Interpreting Chinese Philosophy

A New Methodology

Jana S. Rošker

• Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781350199880
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Eastern Philosophy

Understanding Chinese philosophy requires knowledge of the referential framework prevailing in Chinese intellectual traditions. But Chinese philosophical texts are frequently approached through the lens of Western paradigms. Analysing the most common misconceptions surrounding Western Sinology, Jana Rošker alerts us to unseen dangers and introduces us to a new more effective way of reading Chinese philosophy. Acknowledging that different cultures produce different reference points, Rošker explains what happens when we use rational analysis, a major feature of the European intellectual tradition, to read Chinese philosophy. We rely on impossible comparisons, arrive at prejudiced assumptions and fail to arrive at the truth, the consequence of applying a different methodology to the process of perceiving, understanding and interpreting reality. Instead of transferring concepts and categories from Western sinology onto socio-cultural Chinese contexts, Rošker constructs a new methodology of reading, understanding and interpreting Chinese philosophy. She opens our eyes to the basic problems of Western paradigms, encourages intercultural approaches and allows us to master a more autochthonous understanding of Chinese philosophy.

1

Referential Framework

In his book The Methodological Problems of the Chinese Philosophy,¹ Feng Yaoming² assumes a certain grade of incommensurability between the methodological systems of the so-called Western and East Asian traditions (Feng 1989, 291–2). He asserts that this phenomenon is connected with the “frameworks of presumptions,”³ and is based on the non-transferability of concepts⁴ from one socio-cultural context into the other. All this leads of course logically to a certain grade of the impossibility of comparisons or incommensurability of different methodological systems or approaches. In my view, such epistemological difficulties cannot be reduced to differences in presumptions (or, in Gadamer’s language, to different prejudices), but are rooted in an even more complex and very dynamic network of continuously changing references, which is being applied as a living pattern of describing vibrant realities of human life. In the widest sense, this framework differs from one individual to another, but social groups and cultures of all kinds provide us with certain general coordinate systems with relatively stable structures of meanings, views, values, and imageries which stimulate our perceptions and feelings, and profoundly influence our language, thought, and behavior. Hence, the incommensurability Feng had in mind is rather a result of differences between discrete referential frameworks than merely between “frameworks of presumptions.”

Different cultures produce different referential frameworks, which are, on the other hand, linked to different methodologies applied in the process of perceiving, understanding, and interpreting reality. Here, I am specifically referring to frameworks of reference that define theories and other forms of abstractly ordered cognitive constructions within sciences and humanities. A referential framework in this sense can be defined as a relational structure of concepts, categories, terms, and ideas, as well as values, which are applied in the cognitive processing of the objects of comprehension. It also includes paradigms and perspectives that influence and define the comprehension and evaluation of particular semantic elements within this structure, as well as the structure as a whole.

These problems are, however, not limited only to theories or methods, which spring out of different cultural traditions; they are normally also occurring within every research, focused on objects within one single language or tradition. Actually, what we are here confronting is a universal problem, which has been discussed by a broad scope of Western theories (Kuhn, Quin, Lakatos, Feyerabend, etc.) Feng reminds us here of the well-known example of the relation between Newton’s and Einstein’s theories: because they represent different referential frameworks, the functions and semantic connotations of the same notions applied in them are also different. In his important book on the structure of scientific revolutions, Thomas Kuhn has explained these phenomena in the following way:⁵

Within the new paradigm, old terms, concepts and experimentals fall into new relationship one with the other. The inevitable result is what we must call, though the term is not quite right, a misunderstanding between the two competing schools. . . . Consider, for example, the man who called Copernicus mad because he proclaimed that the earth moved. They were not either just wrong or quite wrong. Part of what they meant by “earth” was a fixed position. Their earth, at least, could not move. Correspondingly, Copernicus’ innovation was not simply to move the earth. Rather, it was a whole new way of regarding the problems of physics and astronomy, one that necessarily changed the meaning of both “earth” and “motion.” (Kuhn 1996, 149)

Feng Yaoming tries to explain this difference through the example of two different types of pans that are used for frying food in Easter Asia and in Euro-American region respectively. He writes:

