Practical Wisdom

Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives

Mario De Caro, Maria Silvia Vaccarezza

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000406054
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

Featuring original essays from leading scholars in philosophy and psychology, this volume investigates and rethinks the role of practical wisdom in light of the most recent developments in virtue theory and moral, social and developmental psychology.

The concept of phronesis has long held a prominent place in the development of Aristotelian virtue ethics and moral education. However, the nature and development of phronesis is still in need of investigation, especially because of the new insights that in recent years have come from both philosophy and science. The essays in this volume contribute to the debate about practical wisdom by elucidating its role in empirical psychology and advancing important new research questions. They address various topics related to practical wisdom and its development, including honesty, ecocentric phronesis, social cognitive theory, practical wisdom in limited-information contexts, Whole Trait Theory, skill models, the reciprocity of virtue, and challenges from situationism.

Practical Wisdom will interest researchers and advanced students working in virtue ethics, moral psychology, and moral education.

1
The Reciprocity of the Virtues

Daniel C. Russell

One cannot be good, in the strict sense, without wisdom, or wise without virtue of character. But then the argument that the virtues are separate from each other comes undone … since as soon as there is wisdom, which is a single thing, there will be all the virtues.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.13, 1144b31–4, 1145a1–2¹

People who are learning to play a musical instrument are often surprised to discover that it is hard to play louder without also playing faster. Controlling dynamics while controlling tempo isn’t like talking while driving, two discrete things done at the same time. Instead, the tasks are interdependent; one doesn’t know how to control dynamics, in a skillful way, without controlling dynamics at tempo. To understand musical skill, it is not enough to enumerate the several competencies involved. We must also appreciate their interdependence.²

Competencies in dynamics and tempo aren’t separable from each other, and if Aristotle is right, neither are the virtues. To have any virtue requires practical wisdom (phronēsis); but wisdom brings all the virtues with it, so to have any virtue is to have all the virtues. This is an idealization known nowadays as the reciprocity of the virtues.³ And reciprocity is an idealization – an instructive simplification, I’ll go on to argue (Section 3), but a simplification nonetheless. We know that nobody is virtuous in every way. (And of course, Aristotle did too.)⁴

No surprise, reciprocity has drawn a lot of attention, focused chiefly on the very idea of having all the virtues, that the virtues form a set.⁵ That exclusive focus risks missing a key insight – what I argue is the key insight – of this idealization, and that is the distinct significance of the interdependence of the virtues. That is why it is wisdom that makes them a set: It takes wisdom to find the “mean” of a virtue; but we never have to find just one mean at a time, and the virtues aren’t discrete. Like controlling dynamics at tempo, being both forthright and tactful in telling an uncomfortable truth is not to do two discrete things at the same time. Fusing both at once is part of what it is to do either of them well.⁶

The role of the idealization of reciprocity is to highlight that interdependence, and with it the distinctive challenges for wisdom and development that interdependence brings. We can begin with Aristotle’s version of reciprocity, as well as the interdependence of virtues it serves to highlight (Section 1), before looking at how interdependence creates challenges all its own for learning and development (Section 2). Then we’ll be in a position to see how the idealization of reciprocity, and perhaps idealization more generally, might help us better understand the nature of virtue (Section 3).

One more thing I must say up front: When I say that reciprocity is an idealization, I do not mean that it is an ideal for us to “approximate to.” In fact, one of my goals in this chapter is to deny exactly that (Section 3.1).

1 The Reciprocity of the Virtues

1.1 Aristotle on Reciprocity

The reciprocity of the virtues stems from a particular way of understanding the kinds of things that virtues are.⁷ For Aristotle, a virtue in the broadest sense is an attribute by which a living being is fit for the mode of life proper to its kind.⁸ In the strictest sense, a virtue is an attribute of beings that live by choosing – humans – that fits them for living well through choice.⁹ Or, as Aristotle puts it, virtue finds a “mean” of acting and feeling on the occasions one should, about the things one should, toward the people one should, for the purposes one should, and in the manner one should.¹⁰

Finding the mean takes wisdom. Virtues have good standing goals, like being forthright with the truth, but calling that goal good is a truism – like saying an archer’s goal is to hit the target – since as yet it is indeterminate.¹¹ Practical wisdom is for discerning in a particular case just what such a goal would actually amount to, turning a good but indeterminate goal into a determinate goal that is still good.¹²

Sometimes we speak loosely of virtues, though, and call some people forthright, even when “blunt” or “brusque” would be more accurate, just because they strike us as stereotypically “forthright.” Aristotle calls attributes like these “natural virtues,” and in this looser sense, even children and animals have their virtues.¹³ To say that virtue finds a mean, though, is to say that one chooses and acts so as to suit the situation at hand. Virtues of that sort – what Aristotle calls “genuine virtue” and “virtue in the strict (literally, chief) sense” – are intelligent, and not dispositions to stereotypical behavior.

