A History of Western Philosophy of Education in the Age of Enlightenment

Tal Gilead, Tal Gilead

• Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781350074507
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education Theory & Practice

This volume traces the history of Western philosophy of education through the Age of Enlightenment. The period between 1650 and 1850 was one of rapid intellectual development that revolutionized how education is viewed. Even the most progressive thinkers of the start of this period would have found the educational ideas expressed at its end odd, alien, and even dangerous. Shaped by broad intellectual movements, such as the Enlightenment, the counter-enlightenment and romanticism, as well as by the work of exceptional individuals including John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Hélvetius, Mary Wollstonecraft, Pestalozzi, Fröbel and Emerson, the educational philosophy of this period has laid the foundations of how we think of and conduct education today. About A History of Western Philosophy of Education: An essential resource for researchers, scholars, and students of education, this five-volume set that traces the development of philosophy of education through Western culture and history. Focusing on philosophers who have theorized education and its implementation, the series constitutes a fresh, dynamic, and developing view of educational philosophy. It expands our educational possibilities by reinvigorating philosophy's vibrant critical tradition, connecting old and new perspectives, and identifying the continuity of critique and reconstruction. It also includes a timeline showing major historical events, including educational initiatives and the publication of noteworthy philosophical works.

CHAPTER ONE

Locke on Education

LISA MCNULTY

John Locke (1632–1704) is known for his considerable contributions to epistemology and political philosophy as well as to the philosophy of education. The last of these does not initially seem the most significant. A reader who focused only on Locke’s most straightforwardly educational text might be forgiven for the belief that his contribution to the field was as modest as the title Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693) suggests. The original intention behind the text was indeed modest. Based on letters written by Locke to his friends Mr. and Mrs. Edward Clark, Some Thoughts primarily provides practical advice about the physical and moral care of a boy who will become a gentleman and includes a briefly outlined academic curriculum almost as an afterthought. Locke was reticent to publish the text publicly, doing so only after being encouraged by William Molyneux, and initially the text was published anonymously. Yet, by the early eighteenth century, the educational writings of John Locke were “practically biblical” (Pickering 1981: 9). Not only did Locke inspire later educationalists (including Rousseau), novelists, and even poets (despite Locke’s distaste for the art), but his ideas also became a mainstay of eighteenth-century children’s writers, who wore their Lockean credentials on their sleeves.

To understand fully the significance of Locke’s educational ideas and the reason for their influence, it is necessary to view Locke’s work as a whole. There is a note of caution to be introduced here. John W. and Jean S. Yolton (1989), in their introduction to Some Thoughts Concerning Education, are surely correct to warn readers against applying too systematic an interpretation to Locke’s works. By this, they mean that Locke does not deliberately produce a unified philosophical framework and then map his political, social, and educational works onto that framework. To illustrate this, it is helpful to compare Locke to Plato. Locke clearly regards education as a valuable tool to develop the necessary moral and intellectual capacities to engage in civil society, and in that respect his educational works are married to his political thought. However, Plato’s approach to education is woven into the very social structure of the Republic and exists to perpetuate it. Nothing of this kind can be said of Locke. Instead, Locke writes each of his works to address a particular question, be it epistemological, political, or moral (Yolton and Yolton 1989: 2). Nonetheless, even if a systematic interpretation goes too far, a systematic reading is very necessary, simply because philosophical projects that appear in one work continue into another.

This is particularly the case with Locke’s theory of learning, a project that crosses between the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (hereafter ECHU; 1689), Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693), and the Conduct of the Understanding (1706). The ECHU provides the epistemological foundations without which any interpretation of Some Thoughts would be woefully incomplete. Some Thoughts presents epistemology of ECHU in relation to the actual educational experiences of childhood. The Conduct continues the journey begun in Some Thoughts, applying the same theories of knowledge and learning to the experiences of an autodidactic adult.

It is worth noting, however, that Locke’s relatively modest conception of the limits of human knowledge is reflected in his educational works. We have very little in the way of intuitively or demonstratively certain knowledge, and this is reflected in the focus of Some Thoughts and the Conduct. In the case of the Conduct and the academic curriculum of Some Thoughts, the focus is upon improving our imperfect judgment as best we can. However, the bulk of Some Thoughts is concerned with the moral development of the child. The concept of a child as a blank slate, writ upon by experience, gives education a powerful role to play in the sort of person that child is going to be. When Locke says that “of all the men we meet with, nine parts of ten are what they are, good or evil, useful or not, by their education” (Some Thoughts §1), he is speaking of their moral character more than their intellectual capacities. Furthermore, even the development of intellectual capacities is often presented in moral terms. The more academic elements of Some Thoughts recommend inculcating the child with a love of truth and a love of learning by making the tasks enjoyable and avoiding negative associations with academic pursuits (i.e., the use of the rod). Therefore, while Locke’s contribution to the philosophy of education does draw on his epistemology, it is in large part a treatise on moral education broadly defined (see Figure 1.1).