We all know, that Chinese people normally use pans with round bottom to fry their food, while people in western countries normally prefer pans with even bottom. Same kinds of food can be fried in both types of pans. But the same food, which has been fried in both types of pans, can stay the same in some of its qualities, and become remarkably different in some other qualities. In both kinds of pans we can fry, for example, eggs. This is a common property of both types. But the functions, possibilities and limitations of both pans used for frying the same eggs can also differ. These differences give also reasons for different consistence, color, form and taste of the eggs, being fried either in the pans with round or in those with even bottom. (Kuhn 1996, 149)⁶

According to Feng, different referential frames can—in exactly the same way—lead to different descriptions and interpretations of the same objective reality. Different possibilities and limitations of the concrete functionality of both types of pans express different features of different referential frames, their specific shortages or advantages.

This defining role of a referential framework does not only pertain to the meaning of particular notions, but also to their mutual relations. Hence, it is a comprehensive tool used to filter perceptions and to create meaning. In this intercultural philosophic debate, it is important to consider that different referential frames can lead to different descriptions and interpretations of the same objective reality. This is also the reason because of which transcultural research can sometimes produce misunderstandings between different cultures instead of eliminating or at least diminishing them. The greater the structural, semantic, and axiological diversities between two languages and cultures, the more likely the appearance of such misunderstandings. In the following, we shall attempt to perform a contrastive analysis of two different culturally conditioned frameworks of reference that are important for the present study. But before taking a closer look at these systems, we shall illuminate some of the external and more general issues that are also significantly influencing the “Western” understanding of Chinese philosophy in our academic world.

1.1 Problems of Transcultural Research

For Western researchers, the confrontation and understanding of the so-called non-Western cultural traditions is always linked to the problem of differences in language, tradition, history, and socialization processes. The interpretation of various aspects and elements of different cultures is namely always linked to the geographic, political, and economic positions of the interpreter as well as the subject of interpretation. A fundamental premise of the present study is that Western epistemology represents only one of many different models of human comprehension. Therefore, it follows the main methodological principles of transcultural research, taking into account the incommensurability of diversely (culturally) conditioned paradigms, or theoretical frameworks deriving from diversely formed discourses of different cultural and linguistic environments. In Western research on Chinese philosophy, the non-reflected use of a scientific analysis, which is a result of specific (Western) historical processes and the related, typical organizational structure of societies, often proves to be a dangerous and misleading mechanism. Concepts and categories can namely not simply be transferred from one sociocultural context into another.

In my view, a suitable methodology for studying Chinese philosophy—which is hitherto still often been interpreted based primarily on premises deriving from the traditional Western social sciences and humanities—is found not only in the recognition of a “different theoretical model,” but in the relativization of the value systems and perception structures. Here, it is important to clarify that such a relativization of values does not imply that all values are equally good and reasonable or sensible. In other words, it does not imply that elementary issues, which are not beneficiary for humanity, or even in contradiction with preserving the integration and dignity of human beings, can be pursued and implemented in the name of some “specific culturally conditioned values.” This catchphrase should be understood in a different context, namely as an instrument for preventing a one-dimensional understanding of values, or an absolute, general universalization of criteria for evaluating values by one single axiological discourse or one single axiological doctrine.

Since the dominant discourses in Western philosophical theory are based on the concept of truth, the awareness that there are very few objective, universally valid values is of utmost importance for those Western scholars who are concerned with Chinese philosophy. While the value systems that shape modern Western societies are based upon concepts like individualism and free will, in East Asian societies a strong sense of familism and belonging to a community was (and, to a certain extent, still is) prevalent. These concepts and identification patterns represent the foundations of different values systems, which should thus be seen as being relative.

If we want to consider all abovementioned differences, we need to gain insights into the conceptual structures and connections among the concrete historical, economic, political, and philosophical systems that underlie Chinese social reality, shaping and modifying the complex entity usually called Chinese culture. The awareness of these underlying rudiments—which also unavoidably influence the elementary theoretical approaches, methods, and conceptual frameworks—constitute a platform which might allow us a better understanding of Chinese philosophy at its most profound levels.

