Introduction
The story of how the Safaviyya family metamorphosed from a mystical order into a ruling state and its subsequent rise to power in early modern Iran has been the subject of sustained interest among historians. Pro-Safavid chronicles and their followers, up until the twentieth century, depicted the Safaviyya order as a Shiâi movement from its inception in an attempt to portray Twelver Shiâi identity as the core of Iranian civilization(s) in the Islamic era. This attitude stands in contrast to mainstream modern scholarship,1 which defines the Shiâitization of the order as a sudden, pragmatic change in the mid-fifteenth century under the tenure of Sheykh Joneyd. In an attempt to repudiate the idea of a long history of Shiâism in Iran, both premodern anti-Safavid scholarship and its modern-day exponents, who have dominated the field since the 1930s, developed a new yet still problematic approach, claiming that the founder and the early leaders of the order were staunch Sunnis who rigorously adhered to the ShÄfiâi mazhab, or school of Islamic law, until Sheykh Joneyd (d. 1460), as the head of the order, abruptly converted to Shiâi Islam. Thus, prominent historians of the Aqqoyunlu, Ottoman and modern Turkish states have focused on specific parts of primary sources that justify their efforts to delegitimize the Shiâi ideology of the Safavids, as well as post-Safavid Iranian governments, by stressing the alleged fervent Sunni background of the Safaviyya family. Both of these arguments have repeatedly been articulated to serve later pro- and anti-Safavid political and/or religious agendas. For instance, from the pro-Safavid perspective, the consolidation of Shiâi power in greater Iran created a long history of Shiâism for the ruling family; by the same token, religious discrepancies between the earlier and later leaders of the Safaviyya family facilitated the attempts of anti-Safavid authors to discredit the increasing power of the Shiâi Safavids, as well as their successors in the region.2
While Sheykh Joneydâs reign signifies a turning point in the transformation of the order, it was certainly far from being so sharp or incontestable. An examination of pro- and anti-Safavid chronicles, as well as various European accounts, points to a religiously and culturally syncretistic milieu in northwestern Iran and eastern Anatolia during the fourteenth and much of the fifteenth centuries, where confessional identities at the public level were not as well defined as they would be in the following centuries.3 Depicting a clear bifurcation between âSunniâ and âShiâiâ during this period not only overlooks the period-specific sociopolitical and religious dynamics of the region but also reinforces an essentialist stance concerning the origins and rise of the Safaviyya order.4 First of all, one should mention that the strict âborderâ between Sunni and Shiâi Islam in the region was in fact a latter-day product of the conflict between the Ottomans and the Safavids. In contrast, the coexistence of various religious beliefs and a relative reciprocal tolerance was one of the main features of the late medieval/early modern era before and during the advent of the Safaviyya order and its transformation into a significant religious/political actor in the region. Therefore, claiming a deep-rooted Sunni background for the Safaviyya order is as dubious as attributing to it a long Shiâi past.
In other words, as opposed to these politically driven explanations and anachronistic distortions, the division between Sunni and Shiâi Islam in late medieval/early modern Iran and Anatolia was not definitive and binary though the schism ultimately became the defining characteristic of the religious atmosphere by the late fifteenth century. Apart from a few exceptions, Turkish and Iranian historians, most of whom are the products of a rigidly sectarian worldview, have placed the founders of the order within the borders of an uncompromising mazhab, either Sunni or Shiâi, while depicting a clear-cut transformation from a mystical order into a military movement that happened âovernightâ.5 However, the transformation of the Safaviyya order represented a gradual crystallization of a nonsectarian mystical order into a Shiâi political entity as a product of specific sociopolitical and religious dynamics. A new approach is, therefore, needed to connect this era to recent studies that emphasize continuities instead of ruptures in the religiosity(ies) of the late medieval/early modern Islamic period.6 Examining the origins of the Safaviyya order, as well as its leaders up until the sixteenth century, from this angle is crucial to understanding not only the contemporary sociopolitical and religious characteristics of the era and their influence on this process but also the spread of Safaviyya doctrine among neighboring Anatolians âlike wildfireâ in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
Sheykh Safi Al-Din (d. 1334). Establishment of the order, family lineage and religious background
The exact date of the establishment of the Safaviyya order and the circumstances surrounding its foundation are difficult to pinpoint due to the scarcity of written material from this period and the distorted border between the historical facts and the pietistic legends of later pro- and anti-Safavid ideologists. With the exception of Safvat al-SafÄ, written by Ebn BazzÄz (d. 1391/2), a devout follower of the order, around 1356/7, there are no surviving sources composed by either the sheykhs or the followers of the order during its infancy.7 Safavid chronicles authored during or after ShÄh EsmÄâilâs reign (1499â1524), collectively using Safvat al-SafÄ as their main reference point,8 praise Sheykh Safi, the eponymous founder of the order, as a respected Shiâi sayyed, a descendant of the Prophet Mohammad, through his daughter Fatima and her husband âAli b. TÄleb (d. 661), a cousin of Mohammad.9 This connection to the Prophetâs family, according to the chroniclers, was the only true sign of being the rightful ruler of the umma, or the Muslim community.10 Several court historians of the Safavid Empire even extended this genealogy to Adam, who, according to the creation myths of all Abrahamic religions, was the first man.11
The sayyedhood of the Safaviyya family, as well as its deep-rooted and narrowly defined Shiâi background, however, was a carefully tailored and monitored post facto fabrication of the original work of Ebn BazzÄz, which depicted a distinctly different picture regarding Sheykh Safi and his religious and genealogical attributes. A meticulous examination of the few available contemporary sources reveals that Sheykh Safi was a prime example of what John E. Woods calls âconfessional ambiguityâ.12 As a Sufi dervish with no clear (or conflicting) sectarian indications, he incorporated both Sunni and Shiâi tenets into his interpretation of Islam.
Sheykh Safiâs confessionally fluid and heterogeneous doctrine as the founder of the order quite likely attracted both Sunni and Shiâi sympathizers, as well as nonsectarian Sufis, to become his followers.13 The earlier versions of the Safvat al-SafÄ, as well as various other contemporary sources, describe the orderâs congregation as a ânonsectarianâ community rather than a shariâa-centered assembly defined by strict sectarian beliefs and values. For instance, HamadÄni, a self-claimed devotee of Sheykh Safi, does not use either Sunni or Shiâi descriptive words to explain his love and devotion to his master and the order.14 Interestingly, mainstream historians have interpreted HamadÄniâs self-consciously nonsectarian descriptions of Sheykh Safi and his order as indicative of the Sunni nature of the movement, rather than a sign of potential confessional plurality and/or of the dynamism of the era. In contrast, pro-Shiâi scholars have explained this explanation as a common Shiâi practice of the time, referred to as taqiyya, or religious dissimulation under the hostile rule.
Furthermore, the key Mongol policy of non-interference with the religious landscape also contributed to this picture where new religious authorities and centers rose to prominence in Iran. Contemporary sources, particularly biographical dictionaries, written in this new era, often mention the increased relevance of the Twelver Shiâi community in greater Syria, Iran, and Anatolia.15 For instance, the IlkhÄnid Soltan Mohammad KhodÄbanda, also known as Ăljeytu (d. 1316), established Twelver Shiâism as the state religion, albeit for a brief period, under the heavy influence of al-Motahhar al-Helli (d. 1324), a prominent late thirteenth- early fourteenth-century Twelver Shiâi scholar.16 M...