FIGURE 1.1 Engraving of English philosopher John Locke (1632–1704), author of Essays Concerning Human Understanding, 1690. (Photo by Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

This chapter begins by presenting Locke’s case against innatism and his alternative empirical theory of the origins of our ideas. It moves on to explore his theory of learning, beginning with the epistemology of the ECHU and then tracing implications of this epistemology through the childhood educational experiences laid out in Some Thoughts and into the advice leveled at adults in the Conduct. It then turns to Lockean moral education with its emphasis on the child’s development of self-discipline even from the cradle. This is crucial, since children have no natural inclinations toward virtue or away from vice. Finally, the final section of the chapter explores Locke’s legacy, revealing the role he played in reshaping our conception of childhood and elevating the status of education as a means of forming moral and intellectual character.

REJECTION OF INNATISM

Before addressing either Locke’s theory of learning or his thoughts on moral education, however, it is necessary to consider the central philosophical argument that underlies them: Locke’s rejection of the doctrine of innate ideas. This is perhaps the single most important philosophical commitment of the ECHU and certainly is the epistemic claim with the most powerful hold over Locke’s educational theory. Originating at least as far back as Plato and repopularized in the seventeenth century by Descartes, innatism is the position that humans are born possessing innate knowledge. Candidates for “innate” status included certain mathematical or metaphysical ideas (such as “whatsoever is, is”), moral ideas, which Locke calls “practical principles,” and, notably, knowledge of God (Lowe 1995). The latter is to be expected, since God supposedly placed these ideas within us. Innatism is meant to explain the universal acceptance of certain ideas as true. It also allows us to rest easy in the certainty that these ideas in fact are true: God placed the ideas within our minds and would not deceive us (Aaron 1971).

Locke dedicates chapters 2–4 of the ECHU to discrediting innatism. His motivations for forming such a strong case against innatism were, in part, political. While there was a broad acceptance of the concept of innatism in seventeenth-century political society, there was no unity regarding what those innate ideas actually were. Effectively, any idea that one could not actually remember acquiring might be an innate idea. Given the special “undoubtable” status given to innate ideas, this is a situation ripe for exploitation. In a society that accepts the existence of innate ideas, political and religious authorities can easily claim the existence of innate knowledge of principles that would be useful for them to make universally accepted:

it was of no small advantage to those who affected to be Masters and Teachers, make this the Principle of Principles, That Principles must not be questioned … In which posture of Blind Credulity, they might be more easily governed by, and made useful to some sort of Men, who had the skill and office to principle and guide them. (ECHU 1.4 §24)

The doctrine of innate ideas therefore carries the potential to close off rational debate on the questions that those in authority can plausibly claim are known innately by everyone. In this way, it can stifle the discovery of truth and the development of political freedom. One powerful example of this is the divine right of kings. Suppose the populace at large were convinced that kings had a divinely ordained right to rule over them and, furthermore, were convinced that everyone innately knows this to be true. Such a populace may be unwilling to rebel against the king, however harshly he might rule over them. Considered in this light, it is easy to see how Locke’s political commitments would lead him to reject innatism. In Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, he argues that a system of government that fails to protect the people’s natural rights to life, liberty, and property should be met with revolution. Furthermore, Locke’s arguments in favor of religious tolerance are grounded in the possibility of reasonable disagreement about religious ideas, which is not compatible with those ideas being placed within us innately. His rejection of innatism, therefore, is also a defense of freedom of thought: an assertion that all ideas should be up for inquiry and debate.

Locke’s opponents (not directly named, in part because he is attacking what would have been a common opinion) defend innatism as the best available explanation for the presence of universal ideas. Locke’s initial response is to argue that God would not place principles directly in our minds if he has already granted us the ability to gain those ideas independently:

I imagine any one will easily grant, That it would be impertinent to suppose, the Ideas of Colours innate in a Creature, to whom God hath given Sight … and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several Truths, to the Impressions of Nature and innate Characters, when we may observe in our selves Faculties, fit to attain as easie and certain Knowledge of them, as if they were Originally imprinted on the Mind. (ECHU 1.2 §1)

Locke compares this situation to bridge-building. God gave us hands, the capacity to reason, and suitable building materials to work with; why then would he build bridges for us (ECHU 4 §12)? Surely God’s intent is that we attain independently all the achievements of which he has seen fit to make us capable. Therefore, the best explanation for our possessing any given idea is that we gained it through our own experience and reflection. The only reason to suppose that an idea is innate is that we could not have got at that idea in any other way except innately.