In this context we should clarify the nature of our approach to reading Chinese philosophy. Since this book is written mainly for Western readers, it automatically deals with its subject through the lens of cultural differences. When reading Chinese philosophy, readers born, educated, and socialized in Western languages and social environments are confronted with different epistemologies, different perspectives, perceptions, and patterns of knowledge acquisition and transmission. To a certain extent, and especially when it comes to ancient and traditional philosophies, this problem also affects today’s Chinese readers who live in a globalized world where the standards of conception and understanding have been adopted from Western cultures.

Therefore, our approach to Chinese philosophy is intercultural in the sense of interaction and engagement of several cultures. Interculturality is a specific type of interaction or communication between discourses, where differences in cultures play a role in the formation of meaning. Intercultural interactions therefore involve the process of transferring meanings between cultures (Ongun 2016). However, many contemporary scholars (e.g., Welsch 1999) criticize that the concept starts from a conception of cultures as “islands” or “spheres” and creates a separatist character of cultures. In today’s globalized world it is therefore important to understand that cultural factors have become transcultural. The transcultural understanding of cultures offers us a multi-perspective and inclusive approach rather than an exclusive and isolated approach (Ongun 2016). Transcultural philosophy is a long-standing discourse, but with constantly changing and evolving paradigms. For at least half a century it has been an important field of philosophical investigation. It began with Eduardo Valera’s construction of its methodological foundations (Valera 1972a; b) and has developed more or less continuously in the following decades (see, for example, Fredericks 1988; Nielsen 1995; Siegel 1999; Heubel 2011, 2014; Lee 2013; Dai 2020 and many others).

The suffix “trans-” in the term “transcultural” suggests transcending not only one’s borders, one’s limits, while enriching, updating oneself. It suggests also the possibility to step beyond the very fragmentation and separateness of various cultures and philosophies. (Silius 2020, 275)

Transcultural approaches therefore aim at overcoming the outdated, static, and immobile concept of culture. This does not mean, however, that there is no culture. It is still a real thing, like language, for example. Both are dynamic, historically grown, and constantly changing entities without fixed borders. Therefore, the ontological assumption underlying the concept of culture does not necessarily refer to a metaphysics of an abstract substantial being. In this book, the concept of culture is understood to be based on a metaphysics of relations. In this sense, I continue to use the two terms, that is, both intercultural and transcultural: although it is impossible to draw firm and constant boundaries between them because they form a complex and often overlapping web of meaning, I use the former when referring to concrete interactions between different cultures⁷ and their various elements, and the latter when referring to the goal and results of such interactions, that is, to see oneself in the other.

To enable such a reflection in our investigation of the methodological framework of Chinese philosophies and their formal, semantic, and conceptual foundations, we must first take a closer look at some of the external elements that also strongly influence our interpretation and the modes of our understanding. These external elements are linked to the historically developed structures of power relations within epistemology.

1.1.1 Orientalism and Reversed Orientalism

In the context of the present study, it should first be clarified that the terms “East” and “West,” which are commonly denoting vast multicultural areas in Asia and within the so-called Euro-American cultural tradition, are somewhat problematic, for they are based on generalized and essentialist views of areas covering multifaceted pallets of different historical, political, and cultural developments.⁸ Usually, such characterizations are based upon a superficial view, according to which developmental traits of different cultures are fixed and predetermined; such views completely (and arrogantly) disregard the importance of variations among particular social, ideational, and axiological developments within various cultures, belonging to the two umbrella categories.

Bearing this in mind, I will in this book—for the sake of practicability—nonetheless apply the terms “Western” and “Chinese”; in the framework of the present st...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-Title
• Series
• Title
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Prologue: Chinese Philosophy—Fact or Fiction?
• 1 Referential Framework
• 2 Basic Paradigms
• 3 Chinese Logic as a Basis of Classical Chinese Theory
• 4 Methods and Approaches
• Epilogue: Relation as the Core of Understanding
• Notes
• Glossary
• Sources and Literature
• Index
• Copyright