different and even opposite directions. With so many âpushesâ and âpullsâ it has become increasingly difficult to maintain or even establish a sense of direction. And this is a problem for policy makers and politicians as much as it is for teachers and administrators, and even for pupils and students themselves.
All this is further exacerbated by two developments. One is the rather poor quality of the educational discourse itself, which, as I have argued extensively in previous publications (see particularly Biesta 2006a, 2010a, 2018b), has become dominated by the rather bland and educationally unhelpful language of learning, and the proliferation of this language has been going on and on. The other is the fact that educational problems, including the problem of how to improve education, are predominantly seen as matters of control. Not only are there huge sums of money being invested in research that seeks to find out which educational âinterventionsâ are most effective in generating particular âoutcomes.â Also, students themselves are increasingly being made complicit in this ambition, for example when they are called to become âself-regulated learnersâ who should take âownershipâ of their own learning â a strategy that may sound liberating but actually is a demand for what I tend to see as forms of self-objectification (see also Vassallo 2013; Ball & Olmedo 2013).
Existing as Subject
What seems to be forgotten in all this â and some might say: what is conveniently forgotten in all this â is that pupils and students are not simply objects of educational âinterventions,â effective or otherwise, but that they are subjects in their own right. What seems to be forgotten, in other words, is that the whole point of education can never be that of subjecting students to ongoing external control, but that education should always be aimed at enhancing the ability of pupils and students to âenactâ their own âsubject-ness,â to use an awkward formulation. This is perhaps the main problem with the language of learning, because as soon as we claim that education is âall about learning,â we quickly forget that what really matters is what pupils and students will do with everything they have learned. We are too quickly drawn into monitoring and measuring the learning itself, looking for the interventions that produce the desired learning outcomes, trying to control the whole machinery, and thus easily lose sight of the fact that children and young people are human beings who face the challenge of living their own life, and of trying to live it well.
In this book I will argue that it is this existential question â the question how we, as human beings, exist âinâ and âwithâ the world, natural and social â that is the central, fundamental and, if one wishes, ultimate educational concern. It is also the reason for suggesting that education should be world-centred, that is, focused on equipping and encouraging the next generation to exist âinâ and âwithâ the world, and do so in their own right. This is not to suggest, of course, that existing in oneâs own right is the same as âjust doing what one wants to do.â On the contrary, to exist as subject âinâ and âwithâ the world is about acknowledging that the world, natural and social, puts limits and limitations on what we can desire from it and can do with it â which is both the question of democracy and the question of ecology. This is one of the main reasons why I continue to favour the word âsubject,â as it highlights at the very same time that we are originators of our own actions and that we are subjected to what the world, natural and social, âdoesâ with our âbeginnings,â to use an Arendtian term (see Arendt 1958, p. 184). âSubjectâ â or, to use another awkward word: subject-ness (see also Biesta 2017a, chapter 1) therefore does not refer to individuals but to how individuals exist (see also Böhm 1997).
The existential orientation put forward in this book is not meant as a denial of the fact that children develop and learn. But as John Dewey already has helpfully noted, âpureâ child-centred education that only takes its direction from how children learn and develop is actually âreally stupidâ (Dewey 1984, p. 59). As educators we should at the very least be interested in the direction in which children develop and in the substance of what they might learn, since learning and development can go in so many directions, and not all of them are helpful for engaging with the challenge of trying to lead oneâs life well. Pure curriculum-centred education, however, is equally âstupid,â because just trying to get curriculum content into children and monitor retention and reproduction, without any concern for who they are and for what they might do with all the content they are acquiring, misses the existential point of education as well, and would, in my view, therefore miss the point of education altogether.
âEducationâ
A complicating factor in all this has to do with the word âeducation,â and even more so with the fact that the English language only has one word to speak âinâ and âaboutâ education, whereas other languages, such as German and Dutch or the Scandinavian languages, have a more diverse and, in a sense, more nuanced vocabulary. There is, of course, something nice about the openness of the word âeducation,â as it is sufficiently vague to allow for a range of different interpretations and definitions. Yet this can also be confusing, particularly when people think that they are speaking about the same ârealityâ but are actually referring to rather different phenomena or agendas. The solution for this is not to end up in a fight over the ârightâ definition of the word or over who actually âownsâ the meaning of âeducation.â The challenge rather is to develop ways of speaking that allow for a sufficient degree of precision in articulating what matters and what should matter in âeducation.â This is the reason why I continue to argue that language really matters for education (see Biesta 2004), and why I continue to develop new and hopefully more precise and more meaningful ways of speaking âinâ and âaboutâ education.
One thing I should clarify at the outset, therefore, is that when I use the word âeducation,â I tend to think of it as a verb and not as a noun. For me, âeducationâ refers to an activity, that is, to something educators do. In more formal language I would say that education is a form of intentional action, that is, something educators do deliberately, albeit that for me this includes the perhaps slightly odd but educationally important category of intentional non-action. After all, sometimes the best thing to do as educators in a particular situation is precisely not to act, not to intervene, not to say anything, not to rub it in, but to bite our lip, because ârubbing it inâ may have the opposite effect of what we hope to achieve. For me, then, âeducationâ does not refer to more or less âamorphâ processes that in some way may or may not have an influence on children. I am not denying that such processes take place and that they may have an impact, but I am suggesting that we retain the word âeducationâ for the more specific category of intentional action or, if that works, of intentional educational action.
What Shall We Do with the Children?
This immediately raises a number of further questions, such as why such action actually exists, what such action seeks to achieve, and how such action can be justified (on the latter question see, for example, Flitner 1989[1979]; Prange 2010). With regard to the first question we could follow the German educationalist Siegfried Bernfeld (1973, p. 51) in his suggestion that education is societyâs response to the âfact of development,â although I tend to prefer Hannah Arendtâs formulation that education has to do with âour attitude toward the fact of natality,â that is, âtoward the fact that we have all come into the world by being born and that this world is constantly renewed through birthâ (Arendt 1977, p. 196). In more everyday language we could say, therefore, that education starts with this simple question: âWhat shall we do with the children?â
While this question may sound simple, it actually brings us quickly to some of the main predicaments and enduring questions of education. The question first of all highlights the existence of a âwe,â and thus raises the question of who this âweâ is, that is, what the identity of being an educator is, and also what gives this âweâ the right of even wanting to âdoâ something with âthe childrenâ in the first place. The question also highlights the existence of a category called âchildren,â which raises further questions about who is included in this category, what our notion of the child in the context of education actually is, and why âweâ would assume that âthe childrenâ actu...