Part of Locke’s attack on innatism, then, is to turn the abductive approach on its head. It becomes reasonable to ask of the innatist to show that innatism is the only possible explanation for the possession of certain ideas. Yet Locke is aware that this is unlikely to work as a strategy, since while intellectual fairness might shift the burden of proof to Locke’s opponents, it is Locke himself who is defying the conventional opinion, and that in itself is enough to make his argument the one requiring the stronger defense (ECHU 2 §1).

Therefore, Locke lays out his arguments carefully and at length. The first is a response to the key defense of innatism: that it is the best explanation for the universality of certain ideas. Locke argues that there, in fact, is no such thing as universal ideas—commonly accepted ones, certainly, but not universal. He takes the example of the apparently innate maxim, “That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be” (ECHU 1.1 §4). It might be that among people who have reflected on the meaning of this phrase, we are unlikely to find disagreement. However, many people have not reflected on the meaning and therefore do not know it to be true. Locke maintains that children and “Ideots” (in his unfortunate phrasing) “have not the least Apprehension of Thought of them” (ECHU 2 §5). They do not understand the idea. In the case of children, they may have the potential to understand the idea, but that is not the same as understanding it. If our understanding of innate ideas is developmental, with individuals unable to understand them until a certain age, then these ideas become indistinguishable from ideas gained experientially.

One possible response might be that, while we possess innate ideas from birth, we do not understand or assent to them until we arrive at the age of reason. Locke regards this response as both “false and frivolous.” It is false because coming to understand these ideas is a gradual process that happens after a child attains reason. Anyone who spends time around children will be aware that they “get not those general Ideas, nor learn the Names that stand for them, til having for a good while exercised their Reason about familiar and more particular Ideas.” It is frivolous because, even if certain ideas were universally assented to by everyone who has reached the age of reason, this fact would not prove that those ideas were innate. They could be universal simply because children learn to abstract their various particular empirical experiences into general truths. Take the example of a child learning basic mathematics.

A Child knows not that Three and Four are equal to Seven, til he comes to be able to Count to Seven, and has got the Name and Idea of Equality … The truth of it appears to him, as soon as he has settled in his Mind the clear and distinct Ideas … And then, he knows the Truth of that Proposition, upon the same Grounds, and by the same means, that he knew before, that a Rod and Cherry are not the same thing. (ECHU 2 §17)

It is not necessary that children have innate ideas of number for them to come to the same conclusion about the mathematical relationship between three, four, and seven. It is only necessary that they are able to count. They will learn how to count with reference to particular physical objects, one with apples, another with stones, and so on. Once they have done so, they will perceive the difference between the numbers as easily as the difference between a rod and a cherry. In each case, knowledge of the difference is rooted in empirical experience, not in innate ideas.

If innatism is a questionable doctrine for “speculative principles,” the case is more problematic still for “practical principles” or moral beliefs. In contrast to truths such as “that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be” (ECHU 2 §4), where anyone who understands the proposition will assent to it, there is no universality in moral behavior. Even the most plausibly universal moral compulsion, which Locke identifies as “Parents, preserve your Children” (ECHU 1.3 §12) is so far from being a universal practice of human behavior that “it was a familiar, and uncondemned Practice amongst the Greeks and Romans to expose, without pity or remorse, their innocent Infants” (ECHU 1.3 §12). While it might be plausible to have a universal assent to a moral obligation that we nonetheless fail to meet in practice, the rejection of a principle at the societal level is best explained by there being no such thing as innate practical principles.

The implications of Locke’s rejection of innatism are profound, both for his theory of learning and for his ideas regarding moral education. His theory of learning must include an explanation, firstly, of where our ideas come from and, secondly, how we may determine which (if any) of our beliefs about the world count as “knowledge.” Locke must also offer an account of how we can become moral people, if this does not occur by possessing innate knowledge of moral truths. Both theory of learning and moral education are vital elements of his overall philosophy of education.

LOCKE’S THEORY OF LEARNING

Locke’s theory of learning is underpinned by his epistemology. Four elements are particularly influential: his theory of the origins of ide...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle Page
• Title Page
• Contents 
• List of Figures
• Series Introduction
• General Editors’ Acknowledgments
• Volume Editors’ Acknowledgments
• Timeline
• Introduction: Enlightenment and Education
• 1 Locke on Education
• 2 Rousseau’s Philosophy of Education
• 3 Educational Legacies of the French Enlightenment
• 4 German Educational Thought: Religion, Rationalism, Philanthropinism, and Bildung
• 5 Philosophies of Education “in Action”: Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, Johann Friedrich Herbart, and Friedrich Fröbel
• 6 Mary Wollstonecraft and Harriet Taylor Mill on Women, Education, and Gender Socialization
• 7 Teachings of Uncommon Schooling: American Transcendentalism and Education in Emerson, Thoreau, and Fuller
• Notes on Contributors
• Index
• Imprint