But in that case, no intelligent virtue floats in a vacuum; forthrightness that isn’t tactful and benevolent isn’t the excellence of forthrightness, but just bluntness – it doesn’t look where it’s going, so to speak, but bungles and blusters its way through.¹⁴ In order for wisdom to find even one mean, it has to be ready to find the mean of other virtues too.¹⁵ And it is at this point that Aristotle draws the conclusion in the epigram:

So it is clear from what we have said that one cannot be good, in the strict sense, without wisdom, or wise without virtue of character. But then the argument that the virtues are separate from each other comes undone, which one might make on the grounds that the same person is not naturally suited for all the virtues and therefore will acquire one virtue before another. This is what happens with natural virtues, but not with those virtues by which one is said to be good without qualification, since as soon as there is wisdom, which is a single thing, there will be all the virtues.

(NE VI.13, 1144b30–1145a2)

Nowadays, we call this idealization the reciprocity of the virtues. An idealization is just what it is, since it simplifies away the limitations of our wisdom in the actual world, where often in finding the mean we can do no more than avoiding doing the worst,¹⁶ and where we might do better at finding the mean of generosity than the mean of courage, say, or at finding the mean of fairness than the mean of generosity.¹⁷ And again, Aristotle knows it. The reciprocity of the virtues is not a generalization of what virtuous people are like.

So then, what is the use of this idealization? From this point on, I have to set aside what Aristotle’s own use of it is, because I find it too hard to tell. Instead, I will argue that its best use is to highlight the distinct challenge of fusing interdependent tasks, like playing louder at tempo. First, though, I want to develop the idea that the virtues are interdependent in a way that’s worth highlighting, before taking a closer look at interdependence in Section 2.

1.2 The Mean, Reciprocity, and Interdependence

Beverly has chaired an oral exam for Allan, a graduate student in her department. He passed, but the examiners agree that while he is smart and hardworking, Allan will probably struggle with advanced work in the discipline and should consider leaving the program. How should Beverly get this message across to Allan?¹⁸

Think about why Beverly should need to get this message across in the first place: Allan deserves to know the truth, to make an informed decision about how to spend these valuable years of his life. So the manner in which she should tell Allan the news is one that will serve the purpose for which she should tell him. To tell the truth as one should and for the purpose one should are elements of the “mean” of forthrightness, and these elements are interdependent – they cannot be understood one by one, but only together – as are all the other elements of the mean. At the level of a single virtue, doing the things one should, at the time one should, regarding the person one should, for the purpose one should, and in the manner one should are a matter of fusing interdependent tasks, like playing louder at tempo.

We can take this thought further: Since the purpose for which Beverly should give Allan the news is to help Allan, the mean of forthrightness must also include giving the news in a constructive way. If Beverly gives Allan the news for the purpose she should, then she cannot just make sure the message sinks in, come what may; that would be thoughtless and cruel, not helpful. Nor can she just give Allan the news as she herself would want to hear it, which might be obtuse and unsympathetic; nor in an offhand way, which would be tactless and unfeeling; nor so as to minimize her own discomfort, which would be cowardly and self-indulgent. And so on. To tell the truths one should, to the persons one should, when one should, in the manner one should, and for the purpose one should – to find the mean of forthrightness – one must tell the truth in a way that is also thoughtful, tactful, benevolent, courageous, and temperate.¹⁹ And of course, these further goals are also indeterminate: Beverly won’t find the mean of tact by making the message so soft that it doesn’t sink in; and so on. Finding the mean of forthrightness and finding the mean of tact are not discrete tasks to be done merely simultaneously, but interdependent tasks to be fused. This point, of course, corresponds to the thesis that the virtues are reciprocal, which reflects the interdependence of virtue on a second level: To find even one mean, it is not enough to find just one mean.

The thesis that virtue finds a mean is a thesis about interdependence within a virtue, and the reciprocity of the virtues is a thesis about interdependence between virtues. Interdependence on the second level arises from the elements on the first level. Beverly cannot be forthright as she should be without also delivering the news kindly and courageously; she cannot deliver the news with the kindness or courage that she should without also being forthright.²⁰

For all these reasons, I am going to understand the reciprocity of the virtues as the thesis that to have any virtue is to have every virtue because the virtues are inter...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Permission
• Introduction
• 1 The Reciprocity of the Virtues
• 2 The Priority of Phronesis: How to Rescue Virtue Theory From Its Critics
• 3 Flirting With Skepticism About Practical Wisdom
• 4 Phronesis and Whole Trait Theory: An Integration
• 5 Differentiating the Skills of Practical Wisdom
• 6 Practical Wisdom and Generalization: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation on the Effects of Limited Information
• 7 The Developmental Science of Phronesis
• 8 Species-Typical Phronesis for a Living Planet
• List of Contributors
• Index