This is a test
- English
- PDF
- Available on iOS & Android
eBook - PDF
Self-Knowledge and Resentment
Book details
Book preview
Table of contents
Citations
About This Book
In Self-Knowledge and Resentment, Akeel Bilgrami argues that self-knowledge of our intentional states is special among all the knowledges we have because it is not an epistemological notion in the standard sense of that term, but instead is a fallout of the radically normative nature of thought and agency.Four themes or questions are brought together into an integrated philosophical position: What makes self-knowledge different from other forms of knowledge? What makes for freedom and agency in a deterministic universe? What makes intentional states of a subject irreducible to its physical and functional states? And what makes values irreducible to the states of nature as the natural sciences study them? This integration of themes into a single and systematic picture of thought, value, agency, and self-knowledge is essential to the book's aspiration and argument. Once this integrated position is fully in place, the book closes with a postscript on how one might fruitfully view the kind of self-knowledge that is pursued in psychoanalysis.
Frequently asked questions
At the moment all of our mobile-responsive ePub books are available to download via the app. Most of our PDFs are also available to download and we're working on making the final remaining ones downloadable now. Learn more here.
Both plans give you full access to the library and all of Perlego’s features. The only differences are the price and subscription period: With the annual plan you’ll save around 30% compared to 12 months on the monthly plan.
We are an online textbook subscription service, where you can get access to an entire online library for less than the price of a single book per month. With over 1 million books across 1000+ topics, we’ve got you covered! Learn more here.
Look out for the read-aloud symbol on your next book to see if you can listen to it. The read-aloud tool reads text aloud for you, highlighting the text as it is being read. You can pause it, speed it up and slow it down. Learn more here.
Yes, you can access Self-Knowledge and Resentment by Akeel Bilgrami in PDF and/or ePUB format, as well as other popular books in Philosophy & Mind & Body in Philosophy. We have over one million books available in our catalogue for you to explore.
Information
Topic
PhilosophySubtopic
Mind & Body in Philosophy
396
Index
Smith,
Peter
K.,
354n15
Socrates,
274
Spence,
Donald,
387n12
Spinoza,
Benedict
de:
and
Freud,
111,
306–307,
323,
333;
on
perspectival
duality,
251–255,
263,
353n11,
380–
381n33
Stanford,
P.
Kyle,
374n14
Stoecker,
Ralph,
371n3
Strachey,
Lytton,
63
Strawson,
P.
F.,
xvi;
on
freedom,
10,
46–
85,
93,
96,
107,
110,
112,
115,
120,
123,
158,
160,
173,
180,
184,
185,
193–197,
266–267,
274,
287,
291,
294,
330,
331,
332,
334,
335,
336,
337,
338,
339,
358n27,
358nn1,2,
359n10,
360n11,
361n12,
361–
362n13,
362n14,
371–372n7;
on
per-
sons,
44–45,
132,
138,
383n43,
387n8;
on
the
Cartesian
ego,
270–271
Strict
liability,
107,
110,
355,
375,
377–
378n25
Stroud,
Barry,
363n18
Sturgeon,
Nicholas,
374n10
Supervenience,
95,
166,
250–268,
271,
292,
296,
363n40.
See
also
Perspectival
duality,
its
implications
for
superveni-
ence
Testimony,
24–25,
106,
178,
224,
369n17
Theory-ladenness
of
observation,
11,
16–
17,
352n7
Theory
of
mind,
10–12
Third
person
point
of
view:
in
the
anti-
Cartesian
sense,
6;
in
the
passive
sense,
164,
190,
240,
252,
258,
268,
308,
323,
382n39.
See
also
Detach-
ment;
Oblomov
Thought.
See
Intentionality
Transitional
justice,
382n37
Transparency,
ix–xiv;
conditional
for,
xi,
31–32,
89,
91,
95,
118–122,
126,
133–134,
139,
145–146,
339,
364n2;
presumption
of,
30,
31–32,
43,
88,
91–
92,
118,
285,
291;
proviso
ensures
that
self-deception
is
not
a
threat
to,
91–92,
119,
121–122,
123,
133–134,
138–139,
146,
208,
364n2;
explana-
tion
of,
92–120;
why
explanation
is
not
a
causal-perceptual
account,
120–
139;
how
different
from
authority,
284–289,
364n2;
holds
of
dispositions
as
well
as
commitments,
286–287,
304–305.
See
also
Self-knowledge,
in-
tuitions
about
Unconscious
mental
states,
2,
34,
35,
96,
307,
315–330,
364n5,
386–387n8
Utilitarianism/utility,
64–66,
81,
109,
211,
216–217,
250,
359–360n11,
379n14
Values:
irreducibility
of,
ix,
xiv,
67,
82,
124,
208–240,
268,
342–346,
349n1,
363n19;
value-laden
facts
in
the
ex-
ternal
world,
161,
251,
254,
257–258,
268,
380n36;
as
perceivable,
161,
251,
254,
257–258,
268,
380n36;
hyper-objectivity
of,
220,
223,
255–
256,
346–347,
376n17,
388n2
Wallace,
J.,
359n10
Watson,
J.
B.,
7,
353n10
White,
Stephen,
xv,
374n12,
382n39
Williams,
Bernard:
on
realism,
169,
369n10;
on
‘deciding
to
believe’,
190,
193–194,
370n22;
on
internal
and
external
reasons,
341–347,
379n32,
387n1,
388n3
Winch,
Peter,
378n28
Wittgenstein,
Ludwig,
362,
363;
on
other
minds,
5–7,
19,
350n4,
351–
352n7,
352nn9–11,
367n5,
368n6;
not
a
behaviorist,
7;
on
self-
knowledge,
9;
on
quietism,
47;
on
publicness,
166–167,
170,
171,
174;
on
intentionality,
208–209,
211,
367n5;
on
therapy,
272;
on
Freud,
318
Wood,
Allen,
xvi,
172–173,
369n13
Woolf,
Leonard,
63
Wright,
Crispin,
xv;
on
self-knowledge,
28,
122,
134–135,
294–296,
355n16,
357n23,
366n15,
385n2;
on
response-
dependence,
294–296,
385n2
Table of contents
- Cover
- Title Page
- Copyright
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- One. What Makes Self-Knowledge Special?
- Two. The Conceptual Basis for Transparency I: A Normative Conception of Agency
- Three. The Conceptual Basis for Transparency II: Evaluation, Agency, and the Irrelevance of Cause
- Four. The Conceptual Basis for Authority I: Agency, Intentionality, and the First Person Point of View
- Five. The Conceptual Basis for Authority II: Intentionality, Causality, and the Duality of Perspectives
- Six. Conclusion: Philosophical Integrations
- Appendix I: When Self-Knowledge Is Not Special (with a Short Essay on Psychoanalysis
- Appendix II: Does the Debate about Internal versus External Reasons Rest on a Mistake?
- Notes
- Index