In 1955, philosopher J. L. Austin delivered a set of lectures at Harvard later published under the title, āHow to Do Things with Wordsā (Austin, 1975). These lectures pointed out a different way to perceive the use of natural language. Instead of seeing the primary use of language as making true or false statements, Austin focused on how it could be used to do thingsāto perform various speech acts, from marrying a couple, bequeathing oneās property to oneās heirs, naming a ship, and casting a bet, to making a promise. Thus, in saying āI promise,ā under certain conditions (for example, being in a position to keep it), one does not simply make a statement that is either true or false. Rather, one actually does something with words, namely make a promise, which can, in turn, have various practical consequences, including legal ones in some cases. This emphasis on the performative use of language has been key to the development of the first cognitive-behavior therapy (CBT).
Self-Disturbing Speech Acts
At about the same time Austin was delivering his lectures at Harvard (in Cambridge, MA), psychologist Albert Ellis (in New York City) was working out the details of his āRational Therapy,ā which was to provide the first ever version of CBT. In discussing the origins of his psychotherapeutic approach in his 1962 classic, Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy, Ellis summed up what has become a cornerstone of his version of CBT, which he later called, Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT):
I had finally ⦠at least to my own satisfaction, solved the great mystery of why so many millions of human beings not only originally became emotionally disturbed, but why they persistently, in the face of so much self-handicapping, remained so. The very facility with language which enabled them to be essentially humanāto talk to others and to talk to themselvesāalso enabled them to abuse this facility by talking utter nonsense to themselves: to define things as terrible when, at worst, these things were inconvenient and annoying. (p. 21; emphasis in original)
Importantly, Ellis italicized the word ādefineā to suggest that people do something linguistically to upset themselves, namely define things as terrible rather than as inconvenient or annoying. In 1961, in Ellis and Harperās A New Guide to Rational Living, the authors state, ā[P]recisely because we tell ourselves ⦠catastrophizing sentences, we almost immediately begin to feel anxiousā (p. 10). Further, they go on to state:
Misery ⦠consists of two fairly distinct parts: (1) desiring, wishing, or preferring that you achieve some goal or purpose and feeling disappointed and irritated when you do not achieve it; and (2) demanding, insisting, commanding, and urgently necessitating that you achieve this goal or purpose and feeling bitter, enraged, anxious, despairing, and self-downing when you do not. (p. 77)
In āpart 2ā (which the authors indicate accounts for the self-defeating negative emotions), we find a list of speech actsāādemanding, insisting, commanding, and urgently necessitating,ā which, along with ācatastrophizingā and ādamning,ā provide insight into some key speech acts that human beings perform to emotionally disturb themselves.
More specifically, the above-mentioned speech acts each comprise classes of speech act with different types. Table 1.1 identifies, describes, and illustrates some common types of demanding perfection examined in this book.1
Table 1.1 Speech Acts of Demanding Perfection (Cohen, 2019a) | Type of Demanding Perfection | Definition | Example |
Outcome Certainty | Demanding certainty about the outcomes of oneās actions. | āI must be certain I wonāt fail.ā |
Existential Certainty | Demanding certainty that bad things wonāt happen to oneself or oneās loved ones. | āI must always be certain that bad things wonāt happen.ā |
Moral Certainty | Demanding certainty that one wonāt do (morally) bad things. | āI must be certain I wonāt do something wrong.ā |
Treatment | Demanding that others always treat one fairly. | āOthers should never deceive me.ā |
Existential | Demanding that the world not contain bad things. | āBad things like pandemics should never happen.ā |
Performance | Demanding that one not make mistakes that could reflect badly on what others may think.a | āI must not fail to do what is expected of me.ā |
Hedonic | Demanding immediate (or fast) gratification. | āI must get what I want immediately.ā |
Epistemic | Demanding that reality be just what one says it is. | āI must always be right.ā |
Approval | Demanding the affection, confidence, or approval of others as a condition of oneās own self-worth. | āI must always get the approval of others.ā |
Note
The term āmustā is used in Table 1.1 to illustrate most (but not all) the respective types of demanding perfection. Within the category of motivational language (Cromwell et al., 2020; Siddharthan, 2018), the latter term appears to be rooted in a feeling of necessity: an interoceptive (somatic) feeling of need. For instance, phenomenologically, the client who demands that he must always be right feels a need to always be right.
As illustrated in the cases of existential and treatment perfectionism in Table 1.1, other terms, such as āshouldā (or āoughtā) may also be used to demand perfection (āBad things should never happenā; āOthers should never deceive meā). The latter should-demands differ from must-demands, however. For example, while the āmustā in must-demands expresses a felt need, the āshould neverā expressed in āBad things should never happenā and āOthers should never deceive meā appears to express an automatic, gut feeling of wrongfulness or unfairness, or, following one tradition in moral philosophy, what may be called a ādeontological feelingā (Cropanzano et al., 2017; Manfrinati et al., 2013; Greene et al., 2001).
Such a feeling appears to present as an āintuitionā about the inherent wrongfulness or unfairness of something, that is, a nondiscursive (non-inferential), interoceptive, deontological feeling about the thing in question (Cushman et al., 2006; Manfrinati et al., 2013). Thus, a demand that bad things should never happen appears to express such an intuition.
Importantly, the latter demand resembles a must-demand by virtue of making an absolutistic (exceptionless or unconditional) demand. Words such as āneverā or āalwaysā are intended to linguistically express this dimension of deontological feelings: like felt needs, they feel absolute. Of course, it makes no sense to demand that bad things never happen because one has no control over this, and there is no practically significant chance of such things not ever (or almost ever) happening. Thus, both must-demands and should-demands appear to feel equally compelling (phenomenologically) to the person making the demand. For, in either case, what is being demanded feels equally non-negotiable.
Table 1.2 identifies, describes, and illustrates some common damning speech acts.